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Abstract
In contemporary  post-Yugoslav societies,  the  ongoing processes  of  nation-building
interact and intersect with the manifold challenges of post-socialist transition, post-
conflict  reconciliation,  democratisation  and  European  integration.  Amid  growing
uncertainty and insecurity, public intellectuals may play a key role in ‘making sense’
of these complexities, in particular by shaping shared representations of the nation and
by defining national identities in public discourse. Engaging in symbolic practices of
nation-building, however, also enables intellectuals to legitimise their own authority
and  social  status,  as  reflected  in  the  concept  of  national  intellectual  practice
elaborated by Suny and Kennedy (1999).
This  thesis  explores  the  multifaceted  power  dynamics  underlying  post-Yugoslav
intellectuals’ engagement  in nation-building from the perspective of the Discourse-
Historical  Approach to  critical  discourse studies  (Reisigl  & Wodak,  2009;  Wodak,
2011). Using an innovative methodological framework based on the original notion of
intellectual  spokespersonship for  the  nation (drawing on Pels,  2000),  I  examine  a
sample of published opinion pieces addressing three key recent events, i.e. Kosovo’s
declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008, Croatia’s accession into the EU in
2013, and the anti-government protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014. 
Detailed analysis of the patterns of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation that
are  distinctive  to  each case leads  to  the  following conclusions.  The Kosovo issue
seems to have led Serbian intellectuals to refurbish their attitude as ‘saviours of the
nation’,  similarly  to  what  had  happened  during  the  crisis  of  Yugoslavia.  Croatian
intellectuals, on the other hand, appear to be engaged in an effort to (re)define the role
and place of the Croatian nation within the volatile context of European integration.
Lastly, the ambivalent stance of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s intellectuals concerning the
potential  of  the  protest  movement  to  undermine  the status  quo suggests  that  their
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substantially the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.
3
Acknowledgements
Nobody knows how much this work means to me better than Tijana. I would like to
express  my  love  and  gratitude  to  her  for  easing  my  worries  and  embracing  my
playfulness, and for her unwavering support. I can only hope to be as generous and
supportive to her, particularly now that she is doing a PhD herself.
I will always be indebted to Ruth, my supervisor. She has been the best captain that
someone wanting to learn how to navigate critical discourse studies, and academic life
in general, could wish for.
I would also like to thank my parents, Maria Pia and Guido, for caring about my well-
being and providing me with the best possible environment to pursue my work and
fulfill my ambitions. When I was a child I asked my mother what an ‘intellectual’ was.
She replied, “That’s a difficult question! Well, I guess your dad is one.” This thesis is
perhaps the most compelling proof of how deeply that little talk shaped my future
path.
I feel thankful and lucky to have two sisters like Beatrice and Irene, and a brother like
Pietro. They have always been my best pals, and being around them always reminds
me of how simple and fun life can be.
My final thanks go to all my Lancaster friends, with whom I have shared the pleasure,
the difficulties and the thrill of this beautiful endeavour. 
This  work  was  supported  by  the  UK  Economic  and  Social  Research  Council
[ES/J500094/1], the European Commission Basileus IV project, by the Italian cultural







2. The post-Yugoslav context: intellectuals and nations in transition 18
2.1 Origins and crisis of the Yugoslav project 18
2.2 (Post-)Yugoslav transition: the unique trajectory of intellectuals from 
Yugoslavism to ethno-nationalism
25
2.2.1 Post-communist transition in Europe: intellectuals from a 
position of primacy to marginalisation
25
2.2.2 Uncovering the Yugoslav ‘paradox’ 28
2.3 Unfinished transition: contemporary challenges facing post-Yugoslav 
societies
34
2.3.1 Post-communist transition: an unfinished process 34
2.3.2 The post-conflict situation 37
2.3.3 Democratisation and European integration 39
2.3.4 Transition and its (social) discontents 43
3. Intellectuals and nation-building: towards an interdisciplinary critical 
discourse-analytical approach
46
3.1 The Discourse-Historical Approach: principles, methods and existing 
research on discourse and national identity
45
3.1.1 Critical discourse studies: key notions and principles 47
3.1.2 The Discourse-Historical Approach 49
3.1.3 The DHA and the study of the discursive construction of national
identities
52
3.2 Intellectuals and discourse: between estrangement and social 
spokespersonship 54
3.2.1 Pels’ theory of intellectual spokespersonship 59
5
3.3 Spokespersonship for the nation: intellectuals as nation-makers 61
3.3.1 The modern intellectual as a ‘nation-maker’ 61
3.3.2 Intellectuals and nation-building in the contemporary world 65
3.4 The representation of the nation in public discourse 69
3.4.1 The discursive representation of the nation: macro-topics 70
3.5 A methodological framework for the analysis of intellectual 
spokespersonship for the nation in discourse
76
3.5.1 First component: intellectual self-legitimation 78
3.5.2 Second component: intellectual spokespersonship for the nation 80
3.5.3 The third component: the representation of the nation in public 
discourse
82
4. Design of the research: data selection, case studies and creation of the 
sample
85
4.1 Conveying intellectual viewpoints: opinion pieces as a relevant genre 85
4.2 The case studies: Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 88
4.2.1 Serbia: the aftermath of the declaration of independence of 
Kosovo in 2008
89
4.2.2 Croatia’s accession into the European Union in 2013 89
4.2.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina: the 2014 anti-government protests 90
4.3 Creation of the data sample 91
4.3.1 Step 1: selection of newspapers and magazines 92
4.3.2 Step 2: data gathering (creation of the initial samples) 95
4.3.3 Step 3: downsizing of the Serbia sample through quantitative 
techniques
96
4.3.4 Step 4: creation of the final samples through downsizing based 
on thematic analysis
98
4.4 Overview of the final samples for the three case studies 99
4.4.1 The Serbia sample 99
4.4.2 The Croatia sample 101
4.4.3 The Bosnia and Herzegovina sample 104
6
5. Serbia: the aftermath of the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 
2008 108
5.1 Strategies of intellectual self-legitimation 108
5.1.1 Intellectual self-legitimation based on engagement and attitude 108
5.1.2 Intellectual self-legitimation based on knowledge and expertise 111
5.1.3 Intellectual self-legitimation based on status and membership 115
5.2 Strategies of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation 118
5.2.1 The intellectual as political guide for the nation 119
5.2.2 The intellectual as educator/emancipator of the nation 124
5.2.3 The intellectual as promoter/defender of the nation’s values and 
distinctive character
126
5.3 The discursive representation of Serbia as a nation 128
5.3.1 Serbian society as being in a chronic state of crisis 128
5.3.2 Serbia as a deeply divided society 130
5.3.3 Serbia as a weak and isolated player on the international stage 133
5.3.4 Serbia as a nation driven by its historical and mythical past 136
6. Croatia’s accession into the European Union in 2013 140
6.1 Strategies of intellectual self-legitimation 140
6.1.1 Intellectual self-legitimation based on engagement and attitude 140
6.1.2 Intellectual self-legitimation based on knowledge and expertise 143
6.2 Strategies of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation 149
6.2.1 The intellectual as political guide for the nation 150
6.2.2 The intellectual as promoter/defender of the nation’s values and 
distinctive character
155
6.2.3 The intellectual as educator/emancipator of the nation 159
6.3 The discursive representation of Croatia as a nation 161
6.3.1 The uniqueness and specificity of Croatian identity 162




6.3.3 The controversial narrative of Croatia’s ‘return to Europe’: a 
break away from the Yugoslav legacy and the Balkans, or rather a new
role in the region?
168
6.3.4 Croatia and the EU: from dependency to equal partnership 172
7. Bosnia and Herzegovina: the 2014 anti-government protests 175
7.1 Strategies of intellectual self-legitimation 175
7.1.1 Intellectual self-legitimation based on engagement and attitude 175
7.1.2 Intellectual self-legitimation based on knowledge and expertise 178
7.1.3 Intellectual self-legitimation based on status and membership 182
7.2 Strategies of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation 187
7.2.1 The intellectual as political guide for the nation 188
7.2.2 The intellectual as emancipator/educator of the nation 193
7.3 The discursive representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a nation 195
7.3.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a dysfunctional society facing an 
uncertain future
195
7.3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a political community dominated by 
corrupt elites
198
7.3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a nation marked by a deep divide 
between the people and the elites
200
7.3.4 The increasingly contested hegemony of the ethno-political 
paradigm
203
8. Patterns of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation in 
contemporary Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
208
8.1 Serbia’s intellectuals: still ‘saviours’ of a nation in crisis 208
8.2 Croatia’s intellectuals: redefining the nation’s role in an integrating 
Europe
215
8.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s intellectuals: seeking a pivotal role in the 
country’s ongoing social transformation
221
9. Conclusion 228
List of references 236
8
1. Introduction
There is a widespread belief that public intellectuals have lost much of their relevance
and credibility in the contemporary world, and this belief is often invoked to justify
attitudes  of  indifference,  mistrust  of,  or  even  hostility  towards  intellectuals  and
intellectual  pursuits.1 This  thesis,  however,  arises  from  the  opposite  conviction,
namely,  that  public  intellectuals  still  play  an  important  role  in  shaping  public
perceptions and forming public opinion; in short, that they actually do matter.
A striking illustration of the power of intellectuals to influence and transform society
is provided by the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia. The crisis of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began in the 1980s, when it  became clear that the
political system could no longer accommodate growing demands for greater national
autonomy,  and culminated  in the 1990s with a series of wars that  led to the final
dismemberment of the federation into new independent states. The entire process was
accompanied and sustained by intense intellectual activity. National themes and motifs
had  become  prevalent  in  literature,  theatre  and  art  already  in  the  1980s,  thus
contributing  significantly  to  the  emergence  (or  the  revival)  of  national  and ethnic
consciousness in the constituent republics. As the situation deteriorated, intellectuals,
academics and artists became ever more prone to nationalist and chauvinistic rhetoric,
often  fostering  resentment  and  hatred  among  the  various  ethnic  communities.
Eventually, many of them openly supported the war efforts of their country or ethnic
group,  and  some  were  even  ready  to  justify  the  mass  atrocities  and  war  crimes
committed in the name of ethnic nationalism.
The Yugoslav case is frequently cited as a key instance of how intellectual elites can
be instrumental in creating animosity and division within or among communities, thus
paving the way for future conflicts. “It started with the writers”, gravely notes Ramet
(2002: p. 153) about the war between Croatia and Serbia, which broke out in 1991
after  nationalistic  themes had dominated literary and theatrical  production on both
sides already for several years. Most accounts of the break-up of Yugoslavia focus
1 The thesis of the decline of the public intellectual has emerged with particular force in the USA, where
rampant  anti-intellectualism,  especially  directed  against  the  university,  has  been  explained  as  a
consequence of academic over-specialisation and professionalisation (Jacoby, 2000; Posner, 2001).
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specifically  on  the  responsibilities  of  national  academic  circles,  who  were  often
crucial in translating popular grievances into fully fledged nationalist programmes. In
this regard, the Memorandum issued by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in
1986, which provided the ideological underpinning of Serbia’s ‘national project’ and
the  rationale  for  its  subsequent  involvement  in  the  Yugoslav  wars  (see  §  2.1  for
details),  stands  as  a  dramatic  example  of  the  dangers  associated  with  the  public
exercise of intellectual authority.
As the example of Yugoslavia clearly suggests, one of the most important ways in
which intellectuals may affect and transform society is by promoting specific national
identities, and by mobilising the masses around the idea of the nation as a distinctive
cultural and political community. Indeed, a cornerstone of contemporary nationalism
studies is the notion that modern nations are the product of sustained material and
symbolic practices of nation-building, which require a specialised intellectual elite in
order  to  be  effectively  administered  and  enforced.  This  point  has  emerged  from
prominent studies conducted within modernist approaches, which have highlighted the
key role  of  the national  intelligentsia  in  the dissemination  of  a  homogeneous  and
standardised  high  culture  (Gellner,  1983),  the  creation  of  national  consciousness
through  the  promotion  of  a  shared  national  imagination  (Anderson,  1983),  the
invention of national rituals and traditions (Hobsbawm, 1983), as well as in investing
the nation with symbolic significance and emotional content (Smith, 1998).
Since the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the new post-Yugoslav countries have
undertaken  nation-building  projects  with  the  goal  of  establishing  themselves  as
sovereign nation-states each with its distinctive national culture and identity.2 Broadly
speaking, nation-building processes are ongoing in all nation-states around the globe,
because, as shown above, nationhood and national identity need to be continuously
reproduced and performed in order for the nation to remain the hegemonic point of
focus  of  social,  cultural  and  political  identification.  The  post-Yugoslav  context,
however,  has  some  peculiar  features  that  make  it  particularly  interesting  for  the
investigation of the complexities of nation-building in the contemporary world.  To
begin with, the new post-Yugoslav states have emerged from the violent disintegration
2 In  the specific  case of  Bosnia and Herzegovina,  nation-building projects  have been pursued to a
greater or lesser extent by each of the three major ethnic groups living in the country (see Chapter 2 for
details).
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of a larger polity, as a result of which their individual national identities are largely
built  upon the rejection of previous common forms of identification (i.e. Yugoslav
identity and its ideological baggage) as well as on the exclusion or suppression of
otherness (i.e. erstwhile enemy nations but also internal ‘traitors’). In this regard, most
post-Yugoslav  societies  (particularly  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Croatia,  Serbia  and
Kosovo) are still affected by the long-term impact of the atrocities and human rights
violations  committed  during the  wars,  which makes  post-conflict  reconciliation  an
extremely difficult  objective to achieve.  Secondly,  all  post-Yugoslav societies  have
undergone a process of radical political and economic transformation in the context of
the post-socialist transition to liberal democracy and the market economy. This has
generated widespread economic uncertainty and profound social insecurity, which in
turn have often fuelled inter-ethnic animosity and anti-minority attitudes among the
people. Thirdly, the prospect of membership of the European Union (EU) has served
as a powerful incentive for democratic reform and economic progress, but has also
raised  concerns  over  the  potential  loss  of  national  sovereignty and the  erosion  of
national identity involved in the process. Moreover, the uneven impact of the EU’s
transformative capacity across the region has further deepened existing discrepancies
among the post-Yugoslav countries, thus creating new sources of tension.
This  thesis  approaches  this  complex  scenario  from  a  critical  discourse-analytical
perspective. The purpose of the research is to shed light on how the symbolic practices
of  nation-building  interact  and  intersect  with  the  overarching  processes  of  social,
political and cultural transformation that characterise the post-Yugoslav societies. In
particular, the study seeks to illuminate the role that public intellectuals play in this
regard,  focusing  on  how  they  use  their  discursive  authority  to  ‘make  sense’ of
complex  social  realities  by  articulating  shared  representations  and  visions  of  the
nation and by promoting them in public discourse.
The reasons I have chosen to address this challenging topic from the perspective of
critical discourse studies (CDS) are manifold. The first, and the most profound, is that
the former Yugoslavia, to me, has always represented something of a language to be
deciphered.  This  was literally  the  case in  my childhood,  when I  would spend our
family holidays at the seaside in Yugoslavia asking my grandmother to teach me new
words in Croatian, her mother tongue. In my teenage years, my attention was drawn to
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the  virulent  war  situation,  which  I  strove  to  decipher  on  the  basis  of  television
coverage and occasional  first-hand news from our relatives  there.  As I  grew up, I
became eager to know more about  the history,  culture and social  dynamics  of the
‘new’ Yugoslavia; this motivated me to spend several years in Sarajevo (Bosnia and
Herzegovina) and Belgrade (Serbia), where I met people who nurtured my curiosity
and desire for further discovery, and made me fully aware of the tremendous influence
that  powerful  actors  (be  they  political,  military  or  religious  leaders  or,  indeed,
intellectuals and writers) can have on the lives of all the rest.
Secondly, I have chosen to work within the framework of critical discourse studies
because I assume that investigating the complex interplay of intellectual discourse and
nation-building practices (in the post-Yugoslav context as well as elsewhere) requires
not  only a focus on language as the medium of such practices,  but  also a critical
perspective on the specific power relations that underlie intellectuals’ involvement in
nation-building. In fact, as Suny and Kennedy (1999) have pointed out, the intellectual
elites entrusted to establish and operate the cultural infrastructure of the nation often
use this platform to legitimise their  own authority and entrench their  social  status.
Therefore, studying the ways in which intellectuals engage in discursive practices of
nation-building  necessarily  implies  a  critical  examination  of  how  intellectuals
strategically use their discursive power to assume specific roles vis-à-vis the nation,
and thus strengthen their own position in society, which is something critical discourse
analysis is well equipped to do.
Thirdly,  I believe that,  by introducing a specific  focus on intellectuals,  the present
study can make a significant contribution to the existing critical discourse-analytical
research on nationhood and national identities. In the scope of CDS, the exploration of
the  discursive  aspects  of  nationalism  and  national  identities  has  emerged  as  a
prominent  research  programme  within  the  Discourse-Historical  Approach  (DHA)
elaborated by Wodak and Reisigl (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; Wodak, 2011). Drawing on
the  seminal  research  into  the  discursive  construction  of  Austrian  national  identity
conducted by Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (2009), the DHA has been, and
continues  to  be,  used  to  investigate  how  national  identities  are  constructed,
perpetuated,  negotiated  and  transformed  through  discourse  in  a  wide  range  of
geographical, socio-political and communicative contexts (see § 3.1.3 for details). To
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date, however, no DHA-based studies have systematically examined the specific role
of public intellectuals as crucial agents in the discursive articulation of nation-building
projects. 
In order to bridge this  gap,  and, I hope,  pave the way for further research in this
direction, I elaborate an original interdisciplinary framework grounded in the DHA.
The  framework  integrates  existing  critical  discourse-analytical  approaches  to  the
discursive  construction  of  national  identity  (particularly  Wodak  et  al.,  2009)  with
concepts  and  insights  derived  both  from  recent  studies  of  nationalism  and  from
sociological  and  philosophical  accounts  of  the  role  of  intellectuals  in  society.
Specifically,  I propose to operationalise  the notion of intellectual spokespersonship
elaborated  by  Pels  (Pels,  2000)  into  a  heuristic  methodology  for  exploring  the
manifestations  of  intellectual  spokespersonship  for  the  nation  in  discourse.  The
methodology is based on the following three empirical research questions:
1. What  discursive  strategies  do  public  intellectuals  employ  to  position
themselves as such?
2. In  what  ways  do  they  discursively  construct  and  perform  the  role  of
spokespersons for their national communities?
3. How do they represent  the  nation  in  public  discourse,  i.e.  what  discursive
strategies do they use to construct, emphasise, perpetuate or transform specific
aspects of the nation?
Using  this  framework,  I  address  three  case  studies  that  relate  to  three  events  of
national importance that occurred in different post-Yugoslav countries. The events are
Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008, Croatia’s
accession into the EU on 1 July 2013, and the anti-government demonstrations that
took place  in  Bosnia  and Herzegovina  in  the  early  months  of  2014.  The analysis
focuses on opinion pieces (i.e. editorials,  columns and interviews) published in the
aftermath of each of these events in the national press of the relevant country. More
specifically, it considers a limited sample of opinion pieces (12 per case study) chosen
among those published in a selected set of daily newspapers and weekly magazines
within 30 days of the relevant event (in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the
first  day  of  the  protests).  Detailed  qualitative  analysis  of  the  36  opinion  pieces
included in the final sample is conducted in the original language on the basis of the
13
integrated  methodology  presented  above,  in  order  to  identify  i)  salient  discursive
strategies  of  intellectual  self-legitimation,  ii)  prominent  discursive  strategies  of
spokespersonship  for  the  nation,  and  iii)  recurrent  themes  in  the  discursive
representation of the nation.
Subsequently, the results obtained from the empirical analysis are brought together in
order to identify the relevant intersections between the discursive strategies pertaining
to  the  three  above-mentioned  levels  of  analysis  (I  refer  to  such  intersections  as
patterns of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation) that are distinctive to each of
the examined cases. The discussion of the findings is oriented towards answering the
following questions: 
A. What do these patterns reveal about the specific national contexts they refer
to? What is their significance in terms of intellectuals’ involvement in nation-
building practices and the underlying power relations? 
B. Are there any salient similarities or differences across the cases, and what can
be concluded from this in regard to the broader post-Yugoslav context?
C. What are the main conceptual and methodological implications for the critical
study of the relationship between intellectual activity and nation-building in
public discourse?
Besides extending knowledge of the specific social,  cultural and political processes
that shape contemporary post-Yugoslav societies, the insights provided by this kind of
analysis  may  have  broader  applications  across  multiple  disciplines  and  fields  of
research.  In  particular,  they  might  help  researchers  to  generate  new  hypotheses
regarding a number of crucial issues, including, but not limited to, the emergence of
re-nationalising  tendencies  both  in  Western  and  Eastern  Europe,  the  relationship
between nationalism, post-socialist transition and the process of European integration,
the role and significance of the nation in the face of local and global challenges (such
as migration, poverty, growing social inequalities and recurrent economic crises), as
well as the evolving place of public intellectuals in contemporary societies.
The  dissertation  consists  of  nine  chapters,  including  the  Introduction.  Chapter  2
introduces the reader to the complexities and diversities of the post-Yugoslav context,
focusing in particular on the changing position of public intellectuals in the process of
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dissolution of Yugoslavia and the emergence of independent nation-states in its place.
The  chapter  begins  with  a  historical  overview  of  the  Yugoslav  project  from  its
inception through its embodiment in socialist Yugoslavia, to its crisis in the 1980s and
final demise in the internecine wars of the 1990s. The subsequent discussion focuses
on  the  striking  ‘conversion’  from  Yugoslavism  to  ethno-nationalist  ideologies
undergone by large sectors of the Yugoslav intelligentsia in the late 1980s and early
1990s,  providing  an  in-depth  examination  of  the  motives,  interests  and  power
struggles underlying this  extraordinary shift.  Then, the chapter  highlights the main
challenges  facing  post-Yugoslav  societies  nowadays,  pointing  out  the  need  to
investigate how local nation-building practices are discursively shaped by, and in turn
shape,  the  overarching  processes  of  post-socialist  transformation,  post-conflict
reconciliation,  democratisation  and European integration,  and what  the role  is  that
public intellectuals play in this regard.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the elaboration of an interdisciplinary framework for the study
of intellectuals and nation-building in public discourse grounded in the DHA. After
elucidating  DHA principles,  notions  and  methods,  the  chapter  provides  a  brief
overview of relevant DHA-based research addressing the discursive construction of
national  and  supra-national  (particularly  European)  identities  from  a  variety  of
perspectives. Subsequently,  I review definitions of the ‘intellectual’ and accounts of
his or her role in society offered by prominent sociological theories, suggesting that
the specific nature of intellectual activity is best captured by the notion of intellectuals
as spokespersons (Pels, 2000). I then examine the relationship between intellectuals
and nation-building practices, both historically and in the contemporary world, and
formulate the concept of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation. Building on this
concept,  I  elaborate  an  interdisciplinary  discourse-analytical  approach  for
investigating the discursive strategies that intellectuals employ to legitimise their own
authority,  assume  various  roles  vis-à-vis  the  nation,  and  promote  certain
representations of the nation in public discourse.
The design of the study is laid out in Chapter 4. The chapter begins by explaining why
opinion pieces  published in  print  media  such as  newspapers  and magazines  are  a
relevant genre for the exploration of intellectual discourse in general. Then, I present
the rationale for using a case study approach, and provides a brief contextual overview
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of the three selected cases (see above). The second part of the chapter details the data
gathering process. It first describes the procedure employed for obtaining an initial
dataset that is representative of the broader media landscape of each country (Serbia,
Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Then, I elaborate how the initial dataset has
been downsized through keyword and thematic analysis into three narrow samples,
one for each case study, in such a way as to preserve representativeness. The chapter
concludes  by  providing  a  cursory  thematic  overview of  all  of  the  opinion  pieces
included in the three final samples.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the results of in-depth qualitative analysis of the opinion
pieces from each of the three case studies. Each chapter is divided into three sections:
the  first  examines  the  salient  discursive  strategies  that  the  authors  of  the  opinion
pieces employ to legitimise their own intellectual authority; the second explores the
roles that they assume and perform in relation to their national community; the third
identifies the most recurrent themes concerning the way in which the relevant nation
is discursively constructed and represented. I illustrate each strategy and theme with
examples taken from the sample texts, which are discussed in great detail.
In  Chapter  8,  I  synthesise  these  empirical  findings  in  order  to  identify  the  most
prominent patterns of intellectual spokespersonship within each of the case studies. I
then  discuss  the  significance  of  these  patterns  for  each  specific  national  context,
drawing both on the considerations about the post-Yugoslav context made in Chapter
2 and on the theoretical  insights  into the  social  role  of  intellectuals  expounded in
Chapter 3. On the basis of this discussion, I advance the following claims: firstly, the
issue of Kosovo’s independence appears to have led Serbian intellectuals to refurbish
their attitude as ‘saviours of the nation’, similarly to what had happened during the
Yugoslav  crisis  in  the  1980s  and  1990s;  secondly,  the  analysis  of  the  positions
assumed by Croatian intellectuals suggests that they are largely engaged in an effort to
(re)define  the  place,  role  and  identity  of  the  Croatian  nation  within  the  broader
European context, which is perceived both as offering great opportunities for national
progress and as posing significant  challenges to national  integrity and sovereignty;
thirdly,  the ambivalent stance of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s intellectuals concerning
the  potential  of  the  protest  movement  to  undermine  the  hegemony  of  the  ethno-
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political paradigm suggests that their involvement should be regarded as an attempt to
strengthen their own influence over the country’s public opinion. 
Finally, Chapter 9 provides a synthetic recapitulation of the main findings of the study,
and offers some conclusive answers to its guiding research questions. Specifically, I
put forth some general observations, based on a cross comparison of the results from
the three case studies, about the interplay of intellectual discourse and nation-building
practices in the contemporary post-Yugoslav context. Then, I offer some reflections on
the contribution that the present study can make to broader scholarly debates on the
relationship  between  national  and  supra-national  identities,  the  power  struggles
underlying intellectual activity, as well as the social role of public intellectuals in an
increasingly  globalised  world.  I  conclude  by  pointing  out  the  study’s  key
methodological implications for critical discourse studies and the DHA in particular,
and suggest directions for future research.
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2. The post-Yugoslav context: 
intellectuals and nations in transition
In order to understand, and hence be able to examine, the complex relationship that
exists  between  post-Yugoslav  intellectuals  and  their  national  communities,  some
knowledge of the historical and socio-political context is required. The questions that
shall guide our inquiry are the following: what were the key aspects of Yugoslavia as a
social, political and, especially, as a cultural project? What has been the impact and
legacy of the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, and of post-communist transition,
on  the  communities  involved?  What  are  the  main  challenges  that  post-Yugoslav
societies are facing nowadays, in the late 2000s and early 2010s, particularly in regard
to post-conflict reconciliation, democratisation and European integration? This chapter
seeks to address these points by focusing in particular on the role(s) of intellectuals in
influencing and shaping these developments, as well as on the changing meanings of
the nation as a form of political, social and cultural organisation.
2.1 Origins and crisis of the Yugoslav project
I  begin  this  inquiry  by  providing  a  brief  historical  overview  of  the  emergence,
evolution  and  eventual  crisis  of  the  Yugoslav  project,  which  found  its  fullest
expression in  the establishment  of the socialist  Yugoslavia  after the Second World
War.
The idea that the South-Slavic peoples could be peacefully brought together into a
single political entity based on a common culture and language has its roots in the
pan-South-Slavic  movement  (also  known  as  Yugoslavism),  which  emerged  in  the
early nineteenth century under the influence of German romanticism. The movement
was  led  by  prominent  writers,  academics  and other  intellectual  figures  who  were
committed to laying the foundation of a common Yugoslav (or South-Slavic) national
consciousness  by  standardising  the  vernaculars  spoken  across  the  region  and  by
creating a canon of shared literary references (Wachtel, 1998). Yugoslavism gained
momentum  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  when  the  collapse  of  the
Habsburg empire (1918) created the conditions for South-Slavic peoples to achieve
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political  unity  under  the  Kingdom of  Serbs,  Croats  and Slovenes,  which  in  1929
changed  its  name  to  Kingdom of  Yugoslavia.  However,  the  project  of  creating  a
Yugoslav  national  identity  through a  synthesis  of  all  local  cultural  traditions  soon
proved difficult to accomplish. As Wachtel (1998) notes, Serbia’s hegemony among
the member states of the new Kingdom led the other national  intellectual  elites to
retain control over cultural policy, which prevented the emergence of an overarching
Yugoslav culture.
The idea of Yugoslavism found a new embodiment in the socialist Yugoslavia (i.e. the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, hereinafter SFRY), which was established in
the aftermath of the Second World War. The impact of the war had been devastating:
the Kingdom had been conquered by Axis forces and partitioned between Germany,
Italy,  Hungary,  Bulgaria  and  client  regimes;  subsequently,  the  communist-led
Yugoslav Partisans had fought a liberation war against the occupying forces and their
puppet  regimes,  such as  the Independent  State  of  Croatia  and the Government  of
National Salvation in Serbia; simultaneously, a civil war had been waged between the
Partisans,  the  Serbian  royalist  Chetnik  movement,  Croatian  nationalist  Ustaše  and
Home Guard, as well as Slovene Home Guard troops. Tito and the leadership of the
victorious  Partisan  movement  soon realised  that  the  deep cleavages  of  a  war-torn
society could be overcome only by fostering a unitary (and ‘unproblematic’) Yugoslav
identity,  which would form the basis  for  creating  a common polity.  In  this  sense,
Yugoslavism was conceived and deployed as an instrument to promote pacification
and  solidarity  among  the  Yugoslav  peoples.  Initially,  anti-fascism  and  the
achievements of the partisan movement served as the founding mythology of the new
state, while controversial war memories were conveniently suppressed in what Judt
(2007) calls  a ‘collective amnesia’.  In fact,  since the recent war history of mutual
antagonisms and ethnically motivated killings was a potential source of social conflict,
the so-called ethno-national question was soon turned into a taboo. Subsequently, the
communist  elites  elaborated  a  fully-fledged  model  for  the  social  and  cultural
development of Yugoslav society, which hinged on the principle of brotherhood and
unity among the Yugoslav peoples. The newly established communist intelligentsia,
made  up  of  civil  servants,  intellectuals  and  educators,  had  the  duty  to  articulate,
promote and disseminate this model among the masses.
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Already in the late 1940s Yugoslavia had departed from communist internationalism,
led by the Soviet Union, by successfully taking a ‘national way to socialism’. This led
to  Tito’s  break  with  Stalin  in  1948,  which  led  to  Yugoslavia’s  isolation  from the
communist  mainstream.  As  a  result,  throughout  the  1950s  the  Yugoslav  regime
pursued its unique project of modernisation in a climate of ideological radicalisation:
pro-Stalinist dissent was fiercely repressed, while workers’ self-management, a form
of decision-making in the workplace that empowered workers to manage their own
labour, replaced the Partisan war as the new founding myth of the SFRY (Wachtel,
1998).  Once  again,  the  state  intelligentsia  was  mobilised,  and  called  upon  to
institutionalise and disseminate the new doctrine. As Malešević notes, 
Yugoslav intellectuals took an active part in the apparatuses and the policies of the
state. They shaped and articulated its laws, they led discussions on the direction of its
development  on the party boards and in the media,  they published literary works,
produced  paintings  and  sang  operas  praising  the  existing  order.  In  other  words,
Yugoslav intellectuals were indeed the ideological power-holders. (2001: p. 70)
The  rigidity  of  the  system,  however,  was  soon  to  be  undermined  by  growing
pluralisation,  especially  in  the  cultural  field.  Already  in  the  1960s,  arenas  for
intellectual debate emerged in which conflicting viewpoints could be expressed. The
appearance of dissenting voices and centrifugal forces, both within and outside the
communist system, generated a climate of disjunction of the intelligentsia from the
regime  (Privitera,  1998).  The  situation  was  further  aggravated  by  the  widespread
disillusionment  with  communism that  followed  the  Soviet  repression  of  the  1956
revolution in Hungary (Judt, 2007). In the 1960s, criticism towards the regime still
came predominantly from within the official ideology, in the sense that it was still
grounded (sometimes tendentiously) in the Marxist tradition.3 In the 1970s and 1980s,
however,  many  intellectuals  became  increasingly  disengaged  with  the  Yugoslav
regime, and began to voice the concerns of their respective national groups, often in
an  unprecedentedly  outspoken  manner.  It  became  clear  that  the  existing  political
arrangements  could  no  longer  accommodate  the  growing  tensions  between  the
3 The most prominent among these currents was the Praxis school, a Marxist humanist philosophical
movement that originated in Zagreb and Belgrade in the SFRY during the 1960s. Important  figures
among  the  school's  founders  include  Gajo  Petrović  and  Milan  Kangrga  of  Zagreb,  and  Mihailo
Marković of Belgrade.
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national and the supranational levels, and that Yugoslavism as a project of cultural
synthesis and homogenisation had clearly lost its impetus (Wachtel, 1998). 
In the absence of a shared political  vision,  the Yugoslav intellectual  elites  became
increasingly fragmented, aligning themselves into three distinct groups. The first was
the state intelligentsia, i.e. the keepers of the official doctrine, made up of ideologues
working on the communist party boards as well as in state-sponsored academic and
research  institutions.  The  second group included  left-wing (Marxist)  critics  of  the
regime, who disagreed with the official party line but nevertheless supported workers’
self-management and promoted anti-nationalism, albeit from different and sometimes
diverging viewpoints.  The third group included right-wing intellectuals,  who often
promoted  particularistic,  ethno-nationalist  agendas  that  were  incompatible  with
Yugoslavism  and  explicitly  opposed  to  any  form  of  supranational  centralisation
(Malešević, 2001). 
Until the mid-1980s, advocates of ethno-national viewpoints were much less effective
than left-wing critics in voicing their objections to the Yugoslav regime, for two main
reasons. The first was that the ‘ethno-national question’ was still taboo in communist
Yugoslavia,  so  that  any  activities  aimed  at  stirring  up  ethnic  consciousness  and
divisionism were met  with  repression:  books  and leaflets  published by right-wing
intellectuals were often confiscated or banned, and their authors put under house arrest
or even imprisoned. The second reason is that the conflicting and mutually exclusive
character  of  the  national  ideologies  that  they  propagated  prevented  them  from
constituting a unitary opposition front at the federal level (Malešević, 2001). In such a
climate it is not surprising that critical intellectuals were mostly inclined to address the
crisis  of  the  SFRY in  partnership  with  the  actors  of  the  regime  rather  than  in
opposition to them (Ramet, 2002). 
In the mid-1980s, however, the situation changed. The crisis of the Yugoslav paradigm
had become so deep that the communist party leaders were forced to acknowledge it
publicly.  As  a  consequence,  intellectual  dissent  became  harder  to  silence  or
marginalise.  As Bernik notes, “[f]or the intellectuals [...]  the crisis opened up new
opportunities,  particularly  because  of  the  declining  ability  of  the  increasingly
internally divided political elite to keep intellectual non-conformism under control”
(1999: p. 109). At this point, a steady process of defection was well  underway, as
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some nationalist intellectual circles were quietly working to reorganise, and possibly
overturn, the system (Ramet, 2002).
The first to speak out against the shortcomings of Yugoslavia’s federal political system
were Serbian historians: in 1986, a commission instituted by the Serbian Academy of
Sciences  and  Art  issued  a  Memorandum which  portrayed  the  Serbs  as  the  great
victims of communist rule and accused Croats and Albanians of pursuing genocidal
policies  against  them.  The  publication  of  this  document  by  prominent  Serbian
intellectuals triggered a response from their Slovenian counterparts, who in early 1987
drafted a similar document, i.e. the Contributions for a Slovenian National Programme
(also known as  Nova Revija). As Dević (1998) points out, the almost simultaneous
formulation of two opposing nationalist agendas by leading intellectuals marked the
final  rupture  between  the  Yugoslav  republics’ cultural  institutions,  indicating  the
culmination of parochial visions and interests vis-à-vis the problems of the Yugoslav
state. However, she maintains, “the content of these two agendas would have never
reached the level of popular discourse if political leaders in Serbia and Slovenia had
not pursued their own agendas of conflictual ethnic mobilization” (1998: p. 405). In
Serbia,  in  particular,  the  Memorandum set  the  direction  for  the  ethno-nationalist
doctrine of the ‘Greater Serbia’, i.e. the irredentist ideology aiming at creating a Serb
state  which  would  incorporate  all  regions  of  traditional  significance  to  Serbs
(including Serb-populated regions outside Serbia), which the Milošević regime later
pursued in  an attempt  to broaden Serbian control  over the disintegrating  Yugoslav
Federation.
These developments  in  Serbia  and Slovenia soon triggered  similar  attitudes  in the
other Yugoslav republics, particularly in Croatia. What ensued over the next few years
can best be described as a widespread national revival across all of the constituent
republics, which encompassed many spheres of public life. Almost everywhere, local
thinkers, academics and artists undertook to ‘re-discover’ and promote their particular
national  literature,  history  and  traditions,  stressing  their  unique  and  distinctive
character  and  emphasising  differences  from other  nations  or  ethnic  groups.  Some
intellectuals  were  even  ready  to  translate  these  efforts  into  politics  by  forming
alternative,  nationally-based political  parties, especially in the course of 1988-1989
(Ramet, 2002). These tendencies fostered the emergence of shared narratives, values
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and social aspirations that were centred around the idea of autonomous and sovereign
national communities, and therefore in open contrast with the declining all-Yugoslav
ideology. By the end of the 1980s, Yugoslavia had become so culturally fragmented
that  the  idea  of  Yugoslavism could  hardly  inspire  any  viable  unitary  political  or
cultural initiative.
In this light, it is reasonable to assume that the demise of the Yugoslav project (and of
its  derivative and reformed versions) was certainly among the factors that laid the
ground for the outbreak of the Yugoslav inter-communal wars in the 1990s. Of course,
scholars  have  advanced  a  variety  of  hypotheses  to  account  for  the  violent
disintegration of Yugoslavia, focusing on factors such as the system’s loss of political
legitimacy (especially after Tito’s death in 1980), the inability of the ethnically-based
federal  system to accommodate  growing demands  for  autonomy,  severe  economic
deterioration,  as  well  as  concrete  decisions  taken  by  specific  political  leaders.4
However, as Wachtel (1998) contends, it is precisely the earlier disengagement of both
political and cultural elites from the project of building a unitary Yugoslav state that
created the conditions for the aforementioned predicaments to escalate into a series of
armed conflicts.
Between 1989 and 1992, the entire Yugoslav political landscape underwent dramatic
developments and ruptures, which undermined the stability of the federal institutions
and led the constituent republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Macedonia  to  unilaterally  declare  independence  from  the  Yugoslav  Federation.
However,  not  only  was  this  process  of  partition  fiercely  opposed  by  the  rump
Yugoslavia – now under the hegemony of Milošević’s Serbia – but it also exacerbated
issues of ethnic minorities (chiefly Serbs living in central  parts of the country and
Albanians living in the South-East) which could no longer be managed at the federal
level. These animosities gave rise to a series of wars that affected most of the former
Yugoslav republics over a period of ten years. After an initial short confrontation with
Slovenia,  Serbian forces moved on to a larger  and more deadly war with Croatia,
which lasted from 1991 until 1995. Another war erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in
1992, as Bosnian Serbs (one of the three main ethnic groups living in the country,
along  with  Bosnian  Muslims  and  Bosnian  Croats)  rejected  independence  from
4 For a comprehensive and critical overview of this debate see Ramet, 2005.
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Yugoslavia and mobilised their forces in order to secure Serbian territory inside the
country. This led to a four-year war between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat entities (led and supplied by
Serbia and Croatia, respectively), which was accompanied by the ethnic cleansing of
the  Muslim  and  Croat  population.  According  to  estimates  from  the  International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the total number of casualties in
the Bosnian War is around 100,000. In 1998, after Kosovo’s autonomy was quashed
by the Serbian government, Kosovar Albanians started an insurgency that escalated
into armed clashes with the Serbian army,  and which was ended through a NATO
military intervention against Serbia in 1999 (see § 4.2.1 for details). Lastly, in 2001
the Republic of Macedonia experienced a short conflict between its security forces
and  the  National  Liberation  Army,  which  was  seeking  greater  autonomy  for  the
Albanian minority living in the country. Overall, the Yugoslav wars claimed several
hundred  thousand  victims,  produced  masses  of  refugees  and  internally  displaced
people, and resulted in the complete dismemberment of the Yugoslav Federation (the
dramatic social consequences of the wars are dealt with in § 2.3.2).
As seen above, intellectuals played a decisive role in the prelude to the Yugoslav wars,
as  they  shaped  the  various  emerging  national  consciousnesses  and  often  fostered
resentment against other national or ethnic communities. Many continued to be vocal
also during the conflict,  using the media as a platform to propagate and legitimise
opposite  ideological  and  political  views.  Television  and  the  press  had  already
undergone a process of fragmentation along national lines before the beginning of the
hostilities, and had thus played a crucial role in ‘forging the war’ (Thompson, 1999).
With war and violence flaring across the Yugoslav space, the media were consciously
used by political leaders to gain support for their aggressive policies and stir up the
masses  against  the  enemy  (Thompson,  1999).  Several  intellectuals  actively
participated in this kind of propaganda, by disseminating hatred and fear in support of
the  national  cause  (Malešević,  2001).  According  to  Huttenbach  (2004),  their
engagement was often cynical and opportunistic, as most of them tended to instigate
inter-ethnic hostility and would oppose the violence only when their  own national
group  succumbed.  In  such  a  climate  of  intense  popular  mobilisation,  of  course,
dissenting voices had little or no resonance, as they were largely marginalised or even
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suppressed by the establishment; as a result, several nonconforming intellectuals were
forced to relinquish their posts, and many decided to emigrate abroad.
2.2 (Post-)Yugoslav transition: the unique trajectory of 
intellectuals from Yugoslavism to ethno-nationalism
As  shown  above,  the  aggravating  crisis  of  the  Yugoslav  project  and  the  rise  of
nationalist rhetoric was accompanied by intense negotiation over intellectual identity
that  culminated in the late  1980s and the 1990s, when most  intellectuals  who had
previously been loyal or at least unopposed to the Yugoslav regime widely embraced
ethno-nationalist  standpoints,  in  an  apparent  mass  ideological  conversion.  The
proliferation  of  anti-Yugoslav  ‘dissidents’ in  the  new post-Yugoslav  states  is  even
more striking if compared to what happened elsewhere across the Eastern bloc, where
dissidents,  who  were  rather  prominent  and  vocal  under  communist  rule,  were
relegated to low status positions in the course of transition. Hence, I begin this section
with  a  brief  overview  of  the  marginalisation  of  intellectuals  during  the  post-
communist  transition  in  Europe;  then,  I  turn to  the  post-Yugoslav  case  to  discuss
possible  explanations  for  the  Yugoslav  intellectuals’  unique  trajectory  from
Yugoslavism to ethno-nationalism.
2.2.1 Post-communist transition in Europe: intellectuals from a position of primacy 
to marginalisation
The transition from communism to post-communism in Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe is often described as a revolutionary process, because the changes undergone
by the  societies  involved  have  been radical,  far-reaching  and often  of  a  systemic
nature.  As  in  the  case  of  Yugoslavia  (see  above),  the  impetus  for  the  great
transformation, as Ramet (1995a) dubbed it, came from the inability of the communist
regimes to cope with the gradual repluralisation of society that occurred in the 1970s
and 1980s, when various social currents alternative to the official ideology began to
gain public support and recognition. Over time, due to widespread dissatisfaction with
the  status  quo,  various  social  sectors  such  as  trade  unions,  civil  and  religious
organisations, human rights defenders, as well as individual writers and artists came to
identify themselves as a single group, i.e.  the people, struggling against a common
enemy, i.e. the communist nomenklatura. This antagonism culminated in the popular
upsurges of 1989, which caused the fall of all European communist regimes and their
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replacement  with  freely  elected  governments.  Although  they  have  often  been
described as a conscious yearning for freedom and democracy, these uprisings were
rather a reaction against communist oppression, with no clear-cut ideas regarding the
positive content of the future post-communist political systems (Ramet, 1995a). 
Indeed, everywhere (with the exception of Serbia) the transition process unfolded as a
categorical rejection of communist ideals and an enthusiastic appropriation of Western
European models and standards. In the political sphere, state communism was rapidly
dismantled  and  replaced  with  multiparty  and  parliamentary  liberal-democratic
systems,  aimed  to  guarantee  the  enforcement  and  protection  of  human  rights,
particularly civil and political freedoms. The planned economy was converted into a
free-market capitalist  economy,  through the privatisation of state-owned enterprises
and  the  liberalisation  of  the  market.  Furthermore,  Eastern  European  countries
embarked  on  a  gradual  but  steady  process  of  integration  with  Western  European
supranational institutions such as the European Communities (nowadays the European
Union,  EU) and NATO.  Lastly,  for  multi-ethnic  and federal  countries  such as  the
Soviet Union, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the transition also led to the
redefinition of borders on the basis of the principle of national self-determination.
In conclusion, the transition to post-communism came to coincide to a great extent
with a relentless and pervasive process of Europeanisation, which was (and still is)
largely perceived as the guarantee of long-term prosperity and stability (Galasińska &
Krzyżanowski, 2009). As Judt points out, Europe was not regarded as an ideological
alternative, but rather as the political norm; the overarching goal of transition, in fact,
was  not  to  replace  communism  with  North-American  capitalism,  but  to  join  the
ongoing European project of political, economic and cultural integration. This is why
the transition was commonly framed in public and political discourse as a  return to
Europe (see Judt, 2007: p. 630).
A crucial role in the discursive articulation of transition as a much yearned-for return
to Europe was played by the dissident intellectuals of pre-1989, who were also among
the  ones  who  had  fought  the  communist  regimes  most  strenuously  and  led  the
movements that brought about their eventual collapse (Bozóki, 1999). It is for this
reason that the historian Garton Ash, among others, has defined the 1989 revolutions
as revolutions of the intellectuals (1995). However, in spite of their central role, most
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dissidents were unable to capitalise on their reputation and become prominent political
or public figures in the post-1989 societies.5 
The  reasons  for  their  marginalisation  are  manifold.  Most  importantly,  intellectuals
were  largely  unprepared  to  cope  with  the  messy  political  and  technical  issues
connected with building viable social, political and economic institutions. As Ramet
(1995a)  notes,  their  previous  elaboration  and  promotion  of  freedom,  political
pluralism,  human rights,  free market  economy and national  self-determination was
scarcely focused on how these values could be concretely implemented and protected.
In  consequence,  it  was  the  technocrats  from the  old  regimes,  i.e.  the  communist
nomenklatura and the bureaucrats, who eventually led and managed the processes of
transition (Judt, 2007). In addition to this, several intellectuals and opinion-leaders
were  forcibly  ousted  from  the  political  arena  by  post-communist  ‘guardians  of
nostalgia’ and rising nationalist forces (Bauman, 1992). According to a more skeptical
viewpoint, many dissenters were taken aback because they did not really believe that
change was possible, their criticism of communist power being but a sort of gratuitous
and self-complacent game (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1999). Finally,  it has also been argued
that the advent of mass democracy somehow marked the end of the public intellectual
as such, since the young generation was ready to turn away from traditional sources of
authority and guidance, in the East and the West alike (Judt, 2007; Körösényi, 1999).
As  discussed  above,  the  trajectory  followed  by  Yugoslav  intellectuals  during  the
transition  differs  quite substantially  from the rest  of the post-communist  world.  In
broad terms, while in the countries of the Eastern bloc anti-regime intellectuals went
from prominence to marginalisation, in Yugoslavia they went from marginalisation to
prominence. This point has been made with great force by Malešević:
When  observing  Yugoslav  intellectuals  before  and  after  communism  one  can
immediately notice a striking paradox – whereas the rest of the communist world had
well-known and prominent dissidents, communist Yugoslavia had very few. Whereas
with the disintegration of the  communist  order,  dissidents  have either  disappeared
from countries  across  Eastern  Europe  by becoming  professional  politicians  or  by
returning to their previous academic or artistic professions, the new post-Yugoslav
states have witnessed the proliferation of their first proper dissidents. (2001: p. 55)
5 With the notable exception of Václav Havel, who became the first democratically elected president of
Czechoslovakia.
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The  Yugoslav  ‘paradox’,  as  Malešević  calls  it,  that  is  the  striking  ideological
conversion from Yugoslavism to ethno-nationalism undergone by large sectors of the
Yugoslav  intelligentsia  since  the  mid-1980s,  has  attracted  the  attention  of  many
scholars, who have offered various explanations for it. In the following, I will discuss
three  such  accounts,  in  an  attempt  to  shed  some  light  on  different  aspects  and
contradictions of this rather complex scenario.
2.2.2 Uncovering the Yugoslav ‘paradox’
The first account has been elaborated by Malešević himself in an attempt to answer
the two key questions: “why did Yugoslavia not have proper dissidents and why has
the  great  majority  of  Yugoslav  Marxist  intellectuals  become  so  suddenly  ethno-
nationalist?” (2001: p. 56). By bringing together Gramsci’s and Bauman’s theories of
the intellectual (which I discuss in greater detail in § 3.2), he characterises the abrupt
ideological reversal of the Yugoslav intelligentsia as a transition from the position of
organic legislators to that of organicistic interpreters, which was largely determined
by its members’ social origins.
When it was founded in the 1940s, the Yugoslav state had virtually no intellectual
class as such. On the one hand, the majority of the population consisted of illiterate or
semi-illiterate  peasants,  and  academic  life  was  confined  to  the  three  major  cities,
Belgrade,  Zagreb and Ljubljana. On the other, the triumph of communism had led
most non-communist intellectuals to relinquish their posts or even migrate to the West.
Hence,  the  only  active  intellectuals  were  the  few  leftist  thinkers  who  had  been
integrated into the apparatuses of the new state, thus constituting an embryonic state
intelligentsia.  In the next three decades, however,  the Yugoslav elites engaged in a
large-scale modernisation programme,  promoting industrialisation,  urbanisation and
the creation of an extensive academic and cultural infrastructure. These advancements,
coupled  with  the  growing  cultural  pluralisation  described  by  Wachtel  (see  §  2.1
above), fostered the emergence of a very lively intellectual scene. As Malešević notes,
In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s Yugoslav society was characterized by a fairly rich
academic,  literary  and  political  life.  Cultural  and  informational  production  was
impressive.  Although  controlled  by  the  party-state  apparatus,  the  newspapers,
journals,  radio  and TV stations  could  not  but  facilitate  ever-increasing  and lively
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discussions and conflicting viewpoints of the newly emerging intelligentsia. (2001: p.
63)
As already discussed above (§ 2.1), the Yugoslav intellectual landscape came to be
structured around three distinct groups: the state intelligentsia, the left-wing Marxist
critics (such as the Praxis School), and the right-wing opponents. 
In Malešević’s view, all three groups were made up of intellectuals who were organic
in the Gramscian sense and legislators in Bauman’s terms. They were all organic – and
not  traditional  –  intellectuals  because  they  did  not  perceive  themselves  as  being
autonomous and independent from the dominant social class, in this case the Yugoslav
communist establishment. In fact, they were either the pure product of its policies (the
state  intelligentsia)  or  their  ‘unintended  surplus’ (left-wing  critics  and  right-wing
opponents).  Furthermore,  all  three groups were legislators  – and not interpreters  –
because each of them held a legislative worldview in its own right: while the Marxist-
Leninist  intelligentsia  and the  left-wing critics  saw themselves  as  the  holders  and
administrators of the ‘true’ communist doctrine, the right-wing thinkers (usually) acted
as  defenders  of  the  ethnic  principle,  pursuing  ever  greater  autonomy  for  their
respective national communities. This characterisation reflects the fact that Titoism,
i.e. the brand of socialism promoted by Tito’s regime after Yugoslavia was expelled
from the Cominform in 1948, was far more liberal as compared to the Eastern bloc
(although it did not avoid censorship and political persecution, which were achieved
more  through  implicit  threat  than  through  direct  intervention).  Hence,  unlike
elsewhere  across  the  Eastern  bloc,  the  Yugoslav  intellectuals  were  not  radically
opposed  to  the  holders  of  power,  and  were  also  usually  allowed  to  voice  their
opinions, so their status and authority were a function of their relationship with the
regime and not of their opposition to it. 
This insight is fundamental to understanding the reasons behind the dramatic shift that
occurred  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  when  the  great  majority  of  the
intelligentsia  rejected  socialist  Yugoslavism to  become  committed  nationalists.  As
discussed  above,  the  crisis  of  Yugoslavia  had  a  profound  impact  on  the  very
conditions of existence of its communist intellectuals. On the one hand, their common
state had suddenly begun to collapse under the pressure of separatist forces. On the
other, the fall of communism in the Eastern bloc in 1989 had generated widespread
29
disillusionment  with  Marxism-Leninism  in  general.  As  a  result,  the  Yugoslav
intelligentsia lost much of its political power, and also its hegemonic position in the
social and cultural spheres. In such circumstances, argues Malešević, most Yugoslav
intellectuals had no better alternative than to commit themselves to their respective
ethnic and national  communities  in order to recapture some form of authority and
maintain their social privileges.  In Malešević’s terms, from organic legislators they
became organicistic interpreters.
Organicism is here understood as the worldview that conceives of the nation as an
organic body in which individual lives are subordinated to the collective, in the same
way as organs exist only to maintain and serve the whole organism (see § 3.3 and 3.4
about  this  conception  of  the  nation).  The  shift  from  organic  to  organicistic
worldviews,  Malešević  continues,  was  certainly  facilitated  by  the  dominance  in
Yugoslav society of the traditional and collective values associated with patriarchy,
authoritarianism and rural life, which many intellectuals readily drew upon to glorify
their own national communities. The shift from legislators to interpreters, on the other
hand, was triggered by the fact that Marxist-Leninist doctrine had lost its appeal in the
new world of post-communism. This forced intellectuals to give up their pretension to
articulate  universalist  perspectives,  and  led  them  to  redefine  themselves  as
representatives of the particular prerogatives claimed by their own communities. Their
commitment to a single community and a single tradition, he concludes, soon became
absolute and exclusive, thus paving the way for the affirmation of ethno-nationalist
ideologies.
Another  insightful  account  of  the  ideological  reversal  undergone  by the  Yugoslav
intelligentsia is Dragović-Soso’s comprehensive study (2002) of the specific trajectory
followed by Serbia’s intellectual opposition. The purpose of her inquiry is “to explain
why nationalist concerns came to overshadow all other aspects of [the opposition’s]
political agenda, leading many former dissidents to betray the humanist principles that
were  initially  at  the  core  of  their  activism”  (2002:  p.  2).  The  Serbian  case  is
particularly salient because, as she explains, 
[t]he Belgrade critical intelligentsia’s choice of ‘nation’ over ‘democracy’ [...] shows
how individuals whose self-defined social role is based on their defence of universal
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principles can be seduced by particularist – in this case, nationalist – ideology. (2002:
p. 2)
Through detailed analysis of the intellectual debates that took place in Serbia from the
1960s to the 1980s, Dragović-Soso concludes that many thinkers did not start off as
nationalists,  but  came  to  that  position  due  to  structural  and  contingent  reasons,
primarily related to the political, social and economic problems facing Serbs in the
1980s.
As a matter of fact, during the 1960s and 1970s the Serbian critical intelligentsia had
firmly, if unsuccessfully, defended political pluralism and civil rights. After the death
of Tito in 1980, Dragović-Soso maintains, the possibility emerged for this group to
establish alliances with intellectuals from the other republics, particularly Croatia and
Slovenia, and thus form a common opposition front. Yet, all attempts made in this
direction,  such as  the  creation  of  a  solidarity  fund to  protect  civil  activists,  were
systematically thwarted by the Yugoslav federal authorities. Furthermore, initiatives
with  an  all-Yugoslav  dimension  were  met  with  suspicion  by  key  non-Serbian
politicians, writers and academics, who believed that “they [the Serbs] were merely
hiding their ‘Serbianism’ behind the facade of ‘Yugoslavism’” (Dragović-Soso, 2002:
p. 172). In such a climate of institutional rigidity and professional distrust, Serbian
critical  intellectuals  became  increasingly  frustrated,  and  hence  more  prone  to  be
persuaded by particularist ideals.
In  order  to  identify  the  reasons  that  led  this  movement  to  adopt  distinct  Serbian
nationalist  positions,  Dragović-Soso  focuses  her  attention  on  the  most  salient
scholarly and historiographical debates of the 1980s, namely, the questioning of the
dominant meta-narratives of the Titoist period, the controversies regarding political
pluralism in  the  Yugoslav  state,  and  the  concern  for  the  difficult  situation  of  the
Serbian minority in Albanian-majority Kosovo, and finds the latter to be the crucial
one. She demonstrates how the Serbian intellectuals were particularly keen to amplify
claims of Serbs being mistreated by Albanians, as well as to affirm Serbian national
rights to Kosovo. As seen above (§ 2.1), these views were largely incorporated in the
1986  Memorandum,  which  then  prompted  prominent  Slovenian  intellectuals  to
publish  a  national  programme  which  challenged  the  Serbian  proposal  of  re-
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centralisation arguing that Slovenia’s interests would rather benefit from a loosening
of ties between the republics. 
The  incorporation  of  these  two documents  into  the  political  agendas  of  Slobodan
Milošević and Milan Kučan, leaders of Serbia and Slovenia respectively, provoked a
“spiral of radicalization” (Dragović-Soso, 2002: p. 257) that hastened the process of
disintegration  of  Yugoslavia.  Caught  up  in  this  spiral,  Serbian  intellectuals
experienced a sort of national rejuvenation, coming to see themselves as saviours of
the nation.6 This also explains why they failed to question Milošević’s subsequent rise
to  power,  although  it  involved  manipulating  state  institutions  and  passing  illegal
amendments to the Constitution. Many of them, in fact, were ready to condone such
actions  because  these  reflected  and  legitimised  their  own  stances  on  Serbian
victimhood.
The third and last account of the Yugoslav intellectuals’ nationalist  turn is Dević’s
analysis (1998) of the social and professional space of the Yugoslav academics, which
seeks to challenge commonplace assumptions about the supposed proneness of East
European intellectuals to adhere to nationalist causes: 
It is commonly accepted that the speeches and writings of nationalist academics and
writers incited the (resurgence of) inter-ethnic hatreds in the minds of their attentive
audiences. I would insist, however, that the 'nationalization' of academic knowledge in
former Yugoslavia must be examined as a part of the disintegration of cultural and
academic  institutions  of  the  federal  state,  rather  than  as  an  enchantment  of  East
European and other ‘peripheral’ intellectuals with the idea of being the builders of
their ethnic nations’ states. (1998: p. 376)
How come, Dević asks, that in the 1980s so many members of an older generation of
established  sociologists,  historians  and  writers  steered  away  from  all-Yugoslav
economic,  political  and  social  issues,  promoting  instead  the  demands  and
remonstrations of specific ethnic groups? In her view, this shift was not driven by
opportunism as much as by their propensity to define their professional and personal
identities within the boundaries (also ethnic) of their republics. Such a propensity, in
turn, was but the expression of their being embedded in a system that had become
increasingly  fragmented.  Research  institutions  and  the  corresponding  funding
6 This expression appears in the very title of Dragović-Soso’s book.
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agencies,  in  fact,  were  organised  around what  Dević  calls  academic  and cultural
enclaves, whose horizons largely corresponded to those of the individual republics in
which their were situated.
In such circumstances, it is not surprising that many academics, writers and journalists
began to actively participate in the public debate on the ‘civilisational differences’
existing  between the  Yugoslav republics,  and on how aspects  of  ‘ethnic  injustice’
could  be  corrected  through political,  administrative  and constitutional  reforms.  As
Dević notes, almost all intellectuals engaged in this kind of rhetoric in their public and
media appearances, while those who advocated political pluralism and human rights
became increasingly marginalised. Once again, such widespread politicisation should
be interpreted “as a defense of the parochial professional and cultural establishments
against the pressures for re-integration in the Yugoslav political, economic and cultural
space” (1998: p. 402). In a similar vein, however, the regional political elites were
interested  to  support  only  those  aspects  of  the  intellectuals’ work  that  could  be
strategically used to legitimise their own nationalist agendas. Hence, Dević concludes,
the supposedly strong relationship between intellectuals and ethno-nationalist politics
should  rather  be  considered  as  “an  ‘elective  affinity’ between the  interests  of  the
political  elites  and  the  status  aspirations  of  the  academics”  (1998:  p.  376).  The
contingent and transitory nature of this alliance is apparent from the fact that already
from 1993 ethno-nationalist  intellectuals had started to withdraw from the political
arena and the mass media, thus abdicating their public role.
Taken together, the three accounts exposed here provide a rather exhaustive overview
of  the  structural  and  contingent  reasons  behind  the  unique  trajectory  of
(post-)Yugoslav intellectuals from Yugoslavism to nationalism. Malešević and Dević
identify  the  intellectuals’ organic  links  (Dević  speaks  of  embeddedness)  with  the
deteriorating and increasingly fragmented Yugoslav political and cultural  system as
the  key  element  underlying  their  predisposition  to  adopt  nationalist  viewpoints.
Dragović-Soso also takes into account structural factors, such as the imperviousness
of  the  regime  to  early  attempts  by  Serbian  critical  intellectuals  to  promote  all-
Yugoslav pluralistic agendas; her focus, however, is rather on contingent aspects, such
as the involvement of prominent Serbian intellectuals in the debate on the Kosovo
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question,  and the subsequent  ‘political  fortune’ of their  (predominantly nationalist)
viewpoints on the matter. 
A useful summary of the reasons why the Yugoslav intellectual elites were ready to
dismiss the Yugoslav project in favour of ethno-nationalist views has been proposed
by Privitera (1998). He identifies four main reasons, which also includes some of the
aforementioned  points  made  by  Malešević,  Dragović-Soso  and  Dević.  First,  as
mentioned above (§ 2.1), the Yugoslav political-intellectual leadership was generally
unprepared to cope with the growing pluralisation and to accommodate the demands
of the regime’s  constituencies.  Secondly,  the intellectual  class soon realised that it
could not maintain its power unless it turned to speak in the name of the emerging
national communities. Thirdly, many intellectuals were keen on becoming leaders of
their respective nations as a way to ‘refurbish’ their declining messianic role. Fourthly,
the very ideal of democracy was largely re-appropriated in nationalist terms, that is, as
the expression of the freedom of individual national groups.
2.3 Unfinished transition: contemporary challenges facing post-
Yugoslav societies
In this  section,  I  discuss  the main  characteristics  of the post-Yugoslav transitional
context,  focusing  in  particular  on  issues  of  post-conflict  reconciliation,
democratisation, European integration and the social consequences of transition. The
purpose of this overview is to illuminate those aspects of the context that are relevant
to understand the contemporary significance of the nation in post-Yugoslav societies,
and hence to clarify the social role(s) of intellectuals in that respect, which is the main
goal of the present study.
2.3.1 Post-communist transition: an unfinished process
The dramatic social, political and economic transformations that took place in Eastern
European countries from the late 1980s prompted the formulation – in the 1990s – of
various  theories  of  transition,  intended  both  as  analytical  tools  for  explaining  the
situation and as blueprints for guiding the elites of those countries towards achieving
specific  objectives.  The  notion  of  transition,  however,  was  not  new  to  political
science, as it had already been used in relation to the shift from authoritarianism to
democracy that occurred in Southern American and Southern European countries in
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the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s.  The  transition  theories  elaborated  at  the  time,
particularly  after  the  publication  of  an  influential  article  by  Rustow  (1970),  had
marked a turn away from mainstream political science. Since their focus was on the
micro-level of political action rather than on the macro-level of structural trends, they
challenged  the  idea  that  the  development  of  societies  is  fundamentally  linear  and
ultimately predictable (being determined by structural trends), placing emphasis on
uncertainty and unpredictability instead. Consequently,  the purpose of analysis  was
retrospective rather than predictive.
The events of 1989 presented new and unique challenges to this established field of
political research. Taken by surprise by the swiftness and relative peacefulness of the
collapse of communism in Europe (Schöpflin, 1993), scholars responded mainly by
seeking  to  identify  commonalities  among  various  transitional  contexts,  including
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Latin America,  thus developing an approach
that has become known as transitology (Tőkés, 2000). As Jović (2010) points out, this
involved a fundamental shift of paradigm, from transition from (authoritarianism) to
transition to (democracy). While previous theories were predominantly retrospective,
i.e. focused on explaining the past, the new theories of post-communist transition were
anticipatory,  i.e.  forward-looking.  Even  more  importantly,  they  were  largely
normative, in the sense that the collapse of communism was regarded as the beginning
of a long age of certainty in which there were no alternatives to liberal democracy.
Specifically, post-communist transition was envisaged as a positive, fixed and quasi-
teleological process of modernisation with a predetermined goal, namely, integration
into  the  global  capitalist  system  of  western  liberal  democracy  (Buden,  2010;
Galasińska & Galasiński, 2010; Krzyżanowski & Wodak, 2009). 
Within  this  paradigm,  theoretical  and  empirical  efforts  were  redirected  from
examining the past to constructing the future of evolving societies. Proponents of this
approach, in fact, were primarily interested in identifying the objective factors that
determine the course of democratisation. The purpose of the new theories of transition
was to make reliable predictions about the prospects for democratisation of any given
society in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and also to advise local and international
decision-makers  on  how  to  consolidate  democracy  through  specific  policies  or
actions. As Jović (2010) notes, most of these theories were built on the assumption
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that democracy was not only the ‘natural’ end of political evolution (in a Darwinist
sense),  but  also  the  product  of  collective  action  driven  by  rationally  recognised
interests. By constructing western liberal democracy as a universally desirable model
of  society,  transition  theorists  implicitly  (and  sometimes  explicitly)  asserted  that
Eastern European countries were backward and needing to ‘catch up’ with Western
Europe, and that their deflecting from the prescribed path towards liberal democracy
would be irrational and counterproductive.
Within a decade of the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, this paradigm began to attract
serious criticism. On the one hand, its normative character and claimed universality
made it unfit to adapt, or even account for, the specificities of East European societies,
which severely limited their explanatory and predictive power (Jović, 2010). On the
other hand, the actual transition proved to be much less linear and smooth than it was
expected. Processes of economic and political restructuring, in fact, appear to have
been distorted by corruption, nepotism, and widespread reluctance to comply with the
precepts of fair economic competition and democratic culture (Judt, 2007). Faced with
the fact that ordinary people and leaders alike tended to act counter to the calculations
of  western  economists  and  policy-makers,  social  scientists  and  analysts  gradually
relinquished  the  dominant  notion  of  transition  as  a  progressive  pathway  towards
liberal democracy. Instead, they began to think of it as a condition marked by a high
level of  social, political and economic uncertainty, and which produces innovation
only insofar as old values and interests can be articulated within the new normative
framework  (Burawoy  &  Verdery,  1999;  Fraser,  1997).  Furthermore,  much  more
attention was paid to the micro-level, which enabled the identification of elements of
continuity with the communist  regimes and concrete forms of resistance to change
(Galasińska & Galasiński, 2010).
The strongest criticism of the transition paradigm, however, came from those scholars
who did not simply see it as a set of misplaced expectations about the development
prospects of post-communist societies, but denounced it as the ideology underlying
western hegemony over  Eastern Europe.  For  instance,  through an inquiry into the
ideological  function  of  metaphors  in  the  dominant  discourses  of  transition,  Buden
(2010) shows that  a key feature of the post-communist  condition is the repressive
infantilisation of societies, in the sense that people inhabiting transitional contexts are
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often treated by western agencies, as well as by their own rulers, as children who have
to learn the fundamentals of democracy and market capitalism under the guidance of
external (that is, western) authorities. For Buden, this relationship of power is best
described as  tutelage. Its force, he argues, lies in the fact that it relieves transitional
subjects of all responsibilities connected both with the communist past and with the
new challenges of post-communism itself, which explains why this ideology has been
so easily and widely internalised.
In conclusion, the reality of post-communist transition has turned out to be far more
laborious and complex than was anticipated by both scholars and policy-makers. In
this  light,  one could say,  following Jović (2010),  that  if  the 1989 revolutions  had
marked a shift from transition from to transition to, the current disillusionment with
the process of democratic consolidation and the capacity of the market economy to
bring  about  prosperity,  especially  in  South-Eastern  European  countries,  justifies
speaking of unfinished transition, that is, of transition as a sort of permanent state of
political instability and economic uncertainty with no clear alternative in view. In the
post-Yugoslav  context  such  volatility  is  particularly  acute,  because  societies  are
confronted  with  challenges  related  to  the  post-conflict  situation,  the  processes  of
democratisation  and  European  integration,  and  the  current  social  and  economic
hardships. In the following, I discuss each of these aspects in detail.
2.3.2 The post-conflict situation
The disintegration of Yugoslavia was an extremely violent process. The Yugoslav wars
collectively extended over a period of ten years, from 1991 until 2001, and involved
several armed conflicts between the secessionist republics and the central Yugoslav
state, as well as between distinct factions both within and across the borders of the
newly independent states.7 Approximately two hundred thousand people were killed
(although estimates  vary quite  considerably)  and about  two million  civilians  were
forced to leave their homes. Moreover, the conflicts involved systematic recourse to
violence against the civilian population (including systematic rape) usually motivated
7 Namely: the Ten-Day War in Slovenia (1991), the Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995), the
Bosnian War (1992–1995), the Kosovo War (1998–1999), including the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia,
the insurgency in the Preševo Valley (1999-2001), and the insurgency in the Republic of Macedonia
(2001).
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by strategies of ‘ethnic cleansing’, which resulted in a dramatic record of human rights
violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Dealing  with  the  long-term impact  of  atrocities  and  human  rights  violations  is  a
common challenge in all post-conflict societies, but this is particularly the case in the
former Yugoslavia, where a “decade of internecine war in the region [...] left behind
not  only  a  terrible  legacy  of  human  losses  and  material  destruction,  but  also  an
unprecedented  level  of  traumatization  among  the  population  at  large,  which
contributed to a widespread and generalized sense of victimhood on all sides of the
conflict”  (Sisson,  2010:  p.  172;  in  regard  to  Serbia  see  also  Kanin,  2011).
Furthermore,  the  politics  of  hatred  and  fear  used  by  wartime  leaders  in  order  to
achieve  consensus,  along  with  the  direct  involvement  of  large  sectors  of  the
population  in  the  hostilities,  have  generated  deep-seated  rivalry,  antagonisms  and
mistrust  among  members  of  the  different  communities.  Additionally,  the  ethnic
cleavages exacerbated and cemented by the conflicts have been largely carried into the
institutional (and in some cases even constitutional) arrangements established through
the  peace  settlements,  which  has  further  entrenched  ethno-political  divides  either
between  majority  and  minority  groups  or,  in  the  specific  case  of  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina, among the country’s ‘constituent peoples’ (Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats).
The societal efforts to come to terms with the consequences of armed conflicts include
a  variety  of  practices,  policies  and institutional  mechanisms  aimed  at  establishing
durable  peace  and  facilitating  reconciliation  among  the  communities  affected,
especially in deeply divided societies. Due to the aforementioned reasons, in the post-
Yugoslav context such efforts are particularly critical.  The major challenges in this
regard concern the effective operation of transitional justice, on the one hand, and the
set of practices that are typically subsumed under the rubric of dealing with the past,
on the other.8 Transitional justice is an approach to achieving justice in post-conflict
societies, which aims to ensure accountability and obtain redress for war victims (for
instance through reparations); its broader purpose is to promote civic trust, the rights
of  victims,  and the  democratic  rule  of  law,  by facilitating  a  process  of  collective
healing through seeking out the truth (Subotić, 2009). Dealing with the past, on the
8 On  the  topic  of  how  democratic  societies  cope  with  traumatic  events  in  their  past  through  the
construction  of  historical  narratives,  see  Heer,  Manoschek,  Pollak  & Wodak,  2008;  Wodak,  2006;
Wodak & Martin, 2003.
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other hand, includes activities and projects of fact-finding, raising awareness of the
past, reconciliation and peace education (Franović, 2008). 
In  recent  times,  the  transitional  justice  framework  adopted  in  the  post-Yugoslav
context  has  been criticised  as  being inadequate  to  confront  the collective  political
ideologies that made mass atrocities and human rights violations possible in the first
place. Subotić, a prominent scholar in the field, has argued that in order to achieve full
political accountability the existing framework should be extended beyond individual
and state responsibility to include  societal responsibility for past violence (Subotić,
2011b). This requires embracing a broader dealing-with-the-past approach to balance
conflicting memories and competing historical narratives.
In  addition  to  this,  post-conflict  reconciliation  has  also  been established  as  a  key
requirement for the post-Yugoslav countries to join the European Union (in the scope
of EU conditionality, see below). Specifically, candidate countries have been required
to create institutions for ensuring the respect for and protection of minority rights, to
commit to judicial prosecution of war crimes both domestically and internationally
(i.e.  through  cooperation  with  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  former
Yugoslavia),  and finally to foster reconciliatory efforts  by facilitating the return of
refugees, by developing regional cooperation, by establishing truth and reconciliation
commissions,  and also  through public  apologies  by political  leaders  (Petričušić  &
Blondel,  2012).  Despite  the  great  emphasis  placed  on  reconciliation  by  the  EU,
however,  the  political  divergence  among  post-Yugoslav  countries  in  terms  of
advancement towards EU membership has seriously hampered discussion, to the point
that in the course of the 2000s reconciliation has virtually disappeared from public
debate,  the  media  and the  educational  process  (with  the  exception  of  a  few high
political figures and civil society organisations).
2.3.3 Democratisation and European integration
As  mentioned  above,  the  question  of  post-conflict  reconciliation  and  transitional
justice  is  deeply  intertwined  with  processes  of  democratisation  and  European
integration, which also shape the post-Yugoslav context in very complex and profound
ways.  Broadly  speaking,  the  democratic  transition  of  the  successor  states  of
Yugoslavia has followed a rather belated and uneven development. In fact, although
the first multi-party parliamentary elections were held in each of the republics already
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in 1990 (as the Yugoslav Federation was on the brink of dissolution), it was not until a
decade  later  that  most  post-Yugoslav  countries  (with  the  notable  exception  of
Slovenia) entered a comprehensive and substantial democratisation process. In Croatia
and Serbia, this shift is best epitomised by the death of Franjo Tuđman in 1999 and the
fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, which marked the end of authoritarianism and the
advent  of  democracy  in  both  countries  (Ramet  &  Soberg,  2008).  In  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina and Kosovo, tentative democracy became possible only after the wars
had ended and elections were resumed in 1996 and 2001, respectively. In Macedonia,
democracy had begun to develop already in the aftermath of independence, but the
process stalled in the late 1990s mainly due to growing tensions between the state and
the sizeable Albanian community living in the country.  Finally,  Montenegro began
democratising only after reformist forces came to power in the late 1990s.
In the period between 1996 and 2001, the state of democracy across the post-Yugoslav
space  improved  quite  rapidly,  as  earlier  authoritarian  or  only formally  democratic
structures  were  replaced  by  more  effective,  accountable  and  legitimate  public
institutions,  and new political  elites  emerged  who shared  (at  least  declaratively)  a
consensus  on establishing  fully  consolidated  democracies.  However,  differences  in
democratic performance among the post-Yugoslav societies are still quite marked even
now. While Slovenia is regarded as most advanced and Croatia is quickly developing
into a stable democratic state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia
and Montenegro are widely considered as fragile democracies. Viewed through the
dominant paradigm of consolidation of democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996), the type of
democracy  that  exists  in  most  post-Yugoslav  countries  is  best  described  as
unconsolidated (especially if compared to Western European countries and the USA).
This approach, however, has been criticised as ill-suited to accounting for the deeply
embedded constraints  on democracy that  exist  in  the post-Yugoslav  region,  which
make  consolidation  (as  traditionally  understood)  a  particularly  difficult  goal  to
achieve. For example, Bieber and Ristić (2012) have proposed considering the post-
Yugoslav case as a specific model of democracy with distinctive features, which they
have termed constrained democracy.
Of  course,  developments  in  democracy  and  state-building  in  the  post-Yugoslav
context cannot be considered separately from the overarching process of European
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integration, which has become widely recognized as the key strategy for achieving
stability and prosperity in the region. European involvement in the ‘Western Balkans’
–  as  the  former  Yugoslavia  has  come  to  be  referred  to  in  European  institutional
discourse, being thereby reinvented politically as a region – began with the attempt to
address the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. As Belloni (2009) points
out,  it  is  precisely  due  to  the  disillusionment  with  the  failures  in  managing  the
Yugoslav crisis,  and later  with the difficulties  faced by international  peacebuilding
missions  (especially  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina),  that  European  integration  has
gradually  emerged  as  a  comprehensive  strategy  of  conflict  prevention  and
management.  Thus,  “since  the  end  of  the  Kosovo  war  the  goal  of  international
intervention  has  shifted  gradually  from one of  managing  the  consequences  of  the
Yugoslav Succession Wars to that of integrating the Balkans into Europe” (Belloni,
2009: p. 319).
Within this framework, the EU has emerged as the central and most influential player,
particularly since 2000 when it offered the entire South-Eastern European area the
prospect  of membership.  Indeed,  such a  prospect  has  been the main  driving force
behind a number of reform activities, and has quickly become the key political priority
for most (if not all) governments in the post-Yugoslav states. Moreover, in countries
like Slovenia and Croatia, European identity has become a widely shared social value,
and  this  process  of  identity  convergence  has  further  consolidated  the  European
perspective of the two countries (Subotić, 2011a).
EU  influence  in  the  region  has  followed  two  main  pathways,  namely  EU
conditionality  (whereby  aspiring  members  states  are  required  to  align  with  EU
standards in terms of democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection
of minorities, and economic capacity, i.e. the so-called Copenhagen criteria) and the
social learning approach (i.e. the long-term redefinition of interests and identities of
domestic  players).  According to  Belloni  (2009),  the EU enlargement  approach has
clear advantages but also limits. On the one hand, it provides a long-term and coherent
vision  for  South-Eastern  European  countries,  favours  domestic  ownership  and
institutional development, fosters stability and regional cooperation, and contributes to
softening nationalist identities. On the other hand, however, the varying ‘absorption
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capacity’ of the EU has turned the goal of membership into a moving target,  thus
undermining its function as an incentive for domestic reform.
On the whole, the role held by the EU in the development of democracy in the post-
Yugoslav context has been described as contradictory (Bieber & Ristić, 2012). If, on
the one hand, EU conditionality has been effective in promoting legislative reform and
driving party systems towards a more democratic form of government, on the other
the impact of the EU’s transformative capacity has been uneven across the region.
This is reflected in the discrepancies that exist among the post-Yugoslav countries in
terms of integration into the EU. Slovenia was the first to join the Union in 2004,
while Croatia became a EU member-state only nine years later, in 2013. As of mid-
2015, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro have been granted the status of candidate
countries, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are still  potential candidates,
meaning that they have been promised the prospect of joining when they are ready
(i.e. when they meet the aforementioned requirements).
The reasons behind such discrepancies in democratisation are multifarious and depend
to a great extent on the specific situation of each country. According to contemporary
scholarship, two broad factors that help account for these differences are the poor or
contested legitimacy of domestic governments, on the one hand, and the challenge of
diversity management, on the other. As Bieber (2011) claims, the ineffectiveness of
EU-driven  state-building  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Serbia  and  Kosovo  partly
depends on the fact that these are  minimalist states, i.e. their political orders are not
based on a  consensual  arrangement  and therefore  lack popular  legitimacy.  This  is
reflected in the widespread distrust of public administration and formal institutions
that affects most post-Yugoslav societies (Marčić, 2015). The other factor mentioned
above concerns the difficulties arising from the need to accommodate ethno-national,
religious  and cultural  pluralism within  the  framework of  liberal  democracy.  In  so
diverse  (and often  divided)  societies  such as  the  post-Yugoslav  ones,  in  fact,  this
challenge is particularly acute, as it involves elaborating mechanisms and policies for
managing ethnic relations,  for protecting minorities,  as well  as for preventing and
managing crisis and conflict (Žagar, 2008). The critical interplay of these two factors
is most evident in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose unique political system,
based on power-sharing among ethnic elites (of the three ‘constituent peoples’, i.e.
42
Bosniaks,  Serbs  and  Croats),  is  both  highly  dysfunctional  in  terms  of  democratic
performance  and suffers  from the  distrust  and  disaffection  of  large  sectors  of  the
citizenry.
2.3.4 Transition and its (social) discontents
As  seen  above,  the  interrelated  processes  of  post-conflict  reconciliation,
democratisation  and  European  integration  shape  the  post-Yugoslav  context  in
profound and distinctive  ways.  The challenges  connected with these processes  are
further exacerbated by the climate of social instability and economic insecurity that
has characterised most post-Yugoslav societies since the beginning of transition, and
which has become particularly acute in recent years also due to the global economic
and financial crisis.
The wars of the 1990s were especially  detrimental  for the economies  of the post-
Yugoslav region. In the aftermath of the Yugoslav breakup, the economic situation in
the seceding states was therefore extremely precarious: economic activity had fallen,
while inflation and unemployment  had reached alarming rates.  Economic recovery
resumed  only in  the  2000s,  when efforts  at  rebuilding  production  capabilities  and
restoring  trade  links  began  to  yield  the  desired  results.  The  major  challenges  to
economic  development,  however,  came  from  the  transformation  of  the  socialist
planned economy into a market-oriented economy.  As soon as the process started,
income  disparities  among  the  population  began  to  grow  considerably.  This,  in
combination  with  rapid  economic  decline,  the  chronic  lack  of  employment
opportunities,  and  the  radical  transformation  of  the  structure  of  social  capital,
contributed to severe social stratification, and brought about the spreading of poverty
(Stambolieva,  2011).  Indeed,  economic  restructuring  was  carried  out  at  enormous
social costs for the majority of the population, who experienced a drastic and long-
term fall in living standards (Lazić, 2011).
Among  the  above-mentioned  consequences  of  economic  transition,  social
stratification is probably the one that has left the deepest mark on contemporary post-
Yugoslav societies.  Since the beginning of economic restructuring,  in fact,  income
disparity has continued to grow, leading to an ever-widening gap between the small,
rich and powerful elites and the impoverished masses (Lazić, 2011). Moreover, this
process has unfolded in an extremely unruly way, leaving most people at the mercy of
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the arbitrary use (and abuse) of power by public authorities and private employers.
This  is  best  captured  in  the  popular  distinction  between  winners and losers  of
transition, which emphasises the aleatory and unpredictable nature of socio-economic
development in transitional contexts, particularly in regard to the labour market. As
Stambolieva remarks, “unless a person landed on the ‘winning’ side in the process of
capital transformation and managed to secure other sources of income, apart from the
one obtained from the employment  status,  an unemployed person and their  family
were at a high risk of poverty” (2011: p. 356).
Such concentration of wealth in the hands of a few occurred at an unusual speed and
scale  because it  did not involve gradual  accumulation of newly created  value,  but
rather  the  predatory appropriation  of  existing  state  and collective  property (Lazić,
2011). As a matter of fact, in most post-Yugoslav countries the most frequent process
of  privatisation  of  formerly  socially  owned  enterprises  turned  out  to  be  through
management take-over, as a result of which a large number of workers were stripped
of  their  ownership  rights,  while  some  even  lost  their  jobs  (Stambolieva,  2011).
According to Bartlett (2008), the socially adverse consequences of privatisation have
been particularly severe in  cases in  which the privatisation  process  has  led to  the
monopolisation of the market and where the institutions of public accountability have
been weakened by conflicts  and slow democratisation.  Indeed,  the perpetuation of
economic instability, coupled with the lack of reforms and investments, have strained
the financial viability of the entire social security structures inherited from Yugoslavia.
Consequently,  depending  on  the  specific  country,  smaller  or  larger  parts  of  the
population,  particularly those belonging to  vulnerable  groups (such as  the Roma),
have become victims of social exclusion (Stambolieva, 2011).
The  chronic  inability  of  governments  to  counteract,  or  at  least  mitigate,  the
detrimental  consequences  of  transition  has  led  to  rising  social  discontent  and
mobilisation. In recent years, such discontent has sparked a wave of protests across
the post-Yugoslav space (and also in  other parts  of South-Eastern Europe),  over a
range of issues including the poor provision and privatisation of welfare and public
utilities,  poverty  and  social  exclusion,  corruption,  bureaucratic  inefficiency,
environmental  concerns,  and also authoritarian tendencies.  Although many protests
have been triggered by tangible issues, they have frequently served as platforms to
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convey  broader  social  and  political  dissatisfaction,  and  to  advance  demands  for
fundamental political and social transformation. A clear illustration of this is the case
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2013, the government’s failure to resolve a problem
related to the allocation of identification numbers to citizens triggered unrest across
the  country.  One  year  later,  as  workers  from  several  factories  which  had  been
privatised and then gone bankrupt united to demand action over their jobs, unpaid
salaries  and  pensions,  the  movement  resumed  its  momentum.  Students,  political
activists and ordinary citizens joined the workers’ protests countrywide and organised
popular  assemblies  (plenums)  calling  for  the  resignation  of  the  government  and
demanding concrete measures against corruption, and social and economic injustice.
In  conclusion,  the  contemporary  post-Yugoslav  context  is  characterised  by  a  high
degree  of  uncertainty  and  volatility  in  the  social,  economic  and  political  spheres.
Issues  of  post-conflict  reconciliation,  democratisation,  European  integration  and
economic restructuring continue to affect post-Yugoslav societies in complex ways
that  are  hard  to  understand  and  very  difficult  to  manage.  In  such  a  climate,  the
categories  of  nation  and national  identity  seem to  acquire  new meanings,  as  they
constitute powerful resources that people can draw on to cope with the hardships of
everyday life, and which political  elites can use to mobilise the masses and secure
consensus (the place and significance of the nation in the contemporary world, and in
the post-Yugoslav area specifically,  are discussed in more detail in § 3.3.2). In this
respect, the relationship between post-Yugoslav intellectuals and their own national
communities has probably undergone significant change since the ‘mass conversion’
to  ethno-nationalism that  reached  its  peak  in  the  early  1990s,  as  Yugoslavia  was
disintegrating. Shedding light on the new ways in which contemporary post-Yugoslav
intellectuals  position  themselves  in  relation  to  the  nation  and  engage  in  nation-
building discourses is precisely the objective of the present investigation.
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3. Intellectuals and nation-building: 
towards an interdisciplinary critical 
discourse-analytical approach
In this chapter, I elaborate an interdisciplinary and context-specific approach to the
analysis of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation in public discourse. I begin by
elucidating  the  main  principles  and  methods  adopted  in  the  Discourse-Historical
Approach (DHA) to critical discourse studies (CDS), and by reviewing relevant DHA
research  on discourse  and  national  identity  (§  3.1).  Then,  I  discuss  the  nature  of
intellectual practice and the ‘intellectual condition’ drawing on prominent theories and
accounts (§ 3.2). Subsequently, I examine the relationship between intellectuals and
nation-building practices, both historically and in the contemporary world, developing
the notion of spokespersonship for the nation (§ 3.3). In the following section (§ 3.4),
I explore the representation of the nation in public discourse, identifying a range of
salient  macro-topics.  Finally,  I  draw  together  all  these  insights  to  elaborate  a
comprehensive  framework  to  study  the  concrete  manifestations  of  intellectual
spokespersonship for the nation in public discourse (§ 3.5).
3.1 The Discourse-Historical Approach: principles, methods and 
existing research on discourse and national identity
In  order  to  elaborate  a  viable  discourse-analytical  approach  to  intellectual
spokespersonship for the nation in media discourse, it is necessary to review the main
ontological and epistemological assumptions of critical discourse studies, and to look
closely at how the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) incorporates these premises
within a  general  framework for linguistic  analysis.  It  is  worth pointing  out,  as  an
opening remark, that critical discourse studies as a field of research includes a variety
of  strands  and  approaches,  which  share  some  (though  not  all)  fundamental
assumptions but differ in how these are translated into methodological approaches and
concrete analytical tools.
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3.1.1 Critical discourse studies: key notions and principles
Although different approaches in CDS conceptualise discourse in slightly divergent
ways, there is general agreement that discourse is to be conceived as social practice
(Fairclough  & Wodak,  1997),  in  the  sense  that  discourse,  far  from being  a  mere
‘reflection’ of reality, is always materialised and has therefore tangible effects upon
social structures. Hence, discourse can contribute to social continuity as well as social
change. In other words, discourse is conceived of as a set of semiotic practices that are
both socially determined and socially constitutive (Fairclough, 2001). This means that
there exists a dialectical relationship between discourse and the situations, institutions
and social structures in which it is embedded (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). For instance,
according  to  van  Leeuwen  (2008)  discourse  is  best  understood  in  terms  of  the
recontextualisation of social practices.
Furthermore, discourse is seen as a way of constructing aspects of the world from a
particular perspective that can be related to the different positions of social groups
within a social structure (Fairclough, 1995, 2009). The underlying assumption is that
discourse is inherently dialogical, that is, always oriented towards what others have
said or written in other times and places. In order to capture the interplay of different
and often opposing discourses, also at the textual level, critical discourse studies have
drawn  on  Bakhtin’s  notion  of  heteroglossia  (1981)  to  develop  the  concepts  of
intertextuality  and  interdiscursivity.  Both  notions  refer  to  the  fact  that  texts  and
discourses  are  interconnected  and  overlap,  as  they  always  relate  to  other  texts  or
discourses,  in  the  past  as  well  as  in  the  present  (Wodak & Weiss,  2005). Strictly
connected with these is the notion of entextualisation as “the process by means of
which discourses are [...] decontextualised and metadiscursively recontextualised, so
that they become a new discourse associated to a new context and accompanied by a
particular  metadiscourse  which  provides  a  sort  of  ‘preferred  reading’  for  the
discourse” (Blommaert, 2005: p. 47). 
Since discourse is the medium in which social structures and practices are not only
established, but also constantly negotiated and often contested by social agents, the
relationship between discourse and power cannot but occupy a central place in critical
discourse  studies.  Broadly  speaking,  language  and  power  are  inescapably  bound
together,  insofar as language expresses power and is invariably involved whenever
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power  is  challenged  or  appropriated  (Wodak  & Meyer,  2009).  Thus,  discourse  is
inevitably shaped by power relations,  but it  may also affect  them in various ways
(Fairclough,  2001).  As  Lukes  (2005)  has  argued,  power  is  relational  and  multi-
dimensional, and the high complexity of the nexus between discourse and power is
clearly  reflected  in  the  variety  of  ways  in  which  this  relationship  has  been
linguistically defined by prominent scholars: Fairclough (2001) has spoken of power
in and behind discourse, Wodak (1996, 2011) has examined power in, over and of
discourse, Holzscheiter (2011) has focused on power both in and of discourse, while
van Dijk (1993, 1996) has foregrounded the power struggle involved in  obtaining
access to discourse. The overarching idea behind these rather subtle distinctions is that
discursive practices, just like material practices, can be instrumental in the creation
and reproduction of power relations in society (see also Jäger & Maier, 2009; Lemke,
1995; Wodak, 2011).
In this light, critical discourse analysts are well aware that social actors may engage in
discursive practices that contribute to establishing, maintaining or reinforcing unequal
and oppressive power relations among individuals and social groups. Discourses, thus,
sustain  certain  ideologies,  broadly  understood  as  systems  of  social  domination
grounded  in  particular  beliefs,  values  and  attitudes.  In  critical  discourse  studies,
ideology has been defined in manifold ways (see Wodak, 2013). These range from
narrow views of ideology as the systematic process whereby existing unjust power
arrangements  become  seen  as  natural  and  commonsensical  (Fairclough,  2001)  to
broader  conceptions  that  conceive  of  ideologies  (in  the  plural)  as  coherent  and
relatively  stable  sets  of  values  or  beliefs  (Wodak  &  Meyer,  2009)  or  as  basic
representations of social groups (van Dijk, 2001). In any case, ideology is linked with
power  and domination  in  two fundamental  ways:  first,  ideologies  always  work  to
favour some and disadvantage others, thus exhibiting directionality (Purvis & Hunt,
1993); second, ideologies can help maintain unequal power relations between social
agents by obfuscating or dissimulating the real nature of those relations, particularly in
and through discourse.
The commitment of critical discourse scholars to investigate how language is used to
reproduce and legitimise forms of power that sustain social inequality, injustice and
domination, and how powerless groups and individuals may discursively resist them
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(Wodak  &  Meyer,  2009),  is  at  the  core  of  the  discipline’s  critical  vocation  (see
Forchtner,  2011).  Moreover,  it  has  been  argued  (Chilton,  Tian  et  al.,  2010)  that
critique involves two additional aspects: firstly, critical discourse analysts are expected
to be open about their ethical standpoints and take responsibility for the social impact
of their work; secondly,  self-reflexivity  is greatly encouraged, in the sense that the
discourse produced by critical discourse analysts should itself be the object of critical
scrutiny. Such a far-reaching conception of critique poses significant  challenges to
scholarship, and indeed the capacity of critical discourse studies to live up to its own
critical commitment has been called into question. For instance, Billig has pointed out
cases  of  intra-discipline  inconsistency  (2008)  and  the  risk  that  the  growing
institutionalisation  of  critical  discourse  analysis  may  result  in  the  emergence  of  a
‘critical  orthodoxy’ (2003). Moreover,  Sayer  (2006,  2011)  has  argued  that  critical
discourse studies  can hardly be critical  unless research focuses on how discourses
impute and interpret moral significance, and how this relates to human well-being and
flourishing.
3.1.2 The Discourse-Historical Approach
Among the existing approaches to  CDS, the present study is  largely based on the
Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) elaborated by Wodak and Reisigl (Reisigl &
Wodak,  2009; Wodak,  2011).  According to its  proponents,  the DHA as a research
strategy  has  the  following  general  characteristics:  it  allows  for  the  elaboration  of
analytical frameworks that are specifically tailored to the research problem (problem-
orientation)  and  the  broader  context  in  which  the  latter  is  embedded  (context-
specificity); it is suited to exploring a very wide range of social practices, discourse
genres, as well as intertextual and interdiscursive relationships; it is open to theoretical
and conceptual contributions from other areas of research in order to better understand
the phenomenon under investigation; finally, it encourages researchers to make their
findings available both to practitioners in the relevant field and to the general public.
In the light of its clear commitment to eclecticism, flexibility and interdisciplinarity,
the DHA appears to be very well equipped to inform the present research project. In
addition  to  this,  there  are  also  more  specific  reasons  for  choosing  this  particular
approach to critical discourse analysis over others. One is that a careful examination
of  the  ways  in  which  post-Yugoslav  public  intellectuals  perform  the  role  of
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spokespersons for the nation requires taking into account the broader socio-political
and historical  background that  characterises  the  post-Yugoslav  context  (which  has
been discussed in Chapter 2). In this regard, not only does the DHA allow researchers
to incorporate aspects of the broader context in their investigation,  but it explicitly
focuses,  as  its  name  suggests,  on  the  historical  and  socio-political  context  as  a
fundamental  dimension  of  analysis  (see  below:  the  four-level  concept  of  context
elaborated within the DHA). The other reason is that topics related to nation-building
and national identities are at the centre of the DHA research agenda, as attested by the
seminal  research  on  the  discursive  construction  of  Austrian  national  identity
conducted by Wodak et al. (2009), upon which this study draws extensively.
As stated above, the notions of power, ideology and critique occupy a central place in
critical discourse studies. The DHA also considers these notions as constitutive of its
own  approach,  and  conceptualises  them  in  specific  ways.  With  regard  to  the
relationship between discourse and power, the DHA assumes that power, which relates
to asymmetric relationships between different social actors, is constantly legitimised
and de-legitimised in discourse. Therefore, the analyst is expected to approach texts as
potential  sites  of  struggle,  looking  for  linguistic  traces  of  ongoing  ideological
confrontations and fights for dominance and hegemony. Furthermore, the nature of the
social  occasion in  which  a  certain  text  is  produced and consumed should  also  be
explored, particularly in terms of the constraints and affordances related to specific
genres,  and  how  access  to  the  text  is  regulated  across  various  public  spheres.
According to the DHA, the establishment and reproduction of unequal power relations
through discourse is a key expression of ideology. Ideology is defined as “an (often)
one-sided  perspective  or  world  view  composed  of  related  mental  representations,
convictions,  opinions,  attitudes  and evaluations,  which is  shared by members  of  a
specific social group” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: p. 88). 
The reason why scholars working in the DHA are particularly concerned with how
language and other semiotic practices sustain and reproduce certain ideologies across
social spheres and institutions is that ideologies function as a means of transforming
power relations,  for instance,  by framing hegemonic  identity narratives  or through
gate-keeping. Thus, the DHA seeks to demystify the ideological character of specific
discourses  by  unveiling  how  language  is  used  to  establish,  perpetuate  or  contest
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various forms of dominance. Doing critique, according to the DHA, consists precisely
in making explicit the implicit relationship between discourse, power and ideology.
More specifically, the very notion of critique has been systematically conceptualised
into three interrelated aspects: i) discourse-immanent critique, which aims to detect
contradictions  and inconsistencies  at  the textual  level;  ii)  socio-diagnostic  critique,
which  involves  drawing  on  theoretical  and  contextual  knowledge  to  interpret
discursive  practices  and  unveil  their  potentially  manipulative  character;  iii)
prospective critique, which consists of drawing on analytical findings to suggest ways
to improve communication in relevant areas of social life. 
As an established approach to critical discourse analysis, the DHA has elaborated a set
of principles and concepts intended to guide the analytical  process. To begin with,
discourse is defined as a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices related to a
macro-topic  (discourse  about or  on a  macro-topic  X) and situated  within  specific
fields of social action. Moreover, it is seen as being linked to argumentation in the
sense of conferring validity on certain truth or normative claims upheld by various
social actors with different perspectives. Since discourses never occur in isolation, but
are  in  fact  dynamic  and  hybrid  entities  open  to  constant  reinterpretation  and
recontextualisation,  the  DHA  also  embraces  intertextuality  and  interdiscursivity
(discussed above) as key analytical principles. Furthermore, the notion that texts and
discourses are always linked to other texts and discourses, both in the past and in the
present, requires treating context as a specific analytical category.  According to the
DHA,  context  includes  four  different  levels:  i)  the  immediate  co-text  and  co-
discourse;  ii)  the  intertextual  and  interdiscursive  relationship  existing  between
utterances,  texts,  genres and discourses;  iii)  the extralinguistic  social  variables  and
institutional  frames;  iv)  the  broader  socio-political  and  historical  context.  Such  a
comprehensive notion of context, which stresses the interconnectedness of discursive
practices and extra-linguistic social structures, enables the DHA to explore all four
levels  in  a  recursive  manner  on  the  basis  of  the  principle  of  triangulation  (see
Cicourel,  1969),  which  implies  taking  into  account  a  whole  range  of  empirical
observations, theories, methods, as well as background information, in order to gain a
better  understanding of  the  discursive events  at  hand and also as  a  bias-reduction
strategy.
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As stated  above,  the  DHA is  inherently  interdisciplinary,  due  to  its  propensity  to
integrate  theoretical  contributions  from  other  disciplines  in  order  to  produce  a
synthesis  of  conceptual  tools  that  is  tailored  to  the  specific  problems  under
investigation.  Indeed,  interdisciplinarity,  theoretical  openness  and  conceptual
pragmatism are key characteristics of critical discourse studies in general (Weiss &
Wodak,  2003),  to  the  point  that  it  is  practically  impossible  to  identify  a  uniform
theoretical  foundation  being  used  consistently  within  critical  discourse  analysis
(Meyer,  2001).  Such  eclecticism  and  lack  of  systematicity  may  appear  to  be  a
weakness, but it  has been argued that it  is precisely to this plurality of theory and
methodology that critical discourse studies owes its dynamic and productive character
(Weiss & Wodak, 2003). Proponents of the DHA have developed a rather  flexible
interface with social theory, distinguishing between ‘grand theories’, which can serve
as a foundation, and ‘middle-range theories’, which may provide conceptual tools that
are  better  suited  to  analyse  specific  discursive  events  (Reisigl  &  Wodak,  2009).
Furthermore,  the  intrinsically  abductive  character  of  research,  i.e.  the  fact  that
empirical findings necessarily feed back into theory as the research proceeds, has been
explicitly acknowledged.
3.1.3 The DHA and the study of the discursive construction of national identities
Much  research  grounded  in  the  DHA  has  been  devoted  to  investigating  the
relationship between discourse, politics and identity. In particular, the investigation of
the role of discourse in the formation and reproduction of national and supranational
(especially  European)  identities  has  emerged  as  a  prominent  research  programme,
following the seminal research conducted by Wodak et al. (2009) on the construction
of  Austrian  national  identity  in  public,  semi-public  and  quasi-private  discursive
contexts. The theoretical framework and methodological approach elaborated in that
study  have  laid  the  foundations  for  subsequent  DHA-based  research  in  the  field,
which encompasses an increasing variety of social, cultural and institutional contexts.
The case studies collected by Kovács and Wodak (2003), for instance, analyse how
public  debates  on  neutrality  vs. NATO  accession  in  Austria  and  Hungary  have
contributed  to  shaping  national  identities,  focusing  in  particular  on  argumentation
strategies based on ‘historicising ways of thinking’ about the nation. More recently,
Unger (2013) has investigated the discursive construction of the Scots language, both
in institutional settings (through the analysis of educational policies, political debates
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and  official  websites)  and  in  discussions  among  ordinary  people  (through  focus
groups).
The discursive construction of European identity/ies, in particular, occupies a central
place  in  DHA-based  research  on  identity  and  discourse.  The  cornerstones  of  a
coherent  research  agenda in  this  domain  have been laid  out  by Wodak and Weiss
(2005), who have proposed a comprehensive framework that focuses on the interplay
of the ideational, organisational and geographical dimensions in discourses on Europe,
identifies  salient  forms of legitimising the political  construction of the EU and its
enlargement,  and  also  defines  areas  for  future  research  from  historical,
communication,  and  participation/representation  perspectives.  This  framework  is
largely based on Weiss’ inquiry (2002) into legitimation and representation strategies
in German and French political speeches on Europe. 
Another  fundamental  contribution  to  this  field  of  study  is  Krzyżanowski’s  study
(2010)  of  the  role  of  social  and  political  discourses  in  the  construction  of
Europeanness in supranational and national contexts, as well as in regard to discourses
of migrants. His findings substantiate the notion that that European identities, rather
than  being  imposed  from  top-down,  are  constantly  being  (re)constructed  and
recontextualised in response to shifting social and political backgrounds. Moreover,
his analysis of media discourse on multilingualism in the EU shows how diverging
conceptualisations  of  Europe  inevitably  raise  issues  of  national  vs. supranational
interests, and how the media play a key role in portraying such duality. Drawing on
Krzyżanowski’s insights, Boukala (2013) examines whether the rhetoric employed by
Greek print  media  contributes  to  the  creation  of  a  common  European  identity  by
constructing Muslims as Europe’s common ‘Other’ (see also Wodak & Boukala, 2014,
2015).
Like the above-mentioned research work, the present study also draws extensively on
Wodak  et  al.’s  (2009)  original  approach,  particularly  in  terms  of  conceptual
assumptions, analytical methods and empirical findings. Firstly, it shares the following
general assumptions: i) nations are primarily mental constructs, in the sense that they
exist  as  discrete  political  communities  in  the  imagination  of  their  members;  ii)
national  identity  includes  a  set  of  dispositions,  attitudes  and  conventions  that  are
largely internalised through socialisation (see Pickel’s notion of national habitus in §
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3.3.2); and iii) nationhood as a form of social identity is produced, transformed and
dismantled  through  discourse  (2009:  pp.  3-4).  Secondly,  it  follows  the  proposed
categorisation of discursive macro-strategies employed in the discursive formation of
national  identity,  which  distinguishes  between  constructive  strategies,  strategies  of
perpetuation  (with  strategies  of  justification  as  a  special  subgroup),  strategies  of
transformation,  and  dismantling  or  destructive  strategies  (2009:  pp.  31-33);  in
particular,  it  adopts the proposed typology of specific  strategies  pertaining to each
macro-strategy  (e.g.  autonomisation/heteronomisation,  singularisation/unification,
assimilation/dissimilation,  inclusion/exclusion,  just  to  mention  some),  which  I
integrate into my own analytical approach (this is detailed in § 3.5 below). Thirdly, it
builds  on  concrete  empirical  findings  regarding  the  Austrian  case  to  elaborate  a
comprehensive list of macro-topics that are relevant to the discursive representation of
the nation in general (see § 3.4 below).
In conclusion, the DHA enables researchers elaborate analytical frameworks that are
both grounded in social theory and, at the same time, robustly problem-oriented and
context-specific. Therefore, the elaboration of a DHA-based approach to the study of
the interplay of intellectual activity and nation-building practices in the post-Yugoslav
context requires bringing together knowledge of the post-Yugoslav context, on the one
hand,  and  theoretical  insights  into  the  relationship  between  intellectuals,  public
discourse,  and the nation-building  process.  The main  aspects  of the post-Yugoslav
context  (specifically  the fourth level,  i.e.  the socio-political  and historical  context)
have been outlined in Chapter 2. In the following two sections (§ 3.2 and 3.3) I shall
discuss the relationship between intellectual practice and discourse, and the role of
intellectuals vis-à-vis nation-building processes.
3.2 Intellectuals and discourse: between estrangement and social
spokespersonship
Intellectuals  are  an  elusive  social  category.  They  escape  easy  definition,  perhaps
precisely because defining the world is what intellectual activity itself is ultimately
about. Such capacity to define is commonly understood as the power of intellectuals to
articulate, reproduce and possibly change salient aspects of the social world, primarily
through the skilled use of language in public communication. This suggests that there
may be something specific about how intellectuals communicate which lends validity
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and credence to what they say or write. The purpose of this section is to elucidate this
idea by reviewing and discussing prominent conceptions of ‘the intellectual’, in order
to define what is specific about intellectual activity that distinguishes it from other
kinds of social practices.
A useful entry-point to discuss the nature of intellectual activity is the paradox of self-
definition  hinted  at  above.  As  Bauman  (1987)  noted,  virtually  any  conceivable
definition  of the intellectual  is  inescapably a self-definition.  The idea is  that what
makes somebody an intellectual is primarily the capacity to define, or rather to impose
definitions onto,  certain aspects of the social world, including one’s own place in it.
However, this power would be void if the intellectual did not presuppose that he or she
is  somehow  entitled  to  wield  it.  Thus,  it  could  be  argued,  drawing  on  Habermas
(1987), that intellectual activity rests on an implicit, presupposed claim to rightness,
i.e. the claim to have the right to perform acts of defining.
A seminal theory of the intellectual is the one proposed by Gramsci (Gramsci, Hoare
&  Nowell-Smith,  1971).  Before  Gramsci,  classical  Marxism  had  theorised  the
historical mission of the proletariat to overthrow the ruling class, as underpinned by
the ‘iron laws’ of economics. However, as the actual working class proved unable to
live up to it, Marxist intellectuals profiled themselves as the vanguard and arrogated to
themselves  the  task  of awakening  the  proletariat’s  self-consciousness.  Gramsci’s
theory dispels the implicit  ambiguity of this stance by reclaiming the centrality of
intellectuals  to  the  class  struggle.  Social  domination,  he  argues,  rests  on  cultural
hegemony, that is, the capacity of imposing a certain worldview onto an entire society
in  order  to  secure  consent.  Class  struggle,  therefore,  takes  place  primarily  in  the
domain  of culture,  where different  social  blocs  strive to  impose  their  worldviews.
They do so through organic intellectuals, that is, intellectuals who, unlike traditional
ones,  are  explicitly  and  consciously  committed  to  directing  the  ideas  and  the
aspirations  of  the  social  class  from  which  they  emerged.  The  final  triumph  of
communism, therefore, is predicated on the ability of the subjugated classes to express
themselves culturally and intellectually and thus achieve cultural hegemony.9
9 Gramsci’s theory lies at the basis of Cultural Political Economy, an approach to critical studies in
heterodox economics and political economy elaborated by Jessop and Sum (Sum & Jessop, 2010, 2012;
Jessop & Sum, 2010, 2012).
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Echoing Gramsci, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge rests on the assumption that
all forms of social and political knowledge originate in, and are motivated by, the will
of particular social groups to make their worldview universal and thus achieve power
and  recognition  (Mannheim,  1952).  The  partisan  character  of  all  knowledges,
however, does not prevent the possibility of their intellectual synthesis. But this can be
achieved only by a social stratum that is relatively free from the constraints of class
affiliation:  a  free-floating  intelligentsia,  which  is  neither  proletarian  nor  bourgeois
(Mannheim, 1936). Not surprisingly, the idea that intellectuals could rise above their
material interests and social determinations aroused much (intellectual) suspicion. In
response to it,  the critical  sociology of intellectuals elaborated by Gouldner (1979)
reasserted that the discourse of intellectuals is intrinsically affected by the interests
and  power  aspirations  of  those  who  produce  it.  Hence,  self-reflexivity  becomes
imperative: knowledge producers themselves must be subjected to critical scrutiny or,
as Gouldner put it, the camera must be focused on the camera operator (1979: p. 9).
The interconnectedness of power, knowledge and truth is also at the core of Foucault’s
theory of power/knowledge (Foucault, 1972; Foucault & Gordon, 1980), which claims
that people are subjected to the production of truth through power, and cannot exercise
power but through the production of truth. Every society, Foucault claims, has its own
regime of truth, which determines what kinds of discourses are generally taken to be
true, what procedures should govern the acquisition  and dissemination of truth, and
what the status of the people who perform these tasks is. Therefore, intellectuals are
‘produced’ as specific and increasingly specialised positions within given regimes of
truth, and as such are unable to fulfil the traditional role ascribed to them, i.e. that of
disclosing  and  bearing  universal  truths  and  values.  Nonetheless,  Foucault  (1980)
maintains, it  is precisely by virtue of their  specificity that intellectuals can wage a
(local) struggle against hegemonic forms of power/knowledge. The purpose of such
struggle is not to emancipate truth from power, which is an illusion (a chimera), but to
detach specific  truths,  and the corresponding subjugated knowledges,  from present
forms of hegemony. It is in this sense that intellectual activity can still aspire to take
on some sort of universal significance.
The relationship  between power and knowledge is  also central  to  the economy of
practice elaborated by Bourdieu (1991) in order to account for the unequal distribution
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of different forms of power across society. His theory conceives the social world as a
multi-dimensional space separated into relatively autonomous fields, or metaphorical
markets, in which different kinds of capital – economic, cultural, symbolic, linguistic
–  are  at  stake.  The amounts  of  different  types  of capital  possessed by individuals
objectively determine their social position, that is, their “actual or potential powers in
different fields and the chances of access to the specific profits they procure” (1991: p.
231). The interaction between each person’s social position and their habitus, i.e. the
set of embodied dispositions, values and expectations that each social group acquires
through everyday life experiences, is what determines how people behave socially. 
When it comes to intellectuals as a social group, it can be argued that the type of
capital that chiefly determines their social position is symbolic capital. According to
Bourdieu, the unequal distribution of symbolic capital (in terms of prestige, reputation
and fame) underlies the emergence of what he calls  symbolic power. This form of
power consists of the ability to shape social reality by modifying the representations
that social actors have of it, which is obtained through the imposition of principles of
di-vision that actualise certain visions of the world and at the same time legitimise
certain social divisions. In the case of specialists, i.e. intellectuals, the key distinction
that is invoked in order to secure a monopoly of knowledge is that between sacred and
profane knowledge. It is precisely by imposing this kind of division, usually by means
of an elevated style of expression, that intellectuals are able to authorise themselves as
legitimate repositories and producers of valid knowledge.
The idea that the tension between sacred and profane is central to intellectual activity
also lies at the basis of the categorisation of intellectuals proposed by Giesen (2011),
which identifies four ideal types: the cosmopolitan ascetic, the enlightened legislator,
the  revolutionary  and  the  voice  of  traumatic  memory.  The  cosmopolitan  ascetic
reflects the position of intellectuals in medieval feudal Europe, whose command of
written  Latin  allowed  them to  participate  in  a  translocal  high  culture  from which
common people were totally excluded; the enlightened legislator corresponds to the
figure of the Enlightenment intellectual, who, unlike medieval ascetics, pursued the
active transformation of the world in the name of reason and human progress; the
revolutionary is the type of intellectual that originated in the late eighteenth century,
with the rise of movements seeking democratic participation, civil rights and national
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independence (see § 3.3.1 below); lastly, the intellectual as voice of traumatic memory
reflects the central place that the remembrance of past collective trauma occupies in
contemporary discourses of national identity (see § 3.4 in this regard).
Giesen’s typology builds on and extends Bauman’s  (1987) renowned metaphorical
characterisation  of  the  intellectual  in  terms  of  the  dichotomy of ‘legislator  versus
interpreter’. The most conspicuous attribute of modernity, Bauman argues (drawing on
Foucault),  is the  power/knowledge syndrome,  i.e. the synergy,  inaugurated with the
Enlightenment, between the emergence of the bureaucratic state and the establishment
of an autonomous intellectual discourse.  Modern intellectuals serve the purposes of
the modern state by acting as legislators: they enforce the social order by virtue of
their superior knowledge of the world and  their command of the procedures which
assure  the  attainment  of  truth.  In  recent  times,  however,  the  coupling  between
intellectual discourse and the state has begun to dissolve. As a result, a world-view has
emerged which admits an unlimited number of models of orders (not just one) and
which rejects the idea that practices can be validated by knowledge criteria that are
external  to  the  particular  tradition  or  community  of  meaning  that  generated  those
practices. In this state of affairs, usually referred to as post-modernity, the intellectual
can only act as interpreter: he or she acquires the function of translating statements
and propositions from one system of knowledge to another, in order to minimise the
distortion of meaning in the process of communication.
The core idea of Bauman’s theory is that intellectual activity, once instrumental to the
establishment of the modern state, has become a resource for various communities to
achieve social recognition. In epistemological terms, this corresponds to the historical
shift from the positivist (and liberal) ideal of value-neutral knowledge to a variety of
standpoint epistemologies, which rest on the assumption that scientific knowledge is
necessarily position-bound, partial and partisan, and that objectivity can be attained
only by assuming a certain social standpoint, that which guarantees a ‘better vision’.
What primarily differentiates standpoint theories is, obviously, the chosen standpoint.
For classical Marxism (which, however, did not define itself as a standpoint theory) it
was  the  proletariat.  Feminist  theories  look  at  social  reality,  as  it  were,  from the
position of (subordinated) women (see for instance Haraway, 1988). Black studies and
queer theory advocate forms of knowledge stemming from the perspective of black
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and  queer  people,  respectively.  Whether  grounded  in  class,  ethnicity,  gender  or
sexuality,  standpoint  theories  are  similar  in  that  they  conceive  of intellectual  and
scientific activity as being bound to a specific standpoint,  which is considered to be
the privileged position from which social change and emancipation can be effectively
articulated and concretely pursued. 
Although the theories and approaches exposed so far emphasise different aspects of
intellectual  activity  and are thus difficult  to  reconcile,  it  is  possible  to identify an
element that is common to most of them. In one way or another, most accounts depict
the  ‘intellectual  condition’  as  a  social  (and  arguably  also  psychological)  state
characterised  by  a  constant  tension  between  the  pretension  to  speak  from  a
disinterested  vantage  point,  thus  achieving  critical  distance from  their  object  of
analysis, and the inevitably socially determined character of  any such endeavour.  In
other words, intellectuals appear to be caught in a tension between detachedness and
situatedness that is inherent to their position in society.
3.2.1 Pels’ theory of intellectual spokespersonship
The  theory  of  intellectual  spokespersonship  elaborated  by  Pels  (2000)  focuses
precisely on this fundamental tension, arguing that it derives from the dual nature of
social representation. Social representation is the process whereby social entities, such
as collectivities, relationships, interests, values, norms and so forth, are ‘activated’ and
‘performed’, that is, made to matter in social life (see Hall, 1997). According to Pels,
this  process  requires  spokespersons,  i.e.  agents  who  are  legitimised  or  claim  the
authority  to  ‘speak for’ specific  social  entities.  Any act  of  spokespersonship,  Pels
argues, is intrinsically ambiguous, because it involves a distanciation from whom or
what is being represented, as social entities “must first be reduced to (or seduced into)
silence before they can effectively be spoken for” (2000: p. 2). This means that social
representation involves the constant danger that spokespersons might recontextualise
the position, and thus appropriate the power, of the subjects that they represent, so that
ultimately  “all  representative  acts  are  crucially  implicated  in  struggles  over
trustworthiness and legitimacy” (2000: p. 2).10 
10 The  main  objective  of  Pels’ inquiry  is  to  identify  instances  of  this  kind  of  appropriation  in
sociological discourse, focusing in particular on prominent approaches such as Marxism, Mannheim’s
sociology of knowledge, and standpoint epistemologies in general.
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Pels regards intellectuals as a particular kind of spokespersons, whose inherent tension
between detachedness and situatedness arises from the specific  way in which they
tend to engage in social representation. As discussed above, the intellectual condition
has  traditionally  been associated  with  a  state  of  marginalization  from the  broader
society. According to Pels, such state has often been
a source of considerable epistemic pride, in so far as intellectuals have often presumed
the existence of a structural relationship between their generic distanciation and their
chances of attaining a broader, less distorted, more objective or just view of the social
world. (2000: pp. ix-x)
In other words, intellectuals’ assumed epistemic advantage over the rest of society, i.e.
their capacity to think critically and go beyond the horizons of common sense, appears
to be tied to some form of conscious withdrawal from society, which is well illustrated
by the clichéd metaphor of the ivory tower. However, such alienation from the social
world  is  likely  to  create  great  resentment  and  anxiety.  In  order  to  overcome  this
condition,  Pels  maintains,  intellectuals  have  often  sought  to  reclaim  a  sense  of
belonging to society (i.e. a sense of situatedness) by publicly endorsing certain social
ideals, political causes or larger interests. In doing so, they have assumed the role of
spokespersons, lending their voice, as it were, to a variety of  constituencies (as Pels
calls  them), e.g. History,  the Working Class, the Nation,  Culture,  Science,  Reason,
Justice, but also specific political parties, movements, campaigns and so forth. 
Hence, according to this theory, what defines intellectuals as a distinct social category
is the implicit ambivalence with which they articulate their own standpoint in public
discourse: on the one hand, they seek to stress their distance from the broader society
in order to legitimise themselves as intellectuals; on the other, they tend to bracket or
even obliterate that distance by coming forward as spokespersons for certain social
constituencies. This key insight provides a useful theoretical basis for the analysis of
the discursive practices of intellectuals. The elaboration of a comprehensive discourse-
analytical framework for the present study, however, requires a detailed investigation
of the intellectual spokespersonship for a specific constituency, i.e. the Nation. The
next section is thus devoted to examining the relationship between intellectuals and
the nation-building process from a historical and sociological perspective.
60
3.3 Spokespersonship for the nation: intellectuals as nation-
makers
In this  section,  I  elaborate  on the role that  intellectuals  play in  relation to  nation-
building processes, both in a historical perspective and in the frame of contemporary
global tendencies. These insights will inform the second component of the analytical
framework,  which  addresses  the  discursive  manifestations  of  intellectual
spokespersonship for the nation.
3.3.1 The modern intellectual as a ‘nation-maker’
Among  various  approaches  to  nationalism  and  nation-building,  the  so-called
modernist perspective or paradigm (Smith, 1998) posits that nationalism, defined as a
political ideology based on individual and collective identification with the nation as a
sovereign  entity,  is  a  relatively  recent  phenomenon  that  requires  the  structural
conditions  of  modern  industrial  societies  in  order  to  exist.  More  specifically,
proponents of this paradigm argue that the historical development of the nation-state
as the primary form of political,  social and cultural  organisation of modern human
societies is strictly connected with the emergence of a national intelligentsia,  i.e. a
class  of  professionals  and  intellectuals  working  in  the  service  of  industrial
development,  bureaucratic  administration  and  mass  education.  We  have  already
encountered this concept in Bauman’s (1987) portrayal of the modern intellectual as a
legislator, that is, as an authority tasked with administering a new form of state power
capable of planning and implementing established models of social relations (see §
3.2). In a similar characterisation, Smith describes the modern intelligentsia as “the
new priesthood of the nation” (1986: p. 157), arguing that the emerging national elites,
made up of administrators, educators and other professional specialists, have gradually
replaced the pre-modern clergy as the holders of the monopoly of truth. 
The  central  argument  underlying  these  evocative  representations  is  that  modern
societies require the creation and dissemination of national cultures in order to sustain
industrial and economic development, maintain an effective bureaucracy, and ensure
the  circulation  of  knowledge  and  information.  According  to  Gellner  (1983),  the
imposition of homogeneous and standardised ‘high cultures’ is a precondition for the
functioning  of  modern  nation-states.  Such  literate  cultures  need  to  be  specially
cultivated, that is, nurtured and disseminated through a unified educational system and
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supervised by the academic community. These tasks, he argues, can be performed only
by an educated class of intellectuals and professionals, who therefore emerge as the
guardians, or rather the ‘gardeners’ (Bauman, 1987), of modern national cultures. 
Indeed, many scholars have pointed out the key role of intellectuals in establishing the
nation as a homogeneous cultural system, i.e. the process that is commonly referred to
as  nation-building.  According  to  Anderson  (1983),  every  modern  nation  is  an
imagined political community, because it rests on the capacity of its members to feel a
strong sense of communion, although even in the smallest  nations they are mostly
strangers to one another. The very possibility of imagining the nation, or rather oneself
as part of a specific nation, arose historically with the spread of print-capitalism, that
is, when publishers started printing books and other media in the vernacular languages
(instead  of  exclusive  languages  such  as  Latin  in  Europe)  in  order  to  maximise
circulation.  This  created  unified  communication  environments  in  which  educated
readers began to think of themselves as members of distinct cultural  communities,
each  based  on  a  specific  print-language,  i.e.  a  standardised  or  codified  language;
moreover,  these  print-languages  also  became  instruments  of  administrative
centralisation,  i.e. ‘languages of power’, which laid the basis for the emergence of
nations as sovereign political entities. As an imagined community,  the nation needs
constantly to be narrated and talked about in ways that are resonant and familiar to all
of its  members.  Historically as well  as today,  this  has been the prerogative of the
intellectual  elites  who, by nurturing a  shared national  imagination  through various
media,  have  contributed,  and  still  contribute,  to  the  formation  of  national
consciousness.
The importance of intellectuals in processes of nation-formation has been stressed also
by Smith (1998), who maintains, drawing on Breuilly (1993), that there is
a specific sense in which intellectuals as well as professionals, notably educators, are
crucial to nationalisms: so often, they propose the category of the nation in the first
place  and  endow  it  with  symbolic  significance.  It  is  their  imagination  and
understanding that gives the nation its contours and much of its emotional content.
Through  their  images  and  symbols,  they  portray  and  re-present  to  others  the
significance and distinctiveness of the nation (1998: pp. 91-92).
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This description of intellectuals as having the ability to ‘activate’ the category of the
nation,  that  is,  to  make  it  matter  to  people  by  shaping  its  symbolic  content,  is  a
concrete  illustration  of  Bourdieu’s  concept  of  symbolic  power,  but  is  especially
reminiscent of Pels’ theory of social representation and intellectual spokespersonship
(both have been discussed in § 3.2 above). Indeed, the notion of spokespersonship as
the  legitimation  of  one’s  authority  through  the  act  of  representing  certain  social
constituencies  captures  very  well  the  unique  link  that  seems  to  exist  between
intellectuals and the modern nation as such.
Among the various dimensions of the symbolic construction of the nation, Hobsbawm
(1983) has discussed the strategic  use of history as a resource to legitimise social
action and cement social cohesion. In his view, one of the key features of modern
societies is the  invention of tradition, that is, the fabrication of a factitious sense of
continuity with a historical  past  through symbolic  and ritual practices that  seek to
inculcate values and norms by repetition. Modern nations, he maintains, are largely
based on such invented traditions. Although they generally claim to be ‘natural’ and
rooted  in  the  remotest  antiquity,  they  tend  to  be  subjectively  experienced  and
interpreted  on  the  basis  of  recent  symbols,  such  as  flags,  public  ceremonies  and
monuments, as well as suitably tailored public discourses, such as official ‘national
histories’. In other words, “[t]he history which became part of the fund of knowledge
or the ideology of the nation [...] is not what has actually been preserved in popular
memory,  but  what  has  been  selected,  written,  pictured,  popularised  and
institutionalised by those whose function is to do so” (1983: p. 13). The ‘fabricators’
of national traditions alluded to by Anderson are primarily thinkers and educators –
again, intellectuals – who are in a position to disseminate the national culture through
the educational system and the media.
A similar point has been made by Gellner (1983), who openly criticises the ideology
of nationalism for being based on a fundamental (self-)deception, whereby the modern
character of the nation is concealed, as it were, behind the veil of antiquity and folk
culture. As mentioned above, Gellner regards nationalism as a modern phenomenon,
arguing that the nation as a new form of social organisation has emerged in response
to  the  requirements  of  bureaucratic  and technological  communication  imposed  by
industrial  societies.  However,  Gellner  contends,  “this  is  the very opposite  of what
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nationalism affirms and what nationalists fervently believe”, which is that nations are
deeply rooted in the “healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants, of the  Volk, the
narod” (1983: p. 57), of which they represent some sort of ‘awakening’. Although
Gellner is less explicit  than Anderson in identifying the agents responsible for this
‘deception’, a strong case can again be made for intellectuals, whom Gellner defines
as the “driving force of [...] nationalism” (1983: p. 118).
What emerges from the theories exposed above is the absolute primacy of intellectuals
in the articulation of national cultures and the symbolic construction of the nation as a
homogeneous political community rooted in a historic past. This point has been made
with much force by Suny and Kennedy (1999), who conceive of nations as social
formations  that  may  grow  out  of  various  kinds  of  communities  (e.g.  ethnic  or
civic/territorial),  but that come together and understand themselves as nations only
through the efforts of intellectual and political elites to articulate powerful national
discourses  able  to  mobilise  the  masses.  Indeed,  the  two  authors  attribute  to
intellectuals the greatest agency in the process of nation formation. This emerges quite
strongly in this vivid description of how intellectuals have established themselves as
‘nation-makers’:
[Intellectuals were] the “revivers” of cultures that had been forgotten, or,  in many
cases, not yet constituted. They were the discoverers of the folk, the people, whom
they defined and delimited. In an increasingly democratic age they were the political
philosophers who shaped the new universal discourse of the nation, linking people,
power,  and  territory  to  notions  of  representation,  self-determination  and  popular
sovereignty. Intellectuals transformed inchoate peoples into mobilizable nationalities
and modern nations in ways similar to the homogenization of populations carried out
by  bureaucratic  states.  They  spread  the  national  message,  wrote  the  articles  and
published the newspapers, edited the grammars and the dictionaries, taught the classes
and wrote the laws that  bounded the people and determined the citizenry.  And in
many cases they came to power, took control of the instruments of the state and used
that awesome power to promote their nation’s welfare and security as they saw it, its
advancement and expansion, in a dangerous world of national competition (1999: p.
423).
Furthermore, in order to account for the specific ways in which intellectuals engage in
processes of nation-building, Suny and Kennedy have outlined a theory of  national
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intellectual practice. According to it, the national discourses produced by intellectuals
underpin the formation of the nation, but simultaneously constitute the structure that
enables and constrains intellectual activity as such (which is consistent with the co-
constitutive nature of the relationship between discourse and social reality postulated
in  critical  discourse  studies,  see  §  3.1.1).  As  a  result  of  this  mutual  articulation,
intellectuals are faced with a double risk: “[o]n the one hand, as patriots they lose their
credentials  as  critical  or  independent.  On  the  other  hand,  as  critical  intellectuals
questioning the very ‘authenticity’ of the nation, they are either ignored, marginalized,
or cast out altogether” (Kennedy & Suny, 1999: p. 5). This insight illustrates quite
well  the  tension  between  situatedness  and  detachedness  that  Pels  considers  to  be
inherent to the intellectual condition as such (see § 3.2).
3.3.2 Intellectuals and nation-building in the contemporary world
There  is  wide  agreement  among  modernist  (and  Marxist)  scholars  that  modern
nationalism originated in Europe in the period following the French revolution, as a
result of the historical emergence of industrial society and the establishment of the
nation-state as the primary principle of social organisation. As discussed above, they
regard nationalism and nationhood as projects of modernity,  inextricably connected
with the centralising tendency towards the homogenisation of populations that defines
modern statehood. In the contemporary post-industrial world, however, global trends
of  cultural  fragmentation  (connected  to  growing  economic  interdependence,
consumerism,  mass  migration,  and  the  diffusion  of  communication  networks)
increasingly override national boundaries. This has led some scholars to envisage the
end of the ‘age of nationalism’, suggesting that humanity is about to to enter a post-
national era in which nations and nationhood will gradually but inevitably lose their
significance for large segments of the world’s population. This attitude is encapsulated
in this much-quoted prediction by Hobsbawm: 
It is not impossible that nationalism will decline with the decline of the nation-state
[...]. It would be absurd to claim that this day is already near. However, I hope it can
at least be envisaged. After all, the very fact that historians are at least beginning to
make some progress in the study and analysis of nations and nationalism suggests
that, as so often, the phenomenon is past its peak. The owl of Minerva which brings
wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round
nations and nationalism (1990: p. 192).
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The assumption that nationalism and nation-states are abating as a result of increasing
cultural fragmentation is one of the central tenets of postmodernism. Bauman’s theory
of the intellectual, which has been briefly discussed above (§ 3.2), rests precisely on
this assumption: the shift from the role of the legislator to that of the interpreter, in
fact,  is  taken  to  be  a  consequence  of  the  decoupling  of  the  intellectual  from the
modern state, whose function as ordering principle and source of identification has
been  superseded  in  a  globalised  world  by  the  proliferation  of  different  cultural
communities and multiple forms of affiliation.  In a similar  vein, Appadurai (1996)
maintains  that  transnational  trends,  especially  connected  with  global  financial
capitalism, have ‘de-territorialised’ the nation-state, making it necessary for people to
rethink themselves and their identities outside and beyond the national frame. From
the perspective of political science, the supposed crisis of the modern nation-state in
the era of globalisation has been conceptualised mainly as a loss of sovereignty, that
is,  as  diminished  control  by the  state  over  activities  and processes  that  transcend
territorial  boundaries  and  a  growing  inability  to  face  the  pressures  coming  from
transnational  governance arrangements  and the global  market  (Beck,  1999).  Heller
(2011), for instance, argues that the political and economic conditions of globalisation
destabilise  hegemonic  discourses  of  national  identity  and  the  nation-state,  thus
ushering in an age of post-nationalism.
Whereas  the  loss  of  political  sovereignty  of  nation-states  in  the  face  of  global
processes  is  relatively  little  disputed,  the  postmodernist  argument  that  national
identities  are  becoming  increasingly  hybridised  and  therefore  less  salient  as  a
consequence of mass migration and the influx of culturally diverse economic migrants
into more affluent western societies (e.g. Bhabha, 1990) has been met  with strong
objections. The opponents of the post-national paradigm not only argue that the nation
persists as a fundamental source of identity, community and collective memory, but
also point out that processes linked to globalization have in fact led in recent times to
the resurgence of nationalism in various parts of the world (Zuelow, Young & Sturm,
2007; see also Smith, 1998: pp. 202-205). In the European context, for instance, re-
nationalising tendencies have been clearly observed especially in regard to attitudes
and policies towards immigrants and refugees (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy,
2005; Wodak, 2015), signalling a general retreat from multiculturalism as a political
project.
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According to the critics of the post-national paradigm, in the global era the nation still
represents a hegemonic form of cultural affiliation and social organisation, as well as a
tremendously  important  source  of  political  legitimacy  –  the  most  prominent
constituency, as Pels would put it. The pervasiveness and endurance of nationalism
and national identities in contemporary societies has been addressed from manifold
theoretical and analytical perspectives. Pickel (2004), for instance, has elaborated the
concept of national habitus (drawing on Bourdieu, see § 3.2) to capture the idea that
nationhood is largely internalised and so deeply embedded in the ways people think
about  themselves  as  to  appear  as  something  natural  and  universal.  The  modern
individual, he argues, is primarily a homo nationis, because he or she is typically born
and raised in a particular national culture, and socialised as a citizen of a particular
nation-state.  Consequently,  his  or  her  specific  dispositions,  i.e.  forms  of  thinking,
feeling,  acting  and  interacting,  tend  to  reflect  general  patterns  determined  by
nationhood,  thus  forming  what  Pickel  calls  a  “nationalised  personality  structure”
(2004:  p.  327).  Such  national  habitus,  he  concludes,  constitutes  a  pervasive  and
embodied  psycho-social  infrastructure,  and is  therefore  constitutive  of  the  modern
nation-state order (see also Wodak et al., 2009).
A groundbreaking approach to the discursive reproduction of nationhood is Billig’s
study (1995) of what has since become known as banal nationalism. His central claim
is  that,  in  established  nation-states,  nationhood  has  become  so  ‘enhabited’  and
naturalised  that  it  no  longer  requires  acts  of  national  imagination  (as  Anderson
suggests, see above) to reproduce itself. Instead, it operates as an implicit background
for a variety of social practices, political discourses and cultural products, which only
needs to be hinted at, that is, ‘flagged’, in order to be effectively activated. As Billig
puts it, it is small, prosaic words such as ‘we’ and ‘our’, rather than grand memorable
narratives,  that  “offer  constant,  but  barely  conscious,  reminders  of  the  homeland,
making ‘our’ national identity unforgettable” (1995: p. 93). The banal character  of
nationalism, Billig contends, has two problematic implications. The first is that the
people living in established nation-states (such as western democracies) tend to view
nationalism as a dangerous and irrational condition affecting the global peripheries,
thus forgetting, or at least conveniently overlooking, the fact that nationalist ideologies
are a constitutive aspect of their individual and collective self. The second implication
is that nationalism has become so deeply ingrained in contemporary ways of thinking
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that it is not easily studied or theorised, because analysts may be unaware of the extent
to which related unquestioned assumptions and common-sense habits actually shape
their research work. Therefore, Billig concludes, the investigation of nationalism and
its discursive manifestations should necessarily be a critical study involving a high
degree of self-reflexivity.
The general point illustrated by the above theories and approaches is that even in the
contemporary  world  nations  are  always  in  the  making.  Nation-building  is  not  a
historical phase that has now concluded, nor can nations be established once and for
all.  On  the  contrary,  they  need  to  be  continuously  reproduced,  narrated,  and
‘enhabited’ in  order  to  subsist,  especially  in  an  increasingly  globalised  world.  As
Balibar  claims,  the  fundamental  challenge  is  “to  make  the  people  produce  itself
continually as a national community. Or again, it is to produce the effect of unity by
which the people will appear, in anyone’s eyes, ‘as a people’, that is, as the basis and
origin of political power” (Balibar, 1991: pp. 93-94). In other words, the nation-state
can only legitimise itself by literally producing the nation that serves as the basis for
its legitimation (Butler & Spivak, 2007).
Although  nations  are  everywhere  and  always  in  the  making,  there  are  specific
situations in which nation-building processes gain more impetus and become more
explicit than in others. This is particularly the case with modern post-colonial nations,
whose elites have mobilised people and resources in the pursuit of full statehood, and
also with newly emerging states, which strive to ‘nationalise’ themselves through the
promotion of official national cultures. The post-Yugoslav transitional context, which
has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, is an obvious illustration of the
latter case, along with the analogous situation that emerged from the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. According to Kennedy and Suny (1999), intellectuals are particularly
significant in the articulation of the nation precisely in such situations of crisis and
transition, as they find familiar work in the codification of new official languages, the
production of histories and the promotion of unique national values and visions. This
insight finds confirmation in Hobsbawm’s remark that the invention of tradition is
particularly heightened when societies undergo dramatic and radical changes:
There is probably no time and place with which historians are concerned which has
not seen the ‘invention’ of tradition in this sense. However, we should expect it to
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occur more frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the
social patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed, producing new ones to
which they were not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional
carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are
otherwise eliminated [...]. (1983: pp. 4-5)
In  sum,  nation-building  ideologies  and  practices  continue  to  be  hegemonic  in  the
contemporary world, especially in so-called transitional societies (such as the post-
Yugoslav  ones)  in  which  old  social,  political  and  economic  structures  are  being
replaced by new ones. Due to the pervasiveness of processes of nation-formation in
contemporary societies, it is reasonable to assume that the historical nexus between
intellectuals and nation-building described above has not dissolved. On the contrary,
the  power  to  articulate  and  disseminate  national  cultures,  especially  in  newly
established states, has largely remained the prerogative of intellectuals, who therefore
maintain their role of privileged spokespersons for the nation even today.
3.4 The representation of the nation in public discourse
After having discussed the key role that modern and contemporary intellectuals play
in the articulation of national cultures, I now turn my attention to the very contents of
these processes of social  representation,  by considering the relevant  aspects of the
nation that are available to be constructed in public discourse. Broadly speaking, the
discursive nature of national cultures has been pointed out, among others, by Hall,
who maintains that 
[a] national culture is a discourse – a way of constructing meanings which influences
and organises both our actions and our conception of ourselves [...]. National cultures
construct  identities  by producing meanings  about  ‘the  nation’ with  which we can
identify; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which
connect its present with its past, and imagines which are constructed of it. (1996: p.
613)
In the following, I shall attempt to identify the main aspects of the nation that are
available  to  be  activated,  emphasised  or  made  banal  (in  Billig’s  terms)  when
intellectuals speak for the nation in public discourse. Drawing on prominent theories
of nationalism and nation-building (see § 3.3), I propose a categorisation including
five main thematic areas or macro-topics. This categorisation is not intended as an
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exhaustive treatment of all the elements of a national culture that can be expressed in
discourse,  but  rather  as  a  heuristic  tool  to  orient  the  analysis  of  the  discursive
representation of the nation in specific contexts and situations.
3.4.1 The discursive representation of the nation: macro-topics
At the most fundamental level, speaking for the nation involves representing it as a
distinct social entity, that is, as something that can be identified as such and, at the
same time, distinguished from its counterparts, i.e. other nations. As noted by Breuilly
(see § 3.3.1 above), intellectuals are crucial to nation formation precisely insofar as
they affirm and sustain the distinctiveness of the nation. Similarly, according to Smith,
the idea that the nation has its own peculiar character is one of the core propositions
of every nationalist doctrine (1998: p. 187). Since nations are human communities,
positing the peculiar and distinctive character of a nation implies establishing criteria
of belonging based on some specific attributes shared by its members. These attributes
might  be  the  most  diverse,  which  is  reflected  in  the  existence  of  competing
conceptions of the nation, both in scholarly and in popular discourse. A distinction that
is rather entrenched in the specialised literature in sociology and political science is
that between the  Kulturnation,  whereby membership is defined by criteria  that are
perceived as objective and essential,  such as ethnic  belonging,  language,  tradition,
territory  and  ancestry,  and  Staatsnation,  which  is  based  instead  on  civic-political
criteria,  such as  the  will  of  the  citizens  to  be part  of  a  legally  instituted  political
community (Wodak et al., 2009). This distinction is codified in citizenship legislation
as the separation between the principles of jus sanguinis (right of blood) and jus soli
(right  of  the  soil),  which  determine  how citizenship  is  inherited  (by birthplace  or
through  parents,  respectively).  The  dichotomy  of  ‘Kulturnation vs.  Staatsnation’,
Smith  cautions,  does  not  apply  to  particular  nationalisms,  as  all  of  them include
elements of both dimensions; however, he maintains, it can be a useful analytical tool
to explore the various ways in which national distinctiveness is constructed (1998: p.
126).
Whatever grounds are invoked to assert national distinctiveness, this is always an act
of self-definition,  which is “the social  process of naming and defining by self and
others  of  a  community  constituting  ‘us’ in  contrast  to  ‘them’,  outsiders  who  are
dissimilar and unfamiliar” (Smith, 2007: p. 19). It has been widely argued that any
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kind of identity is necessarily constructed through its relation to the Other, to what it
lacks,  that  is,  to  the  constitutive  negative  of  its  positive  meaning;  in  short,  that
“identities  are  constructed  through,  not  outside,  difference”  (Hall,  1995:  p.  4).
National identities,  of course, are no exception.  This has been pointed out,  among
others,  by  Triandafyllidou  (1998),  who  claims  that  national  identity  becomes
meaningful only in contrast to other nations, because national consciousness involves
both self-awareness of the group and awareness of significant others from which the
nation wishes to differentiate itself. More specifically, national self-definition usually
implies stressing internal sameness against the backdrop of external otherness. Thus,
“discursive  constructs  of  nations  and  national  identities  [...]  primarily  emphasise
national  uniqueness  and  intra-national  uniformity  but  largely  ignore  intra-national
differences” (Wodak et al., 2009: p. 4). 
In the light of these considerations, a fundamental dimension (or macro-topic) of the
discursive  representation  of  the  nation  is  the  construction  of  (1)  national
distinctiveness and homogeneity, which can be further differentiated in intra-national
and inter-national similarities and differences.
As stated above (§ 3.3), nationalism is generally defined as a political ideology based
on individual and collective identification with the nation as a sovereign entity. Thus,
another crucial dimension of nation-building discourses is the belief that the national
community should be able to determine itself as an autonomous social and political
entity, typically in the form of the modern (nation-)state. The linkage between national
self-determination and state  sovereignty is indeed enshrined in another of the core
propositions  of  nationalist  doctrines  identified  by Smith,  namely that  “nations  can
only be liberated and fulfilled in their own sovereign states” (1998: p. 187). Once this
linkage becomes accepted as necessary and indispensable, Smith argues, the nation
begins to operate as the fundamental source of political power, because “loyalty to it
overrides  all  other  loyalties”  (1998:  p.  187).  Obviously,  this  has  enormous
implications for political thought and practice. On the one hand, the nation becomes
the basis for any claim to political  legitimacy,  allowing political  elites to establish
themselves as representatives of the interests of the nation; on the other, it also serves
as a resource for political struggle and contestation, because elites may be criticised
and delegitimised by their opponents precisely for harming national interests. In sum,
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the nation can be invoked as a normative principle to legitimise or delegitimise certain
political arrangements, or even an entire political order.
In a similar way, the nation can also function as a principle of social  organisation.
Different  social  actors  may appeal  to  the  nation  in  order  to  promote  or  challenge
certain  social  arrangements  and  institutions.  They  may  discursively  articulate  the
nation in such a way as to justify or reject specific social roles, customs, hierarchies or
patterns of interaction, declaring them desirable or undesirable for a given community.
In this regard, the normative reach of the category of the nation is virtually unlimited,
ranging from particular aspects of the human body to broader social structures and
relationships.  Such  pervasiveness  is  probably  most  apparent  in  the  relationship
between nation, gender and sexuality. Iveković and Mostov (2002), for instance, stress
how nation-building practices tend to rest on rigid social constructions of masculinity
and femininity, in which women are expected to reproduce the nation (physically and
symbolically) while men are supposed to protect and avenge it. Moreover, the nation
can also be invoked to justify and entrench gender inequalities.  As Mostov (1995)
argues,  the ethnonational  concept  of nation defines  it  as a  patriarchal  family,  thus
assigning  to  men  the  power  to  act  as  ‘guardians  of  the  nation’ by  supervising
motherhood and reproduction. Furthermore, scholars like Mosse (1985) have explored
the link between nationalism and sexuality, particularly in regard to the dominance of
the  male  image in  völkish (i.e.  ethnonational)  thought.  Lastly,  Musolff  (2010) has
illuminated the relationship between nationalism and body politics, focusing on the
political  use  of  body-nation metaphors,  particularly  those  related  to  illness  and
parasites, in Nazi propaganda.
What emerges from the above is that various conceptions of the nation can be used as
warrants  for  asserting  certain  social  or  political  ordering  principles,  encouraging
conformity  to  norms and stigmatising  deviation  from them.  Therefore,  the  second
macro-topic  of  the  discursive  representation  of  the  nation  is  (2)  the  nation  as  an
ordered socio-political community.
In the above discussion about the primacy of intellectuals in the symbolic articulation
of  national  cultures  (§  3.3),  history  appeared  to  occupy  a  central  place.  In
Hobsbawm’s  view,  history  is  a  powerful  resource  for  legitimising  social  action:
modern nations, he argues, are largely based on invented traditions, that is, rituals and
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practices  aimed precisely at  cultivating  a  sense of  historical  continuity.  In a  more
critical vein, Gellner contends that nationalist ideologies manipulate history in order to
disguise the modern character of nations and make them appear as being rooted in
antiquity  and  folk  culture.  Indeed,  there  is  wide  agreement  among  nationalism
scholars that history and historical memory play a cardinal role in the creation and
articulation of national cultures (in this regard, see Wodak & De Cillia, 2007). 
Broadly speaking, nations as systems of cultural representation are based on (grand)
historical  narratives,  which  usually  emphasise  aspects  such  as  origins,  continuity,
tradition and timelessness (Hall, 1996: pp. 613-615). These narratives may include a
variety of elements, which various scholars have classified in different ways. Here I
propose a working list based on categorisations formulated by Kolakowski (1995),
Smith (2007: p. 19), and Hall (1996). The first element relates to myths of origins and
ancestry,  which  may include  tales  of  descent  from heroic  ancestors  and are  often
associated  with a  ‘nameable  beginning’,  that  is,  a  foundational  event.  The second
element is the teleological dimension, i.e. the belief that the national community has
an  intrinsic  purpose  or  mission  (a  telos)  entrusted  to  it  by  the  deity,  so  that  any
development  is  interpreted  as  a  fact  of  national  progress  and as  fulfilment  of  the
nation’s destiny. The third element is the fictitious idea of a pure, original people and
of pristine,  ancestral  homelands,  which are the object of collective attachment  and
intimate devotion. The fourth and last element includes ‘myth-memories’ of golden
ages and glorious heroes and heroines, who are to be celebrated, commemorated, and
possibly emulated as ideals of sacrifice, dignity and greatness.
In conclusion, history is often mobilised in order to create national mythologies and
ad hoc official  narratives,  which in turn serve to legitimise and reproduce national
cultures  and  identities.  Hence,  the  third  key  macro-topic  of  national  discourses
concerns (3) the sacred historical foundations of the nation.
Besides  representing  it  as  rooted  in  a  historic  and glorious  past,  speaking for  the
nation  may  also  involve  projecting  it  into  the  future,  particularly  as  a  collective
endeavour towards freedom and prosperity. This aspect resonates with another of the
core  propositions  of  nationalist  doctrines  identified  by Smith,  namely,  that  people
must identify and belong to a nation if they wish to be free and to realise themselves
(1998:  p.  187).  From this  point  of  view,  the  capacity  of  a  community  to  achieve
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freedom and self-fulfilment depends on the extent to which its members identify with,
and express loyalty to, the national project or cause. In a less narrow perspective, the
nation might be taken to incarnate a common vision of future prosperity, and at the
same time a model (or blueprint) for pursuing and realising that vision. In the recent
scholarship on nationalism,  however,  the idea of the nation as a conception and a
vision of the good has seldom been addressed in detail. This is probably a reflection of
what Sayer (2011) identifies as a general and deep-seated tendency within the social
sciences, namely, the reluctance to address and problematise conceptions of the good,
of well-being and of human flourishing. In this respect, the choice to shed light on this
aspect of the discursive construction of the nation is consistent with Sayer’s (2006)
exhortation  to  focus  precisely  on  how  existing  discourses  construe  and  interpret
notions of human flourishing and the good life.
The nation can be thought of, and talked about, as a collective endeavour towards
future  prosperity  either  as  a  teleology  (a  ‘design’)  or  as  a  social  project  with  no
predetermined outcome. In the former case, the future of the nation is conceived as the
necessary fulfilment of its preordained destiny (see above), in a way that binds its
members  into  a  community  of  destiny  (in  this  regard,  see  for  instance  Šarić,
Gammelgaard and Rå Hauge, 2012 on the discursive construction of identity related to
important  national  holidays);  in  the  latter,  national  progress  is  understood  as  the
contingent result of human action, which may or may not be conducive to the self-
actualisation  of  the national  community as  a  whole.  Either  way,  from a  discourse
perspective, casting the nation into the future involves building future scenarios. These
range from utopian scenarios, in which the nation overcomes all the hardships and
ultimately triumphs, to dystopian scenarios, in which the nation succumbs to external
or internal hostile forces and fatally perishes. Depending on how such scenarios are
discursively constructed, they can be drawn upon to argue in favour or against certain
forms  of  social  action  and  behaviour,  through  portraying  them  as  beneficial  or
detrimental to the good of the nation. 
In the light of the above, the fourth macro-topic of the discursive representation of the
nation is (4) the nation as a vision or project of future prosperity.
Finally, speaking for the nation may involve determining and evaluating the influence
that relevant  social  actors (individuals,  groups or institutions) have,  or could have,
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upon the life and wealth of the national community. In the above discussion about the
role of the nation-state in the era of globalisation (§ 3.3), particular emphasis was
placed  on  the  challenges  that  global  processes  such  as  economic  restructuring,
transnational  governance,  mass  migration  etc.  pose  to  national  sovereignty  and
national  identity.  So,  discourses  on the nation might  construct  specific  actors,  e.g.
transnational  companies,  supranational  political  institutions  or  immigrant
communities,  as  constituting  a  threat  to  the  nation  in  various  ways.  Conversely,
however, the same global phenomena could be interpreted as an opportunity for the
nation  to  reassert  its  capacity  to  govern  economic  and social  processes,  to  play a
distinct political role in the international community, as well as to promote and enrich
its  culture.  Thus, the relationship of the nation with some of the above-mentioned
actors may instead be discursively represented as virtuous and beneficial.
Another type of relationship that is likely to figure prominently in national discourses
is, of course, that with other nations. According to Smith, a fundamental assumption
of nationalist ideologies is that the world is naturally divided into nations, and that the
liberation and security of all nations are preconditions for achieving global freedom
and peace (1998: p. 187). From this perspective,  it  appears that each nation has a
vested interest in allowing other nations to develop autonomously and unobstructedly,
which  prefigures  some  kind  of  alliance,  or  at  least  an  agreement  of  mutual  non-
interference, among the world’s nations. This view seems to find confirmation in the
growing  integration  of  nation-states  into  a  global  system  of  governance  and
cooperation  (embodied  in  the  United  Nations  and  other  international  agencies);
however,  the  ongoing  proliferation  of  ethnic  and  national  animosities,  territorial
disputes  and armed conflicts  all  over the world rather suggests that  many modern
nations (still) perceive and often treat each other as potential or actual threats to their
own integrity and prosperity.  This gives credit to Schmitt’s (1996) emphasis on the
existential distinction between friend and enemy as constitutive of the modern political
order  (although  in  his  theory  enmity  is  not  necessarily  based  on  nationality).  Of
course, this polarisation does not only apply to external entities such as other nations
and international bodies, In fact, it may also be directed at actors that are internal to
the nation, such as ethnic or national minorities, immigrant communities, as well as
specific individuals or movements, which may be represented as ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’
of the nation.
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In  conclusion,  the  fifth  and  last  macro-topic  that  pertains  to  the  discursive
representation of the nation is (5) the nation and the Other (i.e. global actors, other
nations, intra-national actors).
3.5 A methodological framework for the analysis of intellectual 
spokespersonship for the nation in discourse
In the previous three sections, I have discussed theoretical aspects of the intellectual
condition, examined the specific relationship between modern intellectuals and nation-
building in the contemporary world, and identified the main elements (macro-topics)
of the representation of the nation in public discourse. The purpose of this section is to
draw upon these three areas to elaborate a comprehensive framework for analysing the
discursive manifestations of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation. In order to
do so, I will  follow the general heuristic scheme developed within the DHA. This
scheme is intended as a guide to develop analytical frameworks that are tailored to the
problem under examination, and it includes three dimensions: i) the identification of
salient contents, i.e. themes and topics; ii) the investigation of the discursive strategies
(including macro- and sub-strategies) that specific actors employ in regard to each unit
of content;  and iii) the analysis  of how these strategies manifest  themselves at the
level of language, i.e. their concrete linguistic realisations. The notion of discursive
strategy, which derives from the assumption that discourse, just as any other social
practice,  involves strategic thinking and behaviour,  is indeed central  to the DHA.11
This approach proposes five types of discursive strategies to be looked at, namely, the
way  in  which  actors  and  processes  are  referred  to  (nomination  strategies),  what
qualities  are  attributed  to  them  (predication  strategies),  what  argumentative  and
persuasive devices are employed (argumentative strategies), from what position these
nominations, attributions and arguments are expressed (perspectivisation or framing
strategies),  and whether  utterances  are  intensified  or  mitigated  (intensification  and
mitigation strategies). The framework elaborated below integrates and builds upon this
useful schematisation. 
Among the various approaches to critical discourse studies, the DHA has developed a
particularly strong and organised focus on argumentation (i.e.  the third of the five
types of discursive strategies mentioned above). A detailed DHA framework has been
11 For a comprehensive explanation see Wodak et al., 2009: pp. 31-35.
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elaborated by Reisigl (2014), who distinguishes between formal and content-related
analysis  of  argumentation.  The  formal  approach  analyses  the  structure  of
argumentation as syllogism, that is, on the basis of three components: the argument,
which gives the reason for or against a controversial claim; the conclusion rule, which
guarantees the connection of the argument to the  claim; and the  claim itself, which
represents  the  disputed  statement  that  has  to  be  justified  or  refuted.  In  formal
argumentation  schemes,  abstract  conclusion  rules  are  also  called  topoi,  and  are
generally  formalised  as  ‘if/because  X  then  Y’  statements. The  content-related
approach, on the other hand, conceives of argumentation as always topic-related and
field-dependent.  From  this  perspective,  topoi are  instead  defined  as  “recurring
content-related conclusion rules that are typical for specific fields of social action”
(Reisigl,  2014:  p.  77).  The  framework  elaborated  in  this  thesis  adopts  the  latter
approach, because a focus on content-related  topoi reveals more about the specific
character and social embeddedness of discourses than a purely formal analysis.
The  proposed  framework  for  the  analysis  of  intellectual  spokespersonship  for  the
nation consists of three components, which are summarised in the Figure 1 below.
Figure 1. The three components of the analytical framework.
The first component is 1) intellectual self-legitimation, which relates to the ability of
intellectuals  to  claim  authority  in  public  discourse  on  the  basis  of  some  kind  of
estrangement from the broader society, i.e. the so-called intellectual ‘vantage point’,
which constitutes the defining feature of the intellectual condition (as discussed in §
3.2). The second component is 2) intellectual spokespersonship for the nation, which
concerns the power of intellectuals to assume the role of public spokespersons for
their  national  community,  using  their  public  position  to  articulate  and  promote
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national cultures (as discussed in § 3.3). The third component is 3) the representation
of the nation in public discourse, which refers to the actual contents of those acts of
representations, that is, the specific aspects of the nation (within the five macro-topics
identified in § 3.4.1) that given intellectuals choose to emphasise in discourse. In the
following,  I  suggest ways  to  approach each components  from a critical  discourse-
analytical  perspective,  drawing  on  the  DHA but  also  integrating  other  relevant
analytical categories taken from cognate areas of research in linguistics.
3.5.1 First component: intellectual self-legitimation
The intellectual condition is one of inherent detachment and marginalisation from the
mainstream of  society.  As discussed  above,  intellectuals  tend to  regard (and often
exhibit)  their  own estranged position as  affording them a better,  clearer  and more
objective view of society, or at least of certain aspects thereof. This distanciation, in
other words, is  perceived and construed as a  critical  distance that enables a more
correct  and rigorous understanding of the complexities  of the social  world.  In this
sense, through assuming this particular standpoint, intellectuals implicitly claim some
kind of epistemic privilege over the broader society, thus legitimising themselves as
authoritative  voices  in  public  discourse.  Taking  a  critical  discourse-analytical
approach  to  intellectual  practice,  therefore,  requires  examining  the  ways  in  which
actors  strategically  use  language  to  achieve  self-legitimation  by constructing  their
standpoint as an intellectual vantage point. For the sake of brevity, I call these macro-
strategies of intellectual self-legitimation. 
Among the five types of discursive strategies identified within the DHA, the most
relevant to this kind of inquiry are the fourth and the fifth types, namely, strategies of
perspectivisation  (or  framing)  and  strategies  of  intensification  or  mitigation.  The
former type includes strategies that speakers or writers employ to position their point
of view and express involvement or distance, which may involve deictic expressions,
discourse markers, speech representation, figures of speech, animating prosody and so
on (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). The latter type refers to strategies used to modify the
illocutionary  force  of  utterances,  i.e.  their  specific  status  as  assertions,  questions,
promises, threats, etc., which is usually obtained through strengthening or mitigating
their  epistemic  or  deontic  status  (see  below)  through  linguistic  devices  such  as
diminutives  and  augmentatives,  modal  particles,  hedges,  vague  expressions,
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hyperbole, litotes, the choice of particular verbs of saying, feeling, thinking, and so
forth  (Reisigl  &  Wodak,  2009).  Both  types  of  strategies  are  salient  in  regard  to
intellectual  self-legitimation,  since  the  discursive  construction  of  the  intellectual
standpoint  involves  both  an  act  of  positioning  and  a  more  or  less  tacit  claim  to
epistemic primacy. Of course, this can also be achieved via other types of discursive
strategies, e.g. nomination, predication and argumentative strategies.
In the light of the above, a concept that is particularly useful to capture the dynamics
of  intellectual  self-legitimation  is  that  of  epistemic  stance.  Broadly  speaking,  the
notion of stance refers to the fact that all speakers and writers take up some position,
which may be overt or covert, in relation to the propositions they make. In discourse
analysis, it has been studied under various names, e.g. point of view (Simpson, 1993),
evaluation (Bednarek, 2006) or appraisal (Martin & White, 2005). Epistemic stance, in
particular,  concerns  the  legitimation  of  propositions,  that  is,  the  process  whereby
speakers  and  writers,  “in  order  to  overcome  the  epistemic  safeguards  of  their
audience,  offer  ‘guarantees’ for  the  truth  of  their  assertions  in  various  forms  of
evidence”  (Hart,  2011:  p.  6).  In  this  light,  the  intellectual  vantage  point  can  be
conceived as a strong form of epistemic stance, in which the guarantees offered by the
speaker/writer reflect his or her claim to epistemic primacy. Thus, a fruitful way to
explore  discursive  strategies  of  intellectual  self-legitimation  is  to  examine  how
epistemic  stance  is  expressed  in  discourse.  According  to  Marín-Arrese  (2011),
speakers/writers  can  achieve  epistemic  positioning  in  two  main  ways:  first,  by
pointing  to  sources  of  knowledge  that  confer  validity  on  the  information  being
communicated  (evidentiality);  second,  by  conveying  their  own  estimation  of  the
veracity or likelihood of the designated fact or event (epistemicity). Hence, analysing
the discursive manifestations of epistemic stance, and specifically of intellectual self-
legitimation, requires looking both at evidential expressions (which point to relevant
evidence, e.g. “I claim this on the basis of X”) and at epistemic modal markers (which
express the author’s epistemic commitment towards his or her own assertions, e.g. “I
am deeply convinced of X but am not quite sure about Y”).
In addition to the notion of epistemic stance, another approach that can help to shed
further light on intellectual authority in discourse is van Leeuwen’s framework for
analysing  the  discursive  construction  of  legitimation  (2007,  2008;  see  also  van
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Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). The framework focuses on the linguistic strategies that can
be used to justify (but also delegitimise) certain social practices. It groups them in four
main categories: i) authorisation, i.e. legitimation by reference to tradition, custom and
law;  ii)  moral  evaluation,  i.e.  legitimation  by  reference  to  value  systems;  iii)
rationalisation,  i.e.  legitimation  by reference  to  goals  and  uses  of  institutionalised
social  practice;  and iv) mythopoesis,  i.e.  legitimation conveyed through exemplary
narratives. These four groups of strategies can occur separately or in combination, and
each  includes  a  set  of  specific  sub-strategies.  Although this  model  was  originally
developed to study the legitimation of social practice, some of its components appear
well-suited to inquire into self-legitimation, particularly of the intellectual kind. For
instance,  sub-strategies  of  authorisation  such  as  personal  authority and  expert
authority (whereby legitimation is provided by social status or expertise, respectively),
as well  as  theoretical rationalisation  (a sub-strategy of rationalisation that grounds
legitimation in some kind of truth about ‘the way things are’), are useful categories for
analysing intellectual self-legitimation too.
3.5.2 Second component: intellectual spokespersonship for the nation
As discussed above (§ 3.3), intellectuals play a pivotal role vis-à-vis nation-building
processes. Evocative scholarly definitions of intellectuals as legislators of the nation-
state,  the  new  priesthood,  gardeners  of  national  high  cultures,  nation-makers  etc.
substantiate the idea of their primacy in the articulation, promotion and dissemination
of national cultures, and more generally in the symbolic construction of the nation.
This  relationship,  which  originated  from  the  historical  emergence  of  the  modern
nation-state, has not lost its significance in a globalised world, due to the persistence
of the nation as a hegemonic form of cultural, social and political organisation in the
global  era,  and  especially  the  re-nationalising  tendencies  that  characterise  many
contemporary societies.  Hence,  the second component  of the analytical  framework
relates to the discursive strategies that intellectuals employ to take up and perform the
role  of  nation-makers.  I  shall  refer  to  these  as  macro-strategies  of  intellectual
spokespersonship for the nation.
In broad terms, speaking for the nation is an act of social representation, as it involves
using language to shape certain aspects of social reality. One of the main assumptions
in critical discourse studies is precisely that discourse is socially constitutive (see §
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3.1.1), in the sense that through discourses social actors  constitute situations, social
roles  and identities,  interpersonal  relations,  objects  of  knowledge  and so on.  This
process, according to the DHA, is mediated by four main macro-functions: 
Firstly,  [discursive  acts]  are  largely  responsible  for  the  genesis,  production  and
construction  of  particular  social  conditions.  Secondly,  they  can  contribute  to  the
restoration,  legitimation  or  relativisation  of  a  social  status  quo  (ante).  Thirdly,
discursive  acts  are  employed  to  maintain  and reproduce  the  status  quo.  Fourthly,
discursive practice may be effective in transforming, dismantling or even destroying
the status quo. (Wodak et al., 2009: p. 8)
The relationship between intellectuals and the nation can easily be described in terms
of these four macro-functions: firstly, intellectuals may use discourse to construct the
national community, e.g. by emphasising commonalities and downplaying differences;
secondly, they may attempt to defend, support or justify a certain interpretation of the
nation  in  the  face  of  adversity  and  disagreement;  thirdly,  they  may  contribute  to
perpetuating an established idea of the nation, notably when it is being challenged or
called into question in public discourse; fourthly, they may seek to transform or even
destroy certain elements of the nation in the name of a different national vision.
In the scope of these four social macro-functions, the concrete discursive strategies
that intellectuals might resort to when performing the role of spokespersons for the
nation are manifold and depend very much on the specific social, cultural and political
context  under examination.  Consequently,  it  is  not  possible  to provide an  a priori
classification.  However,  the five-strategy approach developed within the DHA (see
above) provides a very useful heuristic tool in this regard. In particular, exploring the
referential strategies (i.e. strategies of nomination and predication) that intellectuals
use in regard to the nation can shed light on how they perceive and construct their
relationship to it;  investigating argumentation strategies can help us identify salient
argumentative schemes, or topoi (see above), and the social roles that they underpin;
the  analysis  of  perspectivisation  strategies  can  clarify  the  self-positioning  of
intellectuals  in  relation  to  their  national  community;  lastly,  looking  at
intensification/mitigation strategies can help us determine their level of commitment
and involvement with issues concerning the nation. Therefore, the analysis of macro-
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strategies of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation will integrate all of the above
types of discursive strategies.
3.5.3 The third component: the representation of the nation in public discourse
The  third  component  of  the  proposed  framework  investigates  the  ways  in  which
intellectuals  as  spokespersons  construct,  justify,  perpetuate  or  transform  certain
aspects of the nation, in the scope of the five macro-topics identified above (§ 3.4.1):
(1)  national  distinctiveness  and homogeneity;  (2) the  nation  as  an ordered socio-
political community; (3) the sacred historical foundations of the nation; (4) the nation
as a vision or project of future prosperity; (5)  the nation and the Other (i.e. global
actors, other nations, intra-national actors). In Table 1 below, I indicate a range of
discursive  strategies  that  intellectuals  may employ  when addressing  each  of  these
macro-topics. This categorisation is an adaptation from the comprehensive framework
elaborated by Wodak et al. (2009: pp. 36-42) to analyse the discursive construction of
Austrian national identity, but it also includes some additional strategies.
Table  1.  Discursive  representation  of  the  nation:  macro-topics  and  relevant  discursive
strategies.




distinctiveness and peculiar 
character of the nation; 
criteria of self-definition 




- presupposition of/emphasis on intra-national 
sameness/similarity/commonality
Dissimilation/Exclusion
- presupposition of/emphasis on inter-national differences
Singularisation
- presupposition of/emphasis on national (positive or negative)
uniqueness
- unificatory warning against the loss of uniqueness
Avoidance
- suppression/backgrounding of intra-national differences
(2) The nation as an 
ordered socio-political 
community
Main aspects: autonomy, 
self-determination and 
sovereignty; nation as 
source of political loyalty; 
nation as basis for political 
Autonomisation
- presupposition of/emphasis on national autonomy, 
sovereignty and independence
- emphasis on autonomy and independence to alleviate fears of
increasing heteronomy
Cohesivation/Polarisation
- emphasis on the will to unify/co-operate/feel and show 
solidarity, or rather on intra-societal divisions and conflicts
Legitimation/Delegitimation
- legitimation or delegitimation of national elites
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(de)legitimation of elites; 
nation as principle of social 
organisation (from 
individual body to entire 
society).
Inclusion/Exclusion
- polarisation between ‘us’ and ‘them’
- negative other-presentation
- emphasis on intra-national sameness and inter-national 
difference
Vitalisation
- emphasis on the nation as an organic whole, 
anthropomorphisation, personification
(3) The sacred historical 
foundations of the nation
Main aspects: myths of 
origins and ancestry; 
mission/purpose of the 
nation; fictitious idea of 
original people and 
homelands; ‘myth-
memories’ of golden ages 
and glorious heroes and 
heroines.
Continuation
- presupposition of/emphasis on positive or negative continuity
- negation of discontinuity
Avoidance
- suppression/backgrounding of discontinuities/disruptions 
(e.g. denial, repression)
Discontinuation
- emphasis on a difference between then and now
(4) The nation as a vision 
or project of future 
prosperity
Main aspects: project/vision
of collective prosperity, 
freedom and self-fulfilment;
utopian or dystopian future 
scenarios; notion of the 
good of the nation.
Unification/Cohesivation
- emphasis on the will to unify/co-operate/feel and show 
solidarity
Vitalisation
- emphasis on the nation as an organic whole
Continuation
- presupposition of/emphasis on positive continuity
- utopian future scenarios
- negation of discontinuity
Discontinuation
- emphasis on difference between now and the future
- emphasis on discontinuity/disruptions
- dystopian future scenarios
(5) The nation and the 
Other (i.e. global actors, 
other nations, intra-
national actors)
Main aspects: other actors 
as threat to nation; other 
actors as providing 
opportunities for the nation;
relationship with other 
nations as harmonious 
development vs 
Unification/Cohesivation
- emphasis on national model character of subnational units
- constructing the nation as part of a supranational 
context/entity
Vitalisation
- emphasis on the nation as an organic whole
Autonomisation/Heteronomisation
- emphasis on autonomy and extra-national independence
- emphasis on heteronomy and extra-national dependence
Dissimilation/Exclusion
- negative other-presentation







- suppression/backgrounding of inter-national or supranational 
sameness/similarity/commonality
- ignoring/downplaying of extra-national heteronomy
Shift of Blame and Responsibility
- polarisation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (as strategy of 
isolation/singularisation)
- blaming/scapegoating/victim-perpetrator inversion
As a concluding remark, it should be noted that this is an a priori  and by no means
exhaustive categorisation, which is solely intended to guide the empirical analysis.
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4. Design of the research: data selection, 
case studies and creation of the sample
In  this  chapter,  I  describe  the  design  and  methodology  of  the  study.  I  begin  by
considering what forms of communication, and hence what kinds of linguistic data,
are  best  suited  to  explore  the  discursive  manifestations  of  intellectual
spokespersonship,  arguing  in  favour  of  a  specific  genre  of  media  texts,  namely
opinion pieces published in the national press (§ 4.1). Then, I develop a case study
approach focused on three key events that sparked public debate about nationhood and
national  identity  in  three  post-Yugoslav  countries:  Serbia,  Croatia  and Bosnia  and
Herzegovina (§ 4.2). Subsequently, I describe the procedure I followed for selecting
and collecting the data, as well as for narrowing down the initial sample in order to
obtain three limited samples (of 12 items each) suitable for qualitative analysis, one
for each case study (§ 4.3). Finally,  I  provide a thematic  overview of the opinion
pieces included in the three final samples (§ 4.4).
4.1 Conveying intellectual viewpoints: opinion pieces as a 
relevant genre
The purpose of the present research is to investigate the ways in which intellectuals
engage in nation-building practices in and through public discourse. Therefore, the
first step in developing a viable methodology for the study is to determine what are
the communicative contexts or sites in which this activity occurs most prominently. As
discussed  in  §  3.2.1,  intellectual  spokespersonship  consists  of  a  wide  range  of
discursive practices whereby various social  entities (or constituencies) are ‘brought
into existence’ and made relevant within the public discourse of a given community or
society.  Hence, the focus should be on the mass media, as they are a key arena of
public debate and (still) constitute the chief infrastructure of what is usually referred
to as the public sphere.12 The category of media texts, however, is extremely broad, as
it includes texts coming from sources as diverse as newspapers, magazines, books,
television, film, radio and the internet (and arguably many more) and targeting a wide
12 For a broader discussion of the latest theoretical developments about the notion of public sphere, see
Lunt & Livingstone, 2013. A theory of media power as the power of framing our experiences of the
social has been elaborated by Couldry, 2000.
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variety of different audiences. So the question arises as to what types of media texts
are most relevant for the purpose of exploring the participation and involvement of
public intellectuals in the public sphere. 
The question can be conveniently addressed using the notion of  genre.  Genres are
ideal categorisations of texts according to their inherent properties, such as formal and
stylistic  traits,  textual  structure  and organisation,  and communicative  purposes.  As
Bax (2010) claims, a genre is characterised primarily by the function it performs, in
the sense that  the specific  functions  of a genre determine,  or at  least  significantly
shape,  the  linguistic  features  that  are  peculiar  to  that  genre.  As far  as  intellectual
spokespersonship  is  concerned,  the  relevant  communicative  function  is  that  of
enabling  the  author  to  publicly  express  his  or  her  viewpoints  and  thus  establish
himself or herself as a legitimate and authoritative ‘speaker’ for a certain social entity
or group. The genre that best fulfils this function is, in my view, that of the opinion
piece.  Opinion  pieces,  which  include  editorials,  commentaries,  columns,  op-eds,
interviews13 and letters published in the press (especially newspapers and magazines)
are in fact intended to convey the author’s (or the interviewee’s) authoritative and/or
expert opinion about matters of great interest and significance for the public, and tend
to be perceived as such by the readership. A distinctive feature of this genre is the
predominance of the argumentative mode (Bax, 2010) and the evaluative key (Martin
&  White,  2005),  which  are  important  aspects  of  the  construction  of  authority  in
discourse. The ideological function of opinion pieces, and editorials in particular, has
also been acknowledged in critical discourse studies (van Dijk, 1991).
The choice of focusing on print media such as newspapers and magazines instead of
other  media  types,  such  as  television,  radio  or  online  media,  rests  on  a  set  of
methodological considerations advanced by Mautner (2008). She argues that there are
both practical and substantive reasons why critical discourse analysts would want to
investigate print media such as newspapers and magazines. The practical advantage is
that they are much easier to collect than audio-visual data, and also more permanent
than online contents. The substantive reasons, on the other hand, are threefold: firstly,
print  media  are  typically  very pervasive,  which makes them able to  attract  public
attention  and thus  exert  political  influence;  secondly,  they tend to  reflect  a  social
13 For a discussion of the history and features of media interviews as a genre, see Bell & van Leeuwen,
1994.
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stream (or the hegemonic social mainstream in non-pluralistic societies), which makes
them valuable sites to study dominant discourses; thirdly, like all mass media they are
disseminated  to  large  audiences,  which  amplifies  their  power  to  promote  shared
constructions of reality. The last point, in particular, resonates quite strongly with the
concept of intellectual spokespersonship adopted in the present study (see § 3.2.1).
So far, two key criteria for data selection have been defined: the analysis should focus
on  opinion  pieces  (as  a  relevant  genre)  published  in  printed  newspapers  and
magazines (as a relevant type of media). This raises a further methodological issue:
what  criteria  should guide  the selection  of  specific  print  media  outlets  among the
many that usually circulate in any given society? I argue that the chief criterion should
be representativeness, meaning that the selection of newspapers and magazines should
be such as to best reflect the variety and complexity of the relevant mediascape.14 This
requires exploring the contexts in which individual print media are situated in terms of
economic and political background, institutional environment, authorship, production
process and characteristics  of the readership (Mautner,  2008). Moreover,  particular
attention should be given to the ideological and organisational structure of the media,
as this may significantly affect not only the way in which publics and audiences are
addressed, but also the way in which they are conceptualised (Richardson, 2007).15 In
the light of these indications, I propose the following approach to data selection: the
sample  for  analysis  shall  include  opinion pieces  published in  a limited  number  of
newspapers and magazines of national (not local) circulation, to be selected so as to be
representative of the spectrum of cultural-political orientations existing in the given
society,  as  well  as  of  the  varying  quality  and  reputation  of  the  media  outlets
themselves. In other words, newspapers and magazines will be selected which reflect
different cultural and political attitudes, ranging from conservative and traditionalist
positions to progressive and openly anti-mainstream ones, and which span the full
range from up- through middle- to down-market publications, the popular or ‘tabloid’
press. The concrete application of this approach to the present study is detailed in §
4.3 below. 
14 On the concept of mediascape see Appadurai, 1990.
15 For an inquiry into the difference between audience and public and the possible intersection of the
two notions, see Livingstone, 2005.
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4.2 The case studies: Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
After having established a set of criteria for choosing relevant texts on the basis of
genre  and  media  type,  the  next  step  in  developing  a  suitable  procedure  for  data
selection is to identify specific events or situations, within the broader post-Yugoslav
context, which are likely to have prompted local intellectuals to produce discourses on
the nation. The idea is that the analysis of opinion pieces published in the national
press in the aftermath of these events can offer valuable insights into how intellectuals
engage in discursive practices of nation-building. At the same time, such an approach
allows the researcher to overcome the possible bias of selecting only texts that deal
specifically  with  the  nation  and national  identity,  which  would amount  to  cherry-
picking. As discussed in Chapter 2, the post-Yugoslav context is characterised as much
by its  common historical  background as by the heterogeneous social,  political  and
cultural trajectories followed by each of the post-Yugoslav societies, especially in the
last decade. This complexity requires an approach to data selection based on purposive
sampling (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008), that is, the investigation of a limited number
of carefully selected cases aimed to illustrate the broader context that is the main focus
of research. The most appropriate research method for the present study, therefore, is
the case study method (see Stake, 2000).
In order to try to capture the variety of manifestations of intellectual spokespersonship
for the nation in the contemporary post-Yugoslav transitional context, I have chosen to
address three case studies. These focus on three recent events that had great resonance,
both locally  and internationally,  and which were accompanied  by sustained public
debate around issues concerning various aspects of the concept of a nation, such as
national identity, national history and culture, and its future development. These are: i)
Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008; ii) Croatia’s entry into the
European Union in 2013; and iii) the wave of anti-government protests that took place
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014. These three cases have been selected because
they illustrate the main aspects of the post-Yugoslav context laid out in § 2.3, namely,
post-conflict  reconciliation,  democratisation  and  European  integration,  and  the
challenges of post-socialist transition. A brief introduction to each of the three cases is
provided below.
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4.2.1 Serbia: the aftermath of the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008
As discussed in § 2.3, Serbia’s post-socialist and democratic transformation started as
late as 2000, after an entire decade of rule by the Socialist  Party of Serbia led by
Slobodan Milošević, which attempted to forcibly unite all Serbs living in the various
Yugoslav republics in a single state and secure for them the dominant position among
the other ethnic groups. In Kosovo, this exacerbated long-term ethnic tensions existing
between  the  Albanian  majority  and  the  small  Serb  minority.  Inter-ethnic  violence
culminated in the late 1990s, when Milošević launched a military offensive to crush
Kosovo’s growing resistance movement (Ramet,  2002).  The conflict  was ended in
1999 by NATO’s intervention,  resulting in Kosovo being placed under transitional
United Nations administration.  In 2006, international  negotiations  to determine the
final  status  of  Kosovo  were  initiated,  but  were  largely  unsuccessful.  This  led  to
Kosovo unilaterally declaring independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008, which
again provoked strong reactions in Serbia. As the Serbian government disputed the
legality of the act, more than half a million protesters took to the streets in Belgrade
under the slogan “Kosovo is Serbia”. On the whole, Kosovo’s achieving of  de facto
independence had a profound impact on the articulation of the nation in Serbian public
discourse. In fact, widespread concern soon emerged over the implications this ‘loss
of territorial integrity’ could have for Serbian nationhood. The main reason for this
concern is that Kosovo is widely regarded as the ‘cradle’ of Serbian culture and the
place where defining moments in the country’s history occurred (Malcolm, 1998).
4.2.2 Croatia’s accession into the European Union in 2013
Similarly to Serbia, Croatia’s democratic transition also began only in 2000, with the
end  of  Tuđman’s  autocratic  regime.  The  new  government  implemented  important
democratic reforms, steering the country towards full integration into the European
Union sphere. Ten years after submitting its application for membership, on 1 July
2013  Croatia  joined  the  EU as  its  28th  member  state,  thus  becoming  the  second
former Yugoslav republic to become part of the EU, after Slovenia. EU accession was
hailed as a historic achievement both by the Croatian government in office, led by
President  Ivo Josipović  and Prime Minister  Zoran Ivanović  (both from the Social
Democratic  Party),  and  by  the  majority  of  the  Croatian  people,  who  had  already
expressed their strong support for joining the Union in a referendum held the year
before (with 66% of participants voting in favour). As discussed in § 2.3.3, over the
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past two decades European identity has become a widely shared social value among
the  Croatian  people,  and  this  has  further  consolidated  the  country’s  European
perspective.  The  achievement  of  EU  membership  was  thus  woven  into  official
narratives as the culmination of Croatia’s transition from the burdensome legacy of the
Yugoslav  communist  past  into  the  family  of  Western  European  democracies.  The
process of negotiating EU accession, however, was not without obstacles, mainly due
to the high and rigid requirements  of EU conditionality.  Full  cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, for instance, represented a
major  challenge:  Croatia’s  efforts  to  capture  the war  crimes  suspect  General  Ante
Gotovina were deemed insufficient, which led to the commencement of negotiations
being  postponed.  Apart  from  an  unresolved  border  issue  with  Slovenia,  other
significant  challenges  included the reform of  the  judicial  system,  a  crackdown on
corruption  and  organised  crime,  a  dispute  with  the  Italian  government  over  land
ownership,  and  the  issue  of  shipyard  privatisation.  These  drawbacks  resulted  in
occasional spikes of euroscepticism, which partly stifled the otherwise very positive
attitude of the Croatian people towards European integration.
4.2.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina: the 2014 anti-government protests
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a severely divided society, which is still deeply affected by
the trauma of the recent war that lasted from 1992 until 1995. The territorial divisions
and complex power-sharing arrangements introduced by the Dayton Peace Agreement
(1995)  to  keep  the  country  together  have  been  widely  criticised  as  entrenching
existing  divisions  among  the  country’s  ‘constituent  peoples’ (i.e.  Bosniaks,  Serbs,
Croats). Furthermore, the social situation in the country has been steadily deteriorating
over the past decade, mainly due to widespread political corruption and inefficiencies
in the privatisation process. In the early months of 2014, a series of demonstrations
and riots  took place  in  several  cities  in  Bosnia  and Herzegovina.  The unrest  first
erupted on 4 February in the industrial  town of Tuzla,  where thousands of people
rallied to express their anger about unemployment and the collapse of local industries,
but  quickly  spread  to  other  cities  including,  among  others,  the  capital  Sarajevo,
Mostar, Zenica, and Jajce. The protests, fuelled by discontent over rampant political
corruption,  monotonous  ethno-nationalist  rhetoric  and  the  country’s  deteriorating
economic conditions, led to the emergence of a mass movement seeking social justice
and the overthrow of lower-level governments, which were held responsible for the
90
stagnation. The unprecedented levels of participation and the remarkably non-ethnic
character of the upheaval led international media to refer to it, somewhat prematurely,
as the “Bosnian Spring” in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring (and the 1968 Prague
Spring before that).  Deep dissatisfaction with the political  status quo prompted the
movement to entrust self-governed citizen assemblies (called plenums) with the task
of articulating clear political demands, thus enacting a participatory model of direct
democracy never experienced before in Bosnian-Herzegovinian society.  Apart from
small differences, all the plenums demanded the revision of the privatisation process,
the end of excessive benefits for politicians, and new governments filled with people
with no record of corruption.  As a result,  most canton governments16 resigned and
canton  assemblies  mostly  accepted,  at  least  nominally,  the  main  demands  by  the
plenums.  Although the long-term political  impact  of  the  protests  remains  an open
question (especially since the following political elections in October 2014 saw yet
further  the  consolidation  of  the  main  nationalist  parties  from the  Serb,  Croat  and
Bosniak  communities),  the  movement  reinvigorated  critical  debate  about  the
exclusionary  political-institutional  arrangements  of  post-Dayton  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina and the dominance of the ethno-political paradigm in the country’s social
and political life.
4.3 Creation of the data sample
In this section, I elaborate a method for creating three distinct samples of opinion
pieces published in the national press, one for each case study, which will then be
submitted to in-depth qualitative analysis (in Chapters 5, 6 and 7). The overall aim of
this method is to select those opinion pieces in which the nation is discursively most
salient,  while  at  the  same  time  ensuring  that  the  final  samples  are  sufficiently
representative of each country’s specific context.
The method consists of the following steps:
1. Selection of a representative set of print media (newspapers and magazines)
for each of the three countries under examination;
16 The cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the political districts of the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the two political entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the other being
Republika Srpska). Each of the ten cantons has its own government headed by a Prime Minister.
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2. Gathering of all the opinion pieces addressing the events detailed in the case
studies which were published in the selected media outlets within 30 days of
the date of the event;
3. Downsizing of the initial sample through quantitative techniques (if and where
needed)  in  order  to  obtain  three  intermediate  samples,  each  including  a
maximum of 40 opinion pieces.
4. Downsizing  of  the  intermediate  samples  via  thematic  analysis  in  order  to
obtain three final samples, each including 12 opinion pieces.
Before describing each step in more  detail,  a  few remarks  about  certain  issues  of
language and translation that may arise in the analysis are in order. My knowledge of
the languages spoken in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina17 allows me to
collect  and  analyse  texts  written  in  the  original  language  instead  of  relying  on
translations. For the reader’s convenience, all the original texts, along with the English
translation  of  all  the  excerpts  included  in  the  analysis,  are  available  in  the  CD
enclosed with this thesis. All translation issues as well as all discrepancies between the
original text and the English translation that might affect the analysis  will be duly
addressed and explained, either in text or in footnotes.
4.3.1 Step 1: selection of newspapers and magazines
The first step in the creation of the data sample is to identify the set of newspapers and
magazines in national circulation that is sufficiently representative of each country’s
mediascape. As stated in § 4.1, the selection should reflect both the variety of cultural-
political  orientations  existing  in  the  given  society  and  the  varying  quality  and
reputation of the print media outlets themselves (as both dimensions affect patterns of
production  and reception).  Following  these  two criteria,  I  have  selected  a  limited
number  of  outlets  (newspapers  and magazines)  for  each  case  study,  as  illustrated
below.18
With regard to the case of Serbia, I have selected four daily newspapers (Politika,
Danas,  Blic,  Press)  and  two  weekly  magazines  (Nedeljne  Informativne  Novine,
17 What was once known as Serbo-Croatian is now known as Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin
etc. depending on the speaker’s political and ethnic affiliation; see Greenberg, 2004 for a detailed study
of the disintegration of the Serbo-Croatian language.
18 Information about Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian-Herzegovinian print media outlets has been taken
mainly from the website of the European Journalism Centre (EJC): www  . ejc  . net.
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Vreme). Politika and Danas, the two most important Serbian up-market papers, enjoy
a high reputation for journalistic quality and reliability. Launched in 1904 as Serbia’s
first modern and civic-oriented daily newspaper, Politika has earned its reputation by
nourishing an impartial analytical approach to politics and public life, by providing
fact-based reporting, and by featuring editorials written by people from all spheres of
life;  its  circulation  was  75,000  copies  in  2009.  Danas,  on  the  other  hand,  was
established in 1997 by a group of journalists opposed to the Milošević regime, and in
the late  1990s often found itself  targeted by the Serbian authorities  because of its
independent  editorial  policy;  today it  is  a  left-oriented  paper  promoting  European
integration,  human rights and the protection of minorities.  Blic is  a middle-market
tabloid founded in 1996 by a group of Austria-based investors and owned by a Swiss
communications group since 2004; with a circulation surpassing 150,000 copies, it is
the most widely read newspaper in the country.  Press  was a popular down-market
tabloid  published  in  Belgrade  between  2005  and  2012;  following  its  centre-right
populist orientation, it was prone to unbridled criticism and sensationalism. Nedeljne
Informativne Novine  (known by its acronym  NIN) and  Vreme are weekly magazines
addressing  political  and current  events.  Originally  started  in  1935,  NIN  is  one  of
Serbia’s oldest and most renowned weeklies, with a long tradition of opening its pages
to esteemed Serbian writers, artists and public figures (the magazine also awards its
own  literary  prize  every  year).  Although  commercial  competition  following  the
collapse of socialism has forced  NIN to adapt its content to wider audiences, it still
remains a highly regarded magazine; it has an average circulation of 15,000 copies.
Vreme, on the other hand, was founded in 1990 by intellectuals dissatisfied with the
Milošević  regime,  and has  since  established  itself  as  an  independent,  high-quality
weekly magazine, and also as one of the most reliable news sources in the whole post-
Yugoslav space.
In  the  scope of  the  case  study on Croatia,  I  have  selected  five  daily  newspapers
(Večernji list, Jutarnji list, Slobodna Dalmacija, Novi list and 24sata) and one weekly
magazine (Gloria). Founded in Zagreb in 1959,  Večernji list was the leading state-
owned daily in socialist Croatia, and since 2000 has been under the ownership of the
Austrian media group Styria Medien AG; its political orientation is conservative, and
its circulation is approximately 60,000 copies.  Jutarnji list  was launched in 1998 by
the local Europapress Holding media group and quickly replaced Večernji list as the
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most  widely  read  paper  in  the  country,  establishing  itself  as  an  authoritative  left-
leaning  and  liberal  news  source.  Slobodna  Dalmacija started  in  the  1940s  as  a
Dalmatian  regional  newspaper,  but  quickly  became  one  of  the  most  widely  read
papers across the former Yugoslavia. Fiercely opposed by the Tuđman government in
the early 1990s as one of Croatia’s few truly independent media, Slobodna Dalmacija
was  subsequently  privatised  and  its  editorial  policy  steered  towards  hard-line
nationalism, which resulted in many veteran journalists and editorial staff being fired
or leaving voluntarily.  Acquired by Europapress Holding (see above) in 2005, it is
nowadays the fourth best-selling national newspaper. Novi list is a respected regional
daily  newspaper  published in  Rijeka;  highly critical  of  the  Tuđman  regime  in the
1990s, today it is considered a centre-left newspaper. The fifth print media outlet, 24
sata, is the youngest daily newspaper in the country. It was launched by Styria Medien
AG (see above) in 2005 as a tabloid targeting the younger generation and, due to its
attractive layout and affordable price, quickly managed to reach a circulation of more
than 100,000 copies, thus becoming the third daily newspaper in Croatia in terms of
circulation, after Jutarnji list and Večernji list. Since Croatia’s magazine market is led
by women’s magazines, I have decided to include  Gloria in the sample as the best-
selling  weekly  in  the  country;  first  published  in  1994,  it  has  a  circulation  of
approximately 100,000 copies.
As in the case of Croatia, the selection for Bosnia and Herzegovina also includes five
daily newspapers (Oslobođenje, Dnevni Avaz, Dnevni list, Nezavisne Novine and Glas
Srpske) and one weekly magazine (BH Dani). Since reading patterns are significantly
influenced  by ethnicity,  in  the  sense  that  print  media  based  in  one  region  of  the
country where a certain ethnic group is predominant tend not to be read in other parts
of the country or by people belonging to other ethnic groups, I have decided to include
print media based in different cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Oslobođenje, founded
in 1943, is a popular and highly respected newspaper published in Sarajevo, which
gained distinction during the Bosnian War as its staff, consisting of Bosniaks, Serbs
and Croats, managed to publish the paper continuously throughout the siege of the city
(1992-1995);  nowadays  it  expresses  views  that  are  close  to  those  of  the  Social-
Democratic Party.  Dnevni Avaz, also published in Sarajevo, is the country’s largest
newspaper;  launched  in  1995  by Fahrudin  Radončić,  a  media  magnate  who  later
founded the centre-right political  party  Union for a Better  Future of BiH,  it  has a
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distinct pro-Bosniak stance. Dnevni list, the second most widely read newspaper in the
country (according to  a  2007 survey),  is  based  in  Mostar  and addresses  a  mainly
Croatian audience.  Nezavisne novine  and  Glas srpske are both based in Banja Luka
and are read primarily by the Serb population. Nezavisne novine was launched in 1995
as  a weekly independent  magazine,  and later  became a daily  reaching an average
circulation  of  18,000.  Glas  Srpske,  on  the  other  hand,  was  originally  established
during World War II by national liberation parties, and during the Yugoslav era it had a
regional character until it became, in the late 1980s, a Serbian paper in its content and
target  audience;  it  was  privatised  in  2008 and today  it  is  known as  a  daily  with
strongly nationalist rhetoric. The only magazine included in the sample is BH Dani, a
magazine focused on current political and cultural affairs launched in 1992 and which
features notable journalists and columnists; its average circulation is 25,000 copies per
week.
4.3.2 Step 2: data gathering (creation of the initial samples)
The  second  step  in  the  creation  of  the  sample  is  to  search  the  selected  daily
newspapers and weekly magazines  for opinion pieces  that address,  to  a greater  or
lesser extent,  the key event defining each case study (see above), and which were
published in the 30 days following the event.19 Relevant opinion pieces are identified
on the basis of the title or, in case the title did not reveal enough about the content of
the  piece,  through  skimming  the  text.  The  results  of  this  selection  process  are
illustrated below:
● Serbia: 108 items (Politika: 43; Danas: 31; Blic: 5; Press: 17; NIN: 8; Vreme:
4).
● Croatia: 40 items (Večernji list: 17; Jutarnji list: 11; Slobodna Dalmacija: 4;
Novi list: 8; 24sata: 0; Gloria: 0).
● Bosnia  and  Herzegovina:  36  items (Oslobođenje:  11; Dnevni  Avaz:  10;
Dnevni list: 3; Nezavisne Novine: 6; Glas Srpske: 0; BH Dani: 6).
As stated above, the purpose of the sampling procedure is to obtain three final samples
of 12 opinion pieces each. While in the cases of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
this  can  be  done  through  qualitative  thematic  analysis  (see  Step  4  below),  the
19 For Serbia: from 17 February until 18 March 2008; for Croatia: from 1 until 31 July 2013; for Bosnia
and Herzegovina: from 4 February until 3 March 2014.
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considerable size of the Serbia sample requires elaborating and applying a downsizing
method based on quantitative techniques. This is done in Step 3 below.
4.3.3 Step 3: downsizing of the Serbia sample through quantitative techniques
The third step consists of downsizing the initial Serbia data sample in order to obtain
an intermediate  sample  of  40 items  suitable  to  be  further  downsized via  thematic
analysis. For this purpose I have developed a method that employs quantitative corpus
linguistics (CL) techniques to determine the extent to which the nation is thematised
in each of the sample texts (on the basis of specific keywords, as explained below).
Generally speaking, the potential advantages of combining quantitative corpus-driven
analysis and critical discourse analysis have been acknowledged in the literature from
both  fields  (see  for  instance  Baker,  Gabrielatos,  KhosraviNik,  Krzyżanowski,
McEnery  &  Wodak,  2008;  Wodak  &  Meyer,  2009).  In  particular,  according  to
Mautner (2009) CL techniques may help critical discourse analysts to process larger
amounts of data, broaden the empirical grounds of research, and gain different kinds
of insight into textual data; moreover, they can help reduce cherry-picking (see Koller
& Mautner, 2004: p. 218). In the scope of the present study, however, CL techniques
are employed in their more ‘traditional’ role of a method for supporting qualitative
discourse analysis, that is, for the purpose of downsizing a large sample of media texts
(see Baker, Gabrielatos & McEnery, 2013: p. 276, in note 7).
The proposed method consists  of:  i)  defining  a set  of  keywords  that  relate  to  the
nation, both generally and within the concrete context of the Serbian case study; ii)
using  CL  software  tools  (Wordsmith)  to  determine  the  cumulative  normalised
frequency of all the keywords in each text included in the initial sample; iii) ranking
the texts according to their frequency values; iv) selecting the 40 texts with the highest
keyword frequencies, in such a way as to approximate the original distribution across
print media outlets (in order to preserve the representativeness of the initial sample).
The  definition  of  keyword  adopted  here  is  a  qualitative  one  (unlike  in  corpus
linguistics, where the term stands for a word that is statistically characteristic of one or
more texts; see Culpeper & Demmen, 2015): a keyword is a word that is culturally
‘key’, in the sense that it captures the essence of discourses embedded in particular
social, political and cultural contexts (Williams, 1983) and therefore activates specific
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cognitive frames (see Bigi & Greco Morasso, 2012). This resonates with Mautner’s
(2009) remark that CL processes constitute a valuable approach to text and discourse
analysis  only  if  the  relevant  discursive  phenomenon  crystallises  around  discrete
lexical  items  or  patterns.  Specifically,  the proposed method  looks at  two types  of
keywords: i) lexical items referring to general aspects of the nation; and ii) lexical
items referring to the specific national and ethnic communities involved in the case
under examination, such as ethnonyms, demonyms, politonyms, toponyms, as well as
relevant deictic expressions.
The first  category includes  terms such as  nacija and  nacion (nation),  nacionalista
(nationalist),  narod (people),  patrija,  domovina,  otadžbina (homeland,  fatherland),
zajednica (community),  zemlja  (land,  country),  stanovništvo (population),  ljudi
(people),  društvo (society),  država (state),  and  građanstvo (citizenry)  in  all  their
inflected variants,20 as well as all nouns, adjectives and adverbs derived from them.
The second category includes terms such as Srbija (Serbia),  Srbin,  Srbijanac (Serb),
srpski,  srbijanski (Serbian),  srpstvo (Serbianness),  Albanac (Albanian),  Albanija
(Albania),  albanski (Albanian),  Šiptar  (Albanian)  Kosovo (Kosovo),  Kosovo  i
Metohija (Kosovo  and  Metohija),  Kosmet,  KiM  (short  forms  for  Kosovo  and
Metohija), again in all their inflected variants; moreover, it includes relevant deictic
expressions such as  mi (we),  nas (us),  nam/a (us),  naš  (our, ours),  oni (they),  njih
(them), njima (them), njihov (their, theirs), ovde/ovdje (here), ovdašnji (local), tu/tamo
(there),  tamošnji/ondašnji  (belonging  there).  Since  not  all  of  terms  listed  above
necessarily relate to the nation (or a specific national group), every single concordance
(i.e. the immediate co-text of a word) has been manually checked to ensure that only
relevant occurrences are counted in.
The  application  of  the  downsizing  procedure  described  above  has  allowed  the
researcher to obtain an intermediate sample of 40 opinion pieces with the following
distribution  across  print  media  outlets:  Politika:  15; Danas:  12; Blic:  2; Press:  6;
Nezavisne informativne novine: 4; Vreme: 1.
4.3.4 Step 4: creation of the final samples through downsizing based on thematic 
analysis
20 The  Serbian-Croatian-Bosnian  language  is  characterised  by declension,  that  is,  the  inflection  of
nouns, pronouns and adjectives to indicate number, case and gender.
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The fourth and last  step involves downsizing the intermediate  samples  in order to
obtain three final samples of 12 items each. This is done through thematic analysis,
which allows the determination of the thematic/topical structure of each text and thus
weeds out those in which the nation is less thematically salient.
Broadly  speaking,  thematic/topical  analysis  accounts  for  the  way  in  which
themes/topics  are  hierarchically  organised  within  a  specific  text.  Within  critical
discourse  studies,  this  approach  is  largely  based  on  van  Dijk’s  seminal  work  on
macro-structural  analysis  (1977,  1980,  1988)  and  topical  analysis  (1991).  Macro-
structural analysis  is a highly formalised procedure for deriving or inferring topics
from any strand of discourse through a systematic reduction of semantic information.
Specifically,  it  consists  of  a  set  of  three  semantic  operations  (i.e.  deletion,
generalisation  and  construction;  see  van  Dijk,  1980)  whose  recursive  application
allows the reduction of the information contained in a (coherent) text to a limited set
of  macro-propositions  (i.e.  topics),  which  constitute  the  macro-structure  of  that
particular text. Within critical discourse studies, macro-structural analysis tends to be
employed as a strategy for downsizing large samples rather than as a proper analytical
tool. Approaches grounded in the DHA, in particular, tend to integrate thematic/topical
analysis  as  a  ‘first  level’ analytical  tool  for  detecting  the  main  theme(s)  of  given
strands  of  discourse  and  for  mapping  the  way  in  which  they  are  hierarchically
organised.21 
In the scope of the present study, thematic analysis is employed precisely as a ‘first
level’ analytical tool for downsizing purposes. I have started by identifying the main
topic and the immediate sub-topics of each opinion piece, which has allowed me to
immediately filter out those texts whose main topics were not about the nation (or
aspects of it). Subsequently, I have assigned to each of the remaining texts a ‘saliency
value’ calculated  by  dividing  the  number  of  sub-topics  addressing  the  nation  (or
aspects of it) by the total number of sub-topics included the given text. Finally, for
each case study I have gathered the opinion pieces with the highest saliency value
from each print media outlet (in order to ensure representativeness) and added 6 to 8
of the remaining top-ranking opinion pieces (regardless of the print media), in order to
21 A  nice  illustration  of  this  more  ‘exploratory’  use  of  thematic/topical  analysis  is  found  in
Krzyżanowski (2008).
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obtain a final sample of 12 items. An overview of the opinion pieces included in the
three final samples is provided in the next section.
4.4 Overview of the final samples for the three case studies
In this section I provide an overview of the three final samples obtained through the
downsizing  procedure explained  in  § 4.3 above.  The original  texts  of  the opinion
pieces included in the final samples, along with the translations into English of the
excerpts selected for analysis, are provided in the CD enclosed with the present thesis.
4.4.1 The Serbia sample
The final sample for the Serbia case study includes 12 opinion pieces. An overview of
the content of each text is provided in Table 2 below. For the sake of clarity, each text
from all three samples has been assigned a unique code (indicated in the left column)
which will be used as reference in the analysis.
Table 2. Content overview of the texts included in the Serbia sample.
S01 Ivana Anojčić, Naši interesi [Our interests], published in Politika on 17 February 2008
In her commentary,  published on the very day of Kosovo’s declaration of independence,
Anojčić discusses the highlights of a conference on Serbia’s national and state interests held
in Belgrade. The main points raised by the speakers are that there is no clear consensus
about such interests, that Serbia’s progress is hindered by unresolved border disputes, and
that Serbia should embrace democracy and European integration.
S02 Milan Grujić, Lazarev zavet [Lazar’s oath], published in Press on 17 February 2008
Also published on the day of Kosovo’s independence, Grujić’s opinion piece firmly defends
the idea that Serbian society ought to honour its past struggles, epitomised in the myth of
Prince Lazar,22 by claiming sovereignty over Kosovo.
S03 Miloš Garić, Prokletije [The Accursed Mountains],23 published in Press on 18 February
2008
In his passionate commentary, Garić argues that Serbia must and will fight for Kosovo in
the future. After expressing disgust for the Serbs who do not deplore Kosovo’s secession
22 Prince Lazar is a medieval Serbian ruler who gave his life fighting against the Ottomans in the Battle
of Kosovo in 1389. He is a key figure of the Kosovo myth (see § 5.3.4 for details).
23 Prokletije is a mountain range on the western Balkan peninsula, extending from northern Albania to
Kosovo, to eastern Montenegro. Its name means “the accursed (mountains)”, possibly because they are
perceived as wild and insurmountable. Here it is used metonymically to refer to Kosovo.
99
from Serbia,  he  declares  that  future  generations  of  Serbs  will  take  up  the  struggle  for
Kosovo in the name of the nation’s great ancestors.
S04 Nikola  Samardžić,  Kosovo  u  Srbiji  [Kosovo  in  Serbia],  published  in  Danas on  19
February 2008
Samardžić, historian and professor at the University of Belgrade, advances the claim that
the Serbian political and economic elites are the most responsible for the country’s critical
situation. Not only have they precipitated the Kosovo crisis, he argues, but they also foster
the Kosovo myth as ideological cover for pursuing their own private interests.
S05 Goran Despotović, Vreme za odgovornost, otrežnjenje i razum [Time for responsibility,
sobriety and reason], published in Danas on 20 February 2008
Despotović  blames  the Serbian political  elite  for being self-interested and for using the
Kosovo issue to shift public attention away from the real problems affecting society.  He
then urges the political  leadership to improve Serbia’s  foreign relations and to embrace
European integration as a pathway to prosperity.
S06 Jelena Cerovina,  Bol i nada  [Pain and hope], published in  Politika on 22 February
2008
In her opinion piece, Politika reporter Jelena Cerovina advances the view that, contrary to
popular belief, most Serbs are not willing to accept the loss of Kosovo, as shown by the
recent massive street protests.
S07 Đoko Kesić, Mudrost [Wisdom], published in Press on 26 February 2008
Kesić’s opinion piece provides advice to Serbia’s political and intellectual elites on how to
wisely address the Kosovo issue. Kesić argues that Serbia needs to avoid armed conflicts
and clearly define its own goals, and concludes by stating that the best way for Serbia to
strengthen itself is to continue its engagement in the European integration process.
S08 Batić Bačević, Tri lidera [Three leaders], published in NIN on 28 February 2008
Bačević regards the inability of Serbia’s three main political leaders (President Tadić, Prime
Minister Koštunica and the opposition leader Nikolić) to adopt a unified response to the
Kosovo  crisis  as  evidence  of  the  high  level  of  polarisation  of  Serbian  society.  Such
dividedness,  he  contends,  damages  Serbia’s  international  reputation  and  undermines  its
chances to achieve prosperity.
S09 Teofil Pančić, Anamneza jedne parole [Anamnesis of a slogan], published in Vreme on
28 February 2008
In this ironic and caustic commentary,  Vreme’s prominent columnist and political analyst
Teofil Pančić takes a cue from a statement by Prime Minister Koštunica to expose what he
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regards as the core of Serbia’s dominant political ideology, namely the idea that Kosovo has
acquired a much greater significance than Serbia itself. He concludes by pointing out how
the political establishment is increasingly divided over the Kosovo issue.
S10 Vuk Drašković, Kosovo i mi [Kosovo and us], published in Blic on 5 March 2008
A renowned political figure, opinion leader and novelist, Vuk Drašković accuses both the
political elites who ruled Serbia in the 1990s and those who spearheaded its post-Milošević
democratic transition of being responsible for the loss of Kosovo,  which he views as a
traumatic national defeat. He also states that recognition of Kosovo’s independence is not a
precondition  for  Serbia’s  EU integration,  and  concludes  with  an  appeal  to  the  Serbian
people to uphold the spirit of the Zajedno coalition (i.e. the main anti-Milošević movement
during the 1990s, of which Drašković himself was a prominent leader).
S11 Vladimir  Arsenijević,  Kosovo  ni(je)  Srbija  [Kosovo  is  (not)  Serbia],  published  in
Politika on 13 March 2008
Novelist and columnist Arsenijević advances the viewpoint that Serbian society needs to
‘grow up’ by coming to terms with the fact that Kosovo is no longer part of Serbia. The
inability of  many to accept  this  truth,  he  claims,  depends on a widespread ‘disorder of
perception’ that  has  characterised  Serbian  society  since  the  demise  of  Milošević.  The
responsibility to help Serbia overcome this predicament, he concludes, lies with the political
leaders.
S12 Milan Škulić,  Kosovo je Srbija  [Kosovo is Serbia], published in  Politika on 18 March
2008
In his commentary written in response to Vladimir Arsenijević’s editorial (see above), law
professor  Milan Škulić  maintains  that  Kosovo belongs to  Serbia  from both a  legal  and
cultural perspective, and that those who claim the opposite should be considered as traitors
to the Serbian nation.
4.4.2 The Croatia sample
The final sample for the Croatia case study includes 11 commentaries and 1 interview.
Table 3 below provides a brief overview of their content.
Table 3. Content overview of the texts included in the Croatia sample.
C01 Božo Skoko, Hrvatska je zaslužila dostojanstveniji finale ulaska u EU [Croatia deserved
a grander finale in the EU accession game], published in Večernji list on 1 July 2013
Skoko acknowledges the fact  that  EU accession will  likely boost  Croatia’s  international
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reputation, but also regrets that the country could have made better use of this opportunity
by promoting its own success stories.
C02 Gordan  Zubčić,  Povratak  u  ekipu  kojoj  pripadamo  [Back  into  the  team  where  we
belong], published in Slobodna Dalmacija on 1 July 2013
In this short commentary, Zubčić celebrates Croatia’s accession into the EU as a return to
where the country truly belongs.
C03 Ivo Josipović,  Početak budućnosti za našu Hrvatsku  [The beginning of the future for
our Croatia], published in Jutarnji list on 1 July 2013
Writing  in  his  official  capacity  of  President  of  Croatia,  Ivo  Josipović  expresses  his
satisfaction for Croatia’s newly achieved EU membership. European integration, he claims,
brings  freedom,  security and solidarity to  Croatian society,  and therefore  constitutes  an
excellent opportunity to achieve social consensus.
C04 Josip Leko, EU je šansa koju moramo iskoristiti [The EU is an opportunity we have to
take advantage of], published in Jutarnji list on 1 July 2013
Josip Leko, Speaker of the Croatian Parliament at the time, embraces EU membership as an
opportunity for Croatia to progress.  He acknowledges that  Croatia has made significant
efforts  to  promote  the  European  project,  and  that  this  has  shaped  Croatian  society  in
profound ways.  Moreover, he calls attention to Croatia’s role in stabilising the region of
South-Eastern Europe, and points out its need to take a proactive role within the European
context.
C05 Jurica Pavičić, Između katedrala i balkanskih gudura [Between cathedrals and Balkan
crevices], published in Jutarnji list on 1 July 2013
Pavičić  advances  the  view  that  Croatian  national  identity  is  based  upon  a  unique
combination of two paradoxes: first, Croatia is a majority Catholic country in the Balkans;
second,  Croats  are  Mediterranean  Slavs.  According  to  Pavičić,  the  lack  of  an  organic
national  identity  is  also  the  reason  why  Croats  are  particularly  fond  of  symbolic
representations of togetherness.
C06 Milan  Jajčinović, Od  danas  počinje  novo  hrvatsko  povijesno  vrijeme  [Today  begins
Croatia’s new historical era], published in Večernji list on 1 July 2013
Jajčinović’s  opinion  piece  presents  EU accession  as  a  great  opportunity  for  Croatia  to
achieve progress and prosperity,  but also emphasises what Croatia brings to Europe. By
becoming a EU member state, he argues, Croatia has broken away from the Balkans and its
mentality, and finally returned to the European cultural and civilisational environment.
C07 Miljenko Jergović,  Zemlja bez privrede i  bez rudnih blaga, s mnogo vode i  vjetra  [A
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country without an economy or mineral  treasures, with plenty of water and wind],
published in Jutarnji list on 1 July 2013
In this commentary, Jergović, a well-known writer and columnist of Bosnian descent, spells
out Croatia’s unique cultural and natural features. After providing a brief history of Croatian
statehood, he stresses how Croatian culture is the product of a mixture of different cultural
influences coming from the East and the West. He also contends that Croatia is a very rich
country in spite of its current economic crisis.
C08 Nino Raspudić,  Probudili smo se kao građani EU! Što će nam biti novi cilj? [We have
awakened as EU citizens! What will be our next goal?], published in Večernji list on 1
July 2013
Political analyst Nino Raspudić advances the claim that EU accession, instead of being the
object of rational deliberation, has been constructed as an irrefutable dogma in Croatian
public discourse.  Although he believes that  EU membership has not  brought substantial
changes  to  Croatian  society,  he  expects  it  to  produce  a  normalisation  of  the  Croatian
political spectrum.
C09 Marina Šerić, Postali smo dio europske bauštele. Zasućimo rukave i počnimo raditi [We
have joined the European construction site. Let’s roll up our sleeves and get to work],
published in Večernji list on 2 July 2013
Šerić’s commentary draws an analogy between the European project and a construction site,
arguing that Croatia should take the opportunity to take part in the project in a creative and
mature way.
C10 Nino  Raspudić,  Tko  o  čemu,  oni  o  regiji,  ali  tko  ih  je  ovlastio  da  Opatiju  i  Banju
Koviljaču opet  guraju u istu državu? [Let them rattle on about the region,  but who
authorised them to push Opatija and Banja Koviljača into the same country again?],
published in Večernji list on 5 July 2013
In his second opinion piece included in the Croatia sample (see the first above), Raspudić
criticises  the  idea  that  EU membership  implies  that  Croatia  should  seek  new forms  of
regional association with the other post-Yugoslav countries. This idea, he claims, has no
popular support or democratic legitimation, and its realisation would be against Croatia’s
interests.
C11 Josip  Jović,  Hoće  li  Europa  umjeti  da  pjeva…  [Will  Europe  be  able  to  sing…],
published in Slobodna Dalmacija on 7 July 2013
EU-phoric attitudes are largely unjustified, Jović claims in his commentary, because those
who will  mostly benefit  from EU accession are the politicians.  Not only have ordinary
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people remained rather indifferent, but EU integration also involves a loss of sovereignty, so
that Croatia will now be more exposed to external forces and interests.
C12 Katarina Luketić (interviewed by L. Tomičić), Hrvatska je u zabludi ako misli da može
pobjeći od Balkana [Croatia is mistaken if she thinks she can escape from the Balkans],
published in Novi list on 13 July 2013
In this interview about her new book,  Balkan: od geografije do fantazije [The Balkans:
from geography to imagination], literary critic and essayist Katarina Luketić articulates a
critique  of  stereotypical  representations  of  the  Balkans,  both in  Croatia  and  in  Europe.
Particularly, she argues that both the negative perception of the Balkans and the dominance
of the return-to-Europe narrative in Croatian public discourse are a result of the nationalist
ideology nourished by the Tuđman regime.
4.4.3 The Bosnia and Herzegovina sample
Lastly,  the  final  sample  for  the  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  case  study  includes  7
commentaries and 5 interviews. Table 4 below provides an overview of their content.
Table 4. Content overview of the texts included in the Bosnia and Herzegovina sample.
B01 Almasa Hadžić,  Neka ih je stid!  [Shame on them!],  published in  Dnevni Avaz on 7
February 2014
In this quite aggressive opinion piece, written a few days after the first wave of protests,
Tuzla-based  reporter  Almasa  Hadžić  openly  sides  with  the  protesters,  blaming  the
government for failing to protect the people’s interests and to address their demands.
B02 Dino Mustafić, Ujedinjeni u gnjevu [United in anger], published in Oslobođenje on 10
February 2014
Film and theatre director Dino Mustafić regards social rage as a legitimate reaction against
political  corruption,  as  a  way to  pursue  social  justice.  He  blames  both  politicians  and
prominent observers for defaming protesters, framing the protests as ethnically motivated,
and denying  the  possibility  of  social  change.  He  then  wishes  for  progressive  forces  to
reshape the country’s political system.
B03 Slavo Kukić,  Zemaljski  bogovi  i  socijalna bijeda.  Socijalni  bunt za još jedan mandat
etnonacionalista [Earthly gods and social misery. A social uprising which will earn the
ethno-nationalists another term], published in Dnevni list on 10 February 2014
Sociologist and politician Slavo Kukić advances the view that protests are likely to favour
ethno-nationalists  by giving  them an  opportunity  to  manipulate  the  masses  and  further
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entrench their power. He contends that protests stem from widespread discontent but are far
from having a revolutionary character, as they are probably led by powerful actors behind
the scenes.
B04 Almasa Hadžić, Čir je pukao [The bubble has burst], published in Dnevni Avaz on 11
February 2014
In this other commentary, Almasa Hadžić reaffirms her support for the protests, stating that
they are a legitimate response to the social discontent caused by the political elites, which
she also blames for manipulating the masses in order to gain consensus.
B05 Nino Raspudić,  Njihova lasta ne čini naše proljeće [Their swallow does not make our
spring], published in Nezavisne novine on 11 February 2014
Political commentator Nino Raspudić24 offers various interpretations of the demonstrations,
suggesting that they could be part of broader power struggles at the national or international
level. He concludes by arguing that Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not have a stake
in the current protest movement,  because they lack proper political representation in the
country and therefore have nobody to protest against.
B06 Ibrahim Prohić (interviewed by Đ. Krajišnik),  Vlast  se plaši jedinstva građana [The
government is afraid of the unity of the citizens], published in  Dani  on 14 February
2014 
Political analyst  and psychologist Ibrahim Prohić endorses the protests as a way to vent
popular frustration with the political leaders as well as express widespread concern over the
deteriorating social situation in the country. He claims that the authorities fear the masses
and hence react by fostering ethnic animosities and condemning violence instead of facing
their own responsibilities.
B07 Enes Trumić,  Neko se probudio, neko se tek budi [Someone woke up, some are just
waking up], published in Oslobođenje on 17 February 2014
Commentator Enes Trumić contends that protests have forced political elites to confront
their  failings,  heralding  progress  and  prosperity  for  the  whole  country.  He  blames  the
authorities  for  promoting  entertainment  (especially  football)  as  a  way  to  defuse  social
discontent, and justifies violent acts by the protesters as a struggle for survival. Finally, he
calls  upon  Gandhi-like  political  leaders  to  work  for  the  common  good  of  Bosnian-
Herzegovinian society.
B08 Asim  Mujkić  (interviewed  by  V.  Bačanović), Gradimo otoke  slobode  [Let  us  build
islands of freedom], published in Dani on 21 February 2014
24 Note that two texts by Nino Raspudić are also included in the Croatia sample.
105
Political  science  professor  Asim  Mujkić  advances  the  view  that  the  citizen  plenums
challenge the dominant ethno-nationalist ideology in significant ways. After discussing the
ideological structure of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society and the role of academia in it, he
endorses direct democracy as a way for the marginalised to re-enter the political debate and
achieve emancipation. Protests and plenums, he maintains, provide an innovative alternative
to ethno-politics.
B09 Ibrahim  Prohić  (interviewed  by  S.  Degirmendžić),  Vlast  se  uplašila  opljačkanih
građana [The authorities are afraid of defrauded citizens], published in Dnevni Avaz on
21 February 2014
In  this  other  interview,  political  analyst  and  psychologist  Ibrahim Prohić  explains  that
politicians’ reactions to the protests consist of four phases: silence, media spinning, staged
commitment to change, repression. He argues that political elites will not change unless the
people force them to do so.
B10 Svetlana  Cenić,  Svako  svoje  pljačka  i  svako  svoje  bira [Everyone  robs  their  own,
everyone elects their own], published in Dani on 21 February 2014
Economist  and  former  politician  Svetlana  Cenić  argues  that  politics  in  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  resembles  a  corrupted  market  system  monopolised  by  political  parties.
Protests, she claims, are a reaction against the illusion of political marketing, signalling that
people have begun to question the established order based on the ethnic norm.
B11 Zdravko Grebo (interviewed by S. Degirmendžić), Nemojte odustati, budite na ulicama
do izbora! [Do not give up, stay in the streets until the elections!], published in Dnevni
Avaz on 22 February 2014
In this interview, Law professor and renowned political activist Zdravko Grebo claims that
revolting against political corruption is fully justified and that every citizen affected by the
problem should  take  to  the  streets.  Although they  failed  to  break  the  dominant  ethno-
nationalist paradigm, protests have a historical significance, says Grebo, asking the people
to keep demonstrating and to not let the government manipulate them.
B12 Vehid Šehić (interviewed by S. Karić),  Kad kupujete socijalni mir, desi se ulica [Who
buys social peace gets street clashes], published in Oslobođenje on 26 February 2014
Political analyst and Tuzla-based activist Vehid Šehić views the protests as a workers’ revolt
fuelled by the yawning gap between the people and the elite, political corruption and human
rights violations. He encourages protesters to focus on redressing social inequalities and
avoid political appropriation. Then, he explains the lack of protests in Republika Srpska as a
result of ethnic propaganda, advancing the notion of ethnic privatisation.
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The results of in-depth qualitative analysis of all the texts included in the final three
samples will be presented in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
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5. Serbia: the aftermath of the 
declaration of independence of Kosovo 
in 2008
This chapter addresses the first of the three case studies, i.e. the reactions of Serbia’s
intellectuals to Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. The analysis of the 12
opinion  pieces  included  in  the  final  sample  is  conducted  on  the  basis  of  the
methodological  framework  elaborated  in  §  3.5,  which  focuses  on  strategies  of
intellectual self-legitimation (which are examined in § 5.1), strategies of intellectual
spokespersonship for the nation (§ 5.2), and the discursive representation of the nation
(§  5.3).  The  empirical  findings  of  all  three  case  studies  are  further  discussed  in
Chapter  8,  which  also  examines  their  broader  significance  as  well  as  possible
conceptual and methodological implications.
5.1 Strategies of intellectual self-legitimation
The purpose of this section is to examine the strategies that the authors of the selected
opinion pieces employ to legitimise themselves as intellectuals by constructing their
own standpoint as a vantage point, that is, as a position estranged from the broader
society and thus affording them a ‘better view’ of the social world. As the analysis will
show, the strategies used by the authors under consideration are manifold and highly
diversified. On the basis of the findings, I propose to categorise them in three broad
groups:
1. Strategies based on engagement and attitude
2. Strategies based on knowledge and expertise
3. Strategies based on status and membership
In the following, I illustrate the linguistic realisation of these strategies by analysing
relevant excerpts from the sample.
5.1.1 Intellectual self-legitimation based on engagement and attitude
This category includes discursive strategies that construct the privileged position of
the intellectual as marked by specific forms of engagement or disengagement with
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human  affairs,  or  as  characterised  by certain  attitudes  or  dispositions  towards  the
broader society. In this respect, a strategy that is common to a few authors is that of
representing their own pursuit of reason and truth as carrying great responsibility, or
even as an act of courage and prowess, in the face of society’s inability to gain self-
awareness  or  engage  in  meaningful  self-reflection.  The  best  illustrations  of  this
strategy are found in Vuk Drašković’s and Vladimir Arsenijević’s opinion pieces. Let
us consider the opening sentences of Kosovo and us by Vuk Drašković [S10]:
(1)  The  popular  indignation  over  the  violation  of  Serbia’s  territorial  integrity  is
translating into destructive anger. (2) In the streets and squares, in television studios,
in newspapers and churchyards, the word is that [...] we need to return to the path of
our civic, national and mental breakdown. (3) It is risky to think normally. (4) Reason
is stigmatised as betrayal of Kosovo, and thus the clever Serbia has transformed into a
frightened shadow.
The  author  describes  a  society  permeated  by  rage,  defeatism,  self-contempt  and
distrust in reason. The use of nominalisations (e.g. “popular indignation”, “destructive
anger”,  “civic,  national  and  mental  breakdown”)  conveys  a  sense  of  doom  and
inescapability, as if people were no longer in control of themselves and their destiny.
In  such  a  critical  situation,  the  very  exercise  of  reason  appears  to  lose  its  force,
overridden by fervent loyalty to Serbia’s territorial integrity. This is epitomised in the
metaphorical  representation  of  the  “clever  Serbia”,  a  metonymy  for  the  restricted
group  of  people  who  have  managed  to  retain  their  intellectual  faculties,  as  a
“frightened  shadow”.  By  positioning  himself  amid  such  a  scenario,  Drašković
implicitly  emerges  not  only  as  a  member  of  the  “clever  Serbia”  jeopardised  by
collective anger,  but also as someone who has the courage to “think normally”  in
times when doing so appears to be ill-advised.
Vladimir  Arsenijević,  in  Kosovo  is  (not)  Serbia [S11],  constructs  his  intellectual
standpoint in a very similar manner:
(2) Since when,  on 17 February 2008,  Kosovo declared independence,  Serbia has
entered the final stage of its proverbially problematic relationship with reality. (3) For
this reason, today it seems to me more important than ever to use a language that does
not lose sight of factual reality,  and to feed into the local memosphere, so polluted
with nonsense and myths, one notorious truth that no-one of the local opinion makers
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dares  to speak,  and which is  more  than necessary to  us for our collective mental
health. (4) Here is that sentence: Kosovo is not Serbia. 
Like  Drašković,  Arsenijević  paints  a  rather  bleak  and  discomforting  portrait  of
mainstream society,  in which reason, truth and “factual reality” have succumbed to
delusion  and aberration.  Through referential  strategies  drawing on a  health-related
lexicon (e.g. “final stage”, “polluted”, “collective mental health”), which conveys an
underlying  conceptual  metaphor  of  illness  (see  Musolff,  2010;  Wodak,  2015),  this
predicament is constructed primarily as a serious health condition affecting the entire
Serbian society (in this regard, see the first theme in the discursive representation of
the nation,  discussed in § 5.3.1). This specific representation enables the author to
present his own involvement as urgent and decisive. The argument rests on a topos of
threat  and danger,  which can be deconstructed as follows:  if nobody takes on the
(intellectual) responsibility to get a hold on reality and speak the truth, then society is
likely to plunge into some form of mental insanity. Arsenijević’s intellectual heroism
is further underscored by the alleged reticence of his fellow commentators. Hence, the
discursive construction of intellectual estrangement is twofold: on the one hand, the
author presents himself as able to help society recover from a widespread illness to
which  he  is  apparently  immune;  on  the  other,  he  stands  out  among  his  peers  as
someone who dares  to speak inconvenient  truths.  On both levels,  intellectual  self-
legitimation is predicated on engagement, responsibility and bravery.
Another common strategy of intellectual self-legitimation based on engagement and
attitude  consists  of  constructing  the intellectual  vantage point  as  a  position  that  is
impervious to manipulation and from which the workings of ideology can be exposed
and confronted. For example,  in his opinion piece entitled  Kosovo in Serbia [S04]
Nikola Samardžić  presents himself  as someone who is  committed  to demystifying
political manipulation:
(7) It was not difficult to predict the components of the clerical-Marxist orgy which
has once again pushed Serbia back into a state of officially managed barbarianism. (8)
And it is obvious that the languishing pathos of the President and the Prime Minister
about Kosovo’s departure is a smokescreen for realignment in a new phase of the
transitional robbery which benefits from the endless protraction of Serbia’s agony as
an unfinished state. (9) The official raving about world politics, a political pathology
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in itself, is the continuation of a complex process of monopolisation of the political
and economic sphere. (10) The Kosovo myth is again imposed as the framework of an
ideology of unfreedom.
A salient linguistic feature in this passage is the systematic recourse to agent-deletion:
actions and processes are largely nominalised (e.g. “officially managed barbarism”,
“realignment”,  “transitional  robbery”,  “endless  protraction”,  “official  raving”,
“continuation of a complex process of monopolisation”) and verbs tend to be in the
impersonal  (and passive) form. As a result,  the concrete  actors responsible for the
aforementioned actions and processes are almost fully omitted, which conveys a sense
of  vagueness and uncertainty.  Moreover,  most  nominalisations  belong to the  same
semantic  field,  that  of  machination  and  intrigue.  The  combined  effect  of  these
linguistic choices is the creation of a scenario that appears to be dominated by forces
that escape ‘our’ control; however, they do not escape the author’s own awareness, as
signalled by the use of epistemic markers such as “it was not difficult to predict” and
“it is obvious”. This representation, sustained through a particularly assertive, overly
ornamental  and  declarative  style,  enables  Samardžić  to  establish  himself  as  an
outspoken critic who does not refrain from engaging (at least on paper) with covert
and fraudulent large-scale practices and structures.
In conclusion,  the  analysis  has  shown that  a  salient  way to discursively construct
intellectual estrangement is to foreground specific aspects of one’s own engagement in
(or disengagement from) human affairs, as well as one’s attitude towards society in
general. In the texts under scrutiny,  this macro-strategy is reflected in two different
discursive strategies, which vary in terms of how intellectual engagement and attitude
are  characterised:  i)  Representing  intellectual  engagement  as  a  responsible  and
courageous  act  motivated  by  society’s  irrational  state  of  disorientation  (mental  or
cognitive); ii) Constructing the intellectual vantage point as a position affording the
power to uncover and debunk ideological manipulation.
5.1.2 Intellectual self-legitimation based on knowledge and expertise
A second group of strategies of intellectual self-legitimation includes those aimed to
construct the intellectual, implicitly or explicitly, as someone who possesses greater
knowledge and expertise than the ordinary person. This corresponds to van Leeuwen’s
(2008) category of expert authority (which is comprised under authorisation based on
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recommendation). Strategies of this kind presuppose a distinction between expert or
specialist knowledge, on the one hand, and folk or common knowledge, on the other.
In  some  cases,  this  distinction  may  imply  an  evaluation  of  expert  knowledge  as
somehow  ‘superior’  to  common  knowledge;  however,  such  a  disparity  is  quite
unlikely to be explicitly acknowledged or sanctioned by the intellectual-author, as this
would easily be perceived by the readers as a pretentious move. The analysis of the
opinion pieces from the Serbia sample seems to confirm this expectation. To be sure,
many authors support their claims by drawing evidence from various areas of expert
knowledge (primarily history, literature and law); however, in most cases this is not so
conspicuous as to constitute a fully-fledged strategy of intellectual self-legitimation.
Indeed, virtually no author treats her or his expertise as having an intrinsically higher
value than the lay knowledge possessed by the (projected/intended) readership.
There are, however, some cases in which specialist knowledge and expertise indeed
serve as grounds for intellectual self-legitimation, namely, when the author attempts to
de-legitimise those who oppose her or his viewpoint by representing them as biased or
as lacking the necessary knowledge to make meaningful contributions to the debate.
This  strategy is  obviously fallacious,  as  it  is  intended to  discredit  the  other  party
instead of tackling their  argumentation.  More specifically,  calling into question the
knowledgeability of the other party is explicitly recognised in the pragma-dialectical
approach as the abusive variant of the argumentum ad hominem fallacy (van Eemeren
& Grootendorst, 2004: p. 177).
A notable illustration of this strategy of intellectual self-legitimation is found in Milan
Škulić’s  commentary,  Kosovo is  Serbia [S12].  A salient  feature  of  this  text  is  the
discursive construction of the debate about Kosovo as heavily polarised along two
axes: expertise versus ignorance and truthfulness versus mendacity. The author stands
on the  positive  side  of  each dichotomy,  while  the  opponents  are  relegated  to  the
negative side. Thus, Škulić constructs himself as an expert authority (specifically in
the  fields  of  law  and  history),  while  the  other  party  to  the  debate  is  negatively
represented  not  only as  uninformed about,  or  even deliberately oblivious  of,  legal
norms and historical facts, but also as mendacious. Take as an example the following
passage: 
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(2) Sometimes, when they want to be ostensibly objective, Serbs accept the logic of
those who are Serbia’s enemies, or at least not its friends. (3) Some Serbian citizens
raise their voice publicly and quite extravagantly – at least insofar as their opinion
concerns  legal  matters,  but  in  any other  respect  unfoundedly  –  in  favour  of  the
recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Serbia. (4) A lie will not become a truth no
matter  how many  times  it  is  repeated,  though  this  may  create  some  propaganda
effects, but certain truths are to be repeated many times.
Through implicitly targeting Vladimir Arsenijević,25 the author sets out to defame all
those who share the latter’s viewpoint on Kosovo. The opponents are referred to in a
quite vague manner (“Some Serbian citizens”) and are portrayed in utterly negative
terms, i.e. as unloyal to Serbia, too biased or incompetent to make valid claims about
the Kosovo issue (and yet  obstinate in speaking out), as well  as mendacious.  This
passage appears largely fallacious (as it rests on an argumentum ad hominem deployed
to discredit the opponents instead of addressing their claims), but only if it is taken in
isolation. In fact, much of the subsequent text is devoted precisely to deconstructing
the opponents’ standpoint. However, more relevant to our discussion of intellectual
self-legitimation is to ask ourselves what Škulić achieves by means of this discursive
strategy. The answer is that he indirectly emerges as an authority on the subject matter,
i.e. a ‘repository of truth’ with regard to the debate about Kosovo.
There is an additional aspect that makes Škulić’s text particularly interesting in terms
of the discursive construction of the intellectual standpoint, that is, the specific way in
which  specialist  knowledge  is  combined  with  common  knowledge  and  popular
wisdom. Let us consider the following excerpt:
(6) It is known to Serbs that “He whose law is written by his cudgel leaves behind the
stench of inhumanity”.  (7) The “cudgel” can take the form of cruise missiles and
“intelligent” bombs, but also of historical forgery and a sort of “rape” of international
law. (8) But a “cudgel” will always be a “cudgel” and will never become law. (9)
Hence Serbia will never recognise Kosovo as an independent state. (10) Perhaps some
“other Serbia” could do that in different circumstances [...] but that would not be a
legal or legitimate act, just like, for example, the so-called NDH 26 never became a
fully-fledged state although at the time it  was recognised by some countries, Nazi
25 The piece was written as a response to Arsenijević’s commentary (S11). Furthermore, sentence (4) is
an implicit reference to Arsenijević’s  claim that  he “would like to repeat  once more, twice,  even a
hundred times should it be necessary: Kosovo is not Serbia” (27). 
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Germany in the first place. (11) There applies also the traditional legal norm: “What is
born crooked not even time can straighten”.
Škulić makes a case against the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Serbia by
weaving together  a  literary  quote,27 a  historical-legal  reference  to  the  Independent
State  of Croatia,  and a common proverb,  conveniently passed off  as a “traditional
legal norm”. This strategy could be explained as an attempt to make the argument
persuasive  and appealing  to  a  broader  readership.  Apart  from its  rhetorical  force,
however,  this  discursive  construct  is  relevant  also  in  terms  of  intellectual  self-
legitimation. Through employing popular knowledge to illustrate a (specialist) legal
argument,  the  author  seemingly  ‘blurs  the  line’  between  the  two  domains  of
knowledge.  The  distinction,  however,  is  not  obliterated  but  only  dissimulated.
Throughout the article, in fact, proverbs and popular expressions are used solely to
exemplify  or  elucidate  technical  legal  arguments;  nowhere  does  folk  knowledge
surmount or replace professional expertise, which therefore retains its primacy over
the former. The discursive construction of the intellectual standpoint is greatly shaped
by this  specific  interplay.  Although this  strategy is  most  apparent  in Škulić’s  text,
other authors employ it as well, albeit to a much lesser extent.
Finally, the analysis has revealed a very specific form of intellectual self-legitimation,
which involves intentionally downplaying one’s knowledge or ability to comprehend
reality (i.e. one’s epistemic stance) in order to conveniently make one’s authority less
‘visible’,  so  to  speak.  Instances  of  this  strategy  are  found  in  Arsenijević’s  and
Samardžić’s  opinion  pieces.  As  they  comment  upon  Serbia’s  predicament,  both
authors understate their own capacity for ‘vision’ and analysis, and they do so in a
similar  manner.  Arsenijević  [S11]  speaks  of  the  unlikelihood  that  the  country’s
situation will improve by the tenth anniversary of Milošević’s demise: 
(18) Things will hardly get fixed in a significant way by then – one does not need to
be a prophet to guess that things may easily get worse than they are today. 
26 The acronym NDH stands for Independent State of Croatia, which was a puppet state of Germany and
Italy during World War II.
27 Sentence (6) contains a quote from The Mountain Wreath, a mid-nineteenth century poem written by
Montenegrin  prince-bishop  and  poet  Petar  II  Petrović-Njegoš  (and  translated  into  English  by  V.
Mihailović). The poem is widely regarded as a masterpiece of Serbian literature, and the quoted line is
well-known among the Serbian public.
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Samardžić [S04], on his part, criticises the deterioration of the country’s social and
political situation: 
(7) It was not difficult to predict the components of the clerical-Marxist orgy which
has once again pushed Serbia back into a state of officially managed barbarianism..
The two phrases “one does not need to be a prophet to guess that […]” and “It was not
difficult to predict […]” indicate the writers’ attitude towards the quality and validity
of  the  communicated  information,  and as  such constitute  markers  of  evidentiality.
Specifically,  they  minimise  or  even  abolish  the  authors’  vantage  point  by
approximating their epistemic stance to that of ordinary observers. However, the two
expressions can be regarded as understatements, insofar as they serve to reinforce the
authors’ intellectual authority by making it less apparent and explicit,  and therefore
less  exposed  to  objections  and  criticisms  by  the  readership.  In  this  respect,
downplaying  one’s  intellectual  authority  seems  to  constitute  a  salient  discursive
strategy of intellectual self-legitimation.
In conclusion,  the analysis  illustrates that strategies of intellectual  self-legitimation
drawing on knowledge and expertise, and particularly on the (hierarchical) distinction
between specialist and lay knowledge, are not commonly employed in the texts under
consideration.  In  fact,  although  many  authors  mobilise  their  expertise  in  order  to
support their claims, almost none of them appears to establish her or his intellectual
vantage point primarily on these grounds. As suggested above, the reason for this is
that such a strategy would likely come across as self-aggrandisement, with predictable
repercussions  on  the  credibility  of  the  author.  However,  self-legitimation  through
expertise can be achieved in other ways, for instance by representing one’s opponents
as less knowledgeable than oneself (as Škulić does) or, conversely, by conveniently
downplaying one’s authority (as seen in the last two examples).
5.1.3 Intellectual self-legitimation based on status and membership
A third  group  of  strategies  of  intellectual  self-legitimation  includes  those  which
represent  intellectual  detachment  from mainstream society as  deriving  from social
status or from membership of a restricted (intellectual) elite. In van Leeuwen’s (2008)
framework,  this  macro-strategy  corresponds  to  personal  authority  legitimation,
although it is of course directed at legitimising the self instead of an external social
practice.
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Let us begin with Anamnesis of a slogan by Teofil Pančić [S09]: 
(2) I am sure that my colleagues will address everything that happened last Thursday
from a variety of disciplinary approaches, therefore it is unnecessary for me to, you
know, stand out; there is, however, a place that is worth focusing on, as it reveals the
core of a pathology that has costed us an impressively great deal, and surely will cost
us even more.
Here,  Pančić  speaks  as  a  member  of  a  community  of  “colleagues”  that  arguably
includes analysts, commentators, experts, journalists and opinion-makers, i.e. fellow
intellectuals.  He  therefore  constructs  his  intellectual  standpoint  as  based  on
membership  of  a  restricted  group  of  professional  observers/interpreters  of  social
reality.  However,  this  is  just  the  initial  step  in  a  broader  and  more  sophisticated
strategy of  self-legitimation,  which  revolves  around the  opposition  marked  by the
adversative  conjunction  “however”.  Initially,  the author  positions  himself  among a
community  of  peers  and  explicitly  rejects  the  chance  of  ‘standing  out’ from  it.
Subsequently,  however, he contradicts his pledge by implicitly claiming to be able to
focus on something that none of his colleagues seem to have noticed. What is more,
this something is referred to as a matter of the greatest importance, as suggested by the
metaphor “core28 of a pathology” as well as by the use both of intensifiers (such as
“impressively  great”  and  “even  more”)  and  of  markers  of  epistemic  modality
conveying certainty (such as “reveals” and “surely”).  Thus, Pančić eventually does
‘stand  out’ from  the  intellectual  community  in  which  he  had  initially  positioned
himself, a discursive move that grants him an even higher intellectual status.
This  specific  strategy  of  intellectual  legitimation  based  on  a  shift  from  equal
membership in an intellectual community to prominence is unique to Teofil Pančić’s
opinion  piece.  Most  other  authors,  in  fact,  tend  not  to  accentuate  their  own
‘intellectual profile’, and the few who do are much less bold than Pančić about their
belonging to  a  restricted  intellectual  elite.  In  most  cases,  they limit  themselves  to
occasional references to situations and people that are vaguely related to intellectual,
academic or artistic  circles.  A good example  of this  discursive feature is  found in
Wisdom, by Đoko Kesić [S07]: 
28 In Serbian srž, literally “marrow”.
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(1) In principle I  agree with writer Milovan Danojlić who recently said about the
Kosovo events that Europe and the developed world understand only the language of
force,  and  that  no  other  option  is  left  to  us,  today  militarily  and  economically
powerless, other than wait.
Kesić opens his commentary by illustrating his stance with regard to a writer’s opinion
on the geopolitical situation of Serbia. Regardless of the specific content of the quote,
this choice could be seen as a salient perspectivisation device, insofar as it situates the
author on a par with the writer, and by implication associates him to a community of
intellectual peers. This initial form of self-legitimation provides grounds for Kesić’s
subsequent  self-presentation  as  insightful  observer  and  as  advocate  of  political
prudence.
An altogether different form of intellectual self-legitimation based on status is the one
employed by Vuk Drašković in Kosovo and us [S10]. Let us consider the concluding
paragraph of the piece: 
(23) Today we learn from those who, on that 9th of March, at the Vidovdan gathering
as well as at the glorious street carnivals of the Zajedno coalition, awakened Serbia,
gave it back its sight and showed it the way. (24) We learn from those people who
were betrayed by the merchants of democracy because freedom did not ring in the
way hundreds of thousands of Dositejs from the European Serbia had wished.
In order to grasp the importance of this passage for the author’s self-legitimation, one
needs to explicate the numerous references to shared knowledge it contains. The 9th
of March (1991) is the date of the first of a series of mass demonstrations organised by
the Serbian Renewal Movement, an opposition party led by Vuk Drašković himself, to
protest against Slobodan Milošević’s rule. The next reference is to the 1992 Vidovdan
gathering,  another  opposition  event  coordinated  by  Vuk  Drašković’s  political
movement.  Further,  the  Zajedno (Together)  coalition  is  an  alliance  formed  by
Drašković’s Serbian Renewal Movement with other democratic forces in 1996, again
in opposition to  Milošević.  Finally,  Dositej  is  the mononym of Dimitrije  ‘Dositej’
Obradović,  one  of  the  protagonists  of  Serbia’s  national  and  cultural  renaissance
between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. Together with Vuk
Karadžić, he is regarded as the father of modern Serbian literature. 
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In this light, this passage is a clear attempt to praise and aggrandise the people who
took  part  in  the  aforementioned  political  activities.  This  is  achieved  through  a
combination of discursive strategies. In terms of perspectivisation, the syntagm “we
learn from…”, repeated in both sentences, constructs that group of politically active
citizens as exemplary people worthy of imitation. This is reinforced through positive
nominations  (“Dositejs”)  and predications  (“glorious”),  but  mostly  by representing
their engagement as a noble gesture for the entire people of Serbia (through metaphors
of awakening, vision and path), as well as a sacrifice in the name of democracy and a
“European Serbia”. The self-legitimating force of this discursive construction stems
from the knowledge, which the average Serbian reader possesses, that Vuk Drašković
was  himself  the  leader  of  the  movement  he  so  passionately  celebrates.  Thus,  by
praising his followers he indirectly elevates himself as a prominent figure in Serbia’s
recent history,  particularly as an anti-Milošević dissident and as a champion of the
European ideal. This constitutes an instance of intellectual self-legitimation based on
personal  status  and  charisma,  analogous  to  van  Leeuwen’s  notion  of  authority
legitimation based on role model (2008).
Broadly speaking, discursive strategies aimed at constructing intellectual marginality
on the basis of social status or membership appear to be quite rare across the sample.
Nonetheless,  the analysis  has highlighted some interesting features concerning this
specific group of strategies. The main finding is that most authors tend not to amplify
or call attention to their own ‘intellectual profile’, probably for the same reasons that
they  largely  refrain  from  grounding  their  standpoint  in  expertise  and  specialist
knowledge (i.e. in order to avoid self-aggrandisement, as explained above). There are,
however, two notable exceptions. One is Teofil Pančić, who discursively enacts his
intellectual  estrangement  by  playing  ironically  with  his  own  status  of  public
intellectual.  The  other  is  Vuk  Drašković,  who  legitimises  himself  charismatically
through implicit references to his past role of movement leader and political dissident.
5.2 Strategies of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation
In the previous section I have discussed the ways in which the considered authors
discursively construct their own intellectual marginality,  that is, their vantage point
with respect  to  the broader  society.  The purpose of  this  section  is  to  examine the
strategies  they employ in order to bracket or overcome this  original  estrangement,
118
coming  forward  as  spokespersons  for  the  nation.  The  authors  under  consideration
appear to assume a variety of roles vis-à-vis the nation, which I propose to gather in
three broad groups:
1. The intellectual as political guide for the nation
2. The intellectual  as promoter/defender  of  the nation’s  values  and distinctive
character
3. The intellectual as emancipator/educator of the nation
5.2.1 The intellectual as political guide for the nation
The most common way in which Serbian authors take on the role of spokespersons for
the  nation  is  by  granting  themselves  the  authority  to  make  evaluations,
recommendations  and  normative/prescriptive  judgments  concerning  Serbia  as  a
political  community.  By  offering  guidance  on  the  country’s  political  affairs,  they
present themselves as political guides for the nation.
The analysis shows that several authors do so by criticising Serbia’s political elites,
specifically by blaming them for the country’s hardships. A clear illustration of this
specific  strategy of  spokespersonship  for  the  nation  is  found in  Three  leaders by
Bačević [S08]. Throughout the piece, the author speaks not only as someone who is
poised to criticise the conduct of the country’s major political leaders, but also as an
advocate of general political consensus and national unity in times of crisis. The last
paragraph most clearly attests to this form of discursive self-positioning:
(24)  For  the  three  Serbian  leaders  who  last  week  displayed  an  enviable  dose  of
political  immaturity,  there  exists  a  proposal  which  is  totally  unrealistic,  but  it  is
logical.  (25) Forget about the media, the public opinion polls, foreign friends who
friendly took a piece a land away from you, as well as domestic partners who dream
of  isolation  so  that  they  can  further  strengthen  their  business  empires  through
smuggling or the usual robbery.  (26) You failed to agree on a single meeting, but
perhaps you will agree on important matters. (27) This seems impossible today, but
over time it will become clear that some balance between past and future, Kosovo and
Europe, must be achieved among the leading parties in Serbia.
The  three  leaders  (President  Tadić,  Prime  Minister  Koštunica  and  the  opposition
leader Nikolić), who arguably stand metonymically for Serbia’s entire ruling class, are
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depicted  as  incompetent,  self-interested  and  embroiled  in  illegitimate  affairs.  This
negative presentation is intensified by means of irony (e.g. “enviable dose of political
immaturity”,  “friendly”)  and  cynicism  (e.g.  “totally  unrealistic”,  “usual  robbery”,
“impossible”).  In  sentences  25  and  26,  the  author  openly  engages  the  above-
mentioned politicians through direct address, advising them to enfranchise themselves
from  public  opinion  and  untrustworthy  associates.  This  exhortation,  however,  is
labeled as “unrealistic”, therefore it should not be read as a genuine piece of advice,
but rather as a rhetorical move intended to further discredit the addressees. In the final
sentence, then, Bačević puts aside his criticism of Serbian ruling elites and outlines a
political vision for the future of the country that is infused with a sense of historical
necessity (indicated by the future “will” and the modal “must”).
In the example above, the articulation of a political vision for the nation occupies only
a marginal place in comparison to the criticism of political elites. In several texts from
the sample, however, the former strategy emerges as a paramount form of intellectual
spokespersonship  for  the  nation  (under  the  rubric  of  political  guide).  A salient
illustration is found in the following excerpt from Kesić’s commentary [S07]:
(8) [...] the political and intellectual elite of Serbia today have two major tasks before
them:  first,  to  cleverly  and  necessarily  avoid  any  armed  conflicts  over  Kosovo,
especially the potential conflict in which the great powers would flex their muscles
over our neck.  (9) Secondly,  to precisely consider the circumstances in which the
country finds itself, define the state and national goals, and, as politicians would say,
subordinate everything to their achievement. (10) Whether Serbia will actually prove
to be able to defend and reclaim Kosovo through a long-lived diplomatic struggle
depends on how these issues will be addressed.
Here, Kesić spells out what he regards as Serbia’s key political objectives. A number
of linguistic aspects are worth noting: first, the author’s instructions are directed at the
country’s  elites  broadly  understood,  not  only  to  its  political  leaders,  and  should
therefore be viewed as forming a comprehensive social and political vision rather than
as simply a blueprint for political action. Secondly, the argument largely rests on an
implicit  topos of threat and danger, which emerges from the adverbs “cleverly” and
“necessarily”,  and can be deconstructed as follows:  if  a political action or decision
bears specific dangerous, threatening consequences (such as an armed conflict),  then
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one should not perform it. This topos is further substantiated in Kesić’s warning about
the risk of Serbia being drawn into an international conflict (in this regard, see the
third theme of the discursive representation of Serbia as a nation discussed in § 5.3.3),
and finally reinforced by the exhortation to Serbia to pursue its goals through a “long-
lived  diplomatic  struggle”.  Lastly,  the  choice  to  put  forth a  normative/prescriptive
argument without using modal verbs (such as “should” or “must”) lends objectivity to
the prescribed actions and goals, and can therefore be regarded as a persuasive device.
As a result  of these discursive strategies,  Kesić assumes  and performs the role of
political guide of the nation by urging the elites to act with prudence and in the best
interest of the national community.
In some cases, the two strategies of spokespersonship for the nation discussed above
(i.e. criticism of the political elites and articulation of a political vision for the nation)
appear in combination. This occurs, for instance, in Despotović’s opinion piece, Time
for responsibility, sobriety and reason [S05]. The author levels a series of accusations
against  Serbian  political  elites,  reproaching  them  for  their  inability  to  properly
articulate and pursue the good of the Serbian people:
(12) Instead of focusing on29 concrete people, their lives and their rights, our current
politics  asserts  the  priority  of  abstract  principles  such  as  territorial  integrity,
international law and inviolability of borders. [...] (14) This is a dangerous tendency,
because once the well-being of concrete citizens is neglected in favour of inapplicable
principles we are only one step away from the political syndrome of the 1990s, that is,
from an  aggressive  and  hostile  attitude  towards  the  outside  world,  and  from the
limitation  or  the  violation  of  rights  and  liberties  as  far  as  internal  relations  are
concerned.
Despotović  accuses  Serbian  political  elites  of  favouring  compliance  with  abstract
norms over the prosperity of concrete individuals, which is implicitly elevated as a
higher goal. Two linguistic features seem particularly important in this regard. The
first is the predominance of nominalisations (such as “politics”, “tendency”, “political
syndrome”, “attitude”, “limitation”, “violation” etc.) and impersonal verbs, whereby
concrete agents are backgrounded while processes acquire realness and permanency.
The  second is  the  construction  of  a  catastrophic  scenario  raising  the  spectre  of  a
29 Literally “having before its eyes”.
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relapse into the unrest and discontent that marked the 1990s. The relapse is said to be
“one step away”, which creates a sense of risk and danger. From an argumentative
perspective, this constitutes a topos of threat and danger, as the main claim (i.e. that
the political elites should look after the well-being of the citizens) is supported with
reference to the devastating consequences of acting otherwise. Moreover, this could
also  be  regarded  as  a  fallacy  of  the  slippery  slope  type,  as  the  author  fails  to
demonstrate the inevitability of the predicted sequence of events.
In the second half of the article, Despotović constructs a polarisation between Serbia,
which is  portrayed as being in a pathological  state of regression,  and Europe (i.e.
Western Europe), which instead appears as a symbol of progress and prosperity. The
closing paragraph contains a wholehearted appeal for Serbia’s political leadership to
finally  embrace  European integration  as  a  way out  of  the  country’s  long-standing
deadlock:
(38)  The  elimination  of  this  social  pathology  and  European  integration  actually
represent for us one and the same process. (39) For this reason it is high time for all
responsible  political  agents  to  stop  manipulating,  deceiving  and  intimidating  the
public opinion and to finally,  responsibly and explicitly set themselves on the path
which  we  should  have  embarked  on  already in  1989  –  the  path  of  civilisational
progress, the path of European integration. (40) After all the lost years, after decades
of  lies,  evil,  misery and shame,  it  is  high time  for  sobering up,  for  a principled,
responsible and reasonable politics. (41) For Europe.
The central prescriptive argument, i.e. that Serbia’s political elites should uphold the
country’s process of integrating into Europe, rests on three main discursive devices.
First, the representation of integration into Europe as a metaphorical path (the word
“path”  itself  is  repeated  three  times)  leading  out  of  backwardness  and  towards
progress and prosperity. Second, the creation of a compelling sense of urgency (see
the repetition of “it is high time”) and missed opportunities (“already in 1989”, “all
the lost years”, etc.) underlies a  topos of urgency, which has the following general
structure: decisions or actions need to be made very quickly because of an external,
important and unchangeable event or higher cause. Third, the emphasis on the related
notions  of  (political)  responsibility,  maturity  and  reasonableness,  which  are  aptly
encapsulated by the very title of the opinion piece. 
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While in the first excerpt Despotović harshly criticises Serbia’s incumbent political
leaders by warning the reader of the perils arising from their alleged incompetence, in
the second example he makes an enthusiastic plea for Serbia’s European prospects. As
a result, Despotović emerges not only as an intransigent analyst of Serbian politics,
but also as someone who can provide guidance to the nation by indicating the pathway
to recovery and prosperity, which in this case corresponds to European integration.
Another  important  way in which the intellectual  can act  as  political  guide for  the
nation is by representing her or himself as a vocal proponent (if not a leader) of an
epoch-making process of national regeneration. A salient illustration of this form of
spokespersonship for the nation is found in Kosovo and us by Vuk Drašković [S10].
This  is  hardly  surprising,  given  that  Drašković’s  own  political  ideology  revolves
precisely around the idea, and the ideal, of a national regeneration for Serbia. After
depicting the situation of the Serbian nation as bleak and desolate (a “breakdown” and
a “defeat”), the author details his blueprint for national recovery and victory: 
(6)  Kosovo and the Kosovo epic,  as  the  Serbian Iliad and Odyssey,  have always
turned defeat into national victory, and not into a self-destructive cancer. (7) Reason
requires that the same be done now. (8) Victory can be achieved only by a strong
Serbia [...] (9) Our most pressing duty is to recover from the causes of defeat, from
the politics which, at the end of the 20th century, turned our national victories in the
two Balkan wars, as well as in the First World War, into a breakdown.
Through the glorification of Serbia’s mythical (6) and historical past (9), the emphasis
on the momentousness of the present (7) and the foreshadowing of a future victory
(8),  this  passage frames a powerful  teleological  narrative  of national  catharsis  and
regeneration.  In  argumentative  terms,  this  narrative  serves  as  warrant  for  the
prescriptive  claim made in  sentence  9,  in  which the author  calls  upon his fellow-
citizens to repudiate Milošević’s ruinous politics and its legacy, and thus pave the way
to the final goal of national recovery. The style is made declaratory and grave through
lexical choices that convey a sense of duty,  necessity and resoluteness, such as the
predominance  of  the  indicative  mood,  the  recurrence  of  words  such  as  “always”,
“now”, “only”, and the explicit reference to a “most pressing duty”. Another relevant
linguistic  device  is  the  shift  of  perspective  that  occurs  in  the last  sentence  of  the
excerpt,  where  the  possessive  our in  “Our most  pressing  duty”  and “our  national
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victories” constructs the author as a member of the Serbian nation. At the same time,
this is also a strategy of involvement whereby readers too are made to feel part of the
nation. All these discursive elements concur to represent the author as a spokesperson
for the nation,  specifically  as an advocate (and a guide) of the nation’s  envisaged
renewal. Broadly speaking, in Drašković’s opinion piece reason and national victory
are aligned axiomatically, in the sense that the full exercise of the former is equated to
the  attainment  of  the  latter.  This  can  be  regarded  as  a  salient  way of  combining
intellectual estrangement predicated on the ‘courage to be reasonable’ (see § 5.1.1)
and intellectual spokespersonship for the nation based on the role of political guide.
In conclusion, the analysis provides evidence that several authors act as spokespersons
for the nation by framing their role as political guides, and that they do so in three
main ways.  First,  by coming forward as critics  of the nation’s  political  elites,  and
particularly by blaming them for the nation’s ills. Secondly, by articulating so-called
national interests, that is, by setting goals and priorities in order to achieve prosperity.
Thirdly, by acting as proponents and interpreters of a process of national regeneration
culminating  in  the  nation’s  ultimate  actualisation/realisation.  As  seen  in  the  last
example, these strategies may also occur in combination.
5.2.2 The intellectual as educator/emancipator of the nation
Another  macro-strategy  that  intellectuals  may  employ  to  come  forward  as
spokespersons for the nation is that of assuming a pedagogical role towards it, that is,
acting as educators of the nation in some relevant respects. This macro-strategy clearly
mirrors one of the strategies of intellectual estrangement based on engagement and
attitude discussed in § 5.1.1 above, namely  ii) Constructing the intellectual vantage
point  as  a  position  affording  the  power  to  uncover  and  debunk  ideological
manipulation. However,  there is  a fundamental  difference between the two. While
strategies of the latter type foreground the intellectual’s inherent marginality from the
broader  society,  strategies  of  the  former  type  substantiate  a  specific  relationship
between the intellectual and the nation, in which the intellectual performs the role of
somebody who can help the nation to develop its potential and thus gain ‘awareness’
or ‘maturity’.
This macro-strategy of spokespersonship for the nation occurs less frequently than the
previous one (political guide) across the sample texts. Here, I will discuss two cases in
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which the intellectual’s role of educator and emancipator of the nation emerges with
particular force. The first example is taken from Vladimir Arsenijević’s piece Kosovo
is (not) Serbia [S11]:
(26) [Serbia’s international isolation] is always and only the others’ fault, while we are
left to make a fuss immaturely and repeat our little and ever less important “truths” in
this unjust world which, with or without us, keeps moving forward. [...]
(38)  Perhaps  we  ought  to  [...]  make  an  effort  [...]  to  finally  begin  the  inevitable
process of smartening up and facing reality in a responsible manner?
(39) Perhaps we ought to accept the fact that the clock has clearly struck the hour
when Serbia must learn to live without its own “cradle”?
(40) That the time has come for Serbia... to grow up.
I have singled out these sentences, although they are not strictly consecutive, because
taken  together  they  form a  unitary  argumentative  scheme.  The  scheme  begins  in
sentence 26, where Arsenijević ironically adopts Serbia’s point of view in order to
depict the country as immature, self-absorbed, and disgruntled at lacking recognition
on the global stage. In the next two sentences, the point of view remains the same (the
nation-inclusive we), but there is a clear shift from irony to earnestness, as the author
now urges Serbian society to finally overcome its childlike condition. This is done
through  two  rhetorical  questions  which  construct  an  opposition  between
childhood/immaturity  and  adulthood/maturity,  as  exemplified  by  the  expressions
“smartening up”, “facing reality” and “responsibly”, but above all by the metaphor of
the  cradle,  which  is  a  common  way  of  representing  Kosovo  in  Serbian  public
discourse (see § 4.2.1). Moreover, the author’s appeal is further reinforced through a
topos  of  urgency epitomised  by  the  metaphor  of  the  clock,  which  underpins  the
injunction to “grow up” contained in the last sentence. By taking upon himself the
task of stimulating Serbian society to accept  the reality  of the situation instead of
denying it, Arsenijević assumes a pedagogical role towards the national community,
therefore  his  strategy  of  spokespersonship  fully  fits  under  the  macro-strategy  of
educator of the nation.
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The next example is taken from Milan Grujić’s commentary Lazar’s oath [S02]. In the
passage  below,  the  author  instructs  Serbian  society  on  how to  react  to  Kosovo’s
declaration of independence:
(11) We are not entitled to forget Lazar’s sacrifice, to regard his oath with contempt,
to ridicule his promise… (12) We are not entitled to disrespect those who before us
fought for us. [...] (14) We are not entitled not to understand that the declaration of
independence of Kosovo and Metohija is not a consequence of Milošević’s criminal
rule. (15) To be fooled by the western lie that we have lost Lazar’s holy land because
of Račak. [...] (17) And we are not entitled to keep silent.
The  paragraph  is  organised  as  a  set  of  paratactic  clauses,  each  containing  an
appeal/admonition  to  the  Serbian  people  introduced  by  the  syntagm “We  are  not
entitled to” (apart from sentence 15, in which it is left implicit). The use of parataxis
and  repetition  is  both  an  intensification  strategy and a  persuasive  device,  lending
weight  and  authority  to  Grujić’s  claims.  It  also  serves  to  establish  a  connection
between apparently unrelated topics such as Prince Lazar’s mythical sacrifice (see the
fourth theme in § 5.3.4 for details) and the alleged misrepresentation of Milošević’s
responsibilities  vis-à-vis  Kosovo,30 which  are  thus  framed  as  part  of  the  same
narrative/scenario; this culminates in sentence 15, in which contemporary Kosovo is
referred  to  as  “Lazar’s  holy  land”.  Additionally,  Grujić  addresses  Serbian  society
using the first person plural (i.e. the nation-inclusive we, like in the previous example)
and  in  a  quite  informal  register,  thereby enhancing  readers’ involvement.  Broadly
speaking, Grujić positions himself  not only as a defender of Serbia’s glorious past
(which  is  relevant  to  the  third  macro-strategy  of  spokespersonship  for  the  nation
discussed  below),  but  also  as  someone  who  is  committed  to  dispelling  the  false
accusations made against the Serbian nation by ‘hostile’ western forces. In this sense,
insofar as he encourages his fellow citizens to express their national pride by refusing
to believe, so to speak, the ‘lies of the enemy’, he acts as emancipator of the nation.
5.2.3 The intellectual as promoter/defender of the nation’s values and distinctive
character
30 The Račak massacre was the mass killing of 45 Kosovo Albanians perpetrated by Serbian security
forces in the village of Račak (Albanian: Reçak) in central Kosovo in January 1999. Although the order
for the massacre may have come from Milošević's  office,  the Serb government maintained that the
casualties were all members of the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army killed in combat.
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The third and last macro-strategy of spokespersonship for the nation relates to cases in
which  the  intellectual  performs  the  role  of  defender  or  promoter  of  the  national
identity.  Generally  speaking,  this  macro-strategy does  not  occur  very  often  in  the
opinion pieces and interviews included in the sample. As a matter of fact, apart from
the  minor  instance  from Grujić’s  text  that  I  have  just  pointed  out,  the  only other
relevant case appears in the concluding paragraph of Kosovo is Serbia [S12], in which
Škulić challenges Arsenijević’s appeal to the Serbian people to abandon their ‘cradle’,
that is, Kosovo (which has been analysed above):
(33) Kosovo is Serbia and Kosovo is the “cradle” of Serbian nationhood. (34) Not
even reasonable “adults” renounce their “cradles”. (35) Those who claim that Serbs
do not need their “cradle” because they have finally “come of age”, could argue by
the same logic that a grown-up person should renounce his or her parents, since they
are no longer needed. (36) But do elderly parents not need their children? (37) Who
renounce their own past, history and roots just like that? (38) Only those who have a
reason to be ashamed of them, but with Serbs and Serbia this is not the case. (39)
Without a bond with what we were, we cannot be anything. (40) If we renounced our
“cradle”, we would renounce our future, too. (41) For this reason Kosovo was, is and
will remain Serbia.
The argument advanced by Škulić is entirely built around the cradle metaphor. The
main claim (which is not explicitly stated in the text but can easily be inferred) is that
Serbs should not abandon their cradle, i.e. Kosovo. The argument is structured as an
extensive rebuttal to Arsenijević’s assertion that Serbs should renounce Kosovo. The
counterclaim is included in the text (in sentence 35) but not specifically attributed to
Arsenijević, which can be regarded as a rhetorical strategy aimed at depreciating the
opponent.  Škulić’s rebuttal  rests on an attempt to invalidate  Arsenijević’s point by
showing that the underlying warrant (referred to as “logic” in the text) is flawed as it
leads to unacceptable conclusions. In its place, Škulić proposes a set of alternative
warrants, couching them as rhetorical questions (sentences 36 and 37) and categorical
statements (sentences 38 to 40). These warrants are: i) family ties are valuable; ii)
people who are proud of their origins do not repudiate them; iii) having strong ties
with the past is a precondition for future progress and development. By representing
the  Serbian  people  as  adhering  to  these  principles,  and  hence  as  unwilling  to
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relinquish sovereignty over Kosovo, Škulić assumes the role of promoter of Serbian
national identity, heritage and pride.
5.3 The discursive representation of Serbia as a nation
The previous section has provided evidence of the manifold ways in which Serbian
public commentators perform the role of spokespersons for the nation. Now, we shall
turn our attention to what they  say about the nation, that is, how they discursively
represent Serbia as a national community in their opinion pieces and interviews. By
deploying the heuristic  framework for exploring the discursive construction  of the
nation elaborated in § 3.5, the analysis indicates that the authors represent Serbia as a
nation on the basis of four main themes: 
1. Serbian society as being in a chronic state of crisis
2. Serbia as a deeply divided society
3. Serbia as a weak and isolated player on the international stage
4. Serbia as a nation driven by its historical and mythical past
In the following, I will illustrate and discuss each theme through relevant examples
taken from the sample.
5.3.1 Serbian society as being in a chronic state of crisis
The first theme, by far the most common among the authors considered, is that Serbia
is entangled in some sort of continual state of crisis that manifests itself in various
aspects of social and political life. This theme was already implicitly presupposed in
one of the strategies of intellectual self-legitimation discussed above (§ 5.1.1), that
whereby  intellectuals  justify  their  own  engagement  as  motivated  by  society’s
supposed proclivity to irrational and destructive attitudes. This strategy was explained
through examples  taken from Vuk Drašković’s  and Vladimir  Arsenijević’s  opinion
pieces. For the sake of analysis, I will report here the parts in which Serbia’s chronic
state of crisis is explicitly thematised. Drašković describes Serbian society as fraught
with “destructive anger” and vulnerable to slipping down a “path of [...] civic, national
and mental breakdown”; he also bemoans the decline of collective reason, which has
transformed the “clever Serbia” into a metaphorical “frightened shadow”. Arsenijević,
on his part,  speaks of Serbia’s “proverbially problematic relationship with reality”,
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portrays  local  public  discourse  as  being  “polluted  by  nonsense  and  myths”,  and
suggests that “collective mental health” is seriously at risk.
In the examples above, Serbia’s predicament is represented via two salient figures of
speech: a path metaphor, indicating Serbian society’s tendency to backslide into a state
of  collective  delusion  (strategy  of  discontinuation based  on  outlining  a  dystopian
future scenario, see § 3.5.3), and a metaphor of illness, whereby the reluctance of large
sectors of the society to accept Kosovo’s independence is pathologised as a symptom
of mental disease (strategy of vitalisation through personification of the national body,
see § 3.5.3). The analysis shows that across the sample texts both metaphors are often
employed,  albeit  in  different  forms,  to  foreground  the  harsh  conditions  of
contemporary Serbia (that is, as a strategy of singularisation through placing emphasis
on national negative uniqueness, see § 3.5.3). For instance, in Anamnesis of a slogan
Teofil  Pančić  speaks  of  the  dominant  ideology,  by  which  the  importance  of  the
Kosovo issue transcends any other problem or challenge facing Serbian society, as a
“pathology”  that  has  resulted  in  “overwhelming  irrationality,  [...]  meaningless
violence, [...] embarrassing chaos”. The most salient illustration of the pathologisation
of  the  national  body,  however,  is  found  at  the  beginning  of  Jelena  Cerovina’s
commentary Pain and hope [S06]:
(1) These days Serbia looks a bit like a patient who has woken up from anæsthesia.
(2) For the third year in a row, we have been told by the world that it is all over [...].
(3) We listened to them and realised what they were up to. (4) But the moment the
operation was completed, when they cut off part of our territory, the Kosovo wound
hurt us the most.
The initial  analogy between Serbia and a patient  sets the stage for a metaphorical
scenario in which the process that led to Kosovo declaring independence from Serbia
is equated to an amputation carried out on Serbia’s body by an unspecified surgeon
(arguably the international  community,  metonymically  represented as “the world”).
What this representation achieves in rhetorical terms is to stress the power imbalance
existing  between  Serbia,  which  passively  undergoes  the  surgery,  and  the  foreign
powers, who actively perform it. The active verbs employed in sentence 3 partially
countervail this symbolic passivity, connoting Serbia as a vigilant being who is able to
understand the nature of the operation to which it is being subjected. On the whole,
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however, the emphasis is on the nation’s predicament rather than on its resilience. This
is reflected both in the anæsthesia metaphor (1), which denotes inertia and lack of
self-consciousness, and the wound metaphor (4), which stresses the pain that Serbian
society is going through.
There is one case in which the path metaphor and the pathologisation of the national
body appear  in  combination.  In  Kosovo  in  Serbia [S12],  Samardžić  attacks  Boris
Tadić,  then  President  of  the  Republic,  by  preemptively  criticizing  what  he  is
supposedly going to  say at  the ‘Kosovo is  Serbia’ rally  organized  by the Serbian
government for two days later:
(21) It is not an unusual event to which he agreed, and at which he is going to repeat,
together  with  the  owners  of  this  ruined  country and its  mental  meanderings,  that
Serbia will not give up all its nonsense, and that, on the basis of the ruling theology
and politics, self-destruction is the only way out […].
Samardžić’s goal in this passage is to discredit President Tadić by portraying him as
vocally opposed to Serbia’s national interests. Tadić’s projected speech is ironically
twisted  into  as  a  series  of  unacceptable  and  self-defeating  statements,  which  in
argumentative terms constitutes a  straw man fallacy.  But these statements, although
fallaciously attributed to the opponent, actually reveal what the author himself thinks
about  Serbia’s  current  situation  and future prospects.  The catastrophic  scenario  he
outlines hinges, among other things, on the expression “mental meanderings”, which
evocatively  combines  a  path  metaphor  with  an  element  of  pathologisation  of  the
national body, suggesting that the Serbian nation is entrapped in a state of debility
which renders it incapable of articulating clear goals and pursuing them effectively
(strategy of discontinuation placing emphasis on disruptions, see § 3.5.3).
5.3.2 Serbia as a deeply divided society
Strictly connected to the previous theme is the representation of Serbia as a nation
marked by sharp political and ideological cleavages, which emerges as a prominent
theme in several texts from the sample (strategy of  polarisation emphasising intra-
societal  divisions  and conflicts,  see  § 3.5.3).  For  many authors,  in  fact,  Kosovo’s
independence  is  directly  linked  to  the  deep  fissures  affecting  Serbia’s  social  and
political life, in manifold ways. Some regard the ‘loss’ of Kosovo as the culmination
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of  Serbia’s  protracted  inability  to  reach a  common agreement  over  this  and other
fundamental issues (e.g. Arsenijević, Samardžić), or rather as the result of a misguided
attempt to pacify deep-seated political conflicts by imposing a fictitious national unity
(e.g.  Drašković).  Some  others  view  the  Kosovo  issue  as  the  ultimate  proof  that
Serbian society is deeply divided (e.g. Bačević, Pančić). Finally, some commentators
speculate that the dispute over Kosovo will only raise new dilemmas and possibly
nourish future conflicts (e.g. Despotović, Škulić).
The  following  excerpt,  taken  from  Three  leaders [S08],  provides  an  excellent
summary  of  the  theme  of  Serbia’s  dividedness.  In  it,  Bačević  reflects  on  the
significance of President Tadić’s decision to desert the ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ mass rally: 
(7) Thus has ended, temporarily or for a bit longer, the old, boring Serbian story about
unity and consensus, but it is unclear whether that evening began another story,  or
maybe  the last episode of the great Balkan series on the confrontation of the two
Serbias. (8) One that moves forward, into the future, and the other that, lo and behold,
moves backwards, further into the past. (9) The only trouble is that both are in the
same place and there is no indication that one of the two Serbias is going to move out
and let the other live in peace.
The  author  argues  that  Tadić’s  withdrawal  has  finally  dispelled  (though  not
permanently) ill-founded aspirations to national unity, which he dismisses as an “old,
boring  Serbian  story”.  At  the  same  time,  he  also  speaks  contemptuously  of  the
opposite narrative,  that of the conventional polarisation between the so-called ‘two
Serbias’, i.e. the old marxist-nationalist elites and the new pro-Western civic elites,31
representing it as some sort of fictional show. Yet, he does not seem to reject the latter
narrative entirely. In fact, he builds upon it to outline a complex metaphorical scenario
representing contemporary Serbian society. The complexity of the scenario stems from
the fact that the ‘two Serbias’, although moving in opposite directions along the axis
of  progress,  appear  to  be  competing  for  the  same ground.  What  this  ‘impossible’
31 The representation of Serbian society as divided between ‘two Serbias’ originated from a book called
Druga Srbija (English: The Other Serbia), published by Ivan Čolović, an anthropologist, in 1992. The
book contained eighty public speeches delivered by opponents of the Milošević regime, and therefore
provoked much controversy. Since then, the expression ‘the other Serbia’ has become a synonym for all
those  who  opposed  (and  still  oppose)  the  nationalist,  populist  and  militaristic  streams  in  Serbian
politics.
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configuration seems to suggest is  that  Serbia is entangled in radical  contradictions
which severely undermine its ability to achieve prosperity.
Although the narrative of the polarisation between the ‘two Serbias’ is nowhere as
explicitly  articulated  as  in  Bačević’s  commentary,  it  emerges  from  several  other
opinion  pieces,  most  often  as  subtext.  One  such  example  is  found  in  Škulić’s
commentary [S12]:
(9) [...]  Serbia will  never recognise Kosovo as an independent  state.  (10) Perhaps
some “other Serbia” could do that in different circumstances, like a new occupation,
which some maybe even wish for, but that would not be a legal or legitimate act [...].32
That  Škulić  is  drawing  on  the  narrative  of  the  ‘two  Serbias’ is  evident  from the
quotation marks around the expression “other Serbia” signalling its conventional use.
They also serve as scare quotes, implying the author’s skepticism and disdain towards
the role played by the Serbian elites identified by that denomination, whom he sees as
anti-patriotic due to their support for Kosovo’s independence. This aversion becomes
explicit further on, as Škulić insinuates that some members of the ‘other Serbia’ would
even welcome a foreign occupation of the country, thus constructing them as potential
traitors to the nation (see the next theme in this regard). 
Another  example  of  how  the  polarisation  between  the  ‘two  Serbias’ operates  as
subtext is found in Arsenijević’s opinion piece [S11], in the passage where he provides
an explanation of why many Serbs still refuse to accept that Kosovo is no longer part
of Serbia:
(15) All of this inevitably occurs whenever and wherever it comes to such a huge
disorder  of  perception  and  reasoning,  and  this  chasm,  here  at  our  place,  has
unstoppably opened up and grown bigger since Milošević’s times.
The key word, in  this  case,  is  “chasm”.  The resonance of this  metaphor  with the
discourse of ‘first versus other Serbia’ is substantiated by a co-textual element, that is,
the reference to “Milošević’s times”, which is the epoch when the clash between the
‘two  Serbias’  originated.  By  depicting  the  cleavage  as  constantly  widening,
32 This quote has been discussed in § 5.1.2 above in relation to strategies of intellectual self-legitimation
based on knowledge and expertise.
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Arsenijević provides a quite pessimistic outlook on the capacity of Serbian society to
manage its internal divisions in a constructive manner.
5.3.3 Serbia as a weak and isolated player on the international stage
The  third  theme  of  the  discursive  representation  of  the  nation  concerns  Serbia’s
position in the international community. The case of Kosovo’s independence, in fact,
has  prompted  several  authors  among  those  considered  to  problematise  Serbia’s
relations  with  key  international  actors,  particularly  those  directly  involved  in  the
process. The analysis shows that, apart from relatively small discrepancies, the overall
picture is that of a country suffering from international isolation and lacking the power
to pursue its national interests at the global level (strategy of heteronomisation placing
emphasis  on  extra-national  dependence,  see  §  3.5.3).  I  will  illustrate  this  specific
thematisation of the nation by discussing a few salient examples.
The  first  is  taken  from  Kosovo  is  (not)  Serbia [S11].  In  the  following  passage,
Arsenijević  criticises  Serbia’s  international  isolation  through  an  analogy  with
interpersonal relationships:
(22) It is sad, it is unbearable to be on such miserable terms with the entire near and
far surroundings. (23) It is not alright to be so lonely. (24) If, for instance, you are in a
quarrel with all your housemates or neighbours, would it not be logical to ask yourself
what is wrong with yourself and why your relationship with the others does not get
off the ground? (25) However, Serbs mostly do not view things this way.
The country’s international isolation is stressed via two strong predications: Serbia is
said to be on “miserable terms” with many other world countries and “lonely” on the
international stage. The author condemns this situation by evoking shared emotions
(“sad”,  “unbearable”)  and  by  advancing  a  normative  claim  (“It  is  not  alright”)
presupposing the desirability of good external relations. In the subsequent analogy, the
focus  shifts  onto  what  Serbia  ought  to  do  in  order  to  improve  its  situation.  By
employing a rhetorical question and the generic you as persuasive devices, Arsenijević
urges Serbia to question its own attitude, justifying his exhortation through an appeal
to reason (“would it not be logical”). Yet, in the final sentence he expresses distrust in
the willingness of his  fellow citizens  to follow his advice,  conveying an image of
Serbia as stubbornly reluctant to address the problem of its international isolation.
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In  Time  for  responsibility,  sobriety  and  reason [S05],  Despotović  takes  a  quite
different approach, arguing that Serbia should keep a ‘low profile’ on the international
stage in order to avoid getting entangled in global power struggles:
(29) Some [...] advocate friendship with Russia as the priority of priorities [...]. (30)
Others, instead, find arguments to absolutely bring this into question. (31) One loses
sight that Serbia should not place itself into the fray of competing centers of power.
(32) It should not contribute in any way to the deepening of such competition, and
even  less  should  it  base  its  politics  primarily  on  the  intensification  of  such  a
contradiction.
The argument is developed in two stages. First, the author constructs the debate about
Serbia’s  relations  with  Russia  as  dominated  by  bold  stances,  using  intensification
devices  such  as  repetition  (“priority  of  priorities”)  and  the  adverb  “absolutely”.
Second, he rejects those stances by advancing the normative claim that Serbia should
not  get  involved  in,  or  aggravate,  existing  rivalries  between  world  powers.  The
argument is an enthymeme, since the reason or premise supporting the claim is not
explicitly stated. It can, however, easily be inferred from the metaphorical expression
“place itself into the fray” (or “the millstone”,  in a more literal  translation), which
implies  Serbia’s  liability  to  be  crushed  by  external  forces.  The  whole  argument,
therefore, rests on the presupposition that Serbia is too weak to successfully engage in
global power struggles.
In the two examples  above, Serbia  emerges  as a  weak player  on the international
stage. Yet, in discursive terms its agency is never fully suppressed. Both Arsenijević
and  Despotović,  in  fact,  represent  the  Serbian  nation  as  a  relatively  autonomous
subject,  whose  disengagement  is  contingent  upon  temporary  circumstances  or
prudence rather than an intrinsic inability to act. In Despotović, in particular, this is
substantiated by the abundance of active verbs with Serbia as their subject (the fact
that these describe actions from which Serbia should abstain does not invalidate the
point). In contrast with this, a few commentators tend to bracket or even obliterate
Serbia’s agency, portraying it as a passive entity acted upon by external, often hostile,
forces.  In  some  cases,  these  referential  strategies  underpin  or  activate  broader
narratives of victimisation, usually by mobilising elements of contextual knowledge
shared by the readers. Among the very few instances of victimisation found in the
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sample texts, the most striking one appears at the beginning of Škulić’s opinion piece,
Kosovo is Serbia [S12]:
(5) Today, just as a weak person who is a tyrant’s victim, Serbia can endure serious
injuries, but does not wish to inflict pain on itself. (6) It is known to Serbs that “He
whose law is written by his cudgel leaves behind the stench of inhumanity”. (7) The
“cudgel” can take the form of cruise missiles and “intelligent” bombs,  but also of
historical forgery and a sort of “rape” of international law.33
In  the  first  sentence,  Serbia’s  position  on  the  international  stage  is  represented,
through a simile, as that of an individual who is subject to the abusive power of a
tyrant.  This  personification carries a strong moral  connotation,  as it  constructs  the
relationship between Serbia and specific foreign countries (notably those supporting
Kosovo’s  independence)  on  the  basis  of  the  victim-perpetrator  framework.  This
representation is further developed in the next two sentences, in which Škulić draws
on a famous verse from a popular poem (see footnote 27 in § 5.1.2) to portray Serbia
as  a  victim  of  aggression  and  injustice.  This  is  obtained  through  a  set  of  subtle
references to the 1999 war with NATO (“cruise missiles and ‘intelligent’ bombs”) and
to  the  recent  separation  of  Kosovo  (“historical  forgery”  and  “sort  of  ‘rape’  of
international law”), two topoi of history that rely on the readers’ contextual knowledge
to be understood. The choice to draw a parallel between these two events is part of the
same strategy of  victimisation  described above,  as  it  endows the  discourse of  the
Serbian nation as a victim of injustice perpetrated by external forces with a sense of
historical continuity (strategy of continuation presupposing negative continuity, see §
3.5.3).
Further on in his commentary,  Škulić turns his attention to a different category of
actors perceived to antagonise the Serbian nation, that of ‘internal enemies’. Although
this specific sub-theme falls outside the main theme of Serbia as a weak and isolated
player on the international stage, three reasons make it worth investigating: first, it
forms part and parcel of the above-mentioned narrative of victimisation; second, this
is the only case among the texts from the sample in which this aspect emerges so
33 Parts of this excerpt have been analysed in § 5.1.2 above, in regard to strategies of intellectual self-
legitimation based on knowledge and expertise.
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bluntly; thirdly, the very category of ‘traitors to the nation’ is made the object of an
interesting meta-discursive reflection. The relevant excerpt is the following:
(25) Serbia never lacked national “masochists”, but this time the matter is too serious
to gloss over an overt national betrayal. (26) Everyone has had enough of words such
as “betrayal” and “traitors”, because, like many other, they have become quite “worn-
out” in the nineties. (27) But what other word would be adequate to describe not just
the simple acceptance of a territorial loss, but the overt commitment for Serbia to
accept it enthusiastically and thus recognise a monstrously forged state on its own
territory?
The  obvious  purpose  of  this  passage  is  to  defame  and  demonise  supporters  of
Kosovo’s  independence,  by  depicting  them,  through  pejorative  nominations  and
predications,  as  enemies  of  the Serbian  nation.  By speaking of  an  “overt  national
betrayal”, the author extends the foregoing narrative of Serbia’s victimisation to also
include internal enemies apart from external ones. Furthermore, the initial claim that
“Serbia  never  lacked  national  ‘masochists’”  confers  on  this  narrative  a  sense  of
historical  continuity,  much  like  the  historical  parallel  drawn in  the  first  example.
However, the accusation of national betrayal is so serious that Škulić finds it necessary
to justify, and to a certain extent mitigate, his choice of words. First he acknowledges
the strongly negative connotation that  such words have acquired in Serbian public
discourse as a legacy of the rampant nationalism fomented by the Milošević regime in
the 1990s; then, he rebuts with a rhetorical question intended to reclaim their use in
the face of the perceived gravity of the situation. As shown in these two examples,
Škulić conceives the Serbian nation as a perpetual victim of acts of aggression and
subversion perpetrated both by foreign powers and by unloyal Serbian citizens (thus
combining a strategy of  dissimilation/exclusion through negative other-presentation
with a strategy of blaming/scapegoating targeting ‘national traitors’, see § 3.5.3).
5.3.4 Serbia as a nation driven by its historical and mythical past
The fourth main theme that emerges from the analysis relates to how Serbian national
history and mythology are taken to shape, or even determine, the nation’s present as
well as its future (strategy of  continuation presupposing positive continuity between
past,  present  and  future  of  the  nation,  but  also  strategy  of  avoidance through
suppression of discontinuities, see § 3.5.3). There is a clear correspondence between
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this theme and the fact that some authors perform the role of spokespersons for the
nation  precisely  by  appealing  to  national  history  and  remembrance,  either  as  an
attempt to educate/emancipate the national community or as a way to promote/defend
its  unique  identity  (see  §  5.2.2  and  5.2.3).  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  most  salient
instances of this theme are found in the texts written by those same authors. In this
section,  I  will  illustrate  this  theme by discussing two such instances  in  which the
element of the national past is particularly prominent. The first is taken from Lazar’s
oath by Milan Grujić [S02], the second from The Accursed Mountains by Miloš Garić
[S03].
In the first example, Grujić attempts to reclaim the significance of a key element in
Serbian  national  mythology,  i.e.  the  martyrdom  of  Prince  Lazar,  for  the  present
situation of Serbia:
(1)  Perhaps  today we  are  not  obliged  to  understand  Lazar’s  oath.  (2)  Perhaps  it
appears distant and unjustified to us who live in the 21st century. [...] (10) There exist,
however, some things we are not entitled to. (11) We are not entitled to forget Lazar’s
sacrifice, to regard his oath with contempt, to ridicule his promise… (12) We are not
entitled to disrespect  those who before us fought  for us.  (13) Those who made it
possible for us to live freely,  to speak our own language, those who inscribed our
name onto the world map.
Lazar’s  sacrifice  is  one  of  the  central  themes  of  the  Kosovo  myth,  which  is  the
traditional belief of the Serbian people asserting that the Battle of Kosovo Polje in
1389  symbolises  the  struggle  of  the  Serbs  in  defence  of  their  honour,  and  of
Christendom, against the Ottomans (Bakić-Hayden, 2004). The meaning of Lazar’s
martyrdom is encapsulated in his legendary oath, whereby he renounced the worldly
glory of the ‘earthly kingdom’ for the eternal glory of the ‘heavenly kingdom’. In this
excerpt, Grujić restates the significance of this myth, appealing to the Serbian nation
to remember, respect and uphold it as a founding element of national identity. In the
last  sentence,  he  ascribes  Serbia’s  achievement  of  freedom,  cultural  identity  and
statehood – the latter aspect being metonymically represented as Serbia’s appearance
on the world map – to the deeds of those great heroes, thus fabricating a sense of
historical  continuity between Serbia’s mythical  past and its present condition.  This
becomes even more apparent in the continuation of the text, where Grujić draws on
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the Kosovo myth  to challenge what he sees as common misconceptions  about the
ongoing  dispute  over  Kosovo’s  independence,  thus  accomplishing  a  conflation
between myth and reality.
In the second example, Garić also draws on the Kosovo myth in order to establish a
connection between Serbia’s national (and mythical) past and its present reality:
(8) The turbulent history of this country has written its saddest page. (9) But not so
long ago, some six centuries back, historians noted that the bells of Notre Dame in
Paris rang out all day celebrating the glorious victory of the Serbs against the invading
Ottoman Turks. (10) Unfortunately, the great Serbian suffering in Kosovo in 1389 has
the  same  influence  on  current  geostrategic  decisions  by  the  world  powers  like
humidity in Tokyo has on the price of tomatoes at Kalenić market. (11) It is hard, but
Serbs must not cry now. (12) Even less come to terms with defeat. [...] (14) Lazar,
Karađorđe, Putnik and other Serbian knights are watching us. (15) Want it or not, this
and all future generations of Serbs will have to dream of returning to Prizren, Peć and
Pristina.
In this passage, the conflation between mythical past and present reality is obtained
through  a  complex  argumentative  sequence  alternating  claims,  concessions  and
rebuttals. Initially, the author employs the metaphor of history as book to construct the
‘loss’  of  Kosovo  as  the  worst  defeat  in  Serbia’s  history.  Then,  as  a  way  to
counterbalance this downfall, he aggrandises Serbia’s historical role in the defence of
Christendom34 through a topos of history (see Forchtner, 2014) implying that if Serbia
was a great country in the past it should continue to be so even today, as well as by
resorting to intensification devices such as positively connoted attributes (“glorious”)
and  temporal  approximation  (“not  so  long  ago”).  Immediately  after,  however,  he
deplores  the  current  irrelevance  of  Serbia’s  heroic  past,  by  means  of  a  sarcastic
analogy related to everyday life. This is followed by another rebuttal, again introduced
by the adversative “but”, in which Garić exhorts Serbs to be strong in the face of the
current hardship. The supporting reason, provided in sentence 14, combines a topos of
history and a topos of authority: in fact, the metaphorical gaze that Serbia’s national
heroes  direct  at  “us”,  the  Serbs  of  today,  not  only  evokes  the  nation’s  historical
34 It should be noted that Garić omits to say that the bells of Notre Dame rang out prematurely, because
the Serbs,  in whom the hopes of Christian medieval Europe were vested, eventually lost  the battle
against the Ottomans.
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greatness,  but  also  establishes  the  said  heroes  as  a  deontic  authority  conveying
expectations  of bravery and glory on the part  of the Serbian people (the  topos of
authority can be deconstructed as follows:  if Serbian heroes would want us Serbs to
behave in a certain way, then we should behave in that way). It is with this construct,
which appeals to ancestry in order to create a sense of duty in the present, that the
above-mentioned conflation between past and present reaches its culmination. Finally,
in the concluding sentence the author projects this sense of duty into the future, thus
creating a powerful image of historical continuity.
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6. Croatia’s accession into the European 
Union in 2013
This  chapter  examines  the  second  of  the  three  case  studies,  i.e.  the  reactions  of
Croatia’s intellectuals to the country’s accession into the EU in 2013. As in the case
study on Serbia, the analysis focuses on strategies of intellectual self-legitimation (§
6.1),  strategies  of  intellectual  spokespersonship  for  the  nation  (§  6.2),  and  the
discursive representation of the nation (§ 6.3).
6.1 Strategies of intellectual self-legitimation
Do  the  authors  of  the  selected  opinion  pieces  and  interviews  claim,  or  at  least
presuppose, to be looking at the social world from a ‘detached’ observation point? Do
they  characterise  this  position  as  affording  them  a  better,  more  penetrating  or
‘objective’ view into  certain  aspects  of  social  life?  If  so,  what  concrete  linguistic
elements indicate this? The purpose of this section is to provide a comprehensive and
systematic  account  of  the  strategies  employed  by  the  authors  to  legitimise  their
intellectual vantage point by emphasising their own marginal position in regard to the
broader society. On the basis of the findings, I propose the following categorisation:
1. Strategies based on engagement and attitude
2. Strategies based on knowledge and expertise
It  should be noted that,  unlike in  the case of Serbia,  the Croatia  sample does not
include  prominent  instances  of  strategies  of  intellectual  self-legitimation  based on
status  and  membership.  In  the  following,  I  illustrate  the  two  group  of  strategies
indicated above through examples taken from the sample.
6.1.1 Intellectual self-legitimation based on engagement and attitude
For  Croatian  society,  the  process  of  European  integration  constitutes  a  major
development, which has deeply affected, and will most likely continue to affect, the
political, cultural, social and economic life of the country for a long time. Some of the
authors under consideration lament that some aspects of this process, in spite of its
paramount significance, have received insufficient critical scrutiny and limited public
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debate,  whereas  a  few  others  criticise  the  opponents  of  European  integration  for
failing to reasonably appreciate its benefits for the Croatian community. In both cases,
the  criticism rests  on  the  premise  that  issues  that  are  of  great  significance  for  a
community should be subject to critical evaluation and democratic deliberation. By
reclaiming this principle, the authors implicitly position themselves as guardians and
defenders of the public use of reason, particularly in contexts in which it is absent or
very  weak.  In  doing  so,  they  construct  their  own  standpoint  not  only  as  being
disjoined from the broader society,  but also as one from which the ideal of public
reason  and  its  requirements  can  be  upheld  and  promoted  across  society  itself.
Characterised as such, this standpoint manifestly qualifies as a vantage point in the
sense discussed above, and thus corresponds to a specific strategy of intellectual self-
legitimation.
Instances of this  particular  way of granting oneself  intellectual  authority appear  in
several  texts  from the sample.  However,  the most  conspicuous illustrations  of this
discursive strategy are found in the two opinion pieces written by Nino Raspudić and
published in Večernji list. In the piece entitled Let them rattle on about the region, but
who authorised them to push Opatija  and Banja Koviljača  into the same country
again? [C10],  Raspudić  takes  issue  with  the  revival  of  a  regional  perspective  in
Croatian political discourse, following the country’s process of European integration.
Indeed, he rejects the notion that Croatia needs to (re-)establish strong ties with the
other former Yugoslav countries not only as historically untenable, but also as lacking
rational justification and democratic legitimation:
(4) [...] the story about the region has emerged as something self-explanatory. (5) The
problem  is  not  that  someone  from  their  particularistic,  interested  or  emotional
viewpoints  considers  the  former  Yugoslav  framework  as  the  optimal  economic,
cultural and political horizon for Croatia. (6) Although I believe that this standpoint is
totally  misplaced,  because  two  historical  realisations  of  Yugoslavia  confuted  it,  I
accept that it is a legitimate political stance and that its supporters have a democratic
right  to offer  it  to  the public.  (7)  The catch,  however,  is  that  the story about  the
“region” has crept in in a totally illegitimate way.
In sentence 4, the aforementioned regional perspective is contemptuously referred to
as “the story about the region”, and its emergence is represented as a process that has
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unfolded independently of human agency and which has not  involved any debate.
Subsequently, the regional perspective is further discredited as subjective and biased,
and then openly rejected as “totally misplaced” through a  topos of history about the
failure of the Yugoslav project (which has the following structure: because Yugoslavia
failed  as  an  economic,  cultural  and political  project,  its  legacy should  be rejected
altogether).  In  sentence  6,  however,  the author  grants  it  the  status  of  a  legitimate
political viewpoint, thereby demonstrating his own democratic credentials. Finally, he
reiterates  the  initial  claim  by  portraying  the  abhorred  perspective  as  unmanaged,
potentially dangerous (note the verb “crept in”) and devoid of democratic legitimacy.
The argument is structured in such a way that Raspudić emerges as somebody who
greatly values rational deliberation and democratic principles,  and who is ready to
uphold them when they are disregarded.
In his other text,  We have awakened as EU citizens!  What will  be our new goal?
[C08], Raspudić makes a similar point about EU accession, refuting the dogmatic and
myth-like aura in which it has been wrapped in Croatian political discourse:
(8) Since the beginning, accession to the EU has been introduced as a myth, a holy
story one ought to believe in and for which no arguments are necessary.  (9) That
dogma has not been questioned [...].  (10) There has not been public debate about
accession  or  non-accession,  instead  of  rational  arguments  [...]  emphasis  has  been
placed on [...] trivialities. (11) What has been mostly missing is a concrete interest
assessment  [...].  (12)  That  the  EU  has  no  alternative  has  been  imposed  as  self-
explanatory, and this fundamental political myth has cast its shadow onto the entire
political scene.
Most of the analytical remarks made above apply here, too. Through the extended use
of impersonal passive verbs and nominalisations, the author represents the emergence
and consolidation of Croatia’s EU perspective as an agentless, almost self-sustaining
process that has regrettably escaped critical scrutiny and collective deliberation. The
argument  is  based  on  an  axiological  polarisation  between  the  realm  of  rational
thinking, which is positively valued, and that of dogmatism and triviality,  which is
negatively valued. The writer places himself firmly on the side of rational thinking,
bolstering his standpoint through a bold and assertive style, marked by the absence of
hedges and the reiteration of the main claim several times throughout the passage.
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Therefore, the framing strategy outlined above also constitutes a powerful strategy of
intellectual  self-legitimation,  in  that  it  enables  the  author  to  present  himself  as  a
guardian of public reason against attempts to misconstrue or trivialise matters of great
social significance.
As  stated  above,  several  authors  among  those  considered  resort,  in  more  or  less
explicit  ways,  to  this  form  of  intellectual  self-legitimation.  There  is  one  author,
however,  who  stands  out  from  this  group,  as  she  associates  her  intellectual
estrangement  with  unconventional,  creative  thinking  rather  than  procedural  and
deliberative rationality. In her article  We have joined the European construction site.
Let’s  roll  up our sleeves and get to work [C09],  Marina Šerić,  speaking about the
uncertainties of the European integration process, makes the following exhortation: 
(11)  In the  moments  when chaos takes  the  lead,  and when people  can no longer
predict or control anything, one should not resist uncertainty, but rather find in that
general confusion some new opportunities on which something new can indeed be
built. (12) In short, chaos is not purely negative because it warns us that what is old
and worn must crumble and disappear, while at the same time it directs us toward
elements of something new and vital. (13) But in order to notice that, we must be
creative [...].
The author challenges the notion that chaos, understood as a situation in which the
activities of the rational mind (such as prediction and control) become impracticable,
is  necessarily  unproductive.  On  the  contrary,  she  contends  that  chaos  brings
opportunities and, in sentence 12, she even personifies it as a positive agent that helps
people to unfetter  themselves from the past as well as to embrace the future. This
allows the author to dictate what people “should” do and how they “must” be like in
order to seize these opportunities,  as is reflected in the use of prescriptive deontic
modality  and  the  predominance  of  categorical  statements  worded  in  a  declarative
style.  By  granting  herself  the  authority  to  urge  people  to  think  and  act  in
unconventional  ways,  Šerić  assumes  a  discursive  position  that  corresponds  to  the
intellectual vantage point. 
6.1.2 Intellectual self-legitimation based on knowledge and expertise
While some authors seek to establish their intellectual authority by engaging directly
with  existing  social  practices,  either  by  denouncing  the  failure  to  uphold  certain
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principles  or  by  encouraging  people  to  challenge  conventional  outlooks  and
behaviours, others do so by emphasising their own knowledge and understanding of
how society operates. Those employing this strategy of intellectual self-legitimation
tend to present themselves as insightful observers and interpreters of certain aspects of
the  social  world,  typically  by mobilising  their  specialist  knowledge and expertise.
Generally speaking, this  can be done in  a variety of ways.  Authors may speak as
experts in a particular discipline or on a particular topic, for instance by referring to
existing research in the field or by using specialist terminology.  Alternatively,  they
may claim, or at least presuppose, a broad critical perspective on society as a whole,
sustained by the special ability to grasp its fundamental structure and dynamics. Or
they may situate themselves somewhere in between these two cardinal positions.
Instances of this specific strategy of intellectual self-legitimation are not very frequent
in the texts from the sample. However, there are two cases which may serve well to
illustrate the different ways in which it can be realised in discourse. The first case is
Jurica  Pavičić’s  analysis  of  Croatian  national  identity  and  its  relationship  with
statehood,  in  the  opinion  piece  entitled  Between  cathedrals  and  Balkan  crevices
[C05]. The second is the interview with Katarina Luketić entitled Croatia is mistaken
if she thinks she can escape from the Balkans [C12]; Luketić is addressed as an expert
(on the ‘symbolic geography’ of the Balkans), and this is reflected in the way she
discursively constructs her own standpoint. 
Let us first consider the following excerpt from Pavičić’s opinion piece: 
(36) [...] Croats eagerly await symbolic manifestations of togetherness still today [...].
(37)  All  those public  displays  of  euphoric  togetherness  serve to  a  great  extent  to
conceal the fact that the citizens of this country do not know each other well and can
hardly understand each other. (38) One would commonsensically conclude that [...]
Croats venerate their young state and its institutions. (39) The truth is – indeed – the
complete opposite.  (40) In their history,  Croats have been a colonised nation who
experienced statehood only through someone  else’s  state:  Vienna,  Constantinople,
Hungary,  Venice,  Belgrade.  (41) Hence,  in Croatia nationalism goes hand in hand
with total contempt for the idea of the state [...].
This  passage advances two claims  about  Croatian national  identity:  first,  that  it  is
largely ‘imagined’ (i.e. symbolically constructed), since Croats are a composite and
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heterogeneous nation; second, that it expresses itself in opposition to the state due to
historical  reasons.  What  is  relevant  in terms  of the construction of the intellectual
vantage  point  is  the  perspective  from  which  these  two  claims  are  articulated.  In
sentence 37, Pavičić implicitly claims the ability to grasp something that is impalpable
to most Croatian people, i.e. the imagined character of their own national identity.
Thus  he  elevates  himself,  as  it  were,  ‘above’ his  fellow citizens.  In  the  next  two
sentences, he takes the viewpoint of the ordinary person, but only to discard it shortly
afterwards.  By  rejecting  an  argument  based  on  common  sense  in  favour  of  a
counterintuitive “truth”, the author constructs his standpoint as affording him a certain
epistemic  advantage over  mainstream society.  The  topos of  history in  sentence  40
further substantiates this advantage by foregrounding Pavičić’s knowledge of history.
In conclusion, the author ‘performs’ from a privileged position, one which affords him
a clearer and more informed view than the rest of society – i.e. an intellectual vantage
point.
The other salient  illustration of this  strategy of intellectual  self-legitimation comes
from the interview given by Katarina Luketić to Novi list [C12]. Luketić is asked to
elaborate on the perception of the Balkans in the Croatian society,  one of the main
topics of her latest  book. The interview is  therefore framed as a dialogue with an
expert, and the interviewee duly takes up this role by constructing her standpoint as
that of a specialist throughout the entire interview. This strategy of perspectivisation is
well exemplified in the following excerpt:
(24) When did the Balkans become a synonym for all things negative?
(25) – The Balkans have been the object of intense imagination in European literature
approximately from the mid-nineteenth century onwards.  (26) Of  course there  are
earlier texts,  such as Fortis’ famous travelogue through Dalmatia, as well as many
other accounts by English and German travellers. (27) The image of the Balkans has
not  always  been  negative  and is  not  always  demonic.  (28)  In  a  number  of  texts,
especially in the beginning of the above-mentioned period, the entire region and all
local peoples are romanticised. (29) This is the case with Lord Byron, who writes
about Greece and the Greek freedom fighters, and with Alphonse de Lamartine, who
describes  Serbia,  Serbian  fighters  and  the  like.  (30)  This  romanticisation  of  the
Balkans  continues  through  the  twentieth  century,  for  instance  with  the  renowned
travelogue Black Lamb and Grey Falcon written by Rebecca West [...].
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This passage contains several linguistic elements that all contribute to the discursive
construction  of  expertise.  To  begin  with,  the  author  uses  a  rather  impersonal  and
factual style, which is typical of scientific discourse: all verbs are in the indicative
mood, the passive voice is predominant, and some processes are nominalised using
specialist terminology (e.g. “romanticisation”). This lends an aura of objectivity to the
conveyed information. Furthermore, Luketić supports her claims with many learned
examples, thereby emphasising her extensive knowledge of the field. In this regard,
expressions such as “Of course” in sentence 26 and “renowned” in sentence 30 serve
to underscore the author’s expert authority by stressing her familiarity with certain
literary works (although they may conversely be seen as mitigating devices aimed to
downplay the exclusivity of such acquaintance). Through these stylistic, lexical and
rhetorical  choices,  the author constructs herself  as an expert  and researcher  in the
relevant subject. By employing this strategy of intellectual self-legitimation, she also
fulfils the role that is demanded of her by the specific communicative situation (i.e.
public interview).
The examples  discussed above illustrate  how authors can legitimise  themselves  as
intellectuals by exhibiting their advanced knowledge or by boasting their ability to
comprehend certain aspects of society better than ordinary people. An alternative but
equivalent way to stress one’s own epistemic advantage is to criticise other people’s
supposedly authoritative viewpoints as wrong or ill-grounded. In other words, instead
of resorting to positive self-presentation, the author aspiring to attain the intellectual
vantage  point  may  opt  for  negative  other-presentation  and  seek  to  discredit  the
opponents,  i.e.  other  ‘authorities’ in  the  relevant  field  of  knowledge  or  practice.
Notably, this often rests on, or presupposes, an axiomatic distinction between ‘local’
observers and ‘external’ ones (typically Western European).
In her interview about the symbolic geography of the Balkans, Luketić also makes use
of this specific strategy. This is most evident in the passage below, where she attacks
the authors who write about the Balkans in a disdainful, uninformed and rather exotic
manner: 
(71) The works I am talking about are typically written by authors who discovered the
Balkans in the nineties. (72) Few among them know the history and the specificities
of  the  Balkans,  speak the  local  languages and have  dealt  with the  culture  of  the
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Balkans. (73) The result is some sort of cursory insight into the local environment.
(74) Foreign authors come here and at best stay a few months, after which they return
to their countries and become experts, specialists in the Balkans. (75) Many of them
feel  entitled  to  write  as  if  they  fully  understand this  area.  (76)  This  is  a  typical
imperialist attitude, when you come to another country,  another culture, which you
consider somehow less valuable, or not as complex as your native culture.
The passage is filled with negative predications. The targeted authors are described as
latecomers  (and,  subtly,  as  opportunists),  who  lack  sufficient  knowledge  and
understanding  of  the  Balkan  context  and  yet  do  not  refrain  from  designating
themselves as experts. Their pretensions, Luketić argues, are not only unwarranted,
but also inconsiderate of the complexity of the culture of the Balkans, and therefore
constitute a form of cultural imperialism. Luketić’s criticism of these authors can be
regarded as an attempt to undermine precisely the foundations of their  intellectual
vantage point, by challenging the quality of their expertise as well as the depth of their
insights. This discursive strategy has clear implications in terms of self-legitimation:
through diminishing her opponents’ intellectual status, the author implicitly asserts her
own authority as an expert  in Balkan affairs.  What is more,  she emphasises being
situated  in  the  Balkans (note  the  deictic  expressions  “here”  and  “this  area”  in
sentences 74 and 75) as a position that is epistemically more advantageous (and also
morally more justifiable) than that of her foreign peers.
A similar  strategy  of  intellectual  self-legitimation  occurs  in  Miljenko  Jergović’s
commentary A country without an economy or mineral treasures, with plenty of water
and wind, published in  Jutarnji List [C07]. In the following excerpt, Jergović takes
issue first with stereotypical representations of the Balkans (i.e. the so-called ‘ancient
hatred’ argument), and then with western interpretations of the Yugoslav wars:
(28) Although it is commonly believed that hatred and conflicts in the Balkans have
lasted  for  centuries,  and  that  this  is  about  wicked traditions  inscribed  in  national
identity, before 1918 and the establishment of the joint Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, there were no conflicts among these peoples [...] (31) Although European
observers and historians typically characterize them as civil wars [...] the Balkan wars
[of the 1990s] were generally fought because of culture. (32) That is to say, because of
identity, language and belonging.
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The argumentative scheme of the passage is the following: first the author introduces a
claim he disagrees with, which he then seeks to disprove by pointing to disconfirming
evidence; then, he introduces a second claim, to which he also objects by advancing a
counterclaim. Interestingly, the author characterises both claims as widely accepted:
the former is said to be “commonly believed” (28), while the latter is said to be largely
shared by “European observers and historians” (31). By employing these predications,
Jergović sets his own standpoint in opposition to ‘mainstream’ ways of thinking. This,
as we know, corresponds to the paradigmatic structure of intellectual marginality (§
3.2).  Furthermore,  it  should be noted how, not dissimilarly to  the case of Luketić
discussed above, Jergović seeks to legitimise himself by questioning specifically the
authority of European (and generally western) analysts and experts interested in the
Balkans.  In  other  words,  the  strategy  employed  by  both  Luketić  and  Jergović  to
establish their intellectual vantage point, i.e. their claim to a better-informed view on
(Balkan) society, is based not only on criticising viewpoints that are generally held to
be  authoritative,  but  also  on  the  presumption  that  their  ‘belonging’ to  the  Balkan
context gives them a better chance to understand its specificities. In other words, both
authors assume that their being materially and culturally situated within the Balkan
context provides them with a greater ability than ‘external’ observers to understand its
specificities.
In conclusion, the analysis provides evidence that the authors use different strategies
to legitimise themselves intellectually, that is, to frame their social estrangement as an
epistemically advantageous condition. As seen above, several authors establish their
intellectual  vantage  point  by assuming the role  of  guardians  and defenders  of  the
public use of reason. This strategy of intellectual self-legitimation is best illustrated
with  reference  to  Raspudić’s  two  opinion  pieces,  in  which  the  author  vigorously
condemns the surreptitious manner in which two paramount political ideals such as
Croatia’s ‘regional perspective’ and its accession to the EU have become accepted as
dogmatic and incontrovertible, and thereby emerges as a staunch advocate of rational
public debate as a fundamental component of democratic deliberation. An alternative
way of constructing one’s intellectual standpoint is to endorse forms of thinking that
are typically regarded as original and unconventional. The only salient example of this
strategy is  found in Šerić’s  text,  where the  author  exhorts  people to  discover  and
exploit the creative potential of chaos and uncertainty by ‘thinking out of the box’.
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Although these two strategies of intellectual self-legitimation appear quite different
from  one  another,  they  both  construct  the  intellectual  standpoint  as  a  position
involving significant engagement with the broader society: the former emphasises the
intellectual’s  responsibility to publicly uphold fundamental  social  norms,  while the
latter  stresses  the  role  of  the  intellectual  in  encouraging  society  to  depart  from
ordinary ways  of looking at  the world.  Therefore,  both modes of intellectual  self-
legitimation can be subsumed under the category of intellectual self-legitimation on
the basis of engagement and attitude.
Another possible way of establishing one’s perspective as a privileged vantage point is
to treat one’s ability to comprehend key aspects of the social world as superior to that
of  the  ordinary  person.  In  principle,  this  is  the  most  literal  embodiment  of  the
intellectual standpoint, which is based precisely on a superior ability to understand the
social world. At the same time, such an attitude may prove counterproductive, as it is
likely to be judged as arrogant or self-aggrandising by the intellectual’s audience. In
the  two  examples  discussed  above,  however,  this  risk  is  averted.  In  the  case  of
Luketić’s  interview  about  the  symbolism  of  the  Balkans,  the  author  is  explicitly
addressed as an expert in the subject matter, which creates an expectation that she will
draw on her expert knowledge to answer the questions posed by the interviewer. In the
case of Pavičić’s commentary, the author purports to understand the Croatian people
better than they understand themselves; however, he downplays this bold pretension
by couching it in a temperate and mitigated language. Other authors claim a privileged
viewpoint on similar grounds, but do so in a more indirect  and less heavy-handed
manner, resorting to negative other-presentation instead of positive self-presentation.
Namely, they implicitly assert their expert authority by openly challenging notions and
interpretations that are widely accepted or commonly held in high regard. The most
salient  instances  of  this  strategy  are  found  in  Luketić’s  interview  and  Jergović’s
opinion piece. As shown above, both authors take issue with dominant or stereotypical
representations of the Balkans and overtly reject them as ill-founded. By doing so,
they implicitly grant themselves the status of experts.
6.2 Strategies of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation
The  purpose  of  the  previous  section  was  to  identify  and  categorise  the  manifold
discursive strategies employed by the authors to convey their intellectual estrangement
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from  society  at  large.  This  section  investigates  the  circumstances  in  which  they
withdraw from their privileged observation point, in order to speak for their national
community. As revealed by detailed analysis of the 12 texts included in the sample, all
of the authors act to a greater or lesser extent as spokespersons for the nation, and they
do so through a range of different discursive strategies. As with the case of Serbia, I
propose to group them in three broad groups:
1. The intellectual as political guide for the nation
2. The intellectual  as promoter/defender  of  the nation’s  values  and distinctive
character
3. The intellectual as emancipator/educator of the nation
In  the  following,  I  will  illustrate  each  of  these  broad  strategies  of  intellectual
spokespersonship  for  the  nation,  pointing  out  their  most  relevant  linguistic  and
discursive aspects.
6.2.1 The intellectual as political guide for the nation
Croatia’s  accession  to  the  EU has  been publicly  acknowledged in  the  media  as  a
historic  event  of  paramount  importance  for  Croatian  society.  Framed  as  the  long-
awaited fulfilment of a common goal, it has been promoted first and foremost as an
unprecedented  political  achievement,  fraught  with  important  and  far-reaching
consequences for Croatia as a political  community.  Hence,  it  is not surprising that
most  of  the  authors  among  those  considered  focus  precisely  on  the  political
significance  of  Croatia’s  EU membership,  rather  than  on its  economic  or  cultural
aspects. Indeed, several authors are explicitly concerned to explore the relationship
between Croatia as a polity and the EU, as well as the impact that EU membership has
had, or might have, on the Croatian political scene. By assuming this attitude, these
authors undertake the role of political guides for their national community.
This strategy of spokespersonship for the nation can take various forms, depending on
the specific discursive strategies employed by the authors. A typical form involves
articulating a political project or promoting a common agenda/framework for political
action. Generally speaking, this can be done in many different ways,  ranging from
developing  a  broad  and  comprehensive  political  vision  to  spelling  out  single
objectives to be accomplished. Also, the degree of specificity may vary: some authors
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outline  their  proposed  political  project  in  detail,  while  others  just  give  general
recommendations or sketch out guidelines. In this regard, the strategy that recurs most
frequently  in  the  texts  from  the  Croatia  sample  is  the  one  whereby  the  author
emphasises certain opportunities (typically stemming from EU accession) and then
urges the Croatian people to seize them. I will illustrate this specific strategy through
some examples.
In the conclusion of his opinion piece, entitled Croatia deserved a grander finale in
the  EU  accession  game [C01],  Skoko  addresses  the  following  exhortation  to  his
fellow citizens:
(18)  After  a  difficult  and  arduous  negotiation  process,  Croatia  deserves  some
celebration. (19) All the more since we belong to Europe and our membership will
open up new opportunities. (20) But now we have to get to work. (21) To start with,
we could define a vision of the Croatian future and reach a national consensus over
our place in the EU and how we will make use of this high-priced membership.
Membership in the EU is represented as the completion of a long and difficult journey,
but at the same time as the threshold of an era of great promise for Croatia. Skoko’s
argument, therefore, is that Croatian society should not only legitimately celebrate EU
accession as an accomplishment, but also make the necessary arrangements to be able
to reap the benefits that come with it. These arrangements, as suggested by the author,
are  of  a  political  nature,  as  they involve envisaging Croatia’s  political  future,  and
especially developing a shared strategic view of its relationship with the EU. Although
the author stresses the urgency of having a political vision, he does not spell out its
contents.  Nevertheless,  his  position  can  still  be  regarded  as  that  of  a  political
mouthpiece  for  the  nation,  insofar  as  he  takes  the  responsibility  of  exhorting  his
national community to reflect upon its future prospects.
A similar  attitude  is  found  in  Marina  Šerić’s  commentary  We  have  joined  the
European construction site. Let’s roll up our sleeves and get to work [C9]. This is the
concluding paragraph: 
(19) In this whole story Croatia cannot stay on the sidelines, but must demonstrate
that it has will and creativity, and the desire to put effort into a common goal. (20) If
we were to wait for someone to feed us like young birds in a nest because we are
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miserable and small, we would become a burden on the shoulders of the EU. (21)
This is a historic opportunity that we should not fritter away.
Similarly to the previous example,  the author portrays  EU accession as a “historic
opportunity”  (21)  that  Croatia  cannot  afford  to  let  pass  by.  The exhortation  Šerić
addresses to the nation is to take a proactive stance vis-à-vis the European integration
process. In this case, the emphasis is not so much on the necessity of a clearly defined
political vision, but rather on the need to show commitment and inventiveness (which
is  in  tune  with  her  predominant  strategy of  intellectual  self-legitimation  based on
promoting  ‘thinking  out  of  the  box’,  as  discussed  in  §  6.1.2).  In  any  case,  by
formulating  an  overarching  vision  and  direction  for  Croatian  society,  the  author
assumes the perspective of political mouthpiece for the nation. Moreover, she does so
in  a  quite  confident  and assertive  manner,  as  indicated  by the  use  of  prescriptive
deontic modality (“cannot”, “must” and “should not”), and also by the counterfactual
analogy between the Croatian  people and small  birds  waiting  to  be fed,  which  is
probably intended to provoke a sense of (national) pride in the readership. 
In  the two examples  discussed above,  the authors  suggest  a more  or  less specific
framework for political  action,  and by doing so seek to establish their authority as
political spokespersons for the nation. Occasionally, however, authors might already
be officially vested with that kind of authority (in various degrees), notably if they are
renowned political leaders. In this case, the position of spokespersons for the nation is
not one they might attempt to achieve, but one they already occupy, and which they
might  want  to  perform  and  reassert  before  their  constituencies.  It  is  against  this
background  that  I  will  now  examine  the  cases  of  Ivo  Josipović  and  Josip  Leko,
respectively the President of Croatia and the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament (at
the time). Let us first consider the following excerpts from Josipović’s commentary,
entitled The beginning of the future for our Croatia [C03]:
(43) Our country’s accession to the European Union gives us great hopes. (44) I am
personally proud that we have succeeded. [...] 
(51) Perhaps now is an opportunity to think about how to best take advantage of this
new energy and new confidence. [...] 
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(59) Perhaps today is an opportunity for us to foster this new social consensus, this
unity towards a new goal – the development of our country.  [...] (64) When I look
ahead, ten, twenty or fifty years from now, I see today as the birthday of a happier,
more successful and more prosperous Croatia [...] (65) Today is the beginning of our
future – a future that will be better to us than was our past.
Josipović  describes  Croatia’s  accession  to  the  EU as  a  turning  point  for  Croatian
society.  It represents not only a great accomplishment, but also, and especially,  the
inauguration of a ‘space of opportunities’ available to Croatia for sustaining progress
and  achieving  prosperity.  This  crucial  occurrence,  metaphorically  equated  to  the
“birthday”  (64)  of  a  new and  better  Croatia,  is  hailed  with  the  catchphrase  “the
beginning  of  our  future”  (65),  which  also  appears  in  the  title  of  the  article.  But
Josipović  does  more  than  herald the  onset  of  a  ‘new era’.  Firstly,  he outlines  the
emerging opportunities, and encourages his fellow citizens to seize them. Secondly, he
sets “development” (59) as the new, overarching goal of Croatia. Finally, he lays out a
promising scenario for Croatia stretching far into the future, which presupposes an
extraordinary capacity for vision. Admittedly,  none of these projected elements are
spelled out in much detail; nevertheless, through promoting a political vision, however
vague, the author implicitly ratifies his position of political guide of the nation. In this
respect, he appears to fulfil the expectations of his official role of President of Croatia,
in which capacity he is speaking.
Like Josipović, Josip Leko, the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, also takes upon
himself  the  duty  of  motivating  the  Croatian  people  to  pursue  the  opportunities
provided by EU accession. His opinion piece is appropriately entitled  The EU is an
opportunity we have to take advantage of [C04], and this attitude is most apparent in
the following paragraph:
(21) Although we have met the membership requirements and many see us as the
most prepared country for EU membership, there is still much to be done. (22) First of
all, we need to strengthen our economy and raise the standard of living. (23) In the
worldwide economic crisis Croatia suffered major damage, and five years after the
onset of the crisis we have failed to stimulate economic growth. (24) The European
Union provides an opportunity for such a turnaround too, but it is up to us to take
advantage of it.
153
The passage begins with the author calling on his fellow citizens not to underestimate
the  challenges  still  facing  Croatia  in  spite  of  its  recent  accomplishment.  Leko
admonishes that “there is still  much to be done” (22), a warning that echoes Božo
Skoko’s  “But  now we have  to  get  to  work”  (see  above),  and indicates  economic
recovery as the main priority in this regard. The claim is backed up with reference to
Croatia’s long-standing inability to tackle the economic crisis, which can be regarded
as a combination of a topos of history and a topos of threat and danger. Then, Leko
urges Croats to capitalise on EU membership as a way out of the current predicament. 
As  illustrated  by  the  examples  above,  many  authors  discursively  construct  their
standpoint  as  political  guides  for  the  Croatian  nation  in  a  very  similar  fashion.
Namely, they all construct the EU as a ‘space of opportunities’ in which Croatia can
flourish and develop, and subsequently seek to motivate the people to embrace and act
upon  those  opportunities.  The  analysis  has  shown  that  this  applies  to  both
‘prospective’ and ‘official’ political mouthpieces, that is, to regular columnists as well
as to professional politicians. 
Another  possible  way in  which  authors  can  act  as  political  spokespersons  for  the
national  community  is  to  criticise  the  country’s  political  elites,  blaming  them for
failing to adequately represent the people and to advance their interests. This strategy
is also quite frequent in the texts from the Croatia sample. For instance, in his piece
Will Europe be able to sing… [C11], Josip Jović ridicules the enthusiastic attitude of
the  political  leadership  towards  Croatia’s  accession  to  the  EU,  exposing  their
disconnection with the people: 
(4)  Members  of  the  elite  were  genuinely  happy  and  content,  it  is  their  success,
lucrative positions and awards await them, after all they do not have to share the fate
of this nation, and especially of this state that many of them did not gladly welcome.
(5) But which served them well anyway.
The overall tone of the passage is bitter and sarcastic. Initially, the author debases the
fervour of Croatian politicians for EU accession as a mere expression of self-interest.
Then, he attributes their complacent attitude to their being radically alienated from
their  national  community.  Finally,  he  subtly  points  out  their  ambivalent  and
hypocritical  relationship with the Croatian state,  accusing them of reaping benefits
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from a polity that they were not ready to support when it gained independence in the
early 1990s. In this polarised representation, which is further developed through the
article,  political  leaders  are  depicted  as  selfish  individuals  who  do  not  feel  any
obligation towards their constituencies, nor any loyalty to the polity they are meant to
serve. By pointing out the disconnection of political elites from the people, Jović takes
on the role of political mouthpiece for the Croatian national community.
A somewhat  similar  kind of criticism of national  political  elites  comes from Nino
Raspudić. In his opinion piece entitled We have awakened as EU citizens! What will
be our next goal? [C08], he accuses them of having shown more allegiance to the EU
than to the Croatian people:
(31) During all these years of negotiations, the Croatian political elite did not play an
authentic political  game for the local public,  but  a post-colonial  one for Brussels’
judgmental look, to whose expectations it obediently conformed. 
In  this  sentence,  the  author  outlines  a  metaphorical  scenario  in  which  Croatian
politicians appear submissively prostrated before the powerful European Union, which
is personified as casting a “judgmental look” upon them. The adjective “post-colonial”
works  as  a  framing  device:  by  conjuring  up  notions  of  colonialism  and  post-
colonialism,  it  stigmatises  the  relationship  between  Croatian  and  the  EU  as  one
marked by significant structural inequalities. By taking such a bold and critical stance
towards  Croatia’s  leadership,  Raspudić  assumes  and performs  the  role  of  political
guide for the Croatian nation.
6.2.2 The intellectual as promoter/defender of the nation’s values and distinctive 
character
In institutional and media discourses, EU accession has largely been represented as the
historical fulfilment of a common objective of the Croatian people. At the same time,
much  emphasis  has  been  placed  upon  the  challenges  involved  in  joining  an
international organisation of such magnitude and status, particularly in terms of its
possible  impact  on  Croatia’s  culture,  identity  and  values.  In  this  respect,  several
authors among those considered have focused their attention on two broad issues. One
is  the  concern  to  reassert  Croatia’s  national  and  cultural  identity  in  the  new
international context created by EU accession. The other is the wish to complement
the debate on the benefits of EU membership for Croatia with some considerations
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about what Croatia itself can contribute to the EU and its future development, and thus
defend  its  international  reputation.  By  explicitly  addressing  these  issues,  the
aforementioned authors take on the role of promoters and/or defenders of Croatia’s
values  and  unique  national  character,  which  is  a  specific  strategy  of  intellectual
spokespersonship for the nation.
The first two examples, which I discuss below, are taken from two texts published by
Jutarnji  List in the thematic section  Kakva je moja Hrvatska  (What my Croatia is
like). The section, launched on the occasion of Croatia’s entry into the EU, featured
renowned columnists, writers and public figures expressing their personal views on
the country, its people and culture. In all likelihood, the authors were explicitly invited
to submit their contributions to the section; therefore, one may object that they did not
take  on  the  role  of  promoters  of  Croatian  national  identity  (provided  they  did)
deliberately, but were rather put into that position (one may say interpellated) by the
newspaper itself. In my view, this is hardly sufficient grounds to dismiss the notion of
spokespersonship for the nation as irrelevant to this case. On the one hand, one should
not deny the agency of the authors, who consciously occupied the ‘speaking position’
that was offered to them. On the other hand, the decision made by  Jutarnji List to
launch such a thematic section could itself be regarded as symptomatic of a societal
need to reassert Croatia’s distinctive character in the face of European integration, as
suggested above.
The first example is from Miljenko Jergović, a well-known and influential Bosnian
writer who has lived in Zagreb (Croatia) since 1993. In his opinion piece, entitled A
country  without  an economy or  mineral  treasures,  with  plenty  of  water  and wind
[C07], he elaborates on the peculiar character of Croatian identity, culture and society:
(24)  Croatian  traditional  culture  and  popular  folklore  are  determined  by  [...]
versatility, and partly by blending. [...] 
(40)  [...]  Croatia  is  a  rich  and very diverse  country.  (41)  Just  as  its  cultural  and
national identity is variegated and pours into the mould from many different sources,
and as Croats themselves are very much mixed with neighbouring Slavic nations, but
also Italians, Austrians and Hungarians, so the beauty of their country is miraculously
very diverse and contradictory.
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The second example is taken from Between cathedrals and Balkan crevices [C05], by
writer and film critic Jurica Pavičić. In this piece, he gives his personal interpretation
of the specificity of Croatian culture, which is summarised in the opening paragraph:
(2) Geographically, culturally,  linguistically, politically and gastronomically,  Croatia
is  a  country that  is  based on two fundamental  contradictions,  which defy cultural
stereotypes as well as conventional geographic and macro-regional conceptions. (3)
The first of these contradictions is that Croats are Balkan Catholics. (4) The second
contradiction is that Croats are Mediterranean Slavs.
The two authors explain Croatian identity in terms of what they regard as its defining
characteristics.  Jergović  stresses  its  composite  and  heterogeneous  character,  while
Pavičić understands it as the product of two peculiar paradoxes. By advancing their
views in an informative and declarative style, with all verbs in the indicative mood
and no hedges or mitigating devices, both present themselves as experts in the subject.
But there are discursive elements which suggest that they might speak not only as
experts,  but  also  as  promoters of  Croatian  identity.  Jergović,  on  the  one  hand,
represents Croatian identity in very positive terms, emphasising its richness, diversity
and unusual beauty; this positive representation culminates in the value-laden adverb
“miraculously”35 (41),  which  conveys  an  aura  of  mystery  and  otherworldliness.
Pavičić,  on the other hand, argues  that  the two contradictions  underlying  Croatian
identity are such that they challenge common knowledge, which compels the reader to
appreciate its extraordinary character. In this light, both writers act as spokespersons
for the Croatian nation by elevating and reasserting Croatia’s distinctive identity and
culture (in the context of increasing European integration).
As stated above, a further motive driving some authors to speak out in support of
Croatian national identity is the desire to claim recognition for Croatia’s capacity to
contribute to the EU in significant ways. This desire seems to arise in response to a
perceived general undervaluation of Croatia’s ability to improve the Union culturally,
economically  or  otherwise.  A clear  illustration  of  this  attitude,  which  underlies  a
specific strategy of spokespersonship for the nation,  is found in Milan Jajčinović’s
opinion piece, entitled Today begins Croatia’s new historical era [C06]:
35 A more literal translation would be “by some sort of miracle”.
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(8)  The contribution36 Croatia  brings  to  the  EU might  seem modest,  but  it  is  not
insignificant. (9) It brings not only its natural beauty, especially the Adriatic, but also
its millennial culture, its people’s diligence and hard work, intellectual capabilities
and athletic talent.
The  author’s  standpoint  is  enshrined  in  the  first  sentence:  although  he  partially
acknowledges (the epistemic modality marker  “might  seem” functions as a hedge)
Croatia’s  supposedly  limited  ability  to  contribute  to  the  EU,  he  retorts  that  the
country’s endowment is indeed significant. The expression “it is not insignificant” is
an understatement (litotes) whereby the author makes an affirmative point by denying
its opposite. In the next sentence, Jajčinović substantiates his claim by boasting about
what he sees as the country’s main qualities and assets. The construction “not only [...]
but also” serves as an intensification device, as it places the accent on the virtues and
capabilities of the Croatian people, which are portrayed in utterly positive terms. The
attempt  by  the  author  to  vindicate  Croatian  national  identity  in  the  context  of
European integration makes him a spokesperson for the nation, specifically a defender
and promoter of the nation’s values.
In  a  similar  vein,  Skoko  [C01]  expresses  his  disapproval  of  Croatia’s  failure  to
publicise its merits to the wider European public:
(11) [...] In Croatia everyday life [is] really difficult, but it is a shame that we have not
made enough efforts to tell those positive facts that made us deserve membership and
by which we will enrich the Union. (12) And there are many indeed! (13) Of course,
this requires knowledge, creativity, coordination and commitment.
As in the previous example,  the author makes an initial  concession, which is then
followed by a  rebuttal  aggrandising  Croatia’s  accomplishments.  Unlike  Jajčinović,
however, Skoko does not specify the nature of these feats. Instead, he limits himself to
claiming with confidence that “there are many indeed”, which is a rather clichéd way
of eulogising one’s nation as it plainly mobilises commonplace beliefs held by the
general  public.  On  the  other  hand,  Skoko  explicitly  puts  the  blame  for  the
misrepresentation  of  the  nation’s  value  on  the  Croatian  people  themselves.  The
accusation is expressed in quite vague terms, but it is precisely its generic character
that makes it central to Skoko’s self-positioning as a spokesperson for the nation. In
36 Popudbina in the Croatian language, literally “viaticum”.
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fact, by dispersing the responsibility among his fellow-nationals (including himself),
he turns the accusation into a general appeal for every Croat to be a better ambassador
of her or his nation. The exhortative character of this discursive move is confirmed by
the  final  sentence,  in  which  the  author  indicates  the  skills  that  such  an  ‘office’
requires. This attitude is a clear instance of spokespersonship for the nation, as the
author  puts  himself  forward  as  a  promoter  of  Croatian  national  identity  on  the
European and international stage.
6.2.3 The intellectual as educator/emancipator of the nation
Besides  the  two  modes  of  intellectual  spokespersonship  for  the  nation  examined
above, some authors appear to resort to a third mode, which involves assuming the
role of educator or emancipator of the Croatian nation. Broadly speaking, the role of
educator/emancipator  of  the nation  can  in  principle  be assumed  and performed in
manifold  ways.  In  the  texts  under  examination,  only  a  few  authors  assume  this
standpoint, and they do so in two main ways: as educators of the nation, by setting out
to  explain  what  they  see  as  the  key  facets  of  Croatian  nationhood  and  national
consciousness; as emancipators of the nation, by questioning shared perceptions and
common  practices  as  harmful  to  the  nation.  These  approaches  will  be  illustrated
through three examples.
The first example is an excerpt from Josip Leko’s opinion piece [C04], in which he
describes  European  integration  as  a  much-yearned-for  achievement  of  Croatian
society:
(9) From the beginning we knew that we would have to work hard, but also that the
prize  awaiting  us  was  immensely  valuable.  (10)  We  have  regarded  European
integration not only as a duty to be accomplished once and for all, but as the project of
several  generations.  (11)  [...]  we  have  witnessed  the  slow  but  steady  change  of
Croatian society. (12) We have always known that we want a society built on the same
founding values as the European Union, a society that respects human rights, freedom
of the market, the rule of law and the rights of minorities.
The repeated use of we is a rhetorical and persuasive device aimed at obliterating the
distance  between  the  author  and  his  readers  by  presenting  a  particular  viewpoint
(arguably the official position of the government, given Leko’s political role) as being
shared by the entire Croatian people. As indicated by the predominance of epistemic
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verbs (know, regard, witness) associated with  we, this staged viewpoint attributes to
the Croats a shared knowledge and understanding of the reality and the future of their
national community. This specific framing strategy allows Leko to construct a shared
sense of national identity, or national consciousness, by projecting it onto his imagined
audience, the Croats. I designate this attitude as that of an educator of the nation, in
the sense that, by presupposing a common vision of the nation, the author intends to
impart that vision to his fellow-citizens.
A more straightforward illustration of this strategy of spokespersonship for the nation
is found in Katarina Luketić’s interview [C12]. When asked a question about Croatia’s
ambivalent geographical position in between Europe and the Balkans, she replies:
(19) I see Croatia equally as a European, a Mediterranean and a Balkan country. (20) I
do not see any problem in that, and it seems to me that the position that wants to
determine whether you belong to the Balkans or to Europe is something that only
leads to neurosis. (21) Things must be approached differently. (22) Of course we are
both things, Europe and the Balkans.
Luketić’s  attitude  towards  the  nation  in  this  passage  is  both  educative  and
emancipatory.  It  is  educative/didactic  insofar  as  she  intends  to  teach  the  Croatian
public about fundamental aspects of Croatian nationhood. Specifically, she is keen on
promoting a view of Croatia that magnifies its multiple geographic determinations.
The style, made explicative and assertive by the use of the indicative mood and the
paucity of hedges, is well suited to this purpose.37 But Luketić’s attitude with regard to
the Croatian nation can also be seen as emancipatory,  because she is concerned to
dispel a widespread conception of Croatian identity as adversely affecting the nation’s
capacity  for  self-understanding.  The  use  of  the  medical  trope  “neurosis”  (20)
contributes to framing the author’s statement as a diagnosis of a supposedly unhealthy
condition affecting the Croatian national  body (or mind, in this  case).  This further
reinforces her role as emancipator of the nation, which is largely based on promoting
(the value of having) multiple identities. 
The third and final example presents a case in which the author acts as emancipator of
the nation in a quite caustic manner. In his piece We have awakened as EU citizens!
37 As already noted above, Luketić’s assertiveness in exposing her views on the symbolic geography of
Croatia and the Balkans is a key aspect of her intellectual self-legitimation as a knowledgeable expert.
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What will be our next goal? [C08],  Nino Raspudić takes issue with EU-phoric and
EU-phobic stances, condemning both as deceptive and harmful political propaganda:
(12) The idea that joining the EU has no alternative has been imposed as self-evident,
and this founding political myth has cast its shadow on the whole political scene. (13)
What is really different this morning as compared to yesterday? (14) Nothing, we are
in the same predicament, with the same people, in the same boat. [...] 
(22) [...] the europhobic story that today we have lost our sovereignty is also a fairy
tale. (23) We cannot lose something we have not had for long. (24) We have not been
financially, economically, and geostrategically sovereign for years now.
In sentence 12,  Raspudić uses specific  strategies  of nomination and predication to
express  his  distrust  towards  dogmatic  pro-EU attitudes.  These  are  described  as  a
“myth”, fabricated by unspecified powerful actors (notice agent deletion: “has been
imposed”),  which  has  corrupted  Croatia’s  political  life  casting  a  metaphorical
“shadow” on it.  Subsequently,  by  means  of  a  rhetorical  question,  he  engages  his
fellow-citizens in a critical examination of the unwarranted optimism underlying these
attitudes,  which  are  finally  rejected.  The  second  paragraph  does  the  same  with
radically anti-EU positions. First, the author discredits them by calling them “a fairy
tale”.  Then,  he  substantiates  his  judgment  by  invoking  what  he  regards  as  an
‘uncomfortable truth’ about the situation of Croatia. In both cases, Raspudić appears
committed to liberating the Croatian nation from false beliefs and perceptions about
its  own condition.  His role  of emancipator  of the nation is  best  encapsulated in a
question he addresses to the nation at the beginning of the article: (5) “[...] [A]re we as
a community capable at all of living and doing politics without such myths?”.
In  conclusion,  only a  few authors  among  those  considered  construct  their  role  as
educators  or  emancipators  of  the  nation.  The  strategies  they  employ  range  from
imparting a sense of national consciousness to the readership (Leko), to helping the
national community to avoid an ‘identity crisis’ (Luketić), to dispelling false beliefs
and self-perceptions (Raspudić).
6.3 The discursive representation of Croatia as a nation
In  the  previous  section  I  have  investigated  the  discursive  strategies  employed  by
Croatian intellectuals to claim the role of spokespersons for the nation. The purpose of
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this section is to explore the manifold representations of the nation that they put forth
in this capacity, in order to determine recurring themes and discuss their significance
in relation to the context of the case under consideration. I have approached the data
using the framework elaborated in § 3.5. Detailed analysis of the sample texts has
allowed me to identify four main themes:
1. The uniqueness and specificity of Croatian identity
2. European integration as a chance for Croatia to achieve social and political
consensus?
3. The controversial narrative of Croatia’s ‘return to Europe’: a break away from
the Yugoslav legacy and the Balkans, or rather a new role in the region?
4. Croatia and the EU: from dependency to equal partnership
In  the  following,  I  will  introduce  and  discuss  each  theme  by  providing  relevant
examples from the sample texts. 
6.3.1 The uniqueness and specificity of Croatian identity
As shown above (§ 6.2.2), assuming the role of  promoters/defenders of the nation’s
values  and  distinctive  character  is  one  of  the  key  modes  of  intellectual
spokespersonship  for  the  nation  adopted  by  Croatian  intellectuals.  The  obvious
consequence of this tendency is that the distinctiveness of Croatian national identity is
likely to be foregrounded across the sample texts (strategy of singularisation placing
emphasis  on  national  positive  uniqueness,  see  §  3.5.3).  Although  focused  on
intellectuals and how they construct their standpoint, the previous analysis has already
shed some light on aspects of Croatian national identity that are explicitly thematised.
The  most  prominent  one  appears  to  be  Croatia’s  distinctively  composite  cultural
makeup/heritage.  Miljenko Jergović  [C07] celebrates  it  as  the  outcome of  cultural
blending with other nations and as the source of Croatia’s beauty,  whereas Pavičić
[C05]  sees  it  as  stemming  from  two  fundamental  tensions  underlying  Croatian
identity, condensed in the ‘paradoxical’ designation of the Croats as Balkan Catholics
as well as Mediterranean Slavs. A similar emphasis on Croatia’s heterogeneous culture
is also found in Katarina Luketić’s interview [C12], as shown in the analysis of her
self-positioning  as  educator  and  emancipator  of  the  nation  (see  above).  A  less
prominent  aspect  relates  to  praising  the  virtues  and  skills  of  the  Croatian  people,
which Milan Jajčinović highlights as Croatia’s most valuable contribution to Europe.
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These two aspects, however, do not exhaust all the discursive manifestations of the
main theme. An additional way in which the uniqueness and specificity of Croatian
national  identity  are  accentuated  in  the  articles  of  the  sample  is  by  framing  the
European  context  as  a  platform for  Croatia  to  exhibit  and  boost  its  national  and
cultural identity. Many authors among those considered seem to imply this, but it is in
Josipović’s opinion piece [C03] that the argument is made most explicit:
(36) Now that we have become a full member, we have an additional opportunity to
present ourselves to the other European peoples in the best light, to show them the
strength and beauty of our culture and identity. (37) There is no ground to fear that our
identity will be “lost” in the “sea” of the European Union. (38) Not a single people in
the EU lost its identity, nor became unrecognisable, so it will not happen to us either.
(39) Just the opposite – it is an opportunity to integrate our culture into European
culture even more effectively, and thus become more visible and more attractive.
The passage is replete with lexical items from the semantic field of appearance and
recognition  (“present  ourselves”,  “in  the  best  light”,  “beauty”,  “unrecognisable”,
“visible”, “attractive”). They all refer, more or less explicitly, to Croatian nationhood,
which  conveys  the  idea  that  national  identity  requires  being  performed  and
acknowledged by others in order to endure and thrive. Indeed, this general principle
serves as warrant for Josipović’s claim that joining the EU is an “opportunity” (the
word occurs twice in the paragraph) for Croatia to preserve and sustain its national
and cultural  makeup.  The aquatic  metaphor in sentence 37 introduces the counter-
argument  that  integration  might  in  fact  lead  to  assimilation  and  thus  jeopardise
Croatia’s specificities. The author dismisses this fear as unfounded, and further rebuts
it by adducing the continuing distinctiveness of other European peoples as evidence
through a  topos of comparison (38), which has the following structure:  if no other
people has lost its identity upon integrating into Europe, then the Croatian people will
not either). On the whole, this argumentative scheme suggests a conception of Europe
as  a  stage  on  which  different  national  identities  strive  to  achieve  visibility  and
recognition. In Josipović’s view, Croatia should engage in this endeavour in order to
further promote the distinctive “strength” and “beauty” of its national identity.
As shown by the examples above, the unique character of Croatian national identity
tends  to  be  associated  with  positive  attributes  and  qualities:  its  enriching  cultural
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heterogeneity,  its  vitality  and  attractiveness,  the  admirable  skills  of  the  Croatian
people.  There is, however,  one dissonant  view. In  Between cathedrals and Balkan
crevices [C05], Jurica Pavičić argues that what makes Croatian identity exceptional is
its inability to accommodate so much cultural diversity into a coherent whole. In the
following passage, he explains what this implies:
(34)  It  is  because  it  is  incapable  of  producing  an  organic  identity  –  a  tangible
combination of sights,  tastes and idioms that can be seen, heard and enjoyed with
one’s palate – that Croatia is prone to construct abstract national narratives. (35) If
you  cannot  “be  a  nation”  on  the  basis  of  the  Puszta,  goulash  soup,  paprika  and
“Magyar nyelv” (the Hungarian language), Croatia “becomes a nation” through para-
ideological stories, narratives about Zvonimir’s curses, the bulwark of Christianity,
“we-have-always-been-in-the-West”, the millenary dream, geese in the fog, up to the
myths about Genex’s foreign currency and Dinamo’s stolen titles. 
The gist of the argument is that Croats are ready to embrace all sorts of national myths
because they lack a consistent (“organic”) national identity. This is the only case in the
sample where Croatian national identity is not assumed to exist as a coherent, positive
whole. Instead, it is presented as an unfinished project, a failed attempt to create a
synthesis  of  the  country’s  extraordinary  geographic,  gastronomic  and  linguistic
diversity.  As the author puts it,  the impossibility of  being a nation is what impels
Croatia to become a nation by resorting to mythology, collective representations and
common symbols,  ranging from ancient  history to relatively recent  events  such as
corruption  scandals.  Incidentally,  this  argument  partly  reflects  the  well-established
view of nations as imagined communities (Anderson, 1983), as well as the concept
that national official history is largely fabricated (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), both
of which have been discussed in § 3.3.1.  Yet,  Pavičić  does not frame the case of
Croatia as a typical instance of how national identities are constructed, but rather as a
singularity based on a very peculiar configuration of culture, identity and narratives.
This suggests that what may initially appear as a criticism of the defective character of
Croatian national identity might in fact be understood as an attempt, albeit convoluted,
to glorify the country’s extraordinary cultural uniqueness.
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6.3.2 European integration as a chance for Croatia to achieve social and political 
consensus?
The second theme identified  in  the analysis  pertains  to  the  nation  conceived as  a
political  community,  which  is  the second of the five dimensions  of the discursive
construction of the nation included in the analytical framework (§ 3.5.3). The theme
concerns the significance of the European integration process for Croatia’s political
life, particularly the question of whether joining the EU has helped, or can help, the
country to reaffirm its common values and to build a durable political consensus. As
discussed  in  §  2.3,  post-socialist  transition,  the  post-conflict  situation  and
Europeanisation have deeply shaped the post-Yugoslav societies, often bringing about
widespread uncertainty, social distress and political cleavages. Thus, looking at how
Croatian  public  intellectuals  interpret  and  assess  the  impact  of  EU  accession  on
Croatian politics can shed some light on the progress made by Croatian society in
dealing with these challenges and consolidating as a political community. 
As signalled by the question mark at the end of the theme title, there appears to be no
clear  agreement  on  the  issue.  In  fact,  although  only  three  authors  out  of  fifteen
explicitly touch upon it,  the positions  they express are  quite  divergent.  While  one
author  is  very optimistic  about  the  benefits  that  Croatia  may reap from European
integration  in  terms  of  social  and  political  cohesion  (strategy  of  cohesivation
emphasising the will to unify, see § 3.5.3), another insinuates that EU accession has
only made more apparent the deep-seated cleavage between the Croatian people and
its political leadership (strategy of  polarisation emphasising intra-societal divisions,
combined with a strategy of  delegitimation of the political  elites, see § 3.5.3). The
third  author  takes  a  sort  of  compromise  position  between  these  two  extremes,
suggesting that EU integration provides a chance to reconsider, and possibly reduce,
the existing disconnection between the Croatian electorate and the political elites. 
The more optimistic view is that advanced by Josip Josipović [C03]. Considering his
institutional  role  as  President  of the Republic,  as  well  as the strong pro-European
orientation  of  the  incumbent  Croatian  government,  this  is  hardly  surprising.
Nevertheless,  it  is  worth focusing on how Croatia  is  discursively constructed  as a
community  in  Josipović’s  text,  as  this  reveals  some  underlying  ideological
assumptions. Most relevant in this regard is the following excerpt:
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(59) Perhaps today is an opportunity for us to foster this new social consensus, this
unity towards a new goal – the development of our country. (60) It is my desire that
Croatia  maintains  and  improves  even  more  the  sense  of  solidarity  and  mutual
understanding  between  workers  and  employers,  between  the  rich  and  the  poor,
between the haves and the have-nots.
The  first  sentence  contains  an  enthymeme  (a  truncated  argument),  which  can  be
expanded as follows: European integration (metonymically represented as “today”, the
day  of  EU  accession)  is  widely  supported  by  the  Croatian  people,  therefore it
constitutes  an  opportunity  for  Croatia  to  consolidate  and  flourish  as  a  national
community. The implicit warrant is that a society needs to be united around a common
goal in order to achieve prosperity. In the second sentence, Josipović clarifies that in
the  case  of  Croatia  the  common  goal  should  be  to  reduce  existing  cleavages  by
fostering inter-class solidarity. From a critical perspective, this can be seen as a way of
tactically  promoting  social  appeasement,  that  is,  the  neutralisation  of  conflicting
interests in order to preserve the status quo. It should also be noted that the use of the
words  “maintains”  and  “even  more”  generates  the  (conventional)  implicature  that
even before EU accession Croatia already enjoyed such a kind of social solidarity to a
certain  degree,  which  contrasts  with  the  emphasis  on  the  element  of  novelty  (see
repetition of “new”) in the first sentence. This could be interpreted as a compromise
made by the author in order to represent the Croatian national community in utterly
positive  terms,  by  avoiding  suggesting  that  before  becoming  a  EU member  state
Croatia was a divided society.
A very different representation of Croatia as a political community is offered by Josip
Jović in his piece  Will Europe be able to sing… [C11], particularly in the following
extracts,  which  describe  the  way  in  which  Croatian  politicians  welcomed  EU
accession:
(4)  Members  of  the  elite  were  genuinely  happy  and  content,  it  is  their  success,
lucrative positions and awards await them, after all they do not have to share the fate
of this nation [...].
(12)  As  in  all  these  past  years,  local  politicians  have  competed  to  show  how
committed Croatia is  to the  European idea and what  it  brings to  Europe,  without
asking themselves what Europe brings to Croatia. [...] 
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(15) Ordinary people remained quite indifferent.
By stressing the disparity between the attitude of Croatian politicians and the ordinary
people towards EU accession, the text conveys a representation of Croatian society as
marked by a sharp elite-people divide. This polarisation also bears a critical evaluative
stance,  as  political  leaders  are  described  as  opportunistic,  self-interested  and
insufficiently  accountable  to  their  constituents.  Moreover,  the  phrase  “they do not
have to share the fate of this nation” connotes their disengagement with society as
structural rather than contingent; at the same time, the use of the word “fate” gives a
sense  of  disquiet  and  uncertainty,  suggesting  that  the  absence  of  a  responsible
leadership undermines the capacity of the Croatian nation to cope with the challenges
and  the  perils  of  the  contemporary  world.  What  emerges  from Jović’s  anti-elitist
argument  is a portrayal  of Croatia  as a divided and dysfunctional  (at  least  from a
democratic  standpoint)  political  community,  which  stands  in  stark  contrast  to
Josipović’s hopeful and optimistic view.
A much  more  moderate  account  of  Croatia’s  political  situation  is  found  in  Nino
Raspudić’s editorial [C08]. In his view, EU accession is an opportunity for Croatia to
become a more viable political entity:
(35) What is certainly a positive consequence of the accession is the beginning of a
“normal” profiling of the political scene [...], within which the viewpoints of different
segments of the electorate will be articulated in a better and more reliable way,  as
opposed to the present state of affairs in which the majority of voters do not feel
adequately represented.
Like Jović, Raspudić acknowledges that Croatian politics is hampered by a problem of
representation, but unlike his fellow commentator he does not frame this problem as a
chronic anomaly affecting the Croatian body politic, but rather as a transitory phase
that EU integration will help overcome. The argument and its premises are spelled out
in a clear and non-emphatic style, which reflects the more balanced way (as compared
to both Jović and Raspudić) in which the author addresses the issue. The image of
Croatia that emerges from this passage is that of a fairly stable and dynamic political
community  striving  to  improve  its  democratic  performance.  The  only  linguistic
element  that  appears  to  be at  odds with  this  representation  is  the word “normal”,
which  might  be  taken  to  imply  that  the  Croatian  political  scene  has  so  far  been
167
“abnormal”,  thus  substantiating  Jović’s  pessimistic  view.  However,  throughout  the
article quotation marks are used consistently as scare quotes, therefore it is safe to
assume that Raspudić does not subscribe to the apparent meaning of the term.
In conclusion, there appears to be little consensus among the authors considered about
whether European integration provides an opportunity for Croatia to achieve social
and political consensus. The significance of this discrepancy will be further elaborated
upon in Chapter 8.
6.3.3 The controversial narrative of Croatia’s ‘return to Europe’: a break away 
from the Yugoslav legacy and the Balkans, or rather a new role in the region?
The third theme that emerges from the analysis  of the discursive representation of
Croatia as a nation is the ambivalent and controversial framing of EU accession as a
‘return  to  Europe’.  As  pointed  out,  among  others,  by  Galasińska  and  Galasiński
(2010), the narrative of the ‘return to Europe’ was the predominant way in which the
end  of  communism  was  perceived  and  constructed,  both  in  political  and  private
discourses, in Central and Eastern European societies during the 1980s and the 1990s
(see § 2.2.1). This kind of narrative had also a great grip in the Yugoslav context,
where movements  seeking national  self-determination,  particularly in  Slovenia and
Croatia, discursively framed their political action as an attempt to ‘leave’ the Balkans
in order to finally ‘rejoin’ Europe as independent nations (Todorova, 1997). After the
fall of the East-West divide and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the ‘return to Europe’
gradually came to coincide with the process of European integration, and specifically
with membership of the EU. Thus, what had emerged as a narrative of liberation from
oppression evoking a scenario of melting borders has now transformed into a largely
institutional  and bureaucratic  discourse,  founded on new,  and perhaps  more  rigid,
boundaries  (Leontidou,  2004).  Expressions  such  as  ‘Fortress  Europe’  and  ‘Visa
Curtain’ (after the ‘Iron Curtain’), which have circulated in popular and institutional
discourses  since  the  1990s,  aptly  expose  the  onset  of  a  less  idealised  and  more
problematic perception of the ‘return to Europe’, based on increasing awareness of the
challenges inherent in the processes of EU enlargement and European integration in
general (see § 2.3).
This ambivalence between the aspiration to join the ‘European family’ and the great
efforts required in order to meet the political, economic and legislative targets set by
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EU conditionality (see § 2.3.3) is clearly reflected in the different attitudes that the
authors considered assume with regard to the significance of Croatia’s own ‘return to
Europe’. These range from passionate optimism to outright skepticism, as illustrated
in  the  following  examples.  The  most  enthusiastic  stance  is  that  expressed  by
Jajčinović in Today begins Croatia’s new historical era [C06]:
(2) Croatia has finally returned to the cultural and civilisational environment that it
had left almost a century ago due to the will of its elites.
(3) The 1st of July 2013 marks the beginning of a new historical era for Croatia. [...]
(7) Croatia joins the European community of peoples and states with the hope that its
own return to it will also be a European, political, economic, cultural and mental new
beginning.
Jajčinović  interprets  EU  membership  as  signifying  Croatia’s  long-awaited
reintegration  into  the  European cultural  space  (strategy of  unification/cohesivation
constructing  the  nation  as  part  of  a  supranational  context/entity,  combined  with  a
strategy  of  discontinuation emphasising  a  disruptions,  see  §  3.5.3).  In  the  first
sentence,  he  constructs  a  spatial  dichotomy  in  which  Yugoslavia  is  placed  in  a
different  “cultural  and  civilisational  environment”  from  Europe,  which  can  be
regarded  as  a  replication  of  the  ‘Europe  versus Balkans’  leitmotif  identified  by
Todorova (see above). Moreover, by highlighting the responsibility of Croatian elites
in determining the country’s departure from the European space, the author seems to
insinuate that they acted against the will of the people, who would otherwise have
preferred  to  remain  ‘in  Europe’.  In  the  next  sentence,  Jajčinović  stresses  the
significance of Croatia’s accession into the EU by framing it as a crucial turning point
in  the  history  of  the  country.  Finally,  he  further  elevates  Croatia’s  ‘return’  by
suggesting  that  it  might  represent  a  chance  for  Europe  to  rejuvenate  itself.  The
overarching narrative has both a teleological and a palingenetic character, in the sense
that Croatia’s return to Europe is framed not only as the fulfilment of its destiny, but
also as an act of rebirth/regeneration, both for Croatia and (possibly) for Europe as a
whole.
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A teleological understanding of Croatia’s accession into the EU transpires also in the
next example, which is taken from Back into the team where we belong by Gordan
Zubčić [C02]:
(2) [In 1990] Croatia already had in its hands an exit ticket from Yugoslavia, and in
many ways it was miles ahead of the societies that in the meantime have more or less
become proud holders of the title of membership in the European Union. (3) But [...]
many in our surroundings did not want to accept the above-mentioned exit ticket, so
we had to take a detour, along with countless spanners thrown into our own works, to
reach the society towards which we so fervently strived at the beginning of the 90s.
[...] 
(7)  Now,  however,  it  has  come full  circle.  (8)  We have found ourselves  together,
insieme,  with  the  team  that  was  summoning  us,  also  for  the  sake  of  their  own
interests, more than two decades ago.
Here, Zubčić recounts Croatia’s process of integration into Europe as a metaphorical
journey, or race, that lasted more than twenty years (strategy of continuation placing
emphasis  on  positive  continuity,  see  §  3.5.3).  This  metaphorical  scenario  extends
across  the  entire  passage.  In  the  first  sentence,  the  “exit  ticket”  stands  for  the
opportunity that Croatia (supposedly) had in the early 1990s to make a clean break
from  the  disintegrating  Yugoslav  Federation,  while  the  expression  “miles  ahead”
evokes an imaginary race towards Europe in which Croatia holds the first place while
all  other former Yugoslav republics lag behind. Further on, the war with the rump
Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) is euphemistically equated to a “detour” in
Croatia’s  otherwise  steady  advancement  towards  Europe,  while  internal  political
setbacks are depicted as the proverbial ‘spanners in the works’ or, in a more literal
translation from the Croatian,  as ‘sticks in the wheels’ (strategy of  discontinuation
placing emphasis on disruptions, see § 3.5.3). The teleological concept underlying this
metaphorical  scenario  emerges  at  the  end  of  the  second  sentence,  when  Zubčić
clarifies that Croats had clearly determined the endpoint of their ‘journey’ already in
the 1990s, and is further reinforced in sentence 7 by the idiomatic expression ‘coming
full  circle’,  which  indicates  accomplishment  and  closure.  The  significance  of  the
entire  narrative  is  condensed in  the  final  sentence,  in  which  the  author  celebrates
Croatia’s success in becoming an equal member of the European “team”.
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While Zubčić views Croatia’s membership in the EU as a victory in a race against its
competitors, i.e. the other Yugoslav successor states, Raspudić perceives it rather as
imposing on Croatia the burden of helping its competitors to achieve the same goal
(strategy of heteronomisation stressing extra-national dependence, see § 3.5.3). This is
most apparent in the following excerpt, taken from his second commentary [C10]:
(23) It looked like it was not an independent state that joined [the EU], but rather a
piece of the ‘region’ which has promptly accepted to serve as a bridge to get the
others aboard.  (24) This approach does not  conceive of Croatia as a fully-fledged
homeland, but rather as a shard of Yugoslavia or as an amputated limb of the ‘region’.
In both sentences, the author represents the expectation that Croatia should enter into a
partnership with the other countries of the post-Yugoslav region as incompatible with
its  status as an independent  nation-state.  He conveys his  criticism of the so-called
regional approach by putting scare quotes around the word “region” (indicating his
skepticism towards  the  very  notion  of  a  post-Yugoslav  region),  but  especially  by
means  of  a  series  of  metaphors  emphasising  the  degrading  character  of  the  role
ascribed to Croatia, i.e. “bridge”, “shard” and “amputated limb”. The last metaphor
constitutes an interesting variation of the nation-body metaphor (see Musolff, 2010),
as in this case the (Croatian) nation is depicted as a part of a larger, regional body, yet
a body to which, in the author’s view, the nation does not and should not belong.
The question whether EU membership requires Croatia to assume a new role vis-à-vis
the other  post-Yugoslav  societies  is  indeed the object  of much controversy.  In his
commentary titled  The EU is an opportunity  we have to take advantage of  [C04],
Leko voices what can be regarded as the official position of the Croatian government
on the matter:
(18) We see [our  success]  also as a chance for  South-Eastern European countries
wishing to join the European Union.
(19) Croatia’s accession to the EU is more than a clear beacon worth following and a
message that all the hard work pays off in the end. (20) We certainly can and want to
help them, because without a stable South-Eastern Europe there is not stable Europe.
The  attitude  expressed  by  Leko  is  opposed  to  that  assumed  by  Raspudić  in  the
previous example. Unlike Raspudić, Leko regards the possibility of Croatia helping
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the  neighbouring  countries  as  something  positive  instead  of  a  burden (strategy of
unification/cohesivation  constructing  the  nation  as  part  of  a  supranational
context/entity,  see § 3.5.3). Apart from defining Croatia’s accession to the EU as a
“chance” for the countries  of the region, he presents Croatia  as an example  to be
followed (through the beacon metaphor, which conjures up an image of Croatia as a
lighthouse) and also as an inspiring successful story.  The underlying argumentative
scheme  is  made  explicit  in  sentence  20,  where  Leko  clarifies  that  Croatia’s
commitment to help is justified by the need to maintain and guarantee stability. This
could be regarded as a topos of threat and danger implying that the failure of Croatia
to assume a leading role in the region might have dramatic consequences.
In conclusion, the analysis of this theme has shown that Croatia’s intellectuals have
diverging  attitudes  in  regard  to  the  ‘return  to  Europe’ narrative,  and  that  such
disagreement is largely connected with discussion about the role that Croatia should
(or is expected to) play vis-à-vis the post-Yugoslav region.
6.3.4 Croatia and the EU: from dependency to equal partnership
The fourth theme concerns Croatia’s place within the broader frame of the European
project.  As in  the  previous  theme,  the  attitudes  that  Croatia’s  intellectuals  assume
towards this issue are also quite divergent. The analysis of the sample texts shows that
the  relationship  between  Croatia  and  the  EU  is  often  represented  by  means  of
figurative  expressions  related  to  childhood  and  adulthood  (strategy  of  vitalisation
through  anthropomorphisation/  personification  of  the  nation,  see  §  3.5.3).  I  shall
illustrate this point by discussing three relevant examples. The first is a brief excerpt
from Jajčinović’s opinion piece [C06]:
(19) The long-standing negotiations with Brussels’ Eurocracy have not been easy. (20)
During the negotiations, Croatia often behaved as a diligent pupil who simply does
their homework.
The simile in the second sentence frames the relationship between the EU and Croatia
as a teacher-pupil type of relationship, that is, as one marked by an inherent imbalance
of power. Croatia’s subaltern position is further emphasised by the attribute “diligent”
and the adverb “simply”, which indicate the country’s readiness to comply with the
obligations  established  by  the  EU.  The  nomination  strategy  whereby  the  EU  is
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designated as “Brussels’ Eurocracy” is also relevant in this respect, as it highlights the
great amount of power that is embedded in the EU’s polity (rather than, for instance,
its political, economic or cultural dimensions).
In his commentary [C08], Raspudić employs an analogous framing strategy:
(29) This  morning  [...]  has marked the end of  the phase of self-imposed national
childhood.  (30)  Croatia’s  childish  position  in  the  negotiations  was  clearly evident
from the discourse of our negotiators, who talked about “doing our homework” or
“demonstrating maturity”. 
Here  too,  Croatia’s  weaker  position  in  the  negotiations  is  expressed  linguistically
through references to childhood and pupilhood. There are, however, some important
differences. First, Raspudić regards Croatia’s inferiority as “self-imposed” rather than
as a structural condition of the negotiation process, which implies a greater attribution
of responsibility to Croatia than in Jajčinović’s view. Furthermore, Raspudić is more
openly critical of Croatia’s role, which he pejoratively describes as “childish”. Finally,
the  quotation  marks  in  the  second  sentence  could  be  regarded  as  scare  quotes
indicating the author’s disapproval, so to speak, of the childhood/pupilhood discourse
itself.
An  interesting  variation  on  the  theme  of  childhood  versus adulthood  is  found  in
Šerić’s commentary [C09], particularly in the following passage, in which she exhorts
Croatia to take a proactive role vis-à-vis the EU: 
(6) [...] yesterday Croatia joined Europe’s building site, so it must immediately [...]
roll up its sleeves and get to work. [...]  
(19) In this whole story Croatia cannot stay on the sidelines, but must demonstrate
that it has will and creativity, and the desire to put effort into a common goal. (20) If
we were to wait for someone to feed us like young birds in a nest because we are
miserable and small, we would become a burden on the shoulders of the EU.38
In the initial metaphorical scenario, Croatia is likened to a construction worker who
has just joined the EU “building site”. In sentence 29, Šerić spells out what Croatia’s
new role entails in terms of duties and responsibilities towards the common European
38 Part of this excerpt has been discussed in § 6.2.1 in regard to strategies of intellectual 
spokespersonship for the nation.
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project.  Finally,  in  sentence  20 she justifies  her  prescriptive  claim by means  of  a
counterfactual  analogy39 containing  two  salient  figures  of  speech,  i.e.  a  simile
comparing  Croats  to  young  birds  and  a  double  metaphor  in  which  the  EU  is
represented as a person and Croatia instead as an object.40 The juxtaposition of these
two referential strategies (specifically of the construction worker and the small birds
metaphors) suggests that existence of an underlying dichotomy of ‘maturity  versus
immaturity’,  which  resonates  with  the  way in  which  Croatia  is  thematised  in  the
examples discussed above. Specifically, while Jajčinović and Raspudić highlight the
subaltern, ‘immature’ role assumed by Croatia in the negotiation process with the EU,
Šerić focuses on the country’s attainment of a ‘mature’ and responsible role on a par
with the other EU member states.
The overarching narrative that emerges from all three examples is one of ‘maturation’:
Croatia is depicted as moving from an initial position of inferiority (child, pupil, small
birds)  to  one  of  equality  with  the  other  nations  and  peoples  involved  in  the
construction of the future Europe. The broader significance of this kind of discursive
representation will be elaborated upon in Chapter 8.
39 Already briefly discussed in § 6.2.1.
40 A more literal translation of the original text would be “cuffs on EU’s legs”.
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7. Bosnia and Herzegovina: the 2014 
anti-government protests
This chapter is devoted to examining the third case study, which relates to the wave of
anti-government protests that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 2014. In
the  following,  I  illustrate  the  results  of  the  analysis  of  the  sample,  focusing  on
strategies  of  intellectual  self-legitimation  (§  7.1),  strategies  of  intellectual
spokespersonship for the nation (§ 7.2), and the discursive representation of the nation
(§ 7.3).
7.1 Strategies of intellectual self-legitimation
This section is devoted to exploring the discursive strategies employed by the authors
under  examination  to  construct  and  legitimise  themselves  as  intellectuals.  As
elaborated  in  §  3.2,  intellectual  self-legitimation  involves  constructing  one’s
standpoint  as  affording  some  kind  of  epistemic  advantage  over  ordinary  people,
typically  by  emphasising  one’s  estrangement  from  the  broader  society.  Generally
speaking, the analysis of the Bosnia and Herzegovina case suggests that authors resort
to the following macro-strategies of intellectual self-legitimation: 
1. Strategies based on engagement and attitude
2. Strategies based on knowledge and expertise
3. Strategies based on status and membership
In the following I shall illustrate this variety by discussing some relevant examples.
7.1.1 Intellectual self-legitimation based on engagement and attitude
As illustrated in the overview of the opinion pieces included in the sample (§ 4.4.3),
most of the authors openly support the anti-government protests. Positioning oneself
as a politically engaged individual who supports a social cause can be a more or less
effective way of establishing one’s authority in public discourse, and could therefore
be regarded as a strategy of intellectual self-legitimation. However, since the protests
were driven by issues that supposedly affect the entire Bosnian-Herzegovinian society,
such as social inequalities, political corruption and economic mismanagement, cases
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of individual authors endorsing (or dismissing) the protest movement will be treated
as instances of spokespersonship for the nation, and will therefore be discussed in §
7.2. Here, the focus will be on cases in which claims to a vantage point are based on
attitudes or dispositions towards society that do not explicitly involve assuming the
role of a public spokesperson.
Only two clear  instances  of  this  particular  strategy of  intellectual  self-legitimation
were  found in  the  texts  from the  sample.  Interestingly,  both  authors  employ very
similar discursive strategies. In fact, they both present themselves as nonconforming
thinkers,  implying  some  kind  of  estrangement  from  the  mainstream  intellectual
community.  The first  instance  appears  at  the beginning of  Let  us build islands of
freedom [B08], when Asim Mujkić is asked to comment on the attitude of the local
academic community towards the demonstrations:
(1) DANI: Professor Mujkić, the academic community has largely been silent about
the 7th of February and all that ensued, or has otherwise expressed limited support or
severe condemnation. (2) You are one of the few who gave support to the plenums. (3)
What do you think is happening with the academic community?
(4)  MUJKIĆ:  Unfortunately,  I  wrote  a  lot  about  this,  too.  (5)  Our  academic
community has never seriously confronted the issue of academic freedom. [...] (10)
Particularly  when  it  comes  to  social  science  and  humanities,  the  University  has
traditionally been a  place that  brings  together  people  who in one way or  another
legitimise and serve the dominant political worldviews.
The opening question constructs Mujkić as standing out in the academic community
for his openly supportive attitude towards the protests and the citizens’ plenums. It is
precisely in this capacity that he is asked to account for the reluctance of many of his
colleagues to take antagonistic political stances. In his response, Mujkić appears to
embrace this projected identity, by presenting himself as an unremitting (and prolific)
critic of academia as an institution that caters to dominant ideologies and is therefore
unable to promote social change. By depicting the professional community of which
he is a member as generally lacking the capacity to foster alternatives to the status quo
(e.g.  by supporting the plenums),  he implicitly places himself  in the estranged yet
privileged position of the ‘socially engaged’ academic.  Moreover, he constructs his
own critical attitude as a matter of duty rather than inclination, as signalled by the
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adverb “Unfortunately” in sentence 4. This specific perspectivisation strategy allows
the  author  to  claim  intellectual  authority  as  an  outspoken,  principled  and
nonconformist academic.
Further on in the interview, Mujkić resumes his discussion of the social engagement of
academics, this time putting an important restriction on it:
(63) [...] I am glad that nobody, including me, has usurped the public space. (64) That
none of us has come forward trying to do something there, take action, or simply
dominate that space.
After having criticised the structural idleness of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian academic
community,  the author warns against  the opposite risk of academics becoming too
socially engaged, to the point of appropriating the movement and thus undermining its
prerogatives. By explicitly including himself among those who could have ‘usurped’
the arena of deliberation yet did not do so, Mujkić not only demonstrates a capacity
for  self-reflection,  but  also  constructs  his  own political  involvement  as  a  genuine
attempt to help the movement without abusing his power. The image he conveys of
himself  is that of a concerned, self-aware and committed member of the academic
community,  which  constitutes  a  conspicuous  case  of  intellectual  self-legitimation
based on attitude.
The other salient example of the discursive construction of the intellectual vantage
point based on engagement and attitude appears in the following passage from Dino
Mustafić’s editorial [B02]:
(13) The chorus of voices [of politicians] has been joined by conformist intellectuals,
a variety of political analysts who have brainwashed our minds for years talking about
fatalism,  apathy  and  the  impossibility  of  change,  suggesting  that  politics  is  a
meaningless activity.  (14) Such misconduct  is embodied in public figures who use
media appearances to establish the dogma that it is impossible to improve or change
the system.
The passage contains various negative predications targeting Bosnian-Herzegovinian
mainstream  intellectuals  and  analysts.  After  portraying  them  as  united  in  a
metaphorical chorus with the political leaders, whom he had previously described as
irresponsible and self-interested,  Mustafić blames them for eroding trust in politics
177
and stifling the ability of citizens to engage in political action, in particular through
the media. Unlike Mujkić, Mustafić does not present himself as a representative of the
intellectual  community.  However,  being  a  public  figure  himself,  Mustafić’s  harsh
criticism of people abusing their public position to maintain the status quo can be read
as an implicit defence of all discordant, out-of-the-chorus intellectual voices, among
which he supposedly counts himself. In this sense, by criticising the conservative and
repressive  attitude  of  his  peers,  the  author  legitimises  himself  as  a  progressive
intellectual and a promoter of social change.
7.1.2 Intellectual self-legitimation based on knowledge and expertise
In the sample texts, knowledge and expertise appear to be invoked as grounds for
claiming  one’s  intellectual  authority  much  more  frequently  than  engagement  and
attitude.  Various  authors  emphasise  their  specialist  knowledge  or  their  ability  to
understand aspects of the social world, and they do so in manifold ways. While some
propose innovative ways of looking at certain social phenomena, others mobilise their
professional expertise to adopt a ‘didactic’ attitude towards their readership.
A clear example of the latter strategy is found in Ibrahim Prohić’s interview for Dani,
entitled  The government is afraid of the unity of the citizens [B06]. As in Mujkić’s
case, the interviewer initially addresses Prohić as an expert (he is a psychologist), who
then constructs his own position accordingly:
(2) DANI: Mr Prohić, Bosnia and Herzegovina has witnessed its first serious social
unrest, how do you comment on this fact from the standpoint of psychology?
(3) PROHIĆ: Protests are the canonical consequence of a long-term social crisis. (4)
To put it simply, what happened had to happen, logically it had to happen considering
that for years we have been faced with inefficient, irresponsible and even arrogant
authorities.  (5)  From  a  theoretical,  psychological  standpoint  there  is  a  limit  to
tolerating frustration, that is, a point up to which it is possible to endure deprivation.
(6) Certain universal  standards suggest  that  this  social  reaction,  [i.e.]  the citizens’
protests, was long overdue. 
Prohić’s response contains  several  markers  of evidentiality,  that  is,  linguistic  items
indicating the sources of knowledge that the writer invokes to confer validity to his
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assertions.  These  are  “canonical”,41 “logically”,  “theoretical,  psychological
standpoint” and “universal standards”. All of them point to psychology as a research
field with established theoretical principles and norms (apart from “logically” which
appeals to logical rationality in general). What these expressions achieve in terms of
intellectual  legitimation  is  that  they  allow  the  author  to  present  himself  as  an
authoritative  representative  of  the  relevant  discipline.  Moreover,  the  style  is
explanatory and reflects the author’s manifest intention to make complex notions clear
to  his  readers  (e.g.  “To put  it  simply”).  This  pedagogical  approach  fits  well,  and
further reinforces, Prohić’s standpoint as an expert.
Other authors mobilise their knowledge or expertise in different ways. One way to do
so  is  to  articulate  certain  social  facts  as  complex,  heterogeneous  phenomena  that
require intense critical scrutiny in order to be properly understood. An illustration of
this strategy appears in Nino Raspudić’s opinion piece titled Their swallow does not
make our spring [B05]:
(25) [...] the first, quite plausible interpretation is that a protest by outraged citizens
has subsequently been used for political calculation within the Bosniak camp. (26)
The second is that it is a sort of shock therapy aimed at disrupting existing tendencies
identified  in  the  declaration  by  the  European  Parliament  [...].  (29)  The  third
interpretation  is  that  protests  were  encouraged  in  order  to  dissolve  the  Bosniak
community [...] (31) Attempts at interpreting such a complex event, which cannot be
reduced  to  a  single  dimension,  are  reminiscent  of  the  story  of  the  blind  people
touching an elephant and disagreeing about what they think they have touched, as it
seemed like a tree to some and like a snake to others.
The author advances three alternative explanations of the anti-government protests, all
involving a certain degree of machination by some external agency (left unspecified
via agent deletion) seeking to exploit the situation for political purposes. In epistemic
terms,  the  standpoint  from  which  these  propositions  are  put  forth  presupposes  a
capacity to disentangle the complex and often invisible web of power relations and
political  interests  underlying  every  social  manifestation.  This  is  precisely  the
intellectual vantage point that Raspudić discursively assumes in this passage. It should
be noted, however, that nowhere in the article does he venture to assess the veracity or
41 Zakonomjerna in the original language, which means “according to law”.
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likelihood of the proffered explanations (apart from qualifying the first one as “quite
plausible”). The adoption of this particular epistemic stance, which partially offsets
the  previously  established  vantage  point,  finds  its  justification  in  the  concluding
sentence, by means of a vivid analogy with a parable (from Indian culture) about the
relative nature of subjective experiences and the impossibility of attaining a totality of
truth. 
Other  authors build up their  image of knowledgeable  and expert  intellectuals  in a
much bolder way than Raspudić does, for instance by claiming not only the power to
‘see through’ social reality, but also the ability to make exact predictions about it. This
specific strategy is quite salient in Slavo Kukić’s editorial entitled  Earthly gods and
social misery. A social uprising which will earn the ethno-nationalists another term
[B03], particularly in the following bits:
(15) Among the public [...] the thesis prevails that the social uprising is the result of a
spontaneous reaction of the humiliated – who are allegedly backed by informal groups
organised through social  networks.  (16)  I  am afraid,  however,  that  this  is  not  the
whole truth. (17) There are many details, I mean, that call this theory into question.
[...]
(38) In the following months and years – time will tell – the socially humiliated, who,
I repeat, make up nine tenths [of the entire population], will turn again to their own
troubles [...]. (39) And such a state of mind favours the very ones who created the
socially humiliated – and who have manipulated them in the past quarter of a century.
(40) Social turmoil, I mean, will bring the socially miserable back again to where they
have been all these years, that is, to the position of being subject to ethno-nationalist
philosophy, the position in which the masses are easy to manipulate.
In  the  first  excerpt,  the  author  expresses  his  skepticism  about  the  common
interpretation of the protests as a spontaneous uprising by stressing its speculative,
conjectural character. Apart from explicitly contesting its factual validity (in sentences
16  and  17),  this  is  obtained  also  by  means  of  referential  expressions  indicating
epistemic status (such as “thesis”,  “theory”,  and “not  the whole truth”)  as well  as
evidential  markers  (“allegedly”).  This  discursive  move  underpins  a  strategy  of
perspectivisation, as it enables the author to construct his own standpoint as affording
a better-founded and more critical understanding of social phenomena as compared to
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the broader society, which is the hallmark of intellectual authority. The possibilities
arising from this position are exemplified in the second excerpt, where Kukić makes
predictions concerning the way in which the current social discontent will develop in
the future (and also insinuates the existence of some sort of conspiracy against the
people, through a calculated use of vagueness). The use of the future tense (“will turn
again”, “will bring”) and the absence of hedges convey certainty and confidence in the
uttered  predictions,  while  the  phrase  “time  will  tell”  creates  a  general  sense  of
necessity  and  inevitability.  Moreover,  the  very  content  of  these  predictions
presupposes the author’s ability to comprehend the structural/systemic dimensions of
social domination in Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, which is also a relevant feature
of intellectual self-legitimation.
This latter aspect is central to another salient instance of intellectual self-legitimation
based on knowledge and expertise, which appears (again) in Mujkić’s interview for
Dani [B08], particularly in the passage below:
(25)  [...]  a  successful  ideology is  one  that  convinces  its  subjects  to  accept  their
position voluntarily by free will, or says that there is no alternative [...]. (26) And this
is instituted through media narratives, education, the church, and trade unions. (27)
Trade  unions  are  also  an  important  lever  in  the  system of  what  Althusser  called
ideological apparatuses. (28) And I think that after 20 years this whole matrix has
become quite consolidated… When we think of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although we
say that  there  is  no  state  and  that  it  does  not  work,  I  would  even  say  that  this
ideological  matrix,  within  which  people  recognised,  understood  and  positioned
themselves, functioned unobstructedly until the 7th of February. 
In  sentences  25  to  27,  Mujkić  gives  an  explanation  of  how  ideology  works.
Considering that this is (most probably) the written record of an oral interview, the
style is remarkably scholarly and erudite,  almost reminiscent of standard academic
writing, due to the predominance of nominalised abstract notions (see Billig, 2014),
the clarity of the argumentation, and the citation-like reference to Althusser, a well-
known  scholar  of  ideology.  Although  such  self-construction  as  a  knowledgeable
expert is in itself a way of establishing one’s authority, it is in relation to the following
text that its relevance to intellectual self-legitimation can be fully appreciated. As a
matter of fact, in sentence 28 the author applies the previously exposed knowledge to
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the concrete case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus demonstrating not only his ability
to  relate  theory  to  practice,  but  also  his  capacity  to  understand  the  fundamental
mechanisms  that  govern  (his  own)  society.  In  this  respect,  Mujkić’s  choice  to
represent his claim as counterintuitive through the concessive clause “although we say
…” and the intensifier “even” further contributes to establishing his standpoint as an
epistemically privileged vantage point from which commonly shared perceptions can
be called into question.
7.1.3 Intellectual self-legitimation based on status and membership
Several  Bosnian-Herzegovinian authors claim intellectual  authority on the basis  of
their  particular  status in the community and/or their  membership in an established
intellectual elite. The analysis has shown that this is achieved in a variety of ways, and
through manifold discursive strategies. I have regrouped them in three main strategies,
which relate to self-positioning as a member of the intellectual or academic elite, as an
authoritative  and  prominent  commentator  of  social  reality,  and  as  a  witness  or
participant in key historical events, respectively. In the following, I will illustrate each
strategy with two examples, in order to account for the different ways in which the
same strategy can be realised in actual discourse.
The  two  most  conspicuous  instances  of  self-positioning  as  a  member  of  the
intellectual  or  academic  elite  appear  in  Asim  Mujkić’s  and  Zdravko  Grebo’s
interviews. Both are well-known university professors, so it is hardly surprising that
they discursively construct their intellectual authority accordingly. There are, however,
some discrepancies in how they achieve this. Let us first reconsider a passage from the
interview  [B08]  in  which  Mujkić,  asked  to  comment  on  the  distrustful  and
unsupportive attitude of most academics towards the protest movement, assumes the
position of a nonconformist,  critical  voice in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian  academic
world: 
(3) What do you think is happening with the academic community?
(4)  MUJKIĆ:  Unfortunately,  I  wrote  a  lot  about  this,  too.  (5)  Our  academic
community has never seriously confronted the issue of academic freedom. [...] (10)
[...] the University has traditionally been a place that brings together people who in
one way or another legitimate and serve the dominant political worldviews.
182
On  the  one  hand,  this  standpoint  involves  a  strong  disposition  to  challenge  the
hegemonic  role  of  academia,  for  which reason it  has  been examined above as  an
instance of intellectual self-legitimation based on engagement and attitude (§ 7.1). On
the other hand, it can be argued that Mujkić’s critique would not be so cogent if he did
not present himself an academic, which suggests that part of his intellectual authority
derives precisely from his membership in the academic elite. By granting himself the
authority to criticise the very institution to which he belongs (in order to improve it,
arguably),  he  establishes  his  vantage  point  at  the  intersection,  so  to  speak,  of
membership and engagement. 
In  his  interview  for  Dnevni  Avaz [B11],  Grebo  is  also  asked  to  comment  on  the
relationship between the intellectual community and the anti-government protests:
(19)  For  years  the  intellectuals,  including you,  have expressed amazement  that  in
Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no rebellion of the people. (20) What sort of revolt
did you expect?
(21) I expected a genuine, perhaps not fully articulate uprising, but a social one. (22) I
personally do not belong to the class of the insulted, the humiliated, the miserable…
(23) I am a university professor about to retire. (24) I am not hungry or thirsty, and
someone could ask me: “Why are you doing this, since you are not affected?”, which
is true. (25) But my expectations were [...].
Grebo  starts  off  by  giving  a  short  and  concise  answer  to  the  question.  Before
elaborating it further, he makes a digression (from sentence 22 to 24) in which he
explicitly represents his own social position as privileged, particularly in comparison
to  the  people  involved  in  the  protests.  This  is  obtained  through  self-predications
related  to  class  belonging,  profession  and  existential  conditions.  The  digression
culminates with a staged dialogue, in which a generic other appears to successfully
call into question the legitimacy of Grebo’s own involvement with the movement. Yet,
this does not seem to affect his entitlement to articulate expectations about what the
movement can achieve, which he does from sentence 25 onwards. This rather complex
strategy of self-presentation has important implications in terms of intellectual self-
legitimation.  On  the  one  hand,  it  conveys  a  strong  sense  of  self-awareness  and
‘intellectual honesty’ on the part of the author.  On the other hand, it  operates as a
powerful disclaimer: by acknowledging his position as inherently detached from that
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of the protesters, Grebo anticipates and deflects potential criticism targeting his right
to speak of (and for) the movement. This suggests that there are (at least) two ways in
which status/membership can serve as grounds on which to build one’s intellectual
authority:  authors may construct their vantage point by invoking or presupposing a
special status; alternatively, they may represent their special status as an impediment to
acquiring a fully legitimate intellectual standpoint, as Grebo does, and thereby avoid
being  blamed  as  hypocritical  or  manipulative  (see  Hansson,  2015,  about  blame
avoidance strategies).
The second category of strategies of intellectual self-legitimation based on status or
membership refers to authors who present themselves as authoritative and publicly
recognised commentators of social and political matters. As an illustration, let us first
consider the opening paragraph of Slavo Kukić’s opinion piece [B03]:
(3) Over the past days I was asked time and again what I think about all this. (4) And
every time I repeated that I understand this social explosion of hungry people. (5)
After all, for several years I have been repeatedly saying that this is the inevitable
consequence of the way the country has been ruled in the past quarter of a century. (6)
I am referring, let there be no doubt, to a form of governance that has at its subtext a
robbery which BiH [...] has never experienced in its history.
The  passage  is  characterised  by  the  predominance  of  verbs  of  speech in  the  first
person and expressions  conveying  a  sense  of  repetition  (“time  and again”,  “every
time”,  “repeated”,  “repeatedly”).  These underpin a discursive strategy whereby the
author  represent  himself  as  somebody  whose  opinion  (at  least  about  the  protests)
carries weight in the public eye, and also as someone who has long been vocal about
important  matters  concerning  Bosnian-Herzegovinian  society.  More  specifically,
Kukić constructs his role as a critically committed commentator by emphasising his
continuous efforts to speak out against misgovernment and corruption, particularly in
sentence 5. He also manifests a quite strong expectation that his opinion should be
well understood by the audience, as signalled by the aside “let there be no doubt” in
the  concluding  sentence,  which  further  reinforces  his  image  as  an  authoritative
commentator of social facts. 
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Establishing oneself  as an authority in public discourse can also be done in a less
straightforward and bold way. This is the case with Enes Trumić, who in his editorial
[B07] writes the following:
(64) Many have criticized the SDP for dealing with the urban decoration of Tuzla
while the civic spirit is one of misery and destitution. (65) The mayor  ignored the
critics who, in fact, were his best friends, and still are. (66) If he had listened to us,
this would have never happened.
A closer look at the referential strategies used to represent a specific social actor, i.e.
the  critics,  reveals  a  salient  change  of  perspective,  or  reframing.  While  they  are
initially referred to in the third person, in sentence 66 there is a shift to the first person
plural, i.e. the author-inclusive “us”. This entails that the predications about the critics
made in the previous text also apply to the author himself, because he is one of them.
This (re)framing strategy allows Trumić to present himself retrospectively as someone
who is concerned for the well-being of his community, and a constructive (friendly)
critic of the local government. Through the counterfactual in the final sentence, then,
he promotes himself as member of a group whose advice, if taken by the authorities,
could have avoided the escalation of the situation. In formal terms, this strategy of
intellectual self-legitimation is less direct and assertive than Kukić’s, particularly since
Trumić does not employ the first person singular. The substance, however, is quite
similar, as both authors construct themselves, so to speak, as victims of the same curse
as Cassandra,42 lamenting that their valid predictions and warnings were dismissed or
disbelieved by those who should have followed them.
A third way in which some of the authors legitimise themselves as intellectuals on the
basis  of  status  is  by  assuming  the  privileged  standpoint  of  witnesses  to  and/or
participants in historical events that bear some significance for the present situation
(which constitutes a specific topos of history). Two authors, Mujkić and Grebo, do so
quite  explicitly  and  in  a  similar  way:  both  establish  their  authority  by  drawing a
parallel between the current anti-government protests and events from the Yugoslav
past  in  which  they  were  personally  involved.  In  his  interview  [B8]  Mujkić,  for
instance,  explains  the  failure  of  Bosnia  and Herzegovina’s  ethno-national  political
42 The ‘Cassandra’ strategy is one of the strategies of demontage and destruction identified by Wodak
et al. (2009) in their study on the discursive construction of Austrian national identity.
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system to accommodate the growing demand for social change by comparing it to the
crisis of communist ideology in Yugoslavia:
(30) MUJKIĆ: I am not over-optimistic, but I think that a crack has opened up. (31)
Perhaps  we  can  discuss  the  aspects  of  what  happened in  the  late  ‘80s  when  the
vocabulary of the communist apparatchiks simply could no longer mobilise anyone.
(32) It happened almost overnight. (33) So, I witnessed that, I was a student back
then. (34) You could no longer mobilise anyone through the fundamental words of the
ideological-mobilising  narratives  of  the  Communist  Party.  [...]  (36)  This  simply
created space for a different discourse.
Initially,  the  author  describes  the  impact  of  protests  and  plenums  upon  Bosnian-
Herzegovinian  society  as  a  metaphorical  “crack”,  that  is,  as  something  that  can
potentially  disrupt  the existing  order.  Then,  he illustrates  the  point  via  a  topos of
history,  evoking  the  rapid  loss  of  momentum undergone  by the  official  Yugoslav
ideology in the 1980s. In sentence 33, Mujkić constructs himself as a witness to that
significant historical event. By placing himself, as it were, amid those circumstances,
he  gives  credibility  to  his  argument,  and  hence  confers  authority  on  his  own
standpoint.  Indeed,  the  combination  of  autobiographical  elements  and  general
analytical propositions expressed in scientific language appears to be a very effective
strategy of intellectual self-legitimation, enabling the author to give his statements and
judgments about society the force of testimony. 
Unlike  Mujkić,  who willingly vindicates  his  status  of  witness/participant  to  a  key
historical event, Grebo is installed in that position by the interviewer [B11]:
(54) As a participant in the 1968 demonstrations in Sarajevo, can you draw a parallel
between the reaction of that government as compared to the present one?
(55)  –  The  reaction  of  the  then  political  and  military  leadership  was  almost
caricaturally similar to that of today. (56) Even the undisputed leader Josip Broz Tito
during the first ten days said: “We support the legitimate demands of the students, but
we condemn the method”. (57) Somehow this sounds similar to me. (58) But some ten
days later, and I am afraid that we are witnessing this today, [...] Tito gave a speech
[saying]: “No one will ever tear down this country again, we will by all means…”
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Through  inviting  Grebo  to  draw  on  his  own  experience  in  the  1968  protests  in
Yugoslavia,  the  interviewer  implicitly  constructs  that  experience  as  a  valuable
perspective  from which to  discern the ongoing social  clash.  In  his  answer,  Grebo
readily occupies that vantage point by reporting salient episodes from that historical
context and pointing out their similarity to the present situation, quite like Mujkić in
the example above. In fact, both authors ground their authority as interpreters of social
reality in their having been witnesses to significant historical events. Unlike Mujkić,
however,  Grebo  does  not  explain  the  comparison  in  a  conceptually  sophisticated
manner; instead, he uses a much more anecdotal and suggestive style. For instance,
the  conclusion  (i.e.  that  the  incumbent  government  is  ready  to  crush  the  protest
movement) is only alluded to and left to the reader to decipher. In this respect, his
strategy of intellectual self-legitimation differs from that of his academic colleague, as
it does not involve using specialist terminology.
7.2 Strategies of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation
This section focuses on the ways in which the authors under examination take on and
perform the role of spokespersons for the nation. In the specific context of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,  whose  society  is  characterised  by  ethnic  divisions  that  are  deeply
entrenched in the country’s institutional and political structure (see § 2.3 and 4.2.3),
the  concept  of  nation  may be taken as  synonymous  with ethnic  group.  From this
viewpoint, the three ‘constituent peoples’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. Bosniaks,
Serbs and Croats, would constitute three distinct nations, or national groups, within a
single country, and the notion of spokespersonship for the nation would therefore be
coterminous with spokespersonship for a particular ethnic group. In the specific case
under consideration, however, this framework has little or no relevance. As explained
in § 4.2.3, the 2014 anti-government protests did not have ethnic connotations, nor did
they address specific ethnic issues; on the contrary, they rejected the hegemony of the
ethno-political  paradigm,  criticising  its  dysfunctional  and  inherently  oppressive
character. In this sense, the relevant concept of nation is much closer to the idea of a
civic  Staatsnation than to that  of an ethnically defined  Kulturnation (see § 3.4.1).
Hence,  insofar  as  Bosnian-Herzegovinian  intellectuals  supported  the  protest
movement  (and  most  of  them did),  they  took  on  spokespersonship  for  the  entire
Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, irrespective or, rather, in spite of ethnic differences. 
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This point is further confirmed by the fact that, unlike the cases of Serbia and Croatia,
in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina there are no instances of intellectuals acting as
promoters/defenders of the nation’s values and distinctive character. The analysis, in
fact, has shown that the strategies they employ fall under these two categories:
1. The intellectual as political guide for the nation
2. The intellectual as emancipator/educator of the nation
Below I discuss each of them through salient examples taken from the sample.
7.2.1 The intellectual as political guide for the nation
The  most  common  macro-strategy  found  in  the  sample  texts  is  the  one  whereby
authors assume the position of political guide of the nation. This is hardly surprising,
due to the highly political  character of the key event chosen as the case study for
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  In  fact,  almost  all  commentators  (with  a  few  salient
exceptions,  see below) take the side of the protest movement,  endorsing its outcry
against political corruption and its demands for political change. Hence, practically all
of the authors perform, to a greater or lesser extent, the role of political guide for the
nation. They do so by suggesting, arguing or dictating how Bosnia and Herzegovina
should operate as a political community. As stated above, they assume this position in
manifold ways. A very common strategy is that of criticising the country’s political
elites on various grounds in order to de-legitimise them in the eyes of public opinion.
The most blatant illustration of this strategy is found in Almasa Hadžić’s two short
pieces published in Dnevni Avaz, in which she wages a fierce attack on Tuzla’s local
government. In Shame on them! [B01], for instance, she blames local political leaders
for avoiding confrontation with the protesters:
(7) [Tuzla’s government is] unjust, corrupt, and discredited [...]. (8) Were it otherwise,
at least someone from the Tuzla Canton government (of course there is no difference
between  them  and  their  predecessors)  would  have  deigned  to  meet  with  the
representatives of the citizens who demonstrated and talk to them about the reasons
for such dissatisfaction. (9) Nobody did! (10) The ministers [...] pulled out slyly and
bitchily,  indeed  fled,  from their  cabinets  [...].  (11)  [...]  [They  did  so]  instead  of
discussing and negotiating with the people. (12) They did not even issue a meaningful
statement! (13) Shame on them!
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Hadžić  expresses  outrage  and  indignation  over  the  politicians’  behaviour  by
portraying  them  in  utterly  negative  terms.  To  begin  with,  the  tone  of  the  whole
passage  is  contemptuous  and  often  derogatory,  due  to  the  abundance  of  negative
attributions,  the  absence  of  hedges,  and the use  of  intensification  devices  such as
negatively connoted words and exclamation marks.  Furthermore,  the argumentative
scheme  is  largely  based  on  counterfactuals  and  implicatures  indicating  what  the
government officials would have done if they were good instead of bad politicians.
More specifically, sentence 8 contains an explicit counterfactual argument introduced
by  “Were  it  otherwise”,  while  in  sentence  11  a  similar  effect  is  obtained  via  an
adversative construct introduced by “instead”. Lastly, the adverb “even” in sentence
12 generates the analogous implicature that politicians were expected to act differently
from what  they did.  Generally  speaking,  the  author  seeks  to  de-legitimise  Tuzla’s
political leaders by stressing the discrepancy between their actual behaviour and the
expected, normatively defined behaviour of ‘good’ politicians, whereby she assumes
the role of political guide for the nation.
In her other opinion piece, The bubble has burst [B04], Hadžić launches an even more
vehement tirade against corrupt politicians, whom she describes as:
(6)  [...]  party  scoundrels  and  dummies  [...]  who  dressed  up  to  gain  the  seats  of
directors  and  ministers,  the  parliamentary  benches,  national  and  international
commissions,  and  from  their  dens,  without  fear,  ripped  off  the  state,  employed
relatives and diverted budget money to private companies and their criminal bosses...
In this case, her self-construction as political (and moral) guide is based on simply
defaming the politicians rather than assessing their actions against the ideal of political
accountability towards the people, as in the previous example. The quoted sentence, in
fact,  is  a  sequence  of  negative  nominations  and  predications  that  represent  the
politicians as opportunistic, unscrupulous and immoral individuals who exploit their
position of power for personal gain.
While  Hadžić’s  strategy  of  spokespersonship  rests  on  a  rather  sweeping  and
indiscriminate attack on the political elites, other authors establish their position of
political mouthpieces by tackling specific practices that they see as detrimental to the
political  process.  In  this  regard,  the  main  criticism  levelled  at  Bosnia  and
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Herzegovina’s  political  leaders  is  that  they  use  ethnic  politics  to  manipulate  and
mobilise public opinion to their own advantage. Two strong proponents of this idea
are Dino Mustafić and Ibrahim Prohić, who denounce the attempt by politicians to
curb the subversive potential of the protests by forcing an ethnic frame upon them. In
United in anger [B02], Mustafić argues the following:
(12) The political establishment is struggling to find arguments that these riots are a
kind of conspiracy [...], that they should not be allowed to “flow” or “be transferred”
across entity borders; they are trying to ethnicise them so they call them “Bosniak
spring”, urge “their people” not to join them and to be wise and prudent, relying on
the fact that through the politics of fear and ethnic separation they will still be able to
continue to rule for decades.
In his interview for Dani [B06], Prohić makes a very similar claim:
(64) PROHIĆ: There are explicit attempts to use the citizen revolt for fueling conflict
among  ethnic  communities.  (65)  The  war  in  the  early nineties  was  prepared  and
carried out on these grounds. (67) They want to keep the conflict on that level, and
they  are  afraid  of  the  relocation  of  the  conflict  to  its  natural  dimension,  that  is,
between citizens and government, which is the natural environment of social conflict
in non-democratic and non-productive societies.
In the first example, Mustafić strongly condemns political leaders for trying to falsify
the real nature of the social protests in order to preserve their power. He seeks to de-
legitimise them by portraying them as unable to sustain their opinions with reasons
and evidence (they are depicted as “struggling to find arguments”),  by using scare
quotes  to  distance  himself  from  their  words,  and  also  by  condemning  their
manipulative  attitude  as  part  of  a  broader  ideological  strategy  for  monopolising
political power, which he refers to as the “politics of fear and ethnic separation”. In a
similar vein, in the second example Prohić exposes what he sees as a machination
aiming to shift the conflict to a level that better suits the interests of the ruling classes,
that of ethnic struggle. He expresses his criticism in a more veiled and indirect way as
compared  to  Mustafić.  First,  the  process  itself  is  represented  mainly  via
nominalisations and passive verbs, and therefore largely depersonalised. Secondly, the
historical parallel with the Yugoslav wars drawn in sentence 63 is not carried to its
conclusions, leaving it unclear whether it should be understood as an implicit attack
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on the agents of the machination or rather as a topos of threat and danger raising the
spectre  of  a  new conflict.  Thirdly,  the  emphasis  on  political  confrontation  as  the
“natural”  site  of  struggle  (an  attribute  repeated  twice)  implies  a  condemnation  of
ethnicisation  as  ideological  mystification,  although  Prohić  does  not  develop  this
criticism further. In conclusion, the two cases analysed here provide an illustration of
the how intellectuals  may act  as  spokespersons for  the nation by opposing ethno-
political manipulation.
A stylistically noteworthy example of spokespersonship for the nation predicated on
criticising the political elites is found in Enes Trumić’s commentary  Someone woke
up, some are just waking up [B07].  As the title forewarns, the article represents the
situation in Tuzla by outlining a metaphorical scenario of awakening. The scenario
extends across two paragraphs, but it is most prominent in this excerpt:
(46) The people have finally forced Bosnian-Herzegovinian authorities to wake up.
(47) Those who forgot about us in their orgiastic spending spree with public money
are finally stretching and reluctantly opening their eyes. (48) [Local political leaders]
have  not  yet  fully  woken  up  to  the  events  in  Tuzla.  (49)  Which  is  totally
understandable, because if they wake up completely they will realise they have the
biggest responsibility.
What  is  peculiar  about  this  example  is  not  only  the  extended  use  of  figurative
language, but also the fact that the metaphorical scenario of awakening, which is a
rather clichéd way of describing processes of mobilisation and emancipation involving
the  masses,  is  instead  used  in  relation  to  the  target  of  the  protests,  that  is,  the
politicians.  The  agent  of  awakening,  however,  remain  the  people,  specifically  the
demonstrators.  It  is  them,  in  fact,  who  force  politicians  out  of  the  slumber  that
symbolises their indifference towards “us”, the people, as well as their reluctance to be
held  accountable  for  their  deeds.  Hence,  the  author  performs  the  role  of  political
mouthpiece for the nation by constructing a polarisation between the political elites,
who are depicted in utterly negative terms (note also the loaded expression “orgiastic
spending spree”), and the people, who are implicitly elevated as the agents of change.
Among  the  authors  considered,  criticising  the  political  elites  is  by  far  the  most
common manifestation of the macro-strategy of intellectual spokespersonship for the
nation labelled  political guide. A less common but equally relevant manifestation of
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the  same macro-strategy is  that  of  engaging with the  protest  movement  itself,  for
instance by questioning its practices or redefining its goals. Two excerpts from the
sample texts illustrate this well. One is from Vehid Šehić’s interview [B12]:
(40) This social uprising should remain in the domain of solving [the issue of] social
policy in BiH, in order to give hope for a better tomorrow to every citizen, to restore
the dignity they have lost because it has been reduced to numbers and percentages,
instead of names and surnames. (41) I think that one should insist upon these requests,
one should not engage in high-level politics aiming at abolishing cantons and entities,
because we would be wading into political waters and forgetting what has compelled
the citizens to take to the streets.
Šehić  urges  the  movement  to  remain  true  to  its  grassroots,  instead  of  nurturing
aspirations  to  reshape  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina’s  government  and  institutional
structure.  He substantiates  this claim first  by enunciating,  in sentence 40,  what he
regards as the overarching goals of the movement, then by pointing out, in sentence
41,  their  incompatibility  with  such  higher  political  aspirations.  The  latter  point  is
captured in the metaphor of “political waters”, which implies the risk of becoming
‘engulfed’  in  an  unfavourable  situation.  By  advancing  a  prescriptive  argument,
hinging on markers  of deontic  modality such as “should” and “should not”,  Šehić
seems to assume a rather authoritative (even patronising) attitude towards the protest
movement. But this is mitigated by the shift, in the last sentence, from an impersonal
to  a  more  personal  style  involving  the  use  of  we,  which  minimises  the  distance
between the author and the protesters conveying a sense of closeness and benevolent
support. 
The other relevant excerpt is taken from Slavo Kukić’s opinion piece published in
Dnevni List [B03]:
(10) Although I can understand the social explosion of the humiliated, I would be
dishonest if I also justified the form in which it has manifested itself. (11) Buildings
were set on fire, material values created by generations were destroyed. (12) And all
this, let us be honest, is not the cause of all the suffering that every person, Bosnian
and Herzegovinian, is forced to go through. (13) The causes of suffering are, in fact,
the political philosophies – and the politicians who personify them – which have kept
plunging poor people into the abyss over the past quarter of a century. (14) If it be so,
192
and it is, the outpouring of discontent, and hence the destructive energy, should have
been  directed  at  them  –  by  insisting  on  their  resignation,  the  request  for  snap
elections, and the election of new, uncompromised and moral [politicians] [...].
Throughout the paragraph, Kukić takes a rather condescending attitude towards the
movement. On the one hand, he deliberately ignores the obvious symbolic value of
targeting government buildings, dismissing the gesture as an ignominious attack on
heritage.  On the other,  he tells  the protesters what they already know, i.e. that the
politicians  are  the  ones  to  blame,  but  he  frames  this  rhetorically  as  an  act  of
intellectual honesty (“let us be honest”) on his part, thus invoking moral values. In the
last sentence, Kukić reproaches the movement for failing to channel its outrage into
meaningful demands. By using the past tense (“should have been”), he conveys his
distrust  in  the  capacity  of  the  movement  to  change  its  course  of  action.  This  is
reflected  in  the  choice  to  discursively  represent  the  movement  as  a  highly
depersonalised and uncontrolled process, by means of agent deletion (through the use
of  the  passive  voice)  and nominalisations  relating  to  the semantic  field  of  natural
catastrophes  (“explosion”,  “outpouring”,  “destructive  energy”).  Unlike  Šehić,  who
exerts political guidance by encouraging the movement to act in certain ways, Kukić
takes on the role of political spokesperson by harshly condemning its practices.
7.2.2 The intellectual as emancipator/educator of the nation
As in the case of Serbia (§ 5.2.2) and Croatia (§ 6.2.2), also in the case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina a number of authors assume the discursive perspective of emancipators
of the nation, typically by appealing to (and thereby shaping) the shared consciousness
of their fellow-citizens, by supporting their emancipatory practices, or by exposing
political or other kinds of ideological manipulation. In this section I will discuss two
examples of this specific form of spokespersonship. The first example is from Asim
Mujkić [B08], who discusses the value of plenums as a way of empowering people to
become active democratic citizens:
(59) I am delighted that [participants] are given the chance to experience themselves
as agents of change in a system that turns us into objects. (60) This is an opportunity
of  liberation and emancipation,  which in  my opinion carries  with it  an enormous
potential. (61) Perhaps all this may not end as we think it should, but I think it is very
important,  as  a  first  step,  to  change  our  perceptions,  for  ourselves  and  for  the
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communities in which we live. (62) People can finally say to themselves "Look, I am
being asked; look, I can speak out; look, my proposal has been adopted.”
In this passage, Mujkić openly declares his support for the experience of the plenums,
arguing  that  they  constitute  a  real  chance  for  people  to  emancipate  themselves.
Initially,  he constructs  his  perspective  as  the  typical  intellectual  vantage  point,  by
positioning  himself  as  somebody  who observes  the  situation  with  great  analytical
interest  and emotional  zeal,  but without  being directly  enmeshed with it.  Then,  in
sentence 61 there is a shift of perspective (from I-they to we) and register (from formal
to informal), whereby the author appears to situate himself among the subjects of the
emancipation  process.  At  the  same  time,  however,  his  attitude  becomes  more
prescriptive, as he implicitly defines certain priorities and ends for the process itself.
In the last sentence, the initial distance between the author and the people is restored,
although  now  the  latter  are  depicted  (via  fictional  direct  speech)  in  a  slightly
condescending way as individuals who are somewhat naively excited about being able
to exercise political agency. In terms of spokespersonship, this salient oscillation of
point of view can be interpreted as reflecting the author’s concern to preside over the
process of emancipation without seeming to be usurping it.
In the second example,  Dino Mustafić [B02] acts  as emancipator  of the nation by
endorsing the idea of a radical political transformation guided by reason:
(15) [...]  it  is  now time to move forward resolutely.  [...]  (18) Above all,  this  is  a
rebellion against politicians and politics, which must change [...] (19) Such a reversal
will  occur  when  all  intellectual  and  progressive  forces  gather  and  use  reason  to
conduct a responsible policy conceived as a mission to solve the social crisis and to
create the conditions for economic and social development. (20) It  is necessary to
restore public  interest  in politics  and in the universal  value of  leading a free  and
responsible life.
On the one hand, the author constructs the invoked change as a decisive break from
the current state of affairs, by employing spatial metaphors such as “move forward”
and “reversal” along with the loaded terms “rebellion” and “mission”. On the other, he
presents himself as a firm proponent of such change by using several constructions
expressing deontic modality, such as “it is now time to…”, “must change” and “it is
necessary”. Moreover, he dictates the conditions for the transformation to eventually
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occur (in sentence 19), and elevates reason, responsibility,  progressive attitude and
intellectual status as the key attributes of the putative agents of change. As a result,
Mustafić emerges as promoter  of an alternative vision of politics,  understood as a
process  driven by an (enlightened)  intellectual  elite  and aimed at  achieving social
progress and emancipation for the people.
7.3 The discursive representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
a nation
After having explored the strategies employed by Bosnian-Herzegovinian intellectuals
to legitimise their authority (§ 7.1) and assume the role of spokespersonship for the
nation (§ 7.2), this section examines the ways in which they construct and represent
Bosnia and Herzegovina in public discourse. As already specified at the beginning of
§ 7.2, in this specific context the concept of the nation should be understood in civic
rather than ethnic terms. On the basis of the analytical findings, I have identified four
main ways in which Bosnia and Herzegovina is thematised as a nation. These are:
1. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a dysfunctional society facing an uncertain future
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a political community dominated by corrupt elites
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a nation marked by a deep divide between the
people and the elites
4. The increasingly contested hegemony of the ethno-political paradigm
In the following, each theme will be discussed with examples taken from the sample.
7.3.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a dysfunctional society facing an uncertain future
As noted above, apart from a few exceptions the views expressed by most authors are
substantially aligned with the dominant standpoint of the protesters. Thus, it  is not
surprising that, generally speaking, the most common representation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina  found  in  the  sample  texts  is  that  of  a  society  stricken  by  poverty,
inequalities  and  social  discontent,  whose  future  prospects  are  dramatically
compromised  (strategy  of  singularisation  through  emphasis  on  national  negative
uniqueness, combined with a strategy of  discontinuation outlining dystopian future
scenarios, see § 3.5.3). Various authors articulate this theme in different ways, placing
emphasis on specific aspects or resorting to certain discursive strategies rather than
others. 
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Among the many instances  available,  I  have chosen three examples  in  which this
theme is particularly salient. In the first example, taken from The government is afraid
of the unity of the citizens [B06], Ibrahim Prohić explores the reasons for the protests:
(38) Let us try now to specify what bothers the citizens. (39) Poverty, drastic social
differences,  unemployment,  uncertainty,  hopelessness,  a  collapsed  economy,  an
irresponsible,  arrogant  and  inefficient  government,  corruption  and  crime  in
conjunction with the authorities, the criteria on the basis of which one achieves social
status  or  a  professional  career.  (40)  If  this  is  not  enough  reason  for  citizens'
dissatisfaction then there must be something deeply wrong with some people in this
society.
Prohić  makes  a  comprehensive  list  of  the  main  problems  affecting  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina,  portraying  it  as  a  dysfunctional  and  unjust  society  dominated  by
political  corruption  and  economic  hardship.  Most  items  (processes,  entities,  and
conditions) included in the list are largely nominalised; as a result, human agency is
played down, and hence the very possibility of social change is made to appear rather
unlikely. In the last sentence, Prohić constructs dissatisfaction as the only reasonable
reaction to the present state of affairs, thus adding to the dramatic and discouraging
tone that characterises the whole passage.
The  second example  is  from  United  in  anger by  Dino Mustafić  [B02],  who also
explains  the  outburst  of  the  anti-government  protests  as  driven  by  citizens’
dissatisfaction with the deteriorating social conditions:
(11) [...] generations of angry people were born and raised who have no more trust,
nor  patience,  towards  ways  of  doing  politics  that  lead  us  into  the  blind  alley  of
growing debt, as well as towards unemployment, shortage of hope, and an increasing
number of people being sentenced to social death, that is, a life without future, and
hence without meaning.
The two excerpts present similarities and differences. Broadly speaking, both convey
an image of  Bosnia and Herzegovina  as  suffering  from bad administration,  social
distress and lack of future prospects. In both cases, the people/citizens are discursively
construed as passive actors who are subjected to external disruptive forces, rather than
as agents of change. This is evident from the predications associated with them: in
Prohić’s excerpt they are bothered and express “dissatisfaction”, while in Mustafić’s
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text  they are “angry”,  distrustful,  impatient  and “being sentenced to social  death”.
There is a discrepancy, however, in how responsibility is attributed: while Prohić tends
to  represent  social  problems  as  objective  (and  depersonalised)  facts,  Mustafić  is
slightly  more  forthright  in  blaming  “ways  of  doing  politics”  (which  is  still  a
nominalisation,  though)  for  the  current  social  crisis  (strategy  of  delegitimation  of
national  political  elites,  see § 3.5.3). The style  also differs,  as Mustafić employs a
more  figurative  language  (notice  the  metaphors  of  “the  blind  alley”,  “shortage  of
hope” and “social death”), thus creating a rather vivid and dramatic tone.
An  analogous  representation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  as  a  society  facing  an
uncertain future appears in Nino Raspudić’s opinion piece [B05], when he discusses
the factors lying behind the initial outbreak of protests in Tuzla:
(5)  The  initial  impetus  of  the  protests  was  the  tremendous  social  and  existential
dissatisfaction, accumulated over years and decades, that stems from unemployment
and poverty, but also from the impossibility of envisaging any better future within the
existing paradigm. (6) For these reasons on Wednesday a mass of desperate people
boiled over in Tuzla.
Like  Prohić  and  Mustafić,  Raspudić  also  portrays  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  as  a
society  that  has  failed  to  bring  prosperity  and  well-being  to  most  of  its  citizens,
forcing them into frustration and exasperation. His critique is even more radical than
that of his peers, because he regards the very structure (“the existing paradigm”) of
Bosnian-Herzegovinian society as inherently flawed and ill-suited to cater to the needs
and aspirations of its members. This is encapsulated in the expression “impossibility
to envisage any better future”, which resonates with the “hopelessness” lamented by
Prohić as well as the “life without future” deplored by Mustafić.
Generally  speaking,  the  authors  tend  to  discursively  construct  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina not only as a society facing serious economic and social hardships, but
also, and prominently,  as a context marked by uncertainty and where many people
have  been  and  continue  to  be  exposed  to  insecurity,  psychological  stress  and
existential threats. Moreover, the responsibility of politicians in this regard is evoked
by means of discursive strategies of delegitimation.
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7.3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a political community dominated by corrupt elites
Strictly  connected  with  the  previous  point  is  the  representation  of  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina as a political  community tainted by dishonesty and corruption,  which
emerges as a salient theme in several texts from the sample (strategy of delegitimation
of national political  elites,  see § 3.5.3). This largely reflects  the tendency of many
authors to assume the position of spokespersons by acting as political guides for the
nation. In fact, as discussed above (§ 7.2.1), a typical way of performing this role is by
criticising the political elites for their failure to comply with democratic requirements
of  transparency and accountability.  In  most  cases,  this  critique  is  inscribed in  the
referential  strategies  employed  in  relation  to  individual  politicians  or  the  political
leadership altogether.  A clear example of this is found in the extract from Ibrahim
Prohić’s interview for Dani reported in the previous section, in which the government
is  qualified  as  “irresponsible,  arrogant  and inefficient”  and said to  be involved in
“corruption and crime”. However, there are also cases in which political corruption is
thematised  by  means  of  more  complex  and  sophisticated  discursive  strategies,
involving specific argumentative, rhetorical and stylistic devices. Here I will discuss
three such examples.
The first appears in Almasa Hadžić’s opinion piece Shame on them! [B01]:
(5) [The dissatisfied] think that the only one responsible for [their miserable lives] is
the government. (6) What government? (7) The unjust, corrupt, and discredited one;
the one that  smuggled  their  factories  and jobs;  the  one that  unlawfully employed
family members in the administration, in steering and supervisory boards, in Telecom,
in  the  Power  plant,  in  Elektroprivreda,  as  well  as  in  other  public  enterprises;  the
government that for years has only served its own ends and protected itself, its power,
its wages and its party interests.
By asking rhetorically,  in sentence 6, what kind of government is the object of the
protesters’ scorn, Hadžić gives herself the space to express her own personal views of
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political  leadership.  This occurs in the next sentence, in
which the government is presented in extremely negative terms. The criticism derives
much of its rhetorical force from the very structure of the sentence, which is organised
as a sequence of paratactic clauses in which the same subject, i.e. the government, is
coupled  with  different  negative  predicates,  ranging  from  general  predications  to
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concrete examples. Various forms of unethical behaviour are touched upon, such as
malpractice and profiteering from the privatisation process, clientelism, nepotism, and
abuse of power. The broader picture is that of a country in which deep-seated political
corruption has long affected and continues  to affect  both the social  and economic
spheres. 
The second example comes from Svetlana Cenić’s commentary for  Dani [B10]. She
constructs  a  rather  elaborate  metaphorical  scenario  in  which  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina’s political arena is represented as a market:
(18) [...] our political parties, organized as private companies, make up an oligopoly, a
market  where a small  number of manufacturers compete  with each other with the
same or similar products. (19) The prices for the citizens are formed through secret
agreements, while they publicly proclaim that competition exists. (20) For the product
is essentially the same, only the packaging is different. [...] (22) Marketing boils down
to the herd of voters exercising surveillance over themselves, the so-called “divide
and rule”.
In Cenić’s  view,  the (metaphorical)  political  market  of Bosnia and Herzegovina is
severely  affected  by  unfair  competition,  lack  of  transparency  and  consumer
manipulation. On the one hand, political parties secure their hegemony by formally
adhering  to  democratic  principles  while  in  fact  restricting  pluralism  and  public
participation  in  the  deliberation  process.  On  the  other,  the  citizens,  derogatorily
represented as a “herd”, succumb to manipulation and accept as legitimate the (ethnic)
divisions that the political elites impose upon them. The broad picture that emerges
from this metaphorical scenario is that of a country in which hypocritical and corrupt
political  elites  retain  power  and  preserve  the  status  quo  by  reversing  democratic
practices and misleading the people. 
The third and last illustration of the thematisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
corrupt political community is taken from Ibrahim Prohić’s interview for Dnevni Avaz
[B09]:
(9) [Prohić] points out  that the current government is not able to give up the bad
habits  it  has  had  so  far,  nor  is  it  ready for  something  constructive  and  creative,
because it has for years been oriented to consumption and clientelism. (10) – Political
changes are tied to interests,  and people hardly waive their  interests  and acquired
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positions,  but instead defend them by all  means.  (11) Hypothetically,  even if they
wanted to change, the question is  whether they would be able to do so. (12) The
authorities will change only if obliged to, with constant pressure and control from
below, from the people – Prohić maintains.
Whereas Cenić condemns the conservative and impervious  attitude of the political
elites  as a  deliberate  strategy of power,  Prohić interprets  it  as a symptom of their
incapacity to relinquish deep-seated corrupt practices. In order to support this claim,
he develops an argument that combines elementary political analysis with insights into
the  psychological  aspects  of  power.  This  is  reflected  in  the  general  principle  (or
warrant, in argumentative terms) that Prohić invokes in sentence 10, which associates
political conservatism with people’s innate tendency to defend their own interests and
privileges.  The gist  of his  criticism is that  the country’s  political  leadership is  too
entrenched in the status quo to be able to embrace change and articulate progressive
political projects, unless it is forced to do so by the people. Albeit formulated from a
different perspective and in a more neutral tone, Prohić’s criticism resonates well with
both Hadžić’s and Cenić’s accounts. 
As shown in these three examples, Bosnia and Herzegovina tends to be represented as
a  community  in  which  corrupt  political  elites  work  against  the  people  instead  of
addressing their demands, a portrayal that emerges quite strongly also from most of
the remaining texts from the sample.
7.3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a nation marked by a deep divide between the 
people and the elites
The  third  theme  is  a  corollary  of  the  first  and  the  second.  In  addition  to  being
represented  as  a  dysfunctional  society  whose  members  are  denied  security  and
prosperity,  and as country dominated by a corrupt political  leadership,  Bosnia and
Herzegovina is also discursively constructed as a national community characterised by
a  dramatic  cleavage  between  the  people  and  the  elites  (strategy  of  polarisation
stressing  intra-societal  divisions  and  conflicts,  see  §  3.5.3).  In  fact,  several  texts
describe the masses as destitute, disempowered and languishing in misery, whereas the
elites are portrayed as a clique, or rather a caste, of privileged and wealthy individuals
who feel little or no solidarity towards the rest of the society. 
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Slavo  Kukić’s  opinion  piece  [B03]  contains  a  striking  illustration  of  this  theme,
particularly in the excerpt reported below, in which the author blames the government
for the rising economic and social disparities that permeate Bosnian-Herzegovinian
society: 
(7) [I am referring to a form of governance that] results in such social stratification as
can be encountered only in Latin American regimes. (8) Namely, on one side there is
a  very thin,  percentually  insignificant  layer  of  earthly  gods  who  acquired  wealth
through robbery, and on the other side there is social misery, to which belong more
than nine-tenths of the entire population – while the middle class, which everywhere
in the world has the function of connective tissue, has literally been swept away.
Kukić  represents  Bosnian-Herzegovinian  society  as  drastically  polarised.  The
argument  derives  its  rhetorical  force  from  a  comparison  with  Latin  American
countries, which are taken as representative of extreme social inequalities, but also
from the strategies of nomination used in regard to the various social strata, which
largely employ figurative language. Namely, the elites are portrayed as “earthly gods”,
a metaphor intended to stress their practically unrestrained power, whereas the lowest
social  classes are metonymically represented as “social  misery”,  which by contrast
emphasises  their  powerlessness  and  lack  of  agency.43 The  polarisation  is  further
accentuated  by  the  semantic  opposition  between  “misery”,  on  the  one  hand,  and
“wealth”  and “robbery”,  on the other.  Finally,  the middle class is  assimilated to a
“connective tissue”, a clichéd expression related to conceptions of the nation as an
organic  body;  by  pointing  out  its  absence,  the  author  constructs  Bosnian-
Herzegovinian society as a defective social organism, devoid of one of its essential
components. 
Another illustration of the thematisation of the people-elite divide is found in Vehid
Šehić’s  interview  for  Oslobođenje [B12],  when  he  explains  the  protests  as  a
consequence of the loss of solidarity between the political elites and the citizens:
(4) Unfortunately,  something like this had to happen, because the authorities have
alienated themselves from the citizens and lived in a world of their own, oblivious of
how citizens live. (5) Politics has been turned into the most lucrative profession and
43 The two nominations also appear in the title of the opinion piece: Earthly gods and social misery. A
social uprising which will earn the ethno-nationalists another term.
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has  become  what  everyone  strives  for  in  order  to  solve  their  problems.  [...]  (8)
Politicians  have  alienated  themselves  from  everyday  life,  solidarity  has  been
destroyed as a concept, particularly the solidarity from the current government. 
Like Kukić, Šehić too offers a representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a highly
polarised society, in which the elites, similarly to Kukić’s “earthly gods”, appear to
inhabit  a metaphorical “world of their own” situated at an insurmountable distance
from the harsh reality of people’s lives. While his fellow commentator gives a rather
static picture of the situation, Šehić treats it as a process involving specific agents and
actions. In particular, he highlights the responsibility of the political elites, who are
repeatedly said to have proactively “alienated themselves” from the broader society.
As a result of their agency being foregrounded, the elites appear to be responsible also
for the two seemingly agentless  processes described in  sentences 5 and 8,  i.e.  the
transformation  of  politics  into  a  profitable  business  and  the  repudiation  of  social
solidarity.  Thus, apart from condemning the elites’ withdrawal from public life, the
author also stresses the detrimental impact that this disengagement, and the ensuing
social polarisation, has had on social cohesion and political ethics. 
The most suggestive way of representing the people-elite divide affecting Bosnia and
Herzegovina  is  that  chosen  by Enes  Trumić  [B07],  who  develops  a  metaphorical
scenario in which the ongoing confrontation between the citizens and the government
is  recast  as  a  football  match.  The  scenario  extends  across  several  paragraphs,
eventually leading into another metaphorical scenario, that of a collective awakening,
which has been already discussed in § 7.2.2). Some of the key bits underpinning the
football match scenario are reported below:
(10) And so began the match, but not as a game at the stadium, but as a reality on the
streets of Tuzla. (11) The Government on one side and the people on the other. (12)
The Government could claim victory over the people, because the people have been
hypnotized into expressing their dissatisfaction by peaceful and non-violent means
[...].
(42) We all know well that in Tuzla took place the first three-day match between the
people and the Government. (43) What is not clear to most is what is the result of the
match. [...] (45) The result is the first victory of the people over the bourgeoisie in the
last twenty years.
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Using metaphorical expressions that draw on sports as the source domain is a common
and rather clichéd way of representing political (or any other kind of) confrontation
(see King, 2006, about the use of sports metaphors in nationalist discourse). What is
peculiar  about  the  example  above,  however,  is  that  it  contains  a  sort  of  double
metaphor: at one level, the football match as source domain is mapped onto the three-
day anti-government protests in Tuzla; at another level, the ‘Tuzla match’ becomes
itself a metaphor for the long-standing opposition between the citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the country’s political elites. Albeit less explicit, this second-level
metaphor can be inferred from the general statements included in sentences 12 and 45,
which transcend the local context to embrace a wider, national perspective.  In this
respect,  the  football  match  metaphor  operates  as  a  conceptual  metaphor,  which
underpins  the  discursive  construction  of  the  Bosnian-Herzegovinian  national
community as being traversed by a deep-rooted conflictual polarisation between the
people and the elites. 
7.3.4 The increasingly contested hegemony of the ethno-political paradigm
The fourth and last theme of the discursive construction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as
a nation concerns the so-called ethno-political paradigm, that is, the primacy of ethnic
identity  as  a  principle  of political  organisation.  As explained above (§ 4.2.3),  this
paradigm  is  embodied  in  the  political  and  institutional  structure  of  the  country,
through a system of government based on power-sharing among the representatives of
the three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats). This arrangement has often
been criticised by its opponents as being detrimental to democracy and social justice,
insofar  as  it  enables  ethnic  elites  to  entrench  their  power,  pursue  their  economic
interests,  and  manipulate  public  opinion  in  order  to  secure  consensus.  The  2014
protest  movement greatly invigorated this  criticism,  transforming it  into a struggle
against the worst aspects of the regime, i.e. political hypocrisy,  endemic corruption
and growing social inequalities. 
In his commentary United in anger [B02], Dino Mustafić provides a vivid description
of the protests as a reaction to the dominant ethno-political paradigm:
(5) Citizens are no longer willing to suffer robbery,  theft, or the parties that in the
name of their nations have ravaged this country, making it poor and hopeless. (6) This
is an authentic reaction of the citizens against the ethno-political model of Dayton’s
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Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  which  has  allowed  the  plutocrats  from the  “constituent
peoples”  to  accumulate  wealth  and  live  in  luxury  and  comfort  for  years,
demonstrating their arrogance and greed as corrupt elites.
While Mustafić decries the way in which the ethno-political system has allowed for
rampant  corruption  and  accumulation  of  wealth  by  the  political  leaders,  Svetlana
Cenić, in her opinion piece entitled  Everyone robs their own, everyone elects their
own [B10], explains in an equally vivid way how the ethno-political principle operates
as an instrument of social coercion:
(7) The norm in Bosnian-Herzegovinian society is, of course, national belonging, so if
you express skepticism there is no need for the authorities to do anything to get you
back into  the  fold  and to  the  national  prison,  since  the  masses  around you  react
immediately condemning your attempt to escape. [...] (11) The awakening of the brain
is hardly condoned, on the basis of the old principle: if you are not with us, you are
against us.
Most of the authors among those considered raise the question whether the protest
movement  has  the  power  to  subvert  the  dominant  ethnic  norm and thus  help  the
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to escape from the metaphorical “national prison”
described by Cenić. Although all of the authors, to different extents, acknowledge the
concerns of the movement and express general support for its cause, their positions on
this question vary considerably. Some believe that the protests signal the beginning of
the  inexorable  decline  of  the  ethno-political  matrix  (strategy  of  discontinuation
emphasising disruption, combined with a strategy of cohesivation stressing the will to
overcome societal cleavages, see § 3.5.3), while others are more skeptical about the
real impact that the movement might have on the status quo (strategy of continuation
placing emphasis on negative continuity, see § 3.5.3). The most critical stance in this
regard is that of Slavo Kukić [B03], who argues that the turmoil caused by the anti-
government movement will eventually prove counterproductive, rendering the masses
even more susceptible to ethnic propaganda:
(39)  [...]  [S]uch  a  state  of  mind  favours  the  very  ones  who  created  the  socially
humiliated – and who have manipulated them in the past quarter of a century.  (40)
Social turmoil,  I mean, will  bring the socially miserable back again to where they
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have been all these years, that is, to the position of being subject to ethno-nationalist
philosophy, the position in which the masses are easy to manipulate.44
In terms of the discursive representation of the nation, it is worth noticing that both
Cenić (above) and Kukić describe the workings of ethno-politics by means of spatial
metaphors  that  relate  oppression/emancipation  to  movement.  In  Cenić,  the
conservative and reactionary attitude of most part of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society is
represented as a force that pushes dissenters back into place. Similarly, in Kukić the
predicted  failure  of  the  movement  to  produce  emancipation  is  portrayed  as  a
backward movement of the people to their original position of subjugation. In both
cases, the chosen spatial metaphors carry an evaluative connotation, as they convey a
sense of collective impotence in the face of the overwhelming force of the ethno-
political ideology.
In opposition to Cenić’s and Kukić’s pessimistic stances, Asim Mujkić [B08] regards
the protest movement as a sign that the hegemony of the ethno-political paradigm in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is actually waning:
(38) It seems to me that, at least in the places where protests took place, nobody took
the bait of the old matrix. (39) The media are somewhat trying to get people back into
the morass,  but it  does not seem to me that  the ethno-political  narrative has been
predominant. (40) This can be seen in the discourse, in the statements of the people,
and  this  is  really  important  to  me.  (41)  So,  ethno-politics  has  begun  to  lose  its
importance.
The recurrence of hedges, particularly expressions of epistemic modality (“It seems to
me”,  “it  does  not  seem to  me”),  indicate  that  the  author  is  rather  cautious  about
proclaiming the decline of the ethno-political ideology. Yet, he looks very favourably
upon this eventuality, as signalled by the metaphors chosen to represent the situation,
which bear a clear evaluative connotation. Namely, the idiomatic expression ‘take the
bait’ implies that the “old matrix” is being offered to the public so as to deceive and
mislead it, while the stark reality of society dominated by the ethnic norm is portrayed
as a “morass”, which is quite reminiscent of Cenić’s “national prison” (see above). As
in the previous two examples, the regressive/oppressive character of ethno-politics is
44 This  excerpt  has  already  been  discussed  in  §  7.1.2  in  regard  to  strategies  of  intellectual  self-
legitimation.
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encapsulated in a spatial metaphor of forced backward movement: the media, in fact,
are “trying to get people back” to a position of conformity and compliance with the
ethnic norm, thus curbing the emancipatory potential of the movement.
Kukić’s  and Mujkić’s  standpoints  represent,  respectively,  the most  pessimistic  and
optimistic stances about the capacity of the anti-government movement to subvert the
hegemony  of  ethno-politics  in  Bosnian-Herzegovinian  society.  The  other
commentators tend to express more balanced viewpoints, stressing the significance of
the protests without overestimating their revolutionary potential. An example of this
attitude is Zdravko Grebo’s interview for Dnevni Avaz [B11]: 
(28) My other quiet hope – which is dashed for now, but I will not give up on it – is
that the process that started as social would take off the agenda, or at least postpone,
these stories “from above” that strangle and suffocate us. (29) Which are about us
being Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, others. [...] (32) I thought this was a spark that could
ignite something called the class identification of the people, because people live in
equally difficult conditions, and they equally face intimidation from their tycoons and
political elites. (33) So far this just has not happened.
As in the previous examples, ethno-political ideology is discursively constructed as an
extraneous force oppressing the people (strategy of  heteronomisation,  see § 3.5.3).
This is obtained once again via a spatial metaphor, this time related to the vertical
rather than horizontal dimension (“from above”), and also via personification, since
ideology is  referred  to  as  an  agent  inflicting  physical  damage  to  the  people.  The
emancipatory potential  of  the movement  is  also represented  via  a  metaphor,  i.e.  a
“spark”  that  could  “ignite”  social  change,  thus  outlining  a  scenario  in  which  the
negative burden of ethno-political ideology stands in contrast to the positive lightness
of the flame of mass emancipation. It should be noted in passing that Grebo is one of
the few authors who venture to say explicitly what they think should replace ethno-
politics as the dominant paradigm (for Grebo this is class identification). Although the
hoped-for social transition has not occurred, Grebo’s attitude is not fully pessimistic.
On the contrary, he states that he will not give up on his hopes, and the repetition of
time adverbs such as “for now” and “so far” creates the implicature that he still leaves
room for the possibility of a radical social change.
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In  conclusion,  the  hegemony  of  the  ethno-political  paradigm  in  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina is seen by most of the authors considered both as a source of widespread
political  corruption  and  as  an  instrument  to  control  and  manipulate  the  masses.
Therefore,  they  tend  to  justify  the  protest  movement  as  a  legitimate  attempt  to
challenge the dominant paradigm in order to reinvigorate the democratic process and
combat social inequalities. However, they largely disagree about the capacity of the
movement  to  actually  discard  the  existing  power  structures  and  build  a  viable
alternative  to  them.  The  significance  of  this  specific  discrepancy  will  be  further
discussed in Chapter 8 below.
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8. Patterns of intellectual 
spokespersonship for the nation in 
contemporary Serbia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In this chapter, I draw together the findings from the analysis of the three case studies
(Chapters  5,  6  and  7)  in  order  to  identify  the  prominent  patterns  of  intellectual
spokespersonship for the nation that are specific to each case. A pattern is defined here
as  a  meaningful  intersection  between  the  macro-strategies  pertaining  to  the  three
different dimensions of analysis,  i.e. intellectual self-legitimation,  spokespersonship
for the nation, and the representation of the nation in public discourse (see § 3.5).
After  illustrating  each  of  the  patterns  through  examples  taken  from  the  previous
analysis, I explore both their contextual significance in relation to the post-Yugoslav
context (see Chapter 2) and their conceptual and methodological implications for the
critical  study  of  the  relationship  between  intellectual  activity  and  nation-building
processes (see Chapter 3).
8.1 Serbia’s intellectuals: still ‘saviours’ of a nation in crisis
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, proclaimed on 17th February 2008,
prompted  many  commentators  in  Serbia  to  engage  in  intense  and  often  heated
discussion about their country’s situation and overall direction. The 12 opinion pieces
included in the final sample represent only a small portion of the larger debate, yet
their  detailed  analysis  has  provided valuable  insights  into the  discursive strategies
employed  by intellectuals  to  legitimise  themselves  as  authoritative  voices  (§  5.1),
frame  their  role  as  spokespersons  for  the  nation  (§  5.2),  and  promote  specific
representations of the nation in public discourse (§ 5.3). Drawing on these empirical
findings,  in  this  section  I  shall  identify  distinct  articulations  of  intellectual
spokespersonship  for  the  nation  and  point  out  their  contextual  and  theoretical
relevance.
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A first salient pattern of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation revealed by the
analysis involves intellectuals ascribing to themselves the formidable task of helping
the Serbian nation recover from its supposedly ‘pathological’ state. This concept is
reflected  and  embedded  in  each  of  the  three  dimensions  of  analysis.  In  terms  of
intellectual self-legitimation, it corresponds to the strategy adopted, for instance, by
Drašković  and  Arsenijević,  who  frame  their  public  engagement  with  the  Kosovo
dispute as an act of courage and responsibility motivated precisely by the mental and
cognitive  disorientation  affecting  Serbian  society  (§  5.1.1).  In  terms  of
spokespersonship for the nation, the concept resonates quite clearly with the macro-
strategy of  educator/emancipator of the nation, especially insofar as the intellectual
emerges as someone who can help the nation develop its  potential  and thus reach
some kind of maturity; this attitude is well exemplified in Arsenijević’s commentary,
which contains a heart-felt exhortation to the Serbian people to finally ‘grow up’, i.e.
gain  self-awareness,  sustained  through  an  implicit  topos  of  threat  and  danger
embodied in the suggestive metaphor of a ticking clock (§ 5.2.2). Finally, there is a
clear correspondence between this concept and the first of the four themes identified
in the analysis of the discursive representation of the nation, namely Serbian society
as being in a chronic state of crisis (§ 5.3.1). This theme emerges with great force in
several opinion pieces, primarily as a result of strategies of  vitalisation whereby the
nation  is  constructed  as  an  organic  whole.  More  specifically,  there  is  a  recurrent
pathologisation  of  the  national  body,  which  is  often  obtained  through  conceptual
metaphors  of  illness  (see  Musolff,  2010;  Wodak,  2015).  This  is  most  evident  in
Cerovina’s metaphorical representation of Serbia as a wounded patient who has just
awakened from anæsthesia, but also transpires from Arsenijević’s reference to Serbia’s
“proverbially problematic relationship with reality”, from Pančić’s presupposition that
Serbian society is affected by a harmful “pathology”, as well as from the fatalistic
image of Serbia’s “mental meanderings” conjured up by Samardžić.
From  all  the  above,  it  appears  that  there  is  a  strong  tendency  among  Serbia’s
intellectuals to portray their nation metaphorically as affected by some kind of chronic
illness undermining its capacity to cope with reality, and to invest themselves with the
power, so to speak, to ‘heal’ the nation from that illness. This finding resonates well
with specific features of the post-Yugoslav transitional context highlighted in § 2.3. To
begin  with,  it  incarnates  the  difficulty,  shared by most  post-Yugoslav  societies,  in
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coming to terms with the consequences of the wars of the 1990s. In the case of Serbia,
in fact, the ongoing dispute over Kosovo’s political and legal status is probably the
greatest  challenge  facing Serbian society in  terms  of post-conflict  governance  and
reconciliation, so it is not surprising that analysts and commentators perceive it as a
major obstacle to a ‘healthy’ social development. Secondly, the emphasis on collective
delusion  and  bewilderment  corroborates  the  dominant  notion  of  post-socialist
transition  as  a  condition  marked  by  widespread  social  uncertainty  (Burawoy  &
Verdery, 1999), whereas the idea that the nation should be helped to achieve maturity
still  resonates with more traditional  (and widely criticised,  for instance by Buden,
2010, 2012) views of post-socialist transition as a progressive advancement towards
some kind of western-like ‘normality’.
The finding also has some conceptual and methodological implications. The strategy
of representing one’s epistemic advantage not as being afforded by a symbolic act of
‘rising above’ society, but rather as resulting from some sort of cognitive impairment
affecting the whole of society,  suggests that the notion of intellectual estrangement
(discussed in § 3.2.1) should be broadened to include what could provisionally be
called  negative  intellectual  estrangement.  Moreover,  the  pathologisation  of  the
national  body  emerges  as  a  prominent  aspect  of  national  and  nation-building
discourses, lending support to the methodological choice of focusing on the nation as
a vision or project  of  future prosperity,  which has been included in the analytical
framework as the fourth macro-topic of the discursive representation of the nation (see
§ 3.4.1).
Another  salient  pattern  identified  in  the  analysis  refers  to  intellectuals  showing
concern for Serbia’s deep social cleavages (which have been further exacerbated by
Kosovo’s declaration of independence) and hence urging the political leadership to
formulate a viable vision/project for the nation. Unlike the previous case, this pattern
has no direct parallel  with any specific  strategy of intellectual self-legitimation.  In
terms  of  spokespersonship  for  the  nation,  however,  it  clearly  reflects  the  most
common strategy observed in the sample,  i.e. that of  political guide. Indeed, many
authors assume this specific role vis-à-vis the nation, either by acting as detractors of
the political elites (for instance by blaming them for the nation’s woes) or by outlining
a roadmap to achieve national  prosperity.  This has been illustrated in § 5.2.1 with
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three  examples:  Bačević,  who  insists  that  politicians  should  overcome  their
incompetence  (which he points  out  with irony and cynicism)  and finally  reach an
agreement; Kesić, who advocates political prudence and exhorts the elites to define
and  pursue  a  firm national  agenda;  and Despotović,  who reinforces  his  appeal  to
Serbian  politicians  to  embrace  European  integration  through  creating  a  sense  of
urgency  and  momentousness.  With  respect  to  the  discursive  representation  of  the
nation, the relevant theme is the second one, i.e. Serbian society as a deeply divided
society. As discussed in § 5.3.2, the Kosovo debate is regarded as an epitome of the
fundamental contradictions afflicting Serbian society (e.g. by Arsenijević, Samardžić,
Bačević and Pančić), or as a harbinger of future social and political conflicts (e.g. by
Despotović  and  Škulić).  These  representations  largely  hinge  on  strategies  of
polarisation placing emphasis on intra-societal divisions; in particular, most of them
draw on, and therefore reproduce, the popular narrative of the ‘two Serbias’, which
portrays Serbian society as polarised between the old marxist-nationalist elites and the
new civic, pro-western and pro-European elites.
The intellectuals’ bold disapproval of the lack of societal  consensus and of a clear
political commitment to address the country’s most pressing problems substantiates
the  view that  Serbia,  like  other  post-Yugoslav  states,  is  a  fragile  (or  constrained)
democracy  struggling  to  foster  a  viable  democratic  political  culture  (see  §  2.3.3).
Furthermore, the observed persistence of the divide between pro-European and anti-
European stances, epitomised by the paradigm of the ‘two Serbias’, provides further
evidence  that,  unlike  other  post-Yugoslav  societies  such  as  Croatia  and  Slovenia,
European identity is not a widely shared social value within Serbian society. From a
theoretical viewpoint, the propensity of Serbia’s intellectuals to take an active role in
the national political process suggests that, at least in specific situations, contemporary
intellectuals continue to perform the role of legislators rather than that of interpreters
(in the sense proposed by Bauman and Giesen, see § 3.2), insofar as they exercise
their authority to enforce the social order and determine the political development of
the nation-state.
The analysis has provided evidence for a third important, although less predominant,
pattern of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation, which refers to  intellectuals
expressing  deep  concern  for  Serbia’s  strained  relations  with  other  post-Yugoslav
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countries  and  the  major  western  powers.  The  relevant  theme  in  the  discursive
representation of the nation is the third one, i.e. Serbia as a weak and isolated player
on  the  international  stage,  which  rests  mainly  on  strategies  of  heteronomisation,
exclusion  through negative other-presentation,  and  blaming/scapegoating. Examples
of  this  theme  include  Arsenijević’s  criticism  of  Serbia’s  bad  relations  with  the
neighbouring countries, Despotović’s warning about the risk of Serbia being ‘ground’
in the ‘millstone’ of global struggles, and Škulić’s portrayal of the Serbian nation as
historically victimised by external forces (notably western powers such as NATO and
the USA, which led the 1999 military intervention against Serbia, see § 2.1) as well as
by internal ‘traitors to the nation’. The element of victimisation, in particular, seems to
underlie a specific attitude assumed by some intellectuals, that of speaking out against
forms of oppression, manipulation and subversion that are perceived to threaten the
sovereignty  of  the  Serbian  nation.  This  is  best  exemplified  by  the  strategy  of
intellectual  self-legitimation  employed  by  Samardžić,  who  presents  himself  as
someone who is  able  to  discern,  and willing  to  expose,  the obscure and powerful
forces dominating society (§ 5.1.1), but also by Grujić’s strategy of spokespersonship
for the nation, which consists of acting as an emancipator of the nation by exhorting
his compatriots to raise their voices against foreign powers’ attempts to corrupt the
domestic political debate with deception and lies (§ 5.2.2).
Kosovo’s  declaration  of  independence  seems  to  have  brought  into  focus  Serbia’s
fragile  relations  with  its  former  enemies  in  the  Yugoslav  wars  of  the  1990s.  The
passionate engagement of several authors with this issue demonstrates the persistence
of post-conflict challenges in Serbian society (highlighted in § 2.3.2 in regard to the
broader  post-Yugoslav  context).  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  authors
considered have different opinions on the matter: while some (like Arsenijević) wish
for  a  collective  reckoning  with  the  past,  others  (like  Škulić)  do  not  refrain  from
stirring up animosity and resentment towards the old enemies. This suggests that there
is  little  or  no  consensus  in  Serbian  society  about  how  to  confront  competing
responsibilities and overcome the traumatic past. Finally, the aspect of victimisation
that  emerges  in  a  few  texts  in  the  sample  (especially  in  Škulić’s  commentary)
resonates  with  the  claim,  advanced  by  Kanin  (2011),  that  Serbs  are  somehow
‘nurtured by defeat’. Kanin claims that Serbian national identity has developed as a
result  of  sustained  efforts  by  politicians,  intellectuals  and  artists  to  fold  Serbia’s
212
military  failures,  particularly  in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  into  the
memory of the historic Battle of Kosovo Polje; this has led to the emergence of a
powerful  national  mythology  pervaded  by  a  sense  of  collective  defeat  and
victimisation, which is still dominant nowadays.
Kanin’s point about the role played by intellectual elites in the codification of Serbian
national history and identity finds an echo in the fourth and last pattern of intellectual
spokespersonship  for  the  nation  identified  by  the  analysis,  which  involves
intellectuals acting as custodians of Serbia’s mythical past and as interpreters of its
significance for the present and future of the nation. Not many authors among those
considered frame their role of spokespersons for the nation in this specific way; yet,
those  who  do  are  worth  focusing  on,  as  certain  aspects  of  their  discourse  have
important  conceptual  implications  (see  below).  The  most  salient  illustration  is
provided  by  Drašković,  who  presents  himself  as  a  vocal  proponent  of  an  epoch-
making process of national regeneration.  As pointed out in § 5.2.1, his strategy of
spokespersonship as political guide of the nation consists in proposing a teleological
narrative  of  national  catharsis,  in  which  the  glorification  of  Serbia’s  historical-
mythical  past  is  instrumental  to  mobilising  the  nation  to  pursue  future  glory  and
prestige.45 The very idea that the development of the Serbian nation is shaped by its
glorious historical achievements finds expression in the fourth theme of the discursive
representation  of  the  nation,  i.e.  Serbia  as  a  nation  driven  by  its  historical  and
mythical past (§ 5.3.4). This theme has emerged with particular force in Grujić’s and
Garić’s opinion pieces: the former contains a fervent appeal to the nation to remember,
respect and uphold Prince Lazar’s oath (see § 5.3.4 for details), in which myth and
present  reality are  conflated into a coherent  whole;  the latter  evokes the ‘gaze’ of
Serbia’s  glorious  ancestors  in  order  to  create  a  sense  of  national  duty  among  the
readership. Generally speaking, this theme rests on topoi of history and authority, and
particularly on discursive strategies that presuppose positive continuity, and suppress
elements of discontinuity, between the past, present and future of the nation.
45 Interestingly,  one  of  the  premises  underlying  Drašković’s  invocation  coincides  with  Kanin’s
argument  about  Serbian  national  identity:  “Kosovo and the  Kosovo epic,  as  the  Serbian  Iliad  and
Odyssey, have always turned defeat into national victory”, writes Drašković in his commentary Kosovo
and us. 
213
This finding suggests that national history (especially in its mythologised version) has
a strong appeal within contemporary Serbian society. In particular, the Kosovo myth
appears not only to remain at the foundation of Serbian national identity as a source of
remembrance, nostalgia and pride, but also to hold a great mobilising potential that
can be activated in situations of political and social distress, such as the one examined
in this case study. As noted by Bakić-Hayden, “in Serbian self-definition of cultural,
religious and national identity,  Kosovo […] is a narrative that continues to interact
with reality in a unique way” (2004: p. 40). Indeed, the Kosovo myth serves as an
archetype of national  trauma, which is constantly drawn upon, often in ambivalent
and original ways, to cope with new problems and challenges (Spasić, 2010). In this
regard,  Ramet  views  Serbian  nationalism  as  a  typical  example  of  traumatic
nationalism, in that it draws most of its energy “from a reinterpretation of Serbia’s
history in terms of suffering, exploitation, pain, and injustice” (1995b: p. 103). When
intellectuals engage in such work of cultural (re)interpretation, they act as  voices of
traumatic  memory,  which  corresponds  to  one  of  the  four  ideal  types  of  modern
intellectuals identified by Giesen (2011) (see § 3.2 above).
What  can  be  concluded  from the  above exploration  is  that,  in  the  context  of  the
sustained nation-building discourses and debates about national identity triggered by
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Serbia’s intellectuals have tended to adopt an
attitude of deep concern for the well-being and progress of the Serbian nation, casting
themselves in the role of proponents and carriers of an impelling process of national
recovery.  By  expressing  disquiet  about  the  country’s  sharp  social  cleavages  and
deteriorating  foreign  relations  (second  and  third  pattern),  by  reclaiming  the
significance  of  the  nation’s  mythical  past  (fourth pattern),  and by denouncing  the
‘pathological’ conditions  of contemporary Serbian society (first  pattern),  they have
acted as saviours of the nation. As seen in § 2.2, a similar attitude had been taken by
prominent  Serbian intellectuals  in  the 1980s,  when growing centrifugal  forces had
begun to seriously threaten the stability of the Yugoslav Federation (Dragović-Soso,
2002). Although the two contexts differ in fundamental ways and therefore cannot be
easily compared, one can discern some continuity in the way Serbia’s intellectuals
have responded to situations of ‘national crisis’ and widespread uncertainty about the
future.
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8.2 Croatia’s intellectuals: redefining the nation’s role in an 
integrating Europe
As pointed out in § 4.2.2, Croatia’s accession into the EU has been perceived by large
sectors of the Croatian public as a pivotal moment in the history of the country. The
event was in fact preceded and followed by sustained discussion about the political,
social  and  cultural  significance  of  this  achievement  for  the  Croatian  people.  The
liveliness of the debate is clearly reflected in the 12 opinion pieces included in the
Croatia  sample,  in  which  analysts  and  commentators  advance  various  and  often
opposing perspectives on important issues such as Croatia’s place in the European
project, the impact of EU membership on Croatian society, and the changing role of
Croatia vis-à-vis the post-Yugoslav region. In Chapter 6, I investigated the strategies
that the selected authors use to achieve intellectual self-legitimation (§ 6.1) and claim
the  role  of  spokespersons for  the  nation  (§ 6.2),  as  well  as  the main  themes  that
emerge from their discursive representation of Croatia as a nation (§ 6.3). 
The first overarching pattern of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation identified
in the analysis refers to intellectuals fostering the uniqueness of Croatian identity and
culture, particularly within the broader European context. There is obviously a close
correspondence between this pattern and the macro-strategy of spokespersonship for
the nation that I have labelled promoter/defender of the nation’s values and distinctive
character,  which  many authors  among  those  included in  the  sample  resort  to.  As
discussed in § 6.2.2, this macro-strategy manifests itself in two main ways: the first
consists  of  elevating  the  peculiar  character  of  Croatian  culture,  as  exemplified  by
Jergović’s emphasis on its beauty and composite character,  as well as by Pavičić’s
concept of Croatian identity as the extraordinary synthesis of antithetical elements; the
second consists of claiming recognition for the cultural and intellectual richness that
Croatia brings to the EU, as illustrated both by Jajčinović’s appreciation of the virtues
and  skills  of  the  Croatian  people  and  by  Skoko’s  exhortation  that  Croatia’s
achievements should be better publicised to the wider European public. In addition to
this, the above-mentioned pattern can also be recognised in specific manifestations of
another macro-strategy, that of  educator of the nation; in particular, it is reflected in
the attitude adopted by authors such as Leko and Luketić who, although in altogether
different ways, spell out distinctive aspects of Croatian nationhood to their readers.
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These examples clearly point to a specific thematisation of the nation in discourse,
which I have labelled The uniqueness and specificity of Croatian identity (see § 6.3.1).
A remarkable aspect of this theme is that national uniqueness is not predicated on
(presupposed) intra-national sameness, but rather on intra-national heterogeneity.  In
other words, the authors tend to represent Croatian identity as the product of a peculiar
process of cultural hybridisation rather than as a culturally monolithic construct. The
most striking example is provided by Pavičić, who in his opinion piece goes as far as
to argue that the hallmark of Croatian identity is the impossibility of integrating the
existing cultural diversity into a consistent, organic framework.
The fact  that  Croatia’s  accession into the EU prompted so many commentators  to
delve  into  specific  aspects  of  Croatian  culture  (and a  newspaper,  Jutarnji  List,  to
launch an ad hoc section featuring the opinions of popular Croatian writers and public
figures  about  their  country  and  its  peculiarities)  seems  to  indicate  that  there  is
widespread  concern  that  the  European  integration  process  could  dilute  Croatian
national  identity,  which therefore needs to be publicly reasserted.  Evidence of this
concern is  found in President Josipović’s  own commentary,  notably in his  need to
reassure the Croatian people that “[t]here is no ground to fear that our identity will be
‘lost’ in the ‘sea’ of the European Union”. Although it reflects the general climate of
uncertainty associated with efforts at democratisation and EU integration in the post-
Yugoslav region (see § 2.3.3),  this  preoccupation  with preserving national  identity
seems characteristic of Croatia, as it does not emerge conspicuously either in the case
of Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. This may depend on the fact that for both Serbia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina the prospect of EU membership is still too far off to be
perceived as a significant challenge to national or ethnic identity. In any case, the case
of Croatia examined here sheds some light on the complex interplay between national
identity and European identity, and particularly on the cultural tensions inherent in the
process of European integration.
Another  distinctive  pattern  identified  in  the  analysis  relates  to  intellectuals
interpreting  the  significance  of  European  integration  for  Croatia  as  a  political
community.  This  pattern  emerges  from specific  forms  of  spokespersonship  for  the
nation subsumed under the broader macro-strategy of political guide and emancipator
of the nation. The analysis has shown that a significant number of authors perform the
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role of political guide by discussing or theorising the importance of EU membership
for Croatia’s political life. Specifically, most of them discursively construct the EU as
a ‘space of opportunities’, which Croatia should pursue in order to achieve social and
political  progress  (see  §  6.2.1).  Skoko,  Šerić  and  Leko,  for  instance,  exhort  the
Croatian people to be prepared for the future challenges of EU membership and to
take a proactive stance in the new political  environment, while President Josipović
enthusiastically depicts EU accession as ‘the beginning of Croatia’s future’ and sets
development as the country’s overarching goal. Other commentators, like Jović and
Raspudić, are instead quite skeptical about the benefits that European integration will
bring, since they regard Croatia’s political leadership as self-concerned and incapable
of advancing the people’s interests. Raspudić, in particular, also acts as emancipator
of the nation by encouraging Croats to reject both EU-phobic and EU-phoric stances
as ill-founded and dogmatic. This attitude dovetails with his strategy of intellectual
self-legitimation: by stressing the necessity to make important matters (such as EU
accession) the object of public deliberation, he emerges as a defender of the public use
of reason. In terms of the discursive representation of the nation, the above-mentioned
pattern is based on the second theme identified in the analysis, which I have termed
European  integration  as  a  chance  for  Croatia  to  achieve  social  and  political
consensus?.  The  question  whether  EU  accession  can  help  Croatian  society  to
consolidate through strengthening its shared values is raised, more or less explicitly,
by  several  authors.  As  seen  in  §  6.3.2,  their  views  in  this  respect  differ  quite
substantially,  the  two extremes  being exemplified  on  the  one  hand by Josipović’s
emphatic embrace of European integration as a source of national unity, and on the
other by Jović’s criticism of politicians’ opportunistic support for EU integration as
opposed to the indifference and disinterestedness of ordinary people.
The  investigation  of  how  Croatia’s  intellectuals  interpret  the  significance  of  EU
integration  for  Croatian  politics  shows  that  pro-European  perspectives  are
predominant, but by no means unchallenged. In fact, although membership in the EU
is  widely  regarded  as  constituting  a  ‘space  of  opportunities’ for  Croatia’s  future
development and prosperity, there are some controversies regarding the credibility of
Croatia’s political leadership and the apparent lack of a serious public debate about
Croatia’s process of integration into Europe. Furthermore, the explicit thematisation of
the possible impact of EU integration on the country’s chances of strengthening social
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and political consensus carries the implication that this consensus is perceived to be
weak and volatile. In other words, behind optimistic and hopeful views of Croatia’s
bright European future lies a concern for the divisions affecting Croatian society, and
in particular for the gap between the people and the ruling elites, which the European
integration process seems to exacerbate instead of alleviate.
The third pattern marks a shift from Croatia’s internal political affairs to its broader
geopolitical position, as it refers to intellectuals repositioning Croatia in between the
European  and  the  post-Yugoslav  context.  As  pointed  out  in  §  6.3.2,  the  authors
examined  tend  to  frame  Croatia’s  progressive  integration  into  the  European
institutional  space  in  ways  that  often  depart  from  the  traditional  post-socialist
narrative  of  the  ‘return  to  Europe’ (see  §  2.2  in  this  regard),  and  which  instead
attribute  to  Croatia  a  rather  ambivalent,  liminal  position  between  Europe  and the
Balkans (and what the latter are taken to represent). The analysis of the third theme of
the discursive representation of Croatia as a nation, i.e. The controversial narrative of
Croatia’s ‘return to Europe’: a break away from the Yugoslav legacy and the Balkans,
or rather a new role in the region?, suggests that this ambivalence stems from the
discrepancy  between  Croatia’s  aspiration  for  a  fresh  start  in  the  new  European
environment  and  the  reality  of  its  firm  entrenchment  in  the  political,  social  and
cultural dynamics of the post-Yugoslav region. The collective wish for a clean break
from the Yugoslav tradition and the Balkans as a cultural and geopolitical space finds
tangible  expression  in  Zubčić’s  and  Jajčinović’s  choice  to  frame  Croatia’s  EU
accession as a teleological narrative,  respectively of historical  closure and national
‘rebirth’.  Raspudić, on the other hand, points out the difficulties of making such a
break; by employing discursive strategies of  heteronomisation, such as representing
Croatia as an amputated limb of the regional ‘body’ and as a bridge that other Balkan
countries may use to enter the EU, he foregrounds Croatia’s persistent ties with the
post-Yugoslav region, which he condemns as holding back the country’s  European
ambitions. As illustrated by the commentary of Leko, who was then Speaker of the
Parliament, Croatia’s embeddedness in the region is explicitly acknowledged also in
the official  discourse of the Croatian government;  however, unlike Raspudić, Leko
frames it in very positive terms, namely, as a chance for Croatia to maintain stability
in the region by acting as a metaphorical lighthouse for the neighbouring countries. 
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As  shown  above,  the  achievement  of  EU  membership  is  far  from  being  an
unambiguous event with an unequivocally positive interpretation. On the contrary, the
authors  under  examination  advance  different,  and  often  contradictory,  viewpoints
regarding  Croatia’s  place  vis-à-vis  the  European  and  Balkan  milieux.  In  all
probability,  these  intellectual  perspectives  reflect  existing  positions  in  the  public
debate on the matter. Yet, by bringing into the debate their own representations of the
situation,  based  on  specific  discursive  strategies  and  linguistic  devices,  the
intellectuals do more than just transpose existing points of view; they engage in acts of
redefinition of the nation’s role in the wider geopolitical and cultural context, in a time
of great change. This pattern of intellectual spokepersonship for the nation, like the
ones examined above and below, provides a concrete illustration of how intellectuals
may engage in nation-building discourses, thus performing the role of nation-makers
(see § 3.3).
The fourth and last pattern highlighted by the analysis of the Croatia case relates to
intellectuals  stressing  how the  power  relations  between  Croatia  and the  EU have
changed.  As a  way to blame the  country’s  political  elites  for  failing  to  serve the
interests of the Croatian people (which has been examined in § 6.2.1 as an example of
the macro-strategy of political guide for the nation), Raspudić metaphorically portrays
Croatian  politicians  as  having  submissively  prostrated  themselves  before  the  EU,
alluding to the existence of a colonial relationship between the two entities. Although
no other author among those considered frames the relationship between Croatia and
the EU explicitly in these terms, the asymmetry in power between the two actors is
quite  frequently  foregrounded.  In  fact,  the  fourth  major  theme  in  the  discursive
representation of Croatia as a nation is Croatia and the EU: from dependency to equal
partnership (§ 6.3.4). Detailed analysis of this theme has shown that Croatia’s position
vis-à-vis  the  EU  is  often  described  through  figurative  expressions  related  to  the
semantic  field  of  childhood/adulthood,  which  underlie  discursive  strategies  of
vitalisation through anthropomorphisation of the nation. In particular, the achievement
of EU membership by Croatia is more or less explicitly constructed as a transition
from childhood to adulthood, that is, from a condition of dependency (mainly due to
EU conditionality, see § 2.3.3) to a status of autonomy and equal partnership with the
EU. For instance, Jajčinović compares the country’s subservient attitude towards the
EU (before accession) to that of a pupil doing his or her homework, while Raspudić
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sarcastically greets EU membership as the moment when Croatia has finally overcome
the stage of ‘self-imposed childhood’.46 A more generous account is offered by Šerić,
who  emphasises  Croatia’s  newly  acquired  autonomy  by  representing  it  as  a
construction worker who has just entered the European Union ‘building site’ and who
is expected to engage in work on a par with the other team members.
Broadly speaking, the concern shown by these intellectuals  for Croatia’s  ‘inferior’
position in the negotiation process with the EU probably indicates that this issue has
occupied  a  central  place  in  the  national  public  debate  about  EU  accession.  This
suggests that, despite the substantial convergence of Croatian and European identity
over  the  past  two decades,  which  Subotić  (2011a)  regards  as  a  key  factor  in  the
consolidation of Croatia’s European perspective,  there are aspects of the European
integration process that are still perceived as challenging to the Croatian society. This
reflects  the  broader  notion  that  processes  of  post-socialist  transition  and
democratisation  (of  which  integration  into  Europe  constitutes  a  fundamental
component) create conditions of uncertainty and volatility in the societies involved
(see § 2.3). Furthermore, a particularly striking aspect of the pattern examined above
is that Croatia’s progress towards European integration is discursively constructed as a
process of ‘coming of age’, that is, of maturation from childhood to adulthood. As
discussed  in  §  2.3.1,  scholars  such  as  Buden  (2010)  have  criticised  the  dominant
discourses of post-socialist transition because they foster the repressive infantilisation
of  transitional  societies  by  placing  them  in  a  condition  of  tutelage  by  western
authorities.  From  this  perspective,  the  above  representation  of  Croatia  could  be
criticised as infantilising and disempowering, and the intellectuals concerned could be
seen  as  participating  in  the  reproduction  of  dominant  (i.e.  western)  normative
discourses  of  transition.  While  it  could  hardly  be  denied  that  the  choice  of
representing  Croatia  as  being  in  a  process  of  coming  of  age  reflects  mainstream
conceptions  of  democratisation  and  European  integration,  a  closer  look  at  the
linguistic evidence shows that this pattern of intellectual spokespersonship involves an
attempt to empower the Croatian nation, not to stifle its progress. The authors under
examination, in fact, place emphasis on the country’s achieved ‘maturity’ rather than
on its (previous) state of ‘puerility’, that is, inferiority and dependency.
46 This  has  been  observed  for  most  Eastern  European  countries  before  EU  accession  in  2004
(Krzyżanowski & Oberhuber, 2007; Wodak, 2007).
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In  conclusion,  Croatia’s  entry  into  the  EU  appears  to  have  triggered  sustained
intellectual  debate  about  the  country’s  changing  role  in  regard  to  the  European
integration project and, to a lesser extent, about its disputed association with the post-
Yugoslav  and  Balkan  contexts.  The  analysis  of  salient  patterns  of  intellectual
spokespersonship for the nation indicates that intellectuals are determined to preserve
Croatian  national  identity  from being diluted  in  the  ‘European sea’ (first  pattern),
show concern for risk that  European integration,  which is  generally regarded as a
‘space of opportunities’, might exacerbate the existing divide between the Croatian
people and its ruling elites (second pattern), and are keen on supporting their country’s
attempt to achieve a more equal relationship with the European Union (fourth pattern).
In addition to this, they express conflicting views on Croatia’s supposed ‘return to
Europe’ and on how membership in the EU has contributed to reshaping Croatia’s role
within the post-Yugoslav context (third pattern).  Underlying all  these attitudes  is a
common effort at defining (or redefining) the role and place of the Croatian nation in
the volatile and challenging context of European integration, which thus emerges as
the predominant way in which Croatia’s intellectuals act as nation-makers in the case
under consideration.
8.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s intellectuals: seeking a pivotal 
role in the country’s ongoing social transformation
The  anti-government  protests  that  broke  out  in  several  cities  of  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina in early 2014 gave rise to a wave of public debate about the country’s
deteriorating  social  conditions,  which  were  largely  blamed  on  the  corruption  and
inefficiency of the political leadership as well as on the structural flaws of the Dayton-
based institutional architecture (see § 4.2.3). The debate was particularly prominent in
the national press, with many columnists and commentators expressing their views on
the  meaning  of  the  protests  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  people’s  demands.  Such
sustained engagement is well illustrated in the 12 opinion pieces included in the final
sample, which attest to the variety of perspectives, arguments and topics elicited by
the events. In Chapter 7, I have conducted detailed analysis of these opinion pieces in
order  to  detect  the  salient  ways  in  which  the  authors  legitimise  themselves
intellectually (§ 7.1), assume and perform the role of spokespersons for the nation (§
7.2),  and  represent  the  nation  in  public  discourse  (§  7.3).  In  this  section,  I  shall
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identify  the  overarching  patterns  of  intellectual  spokespersonship  for  the  nation
hingeing on the above-mentioned strategies, and point out each pattern’s contextual
and conceptual relevance.
In periods of intense social struggle and distress, such as the early months of 2014 in
Bosnia  and Herzegovina,  it  is  common for  the people  affected  to  seek the  expert
opinion  of  established  authorities  in  order  to  get  a  sense  of  the  situation  and
understand its causes and consequences. Likewise, those who have, or claim to have,
the authority to interpret and explain social reality (that is, the intellectuals; see § 3.2)
will likely take the opportunity to publicly state their viewpoints, and thus consolidate
their  epistemic  authority.  The  latter  point  certainly  applies  to  the  case  under
examination, as evidenced by the occurrence, revealed by the analysis, of two relevant
patterns of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation. The first corresponds to the
act of publicly interpreting the significance of the particular social situation, while the
second reflects the increase in epistemic authority, and hence in social standing, that
the former act entails. In the following I analyse them separately,  as each requires
specific consideration.
The  first  pattern  relates  to  intellectuals  interpreting  and  legitimising  the  protest
movement as a response to the dysfunctional arrangements, exclusionary policies and
oppressive practices that characterise Bosnia and Herzegovina as a socio-political
community. The centrality of interpretive work to the exercise of intellectual authority
is  attested  by  the  preponderance,  among  the  authors  considered,  of  strategies  of
intellectual self-legitimation based on knowledge and expertise. Indeed, many of them
tend to mobilise their specialist knowledge or emphasise, more or less explicitly, their
superior ability to understand how social reality functions. The analysis  has shown
that they do so in various ways, for instance by presenting social facts as being shaped
by a complex web of power relations and political  interests  that can only be fully
disentangled through deep critical inquiry (Raspudić), by claiming the capacity not
only to comprehend social reality but also to make predictions about it (Kukić), as
well  as  through  adopting  a  pedagogical  and  explanatory  attitude  towards  the
readership (Prohić). The outcome of this interpretive work is a predominantly negative
thematisation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  which  is  represented  both  as  a
dysfunctional society facing an uncertain future (Theme 1) and as a nation marked by
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a deep divide between the people and the elites (Theme 3). Within the first theme,
Bosnia  and Herzegovina  is  portrayed  as  a  society stricken by social  injustice  and
economic hardship, and whose future prospects have been severely compromised by
maladministration. This is mainly obtained via discursive strategies of singularisation
highlighting negative uniqueness and of discontinuation outlining dystopian scenarios.
A salient feature of this theme is that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in spite
of their conspicuous engagement in the protest movement, are generally represented in
a passive position. Both Prohić and Mustafić, for example, depict them in ways that
undermine or even suppress their agency, stressing instead their being exposed to the
pressure of disruptive forces in society. Thus, the people are constructed as impotent
victims  of the situation,  instead  of  agents  of change.  In  an even more  pessimistic
account, Raspudić criticises the very structure of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society as
undermining the people’s aspirations and their ability to flourish (in this regard, see
the third pattern of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation discussed below). Such
a negative portrayal  of Bosnia and Herzegovina is further amplified in the second
theme,  which draws a dramatic  contrast  between the masses,  who are depicted  as
destitute  and impoverished,  and the  elites,  who are  instead  portrayed  as  a  narrow
group of privileged and wealthy individuals.  The proponents of this theme employ
specific  discursive strategies of  polarisation.  Kukić,  for instance,  compares  Bosnia
and Herzegovina to Latin American countries as a commonplace example of unequal
and rigidly stratified societies; moreover, he describes it as a defective body lacking
the indispensable ‘connective tissue’ of a proper middle class. Šehić focuses instead
on the retreat of the elites from public life, which he views as a major source of social
conflict  and  political  disaffection.  Lastly,  Trumić  represents  the  ongoing  clash
between citizens and political elites by resorting to the rather conventional metaphor
of a football match.
The fact that so many authors regard the protests not as impromptu occurrences but
rather as symptomatic of structural and deep-seated problems affecting Bosnia and
Herzegovina is a clear illustration of the enormous challenges facing the country’s
democratic transition. As explained in § 2.3, the intertwined processes of post-socialist
transition, democratisation and economic restructuring had, and continue to have, a
dramatic impact on the lives and livelihoods of the people affected. The analysis of the
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above  pattern  of  intellectual  spokespersonship  for  the  nation  suggests  that  this
problem is particularly acute within Bosnian-Herzegovinian society.
As stated above, while the first pattern of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation
reflects intellectuals’ capacity to exercise their interpretive power by articulating and
criticising aspects of society, the second pattern is rather connected with the pursuit of
social legitimacy that is associated with the public exercise of that power. Namely, it
relates to intellectuals establishing or consolidating their public role by spearheading
the protest movement. That the majority of the authors examined take the side of the
protesters, by endorsing their outcry against political corruption and legitimising their
demands for political change, was already evident from the initial thematic overview
of the sample (see § 4.4.3). However,  detailed analysis  of the discursive strategies
deployed in the texts illuminates the specific ways in which, by declaring their support
for the movement,  Bosnia and Herzegovina’s intellectuals also attempt to establish
and legitimise their own social position as authoritative critics of the status quo. The
most common way of doing so is by delegitimising the ruling elites in the eyes of
public  opinion, which belongs to  the strategies  of spokespersonship for the nation
included in the rubric of  political guide and corresponds to the third theme of the
discursive  construction  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  as  a  nation,  i.e.  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina as a political community dominated by corrupt elites. Instances of both
are very frequent across the sample texts. Hadžić, for instance, wages a fierce attack
on local political leaders for failing to confront the protesters, and presents a picture of
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country where chronic political corruption has pervaded
the social  and the  economic  spheres.  Cenić,  on the other  hand,  describes  national
politics as a metaphorical market that is seriously threatened by unfair competition,
lack of transparency and consumer manipulation. Prohić, too, denigrates the political
elites by alluding to their involvement in criminal activities and by depicting them as
unable  and  unwilling  to  abandon  their  corrupt  practices.  A further  way  in  which
intellectuals  establish  their  public  authority  is  by  engaging  directly  with  the
movement’s strategies, methods, and aims. As shown by the analysis, they do so by
acting  either  as  political  guides,  like  Šehić  and  Kukić  who  openly  question  the
movement’s goals, or as emancipators, like Mujkić and Mustafić who acknowledge its
emancipatory potential.
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The presence in the sample of two interviews by two prominent local academics, Asim
Mujkić and Zdravko Grebo, provides a valuable opportunity to shed some light on an
additional interesting aspect of the intellectuals’ pursuit of social legitimacy, namely,
the relationship between academic status and social engagement. The way in which
Mujkić establishes his intellectual authority as an academic, for instance, rests on a
seeming  contradiction:  on  the  one  hand,  he  distances  himself  from  the  broader
(Bosnian-Herzegovinian)  academic community by criticising its  ideological  role  in
maintaining and legitimising the status quo; on the other, he commends his academic
colleagues (and himself) for having abstained from seeking a role within the protest
movement, because to do so would have undermined the movement’s transformative
impact. This apparent contradiction points to a fundamental question about the social
position/role of academia, that is, to what extent academics should be proactive agents
of  social  change,  and  to  what  extent  they  should  instead  maintain  the  role  of
dispassionate,  albeit  critical,  observers  of  social  phenomena.  Since addressing this
question in detail would go beyond the scope of the present study, I will limit myself
to noting how the dilemma implicitly raised by Mujkić is but a specific instance of
Pels’ general concept of the intellectual standpoint as a position that oscillates between
distanciation and social engagement (see § 3.2.1). The same kind of tension surfaces
also,  and  perhaps  even  more  strongly,  in  Grebo’s  discursive  self-positioning  as  a
member of academia. Unlike Mujkić, he openly contrasts his own privileged position
of senior university professor with that of the poverty-stricken masses participating in
the  protests,  thus  questioning his  own entitlement  to  speak for  the  movement.  As
noted in the analysis (§ 7.1.3), Grebo’s partial disavowal of his own authority serves
mainly as a strategy of blame avoidance; nevertheless, his choice to frame his distance
from the masses in terms of material conditions and class difference reveals another
important  aspect  of  the  complex  interplay  between  academic  status  and  social
engagement,  namely,  how  the  privileged  social  status  enjoyed  by  ‘professional
intellectuals’ such as academics may actually hinder their ability to engage in social
spokespersonship and thus legitimise themselves as drivers of social change.
As stated above as well as in § 4.2.3, the 2014 protest movement was more than a
mere reaction to the bad economic situation and rampant political corruption affecting
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  In  fact,  it  openly  challenged  the  country’s  exclusionary
ethno-territorial  institutional  system  and  political  arrangements  (i.e.  what  I  have
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termed  the  ethno-political  paradigm)  as  profoundly  inequitable,  dysfunctional  and
oppressive,  and  even  sought  to  develop  alternative  ways  of  doing  politics  by
organising citizen plenums in various towns across the country.  The third and last
pattern of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation identified through the analysis
concerns  precisely  the  movement’s  transformative  impact,  since  it  relates  to
intellectuals  assessing  the  potential  of  the  protest  movement  to  undermine  the
hegemony of the ethno-political paradigm over Bosnia and Herzegovina’s social and
political life. Elements of this pattern were already discernible in some manifestations
of the first pattern discussed above, especially Raspudić’s radical criticism of Bosnia
and Herzegovina’s social  and political  structure as undermining collective progress
and  prosperity.  However,  most  relevant  in  this  regard  is  the  fourth  theme  of  the
discursive  representation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  as  a  nation,  that  is,  the
increasingly contested hegemony of the ethno-political paradigm. As seen in § 7.3.4,
most  of  the  authors  under  consideration  discursively  construct  the  ethno-political
ideology as an extraneous force oppressing the people, emphasising its detrimental
impact on the well-being of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society.  For example, Mustafić
condemns  the  ethno-political  system  for  favouring  corruption  and  the  private
accumulation  of  wealth,  while  both  Cenić  and  Grebo  criticise  its  coercive  and
oppressive structure, the former by comparing it to a metaphorical ‘national prison’
and the latter by discursively constructing it as an extraneous force that oppresses the
people.  Several  authors  explicitly  question  whether  the  protest  movement  has  the
capacity to bring about systemic changes by overthrowing the hegemony of the ethno-
political paradigm. As shown in the analysis, their views are quite diverse, ranging
from Mujkić’s rather optimistic hope that the protest movement marks the beginning
of the demise of the ethno-political paradigm to Kukić’s pessimistic opinion that the
turmoil will eventually prove counterproductive, making the mobilised masses more
vulnerable to ethnic propaganda and manipulation.
Broadly speaking, the analysis of this pattern suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
intellectuals are grappling with the tension between being supportive of the protest
movement and being skeptical about its potential to effect systemic and large-scale
social change. Although most of the authors show great (and often even enthusiastic)
support for the anti-government movement, they appear to be doubtful about its real
power to disrupt the oppressive hegemony of the ethno-political paradigm, which they
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regard as being deeply entrenched in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s social and political
life. This cautious attitude is mirrored in their general reluctance to propose alternative
political  visions for their  country;  in fact, only a few of them venture to elaborate
possible alternatives  to the status quo, and what they offer are only glimpses  of a
future virtuous society with no clear proposals as to how that goal should be achieved.
In conclusion, the picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s intellectuals that emerges from
the discussion above is a rather complex and ambivalent one. On the one hand, all of
the  authors  under  examination,  albeit  to  different  extents,  lend  their  voice  to  the
movement’s cause by providing more or less articulate explanations of the core social
and political issues driving the protests (as illustrated by the first pattern). On the other
hand, it appears that the intellectuals’ readiness to place their interpretive authority in
the movement’s service does not necessarily entail a firm belief in the latter’s capacity
to effect substantive social  change (as shown by the third pattern).  Indeed, several
authors  remain  cautious  about  the  possibility  that  the  movement  will  succeed  in
undermining the hegemony of the ethno-political  ideology.  How can this  apparent
discrepancy in attitudes be reconciled? A plausible answer is offered by the second
pattern identified in the analysis,  which suggests that the intellectuals’ involvement
with the movement should not be read as a disinterested effort to help the movement
advance its demands and achieve full subjectivity, but rather as an attempt to establish
themselves as authoritative critics of the status quo, and thus secure a pivotal role for




The  present  study  has  been  undertaken  in  an  attempt  to  expose  the  discursive
manifestations  of  the  interplay  between  intellectual  activity  and  nation-building
practices in the contemporary post-Yugoslav context. In particular, I have sought to
shed light on how public intellectuals ‘make sense’ of the complex challenges facing
post-Yugoslav  societies  by  promoting  specific  representations  and  visions  of  the
nation in public discourse, and how this activity in turn enables them to legitimise
their intellectual authority and strengthen their social position. The central notion in
this  respect  is  that  of  national  intellectual  practice  (Suny & Kennedy,  1999).  As
explained  in  §  3.3.1,  this  concept  emphasises  the  co-constitutive  character  of
intellectual  activity  and  nation-building,  arguing  that  the  production  of  national
discourses by intellectuals is central to the formation of the nation, and that the frame
of the nation, in turn, provides the main structure within which intellectual activity is
empowered and legitimised.
In order to explore how this specific relationship is constructed and performed in and
through  public  discourse,  I  have  elaborated  an  innovative  analytical  framework
grounded  in  the  Discourse-Historical  Approach  to  critical  discourse  studies  and
centred around the original concept of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation. I
hope  this  thesis  has  demonstrated  that  this  framework  provides  a  viable  heuristic
methodology  for  examining  how  intellectual  spokespersonship  for  the  nation  is
discursively  constructed  and  performed,  focusing  specifically  on  i)  strategies  of
intellectual self-legitimation, ii) strategies of spokespersonship for the nation, and iii)
the discursive representation of the nation.
The application of this framework to three samples of opinion pieces published in the
aftermath of three important events, i.e. Kosovo’s declaration of independence from
Serbia in  2008, Croatia’s  accession into the EU in 2013, and the anti-government
demonstrations that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014, has allowed me to
identify salient recurring patterns of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation that
are distinctive to each of the examined societies. I have then explored the relevance
and significance of these empirical findings in regard to the main features of the post-
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Yugoslav context described in Chapter 2 as well as in the light of the theoretical and
methodological  points  made  in  Chapter  3.  The  discussion  was  oriented  towards
answering the following research questions:
A. What do these patterns reveal about the specific national contexts they refer
to? What is their significance in terms of intellectuals’ involvement in nation-
building practices and the underlying power relations? 
B. Are there any salient similarities or differences across the cases, and what can
be concluded from this in regard to the broader post-Yugoslav context?
C. What are the main conceptual and methodological implications for the critical
study of the relationship between intellectual activity and nation-building in
public discourse?
In the following, I shall present my conclusions regarding each of the above questions.
I begin by providing a brief overview of the empirical findings pertaining to each case
study, in order to address the first research question (A).
In the case of Serbia, detailed analysis of the opinion pieces published in the aftermath
of  Kosovo’s  independence  has  provided  evidence  that  Serbia’s  intellectuals  have
tended to articulate their relationship with the national community in four main ways:
i) by ascribing to themselves the formidable task of helping the Serbian nation recover
from its  supposedly ‘pathological’ state;  ii)  by showing concern for  Serbia’s  deep
social  cleavages  and therefore urging the political  leadership to formulate  a viable
vision for the nation; iii) by expressing deep concern for Serbia’s strained relations
with other post-Yugoslav countries and the major western powers; and iv) by acting as
custodians  of  Serbia’s  mythical  past  and as  interpreters  of  its  significance  for  the
present and future of the nation,  especially by positioning themselves as  voices of
traumatic  memory (Giesen,  2011).  Broadly  speaking,  intellectuals  appear  to  have
interpreted  the  Kosovo  issue  as  evidence  (or  even  as  consequence)  of  a  general
‘national  crisis’,  framing their  own engagement  with it  as directed at  ensuring the
nation’s survival and future development. In this sense, they have acted as saviours of
the nation, similarly to what their predecessors did in the late 1980s and early 1990s
when confronted with the steady disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation (Dragović-
Soso, 2002).
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The case study on Croatia, on the other hand, focused on the debate that followed the
country’s accession into the European Union in 2013. The analysis of relevant opinion
pieces published in the aftermath of the event suggests that Croatia’s intellectuals have
assumed the role of spokespersons for the nation on the basis of four main patterns: i)
by  fostering  the  uniqueness  of  Croatian  identity  and  culture  within  the  broader
European  context;  ii)  by  offering  interpretations  of  the  significance  of  European
integration  for  Croatia’s  political  life  (mostly  constructing  the  EU as  a  ‘space  of
opportunities’); iii) by (re)articulating Croatia’s place in between the European and the
post-Yugoslav context; and iv) by stressing how the power relations between Croatia
and the EU have gradually changed, often framing this as a process of maturation
from childhood to adulthood (like in most Central-Eastern European countries before
the 2004 EU accession, see Krzyżanowski & Oberhuber, 2007; Wodak, 2007). Taken
together, these patterns indicate that although the EU is widely perceived as a ‘space
of  opportunities’,  European integration  is  also a  source of concern,  particularly in
regard to its possible detrimental impact on Croatian national identity and the role that
Croatia  is  expected  to  play  vis-à-vis  the  other  post-Yugoslav  countries.  The
intellectuals examined appear to grapple with these challenges by engaging in efforts
to redefine the role and place of the Croatian nation in the changing context of the
European integration process.
Finally, the case study on Bosnia and Herzegovina explored intellectual viewpoints on
the wave of demonstrations against  political  corruption,  maladministration,  and the
dominance of ethnic politics that swept the country in early 2014. The protests, which
were accompanied by the formation of several municipal plenums at which citizens
met to discuss their grievances and articulate political demands, provoked sustained
debate about the factors driving the movement and its potential to overturn the status
quo.  The  analysis  of  selected  opinion  pieces  addressing  the  issue  has  disclosed  a
salient  ambivalence in the stances assumed by Bosnian-Herzegovinian intellectuals
vis-à-vis  the  movement.  On  the  one  hand,  virtually  all  of  the  authors  achieve
intellectual  authority i) by interpreting and legitimising the protest  movement as a
response  to  the  dysfunctional  arrangements,  exclusionary  policies  and  oppressive
practices  that  characterise  Bosnia and Herzegovina  as a  socio-political  community
(first  pattern).  On  the  other,  however,  their  attitudes  differ  considerably  when
assessing the potential  of the movement to undermine the hegemony of the ethno-
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political  paradigm  over  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina’s  social  and  political  life  (third
pattern). Such an apparent discrepancy may be reconciled by pointing to the second
pattern of intellectual spokespersonship for the nation identified in the analysis, which
features intellectuals establishing or consolidating their public role by spearheading
the  protest  movement.  In  other  words,  the  findings  suggest  that  Bosnian-
Herzegovinian intellectuals’ involvement with the protest movement should primarily
be regarded as an attempt to secure a pivotal role for themselves as interpreters of the
country’s  ongoing  socio-political  transformation,  and  only  secondarily  as  being
motivated by a genuine commitment to the movement’s cause.
The second research question (B) focuses on similarities and differences across the
case studies, asking what can be concluded from this comparison about the broader
post-Yugoslav context.
A first important observation is that the cases of Serbia and Croatia demonstrate the
existence  of a distinct  tension between the persistence of past  animosities  and the
extraordinary pressure to move towards greater European integration. In Serbia, this
tension is embodied in the divide between progressive sectors, who advocate for the
‘normalisation’ of Serbian society through the acknowledgment of past responsibilities
and  a  clear  commitment  to  EU integration,  and conservative  sectors,  who bolster
national pride by promoting narratives of historical continuity that project the nation’s
glorious  (mythical)  past  onto  the  present  situation.  In  Croatia,  on  the  other  hand,
popular support for EU membership appears to be tempered by concerns over the loss
of sovereignty and the erosion of national identity involved in the process of European
integration; in particular, the dominant narrative of EU accession as a historic chance
to break with the Yugoslav legacy and finally  return to Europe seems to have lost
momentum as a result  of growing awareness of Croatia’s  new moral  and political
obligations towards the other post-Yugoslav countries.
A second observation is that there is a general tendency among intellectuals in Serbia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina (and to a lesser extent Croatia) to blame the government
for failing to safeguard and advance the interests of their society. In the case of Serbia,
politicians are mainly accused of being unable to foster social consensus, improve the
country’s international reputation, and promote the much-needed recovery of Serbian
society  from its  ‘pathological’ condition.  In  the  case  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,
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accusations  of  political  corruption,  maladministration  and  poor  accountability  are
generally linked to a broader criticism of the ethno-political principle underlying the
country’s  institutional  and political  structures.  Although, as shown by the analysis,
adopting  anti-elite  stances  is  an  effective  way  of  legitimising  one’s  intellectual
authority  and  social  status,  the  predominance  of  these  attitudes  should  also  be
regarded as a symptom of widespread popular dissatisfaction with the inability of the
post-Yugoslav ruling elites to govern the processes of post-socialist and post-conflict
transition.  This insight resonates with the notion,  elaborated in Chapter  2,  that  the
post-Yugoslav transition is an unfinished transition, as the societies involved are still
faced with significant socio-political challenges and are therefore pervaded by a sense
of widespread uncertainty and insecurity.
A  third  point  suggested  by  the  comparison  of  the  patterns  of  intellectual
spokespersonship identified in the analysis is that many post-Yugoslav commentators
engage  with  society  by  stimulating  critical  attitudes  towards  dominant  discourses,
norms  and  paradigms,  thus  performing  the  role  that  is  typically  ascribed  to  the
intellectual,  that  is,  that  of  speaking truth to  power.  In  the case of  Serbia,  this  is
reflected in the attitude of those authors who act as emancipators of the nation by
urging  Serbian  society to  overcome its  supposed state  of  denial  and thus  achieve
‘maturity’,  while  in  the  case  of  Croatia  this  emerges,  for  instance,  from repeated
exhortations to challenge dogmatic views of EU integration as either totally positive
or totally negative.  The ambivalent  attitude assumed by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
commentators  towards  the  anti-government  movement,  however,  calls  for  a
reconsideration  of  intellectuals’ involvement  in  radical  causes,  suggesting  that  this
might be predominantly driven by the desire to be publicly recognised as authoritative
voices  in  their  societies  rather  than  by  a  genuine  and  disinterested  political
commitment.
These  three  observations  raise  complex  and  crucial  questions  about  the  role  of
intellectuals  in  the  interface  between  national  and  supra-national  (particularly
European) cultures and identities,  about the power struggles underlying intellectual
activity as such, and more broadly about the place of intellectuals in contemporary
society in an increasingly globalised world. This leads us to the third research question
(C), which focuses on the study’s main conceptual and methodological implications.
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The  contribution  of  this  thesis  to  the  above-mentioned  crucial  debates  can  be
summarised in the following propositions: firstly, contrary to common perceptions the
importance of intellectuals in contemporary society should not be underestimated: as
exemplified by the post-Yugoslav context, they have a fundamental role in making
sense of complex and often contentious issues that cut across local, national, regional
and global  boundaries,  thus  helping their  communities  to  articulate  and concretise
appropriate cultural and political responses. Secondly, intellectual discourse should be
understood, conceptualised and investigated as a site of constant struggles over access
to  power  and authority;  in  particular,  the  concept  of  intellectual  spokespersonship
advanced by Pels (2000), which the discourse-analytical framework elaborated in the
present  study  builds  upon,  has  proven  to  be  valuable  in  unpacking  the  multiple,
layered and dynamic relationships between the exercise of intellectual authority and
the  power  of  symbolic  representation.  Thirdly,  the  historical  interrelationship  of
intellectual activity and nation-building practices (discussed in Chapter 3) does not
seem to  have  abated  in  spite  of  the  supposed crisis  of  the  nation-state;  rather,  it
appears  to  have  developed  into  more  complex  forms,  in  which  nationhood  and
national  identities  are  constantly  being  constituted  and  negotiated  (also  through
intellectual  debates)  in  a  dialectical  relation  with  emerging  local  and  especially
supranational identities. This interplay opens up new and vast cultural horizons, which
may lead towards a more inclusive, tolerant and sustainable society, but also to the
persistence  and  further  radicalisation  of  exclusionary  politics  and  practices,
particularly in the face of global issues such as poverty, growing social inequalities,
migration and recurrent economic crises.
Apart  from  these  general  theoretical  considerations,  the  present  research  also
illustrates the advantages of approaching the study of intellectuals and nation-building
from  the  interdisciplinary  and  problem-oriented  perspective  of  the  Discourse-
Historical Approach to critical  discourse studies. The proposed framework,  in fact,
combines concepts and tools from critical discourse analysis with notions and insights
from other relevant fields such as political science studies of nationalism, sociological
theories of intellectuals, as well as philosophical reflections on the concept of social
representation.  By integrating  knowledge  from various  disciplines,  it  allows  for  a
certain degree of cross-fertilisation among them. On the one hand, this study enriches
the  growing  body  of  DHA-based  research  on  national  identity  by  introducing  a
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specific  focus  on intellectuals  as  key agents  in  the  articulation  of  nationhood and
national identities, an aspect that has not yet been sufficiently addressed. On the other
hand, it substantiates existing theories of the role of intellectuals in nation-building
processes  with  empirical  linguistic  evidence,  thus  contributing  to  the  ongoing
‘discursive  turn’  in  qualitative  political  science.  In  addition  to  this,  it  extends
knowledge about the contemporary post-Yugoslav context as such, by illuminating the
distinctive ways in which dynamics of nation-building and intellectual discourse are
intertwined with issues of post-conflict  reconciliation,  post-socialist  transformation,
democratisation and European integration.
Finally, the study opens up several avenues for future studies in this area, as a result of
both its innovative character and its methodological limitations. Firstly, new research
could integrate an exploration of how ‘intellectual texts’ such as the ones analysed
here are received and interpreted by their readerships, e.g. by focusing on their impact
on audiences from different  cultural  and social  backgrounds. I  have chosen not to
focus on reception analysis due to its inherently limited scope and time-consuming
nature, but I believe that it provides a useful tool for determining the outreach and
resonance  of  public  intellectuals,  thus  enabling  inferences  to  be  drawn  about  the
influence  of  intellectual  discourses  upon  broader  public  opinion.  Furthermore,  it
would be fruitful to extend the proposed approach to other texts, genres and media
types (particularly online media), in order to see how intellectual spokespersonship for
the nation manifests itself across different communicative situations and in relation to
different publics. Lastly,  the study shares the limitations inherent to the case study
method: although the three case studies have been selected in such a way as to ensure
that  they are sufficiently representative of the broader post-Yugoslav context,  their
narrow  scope  as  well  as  the  absence  of  case  studies  concerning  the  other  post-
Yugoslav  societies  (i.e.  Slovenia,  Macedonia,  Montenegro,  Kosovo)  puts  obvious
constraints  on the possibilities  of generalisation.  Hence,  it  would be interesting  to
replicate this study in the other post-Yugoslav societies, as this would permit a more
detailed comparative analysis  of local  nation-building discourses and their  specific
intertextual and interdiscursive links. 
In  conclusion,  the  original  discourse-analytical  approach  to  intellectual
spokespersonship elaborated in this study has proven quite productive and versatile,
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and therefore constitutes a useful tool for researchers interested to explore the role of
intellectuals  and  the  manifestations  of  their  discursive  authority  in  a  variety  of
contexts and situations. This is certainly a promising and crucial direction of research,
because, as I hope to have shown in this study, intellectuals have the power to shape
our perceptions and attitudes in significant ways, for better or for worse, and therefore
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